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The Curious Case of Alcee Hastings
Alan I. Baron*
At 10:00 a.m. on October 20, 1989, the final act in a proceeding
unique in American history began to unfold as the United States Senate was
called to order by Senator Robert Byrd of West Virginia.
The Senators were convening to vote on the articles of impeachment
brought by the House of Representatives against Alcee L. Hastings, United
States District Judge for the Southern District of Florida, the first black ever
to hold that position. Hastings also was the first black federal official ever
to be impeached and was the first federal official impeached after having
been acquitted by ajury in a criminal trial on similar charges. The outcome
of the Senate vote was in doubt.
By any standard Hastings, at 53, had a remarkable record of achievement. He was raised in Florida by his grandmother because his parents
were employed as domestics by wealthy families out of state. He graduated
from Florida A & M Law School in 1963 and became a member of the
Florida Bar. For thirteen years he had what he described as a 'y'all come"
general practice. In 1977, the Governor of Florida appointed Hastings to a
state court judgeship. Two years later he was appointed by Jimmy Carter
to the federal bench. His general reputation as a lawyer and judge was
favorable and nothing turned up in the FBI background check which would
have hindered his federal appointment. He is by all accounts a dynamic,
even charismatic, speaker.
In 1981, Hastings was indicted by a federal grand jury in Miami on
charges of engaging in a corrupt conspiracy with a Washington, D.C.
attorney named William Borders. The object of the alleged conspiracy was
to solicit a bribe from two criminal defendants in a racketeering case
pending before Hastings. Hastings and Borders were tried separately.
Borders was convicted by ajury in March 1982. Hastings was acquitted by
ajury in February 1983.
The matter did not end there. In March 1983, two of Hastings' judicial
colleagues took the extraordinary step of filing a complaint alleging that
Hastings had in fact engaged in a corrupt conspiracy, despite the jury

* Partner with the Washington, D.C. law firm of Howrey & Simon. B.A., Princeton
University, 1963; LL.B., Harvard Law School, 1966. From 1987-1989, Mr. Baron served
as Special Counsel to the United States House of Representatives for the impeachments of
United States District Judges Alcee Hastings and Walter L. Nixon, Jr., both of whom were
impeached, convicted, and removed from office. The contents of this article reflect the
author's own views and do not necessarily reflect the views or opinions of any member of
the House of Representatives.
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verdict. They called for an investigation under a statute enacted in 1980'
which gave the federal judiciary power to investigate and, to some extent,
discipline its members.
A Judicial Investigating Committee made up of three circuit judges and
two district judges conducted an inquiry which stretched over three years,
including lengthy court battles, as Hastings challenged the Committee's right
to obtain documents and testimony and attacked the constitutionality of the
statute under which the Committee operated. Hastings refused to participate
in the proceedings, claiming they were unconstitutional. On September 2,
1986, after hearing testimony from over 100 witnesses and receiving
approximately 2800 exhibits, the Investigating Committee issued a report
which concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence that Hastings
had in fact engaged in a corrupt conspiracy with Borders to solicit a bribe.
The Committee further concluded that Hastings had lied repeatedly at his
trial and had falsified documents in order to mislead the jury.
The bedrock upon which the reputation of the judiciary rests is that the
action of federal judicial officers is not for sale. Judge Hastings
attempted to corruptly use his office for personal gain. Such conduct
cannot be excused or condoned even after Judge Hastings has been
acquitted of the criminal charges.
... With respect to Judge Hastings' post-indictment conduct, the
Committee cannot overemphasize either its deliberateness or its
seriousness.
... There is clear and convincing evidence that Judge Hastings
sought to conceal his participation in the bribery scheme and to explain
away evidence connecting him with the sale of justice and that he
pursued these objectives through concocting and presented [sic]
fabricated documents and false testimony in a United States District
Court. Judge Hastings' conduct was premeditated, deliberate and
contrived.2

On March 17, 1987, this Committee Report was adopted by the Judicial
Conference of the United States. Chief Justice Rehnquist referred the matter
to the House of Representatives for possible impeachment.

1. 28 U.S.C. § 372(c) (1980).

2.

REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATING COMMITTEE TO THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 338-39 (1986).
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The House, faced with a jury acquittal on the one hand, and the report
of the Judicial Investigating Committee on the other, undertook an
independent inquiry over a period of eighteen months. John Conyers, Jr.,
a veteran black congressman from Detroit, chaired the subcommittee which
conducted the House investigation. As the inquiry began, he openly
expressed his concern that racial motivations might underlie the continued
investigation of a black judge who had been acquitted by a jury. After
months of investigation and seven days of hearings, however, Conyers was
convinced that Hastings had conspired with Borders to take a bribe and,
moreover, had lied at his criminal trial. The Judiciary Committee reported
seventeen articles of impeachment against Hastings.
On August 3, 1988, Conyers rose to speak on the floor of the House
in support of the articles of impeachment. He recalled how his initial
skepticism had been overcome as the facts developed during the investigation pointed to Hastings' guilt. He acknowledged how hard it was for him,
as an outspoken black congressman, to have to report on the corrupt activity
of one of a handful of black federal judges. He could not, however, turn his
back on what he regarded as overwhelming evidence of Hastings' guilt.
Conyers' voice rang out in the hushed chamber:
We did not wage [the] civil rights struggle merely to replace one
form of judicial corruption for another.
... The principle of equality requires that a black public official
be held to the same standard that other public officials are held to. A
lower standard would be patronizing, a higher standard, racist. Just as
race should never disqualify a person from office, race should never
insulate a person from the consequences of wrongful conduct.

After Conyers finished, there was a pause. Representative Claude
Pepper of Florida, the aged dean of the House, rose slowly to his feet,
turned, looked squarely at Conyers and began to applaud. In an instant,
everyone in the chamber gave Conyers a standing ovation. The members
recognized that his position and his statement were acts of political and
moral courage rarely witnessed in public life.
The House voted in favor of the articles 413 to 3; the Senate was
formally advised that articles of impeachment had been voted and was asked
to initiate the process for conducting a trial. The House appointed six
Congressmen to serve as managers, or prosecutors, to try the case before the
Senate.
Under the Constitution, the House has the sole power to impeach; the
Senate has the sole power to try a public official on impeachment articles.

Published by NSUWorks, 1995

5

Nova Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 3 [1995], Art. 1

Nova Law Review

Vol. 19

Impeachment has a long history dating back to the fourteenth century when
the English Parliament began its struggle with the Crown for supremacy.
The English institution served as something of a model for the Founding
Fathers when they drafted the Constitution. Nine members of the American
Constitutional Convention had been practicing lawyers in England, and were
familiar with English impeachment practice. The term "high crimes and
misdemeanors," the American constitutional standard for removal from
office, was lifted directly from English law. Its first use was in 1386 when
the Earl of Suffolk was impeached by Parliament.
There are certain watershed distinctions, however, between American
and English impeachments. The model was not adopted wholesale. For
example, in England impeachment was not limited to public officials. In the
United States, only the President, Vice President and certain "public officials
of the United States," including federal judges, are subject to impeachment.
The most important distinction is the fact that in England impeachment
was a criminal proceeding. One could lose one's head as well as one's job.
Many who were not beheaded spent years imprisoned in the Tower of
London. Parliament could also be quite creative in fashioning a punishment
for those convicted in an impeachment. The records reflect that in the
seventeenth century, a hapless individual named Floyd was impeached and
convicted for disparaging the King and Queen of Bohemia. He was
punished by being led through London for two days on a horse, facing
backwards, while holding the horse's tail in his hands. He was then put in
the pillory, branded with a "K" and later imprisoned for life in the Tower
of London.
This could not occur under the American Constitution. Only certain
federal office holders are subject to impeachment; removal from office is the
only sanction, with the possible additional sanction of being barred from
holding federal office in the future. Impeachment in this country is a
remedial process designed to protect the institutions of govemment and the
citizens from persons unfit to hold positions of public trust. It is not
designed to punish the offender. Impeachment, of course, is the only way
to remove a federal judge from office because the Constitution provides for
life tenure.
When Hastings and his counsel entered the Senate chamber on the
morning of October 20, 1989, it was only the fifteenth time in our nation's
history that the Senate had been called upon to vote on articles of impeachment. There had been nine acquittals and five convictions; all of the latter
were federal judges.
Hastings' supporters were confident they would add another acquittal
to the tally.
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Two days prior to the vote, the Senators had heard nearly four hours
of argument from the parties. Hastings had addressed them personally,
proclaiming his innocence of any wrongdoing. Congressman John Bryant
of Texas, the lead Manager for the House, had argued forcefully that
Hastings was corrupt and a liar who had violated his position of public trust.
The following day the Senate deliberated behind closed doors for seven
hours. Although the details of the debate are not public, several reports
have surfaced. According to one source, the first four Senators to speak
came out for acquittal. It appeared that a steamroller in favor of Hastings
was under way. At that point Senator John Kerry of Nebraska, a Democrat
who had served on the fact-gathering Senate Impeachment Committee,
reportedly made an impassioned and persuasive argument in favor of
conviction. Senator Warren Rudman of New Hampshire, a Republican and
also a member of the Impeachment Committee, was said to have been a
powerful advocate for conviction and convinced several Senators that
Hastings had fabricated documents to defend himself. Senator Paul
Sarbanes, a Democrat from Maryland, was described as an eloquent spokesman for conviction, emphasizing that the Senators were not acting as jurors
in a criminal case. Senator Joseph Lieberman of Connecticut, who voted for
acquittal, later stated publicly that the Senate's deliberations were "among
the most thoughtful and impressive moments" of his first year in the Senate.
In order to convict, the House needed a two-thirds majority of the
Senators present and voting. The number of votes necessary to convict was
sixty-four because five Senators were not voting. Four were excused
because they had been members of the House when the impeachment
articles had been voted, and one was absent due to an earthquake in
California.
The House Managers had been hearing only bad news as the vote
neared. The day before the vote, Senator Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania,
Vice Chairman of the Senate Impeachment Committee, issued a lengthy
statement in support of his conclusion that Hastings should be acquitted.
Specter, a former state prosecutor, had been one of the most active
participants in the trial held before the Committee, aggressively questioning
many of the witnesses, including Hastings. He knew every detail of the
case, and his conclusions, made public in advance of the vote, gave Hastings
a powerful ally at this critical moment.
Only moments before the vote began, Senator Lieberman was
overheard saying that he would not vote for conviction. Lieberman, a
former Attorney General of Connecticut, had also been very involved as a
member of the Impeachment Committee. His questioning of witnesses,
which came toward the end of each round of questioning because of his
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status as a freshman Senator, was nevertheless keenly awaited. Soft-spoken
and almost deferential in manner, Lieberman asked questions which were
subtle and disarming while they probed to the core of the witness's
testimony.
For the House, the worst news of all came from Senator Albert Gore
of Tennessee, who told the House Managers about five minutes before the
vote began that he believed a majority of Senators would vote for conviction, but that the House would fall short of the two-thirds majority required
by the Constitution. That final bit of information seemed to dash any hope
the House had that Hastings would be convicted. Simply put, as the House
Managers headed for the well of the Senate chamber to hear the vote, they
assumed Hastings was about to be acquitted.
The Senate rules require that when voting on an impeachment each
Senator must rise from his seat and announce his decision "guilty" or "not
guilty." It is a solemn occasion and does not permit any side conversations
or wandering in and out of the cloakrooms. Majority Leader George
Mitchell of Maine reminded the Senators of this requirement.
The public galleries were packed. Many there were supporters of
Judge Hastings. Senator Byrd, a man of enormous personal dignity, is
fiercely protective of the Senate's decorum. Sensing the tension and
concerned that matters might get out of hand, he advised everyone in the
chamber and in the galleries that the standing rules of the Senate gave him
authority to enforce order whenever "confusion" or "demonstrations of
approval or disapproval" occurred.
The clerk read the first article of impeachment. It was time to vote on
Article One. Byrd proceeded:
The Chair reminds the Senate that each Senator, when his or her name
is called, will stand in his or her place and vote guilty or not guilty.
The question is on the first article.
Senators, how say you? Is the respondent, Alcee L. Hastings, guilty or
not guilty? The roll-call is automatic. The clerk will call the roll.
Mr. Adams?
Mr. Armstrong?

Not Guilty
Not Guilty

Mr. Baucus?

Guilty

Mr. Bentsen?
Mr. Biden?
Mr. Bingaman?

Guilty
Not Guilty
Not Guilty

With Senator Jeff Bingaman of New Mexico voting not guilty, the
Hastings forces were certain they had gained an acquittal. Bingaman was
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the Chairman of the Senate Committee which heard the evidence. They
already knew that the Vice Chairman, Senator Specter, was vigorously
advocating acquittal. In their view it was unthinkable that the Senate would
override the conclusions of these two men. According to one report,
Hastings and his counsel put their pencils down and stopped tallying the
votes. It was as good as over.
Mr. Bond?
Mr. Boren?
Mr. Boschwitz?
Mr. Bradley?

Guilty
Guilty
Guilty
Not Guilty

The first article of impeachment charged that Hastings had engaged in
a corrupt conspiracy with a Washington, D.C. attorney named William
Borders, to solicit a $150,000 bribe from two racketeering defendants, the
Romano brothers, in a case pending in Hastings' court. The Senate vote in
October 1989, was the final chapter of a tale which had begun eight years
earlier.
On July 20, 1981, a man named William Dredge walked into the
United States Attorney's Office in Miami. Dredge told law enforcement
officials that he had information concerning a bribery scheme involving
Judge Hastings, a reputed organized crime kingpin named Santo Trafficante,
and a Washington, D.C. lawyer who was coming to Miami the next day to
meet with Trafficante. Trafficante allegedly controlled mob activities in
South Florida. He was one of sixteen defendants in a major racketeering
conspiracy case pending before Judge Hastings. Dredge later testified that
his revelation sent a shock wave through the office; people were stunned by
the information.
Mr. Breaux?
Mr. Bryan?
Mr. Bumpers?
Mr. Burdick?
Mr. Burns?

Guilty
Guilty
Guilty
Not Guilty
Guilty

Mr. Byrd?
Mr. Chafee?

Guilty
Guilty

Mr. Cochran?
Mr. Cohen?
Mr. Conrad?
Mr. Cranston?

Guilty
Guilty
Guilty
Not Guilty
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William Dredge operated an antiques store in North Miami. He was
also a fence, a burglar, and a drug dealer. His criminal record dated back
to 1943. Short, stocky, and bespectacled, Dredge looked more like a
professor of literature than a career criminal. In March 1981, he was the
subject of a narcotics investigation in Maryland and when he entered the
United States Attorney's office in Miami, he wanted to make a deal. He
would provide information about the bribery scheme in return for dismissal
of the drug charges in Maryland.
Dredge outlined what he had to offer. He told Special Assistant United
States Attorney Martha Rogers that on July 9 and 10, 1981 he had been
staying in Washington, D.C. with a friend who was a big-time gambling
figure in the area. While he was there, Santo Trafficante was also staying
in the apartment. The gambler, who ultimately was identified as Joseph
Nesline, went to dinner with Trafficante at the Lion D'Or Restaurant in
Washington. Dredge related that he accompanied Mrs. Nesline to the
restaurant and they had dinner at a separate table. Dredge learned that
Trafficante was in town to see a Washington lawyer about a bribe to fix the
criminal case pending before Hastings.
At first, Dredge did not identify Borders by name, but he told Rogers
that the D.C. attorney was coming to Miami the next day to meet with
Trafficante. Dredge went on to say that this same, as yet unidentified,
lawyer had contacted him about arranging for Tom and Frank Romano, two
brothers who had been convicted of racketeering in Hastings' court, to pay
a $150,000 bribe to have Hastings reduce their jail sentences to probation.
The FBI set up a surveillance at the Miami Airport the next day. By
reviewing the passenger lists on flights to Miami from Washington, Rogers
was able to single out William Borders as the attorney Dredge refused to
identify. She knew Borders because she had worked as an Assistant United
States Attorney in the District of Columbia before moving to Florida.
Rogers went to the Miami Airport to identify Borders when he got off
the plane. She spotted him immediately. Rogers was terrified that Borders
would recognize her, but he walked past her without even glancing her way.
Borders arrived in Miami around 4:00 p.m. on July 21. The FBI
followed him as he took a cab to Dredge's house. About an hour later,
Dredge drove Borders to a shopping center where Borders took a cab to the
Fontainebleau Hotel. Borders was observed meeting with Santo Trafficante
for five to ten minutes. Trafficante then drove Borders back to the airport.
Agents observed Trafficante shake Borders' hand and heard him say "did
a good job." Trafficante left Borders at the airport. Borders caught a 9:30
p.m. flight to Washington from Miami.
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The FBI interviewed Dredge at length on July 23, 1981. Dredge told
the agents that he went to the U.S. Attorney's Office because he wanted to
let people know about Judge Hastings' misconduct. He stated that although
it might sound unusual coming from someone in his position, he was very
upset that a federal judge would be involved in taking a bribe. He also
wanted to make a deal for dismissal of narcotics charges pending against
him in Federal District Court in Maryland.
Dredge went on to relate that he had known William Borders for some
time because Borders had represented him in certain legal matters.
According to Dredge, Borders was acting as the middle man for a bribe to
be paid by Santo Trafficante, who was under indictment for conspiracy to
conduct the affairs of a union through a pattern of racketeering in a case
pending before Hastings.
Dredge told the FBI that he was unlikely to obtain a great deal of
information regarding the Trafficante matter because Borders was dealing
directly with Trafficante, and Dredge would only learn what Borders
happened to tell him.
Dredge then stated that he also had information regarding another bribe
scheme involving Borders, Hastings, and two brothers, Tom and Frank
Romano. According to Dredge, Borders had asked him to check out the
Romano brothers in order to find out what kind of people they were.
Borders told him that the Romanos were due to be sentenced by Hastings.
Dredge made inquiry in Florida and determined that the Romanos were
"stand up guys," which in underworld parlance meant they would live up to
commitments and not inform the authorities. Borders then told Dredge to
get word to the Romanos that the Judge would fix their sentences for
$150,000.
Mr. D'Amato?
Mr. Danforth?
Mr. Daschle?
Mr. DeConcini?
Mr. Dixon?
Mr. Dodd?
Mr. Dole?

Not Guilty
Guilty
Guilty
Guilty
Guilty
Not Guilty
Guilty

In early April, Dredge related, he had spoken with a "representative"
of the Romanos, a man named "Brother" Moscato, when the Romanos
themselves were in California. Dredge told Moscato that a lawyer in
Washington, D.C. could help the Romanos with their criminal case problem.
Telephone records show that Moscato called the Romanos in California on
April 7, 1981. According to a memorandum in the files of the Romanos'
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attorney, the Romanos thought the approach might be a setup by the
government, or a scam by Moscato. In any event, they did not pursue the
overture.
According to Dredge, he never actually spoke with the Romanos nor
did he have any further contact with Moscato. When Borders kept asking
Dredge about the Romano situation, he told Borders that the Romanos
already had a deal with the Judge through someone else. Borders told him
that the Romanos were crazy and that they could not have a deal. He
challenged their other alleged contact with the Judge to name a time and
place for Hastings to appear. Borders would also name a time and place.
Borders guaranteed Hastings would appear where Borders promised and
thereby prove he controlled the Judge.
Borders asked Dredge to recontact the Romanos. Dredge did not
contact them, but he got back to Borders and told him the Romanos said
they did not have that kind of money. Borders said the Judge couldn't
believe they wouldn't come up with the money to stay out of jail.
When Dredge was asked by investigators why he kept stringing
Borders along, he explained that he had only tried to help Borders because
Joe Nesline had asked him to do it as a favor. Dredge thought Borders was
lying when he said he controlled a federal judge. As Dredge put it, he
thought Borders was "smoking Ajax." Dredge figured that if he kept
stalling Borders, the matter would go away, particularly since he did not
believe Borders really could deliver Hastings.
According to Dredge, something then occurred which changed his
view. Dredge said he received a call from Borders on May 10, 1981.
Borders told Dredge that the Romanos were scheduled to be sentenced, but
that Hastings was going to postpone the sentencing to give the Romanos
another chance to come up with the money. In fact, on May 11, the
Romanos appeared in court to be sentenced. At the hearing, their attorney
asked to postpone the sentencing. No prior motion had been filed and the
government vigorously opposed the continuance. Hastings granted the
delay. Dredge stated that when he heard this, he became convinced that
Borders could produce because there was no other way Borders could have
known in advance what the Judge was going to do.
Mr. Domenici?
Mr. Durenberger?
Mr. Exxon?

Guilty
Guilty
Guilty

Mr. Ford?

Guilty
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Mr. Fowler?
Mr. Garn?
Mr. Glenn?
Mr. Gore?

Guilty
Guilty
Guilty
Guilty

On August 18, 1981, Dredge told the FBI that Borders had called and
told him that he was coming to the Miami area in the next day or so. The
purpose of the visit, according to Dredge, was to work out the details of the
bribery deal between Trafficante and Hastings. The FBI determined that
Borders had a reservation to fly from Washington, D.C. to Miami on August
21. They had Borders under surveillance from the time he left D.C. In
fact, the woman sitting next to Borders during the flight who engaged him
in conversation was an FBI agent. When Borders arrived in Miami, he took
a cab to the Fontainebleau Hotel. He got out of the cab, walked down the
sidewalk, and got into a car which immediately headed back to the airport.
The driver was Santo Trafficante. Borders and Trafficante spoke for four
minutes outside the Delta Airlines terminal and then Trafficante left.
On August 31, 1981, Dredge told the FBI that he had met with Borders
in Washington a few days earlier. Borders said he wanted to deal with the
Romanos as soon as possible and that the price was $150,000. According
to Dredge, Borders said he would only meet with the Romanos, not a
representative. Dredge also told the FBI that while in Washington he
overheard a conversation which suggested that someone was delivering
money to Borders on behalf of Trafficante.
Throughout the month of August and into September, Dredge
continued to negotiate with the Department of Justice in order to cut a deal
to have the narcotics charges against him dismissed. Ultimately, Dredge
agreed to plead guilty to a single felony count; the remaining counts were
to be dismissed. Dredge, in return, agreed to introduce Borders to an
undercover agent who would pose as one of the Romano brothers. The
objective was to record conversations with Borders to determine definitively
whether Judge Hastings was part of the scheme. Dredge refused to record
any conversations or to testify in any prosecution. Dredge felt that if he
testified, he would be "signing his death warrant because of who was
involved."
On Thursday, September 10, 1981 at 1:29 p.m., in the presence of an
FBI agent, Dredge placed a call to Borders and told him the Romanos were
ready to deal. Dredge and Borders agreed to meet on Saturday, September
12, at 8:00 a.m. at the Miami Airport where Dredge would introduce him
to Frank Romano.
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This call triggered significant alterations in the travel plans of both
Borders and Hastings. Prior to Dredge's early afternoon call to Borders,
Hastings was scheduled to fly from Miami at 6:50 p.m. on September 11,
arriving in Washington, D.C. at 9:00 p.m. Borders was scheduled to fly out
of Washington, D.C. at 7:30 p.m. on September 11, arriving in Miami at
9:45 p.m. Thus, as their plans stood prior to Dredge's call to Borders on
September 10, it would have been impossible for the two men to have met
at National Airport.
Telephone records document that Hastings and Borders spoke late in
the afternoon of September 10. Thereafter, Hastings canceled his existing
flight plans and reserved a flight leaving Miami which arrived in Washington at 6:00 p.m., an hour and a half before Borders was scheduled to leave
the city. As it turned out, however, Hastings' flight on the 11th was
delayed until 6:00 p.m. He called Borders' office twice that day from
Miami to advise him of the delay. Hastings ultimately arrived in Washington at 8:00 p.m. Borders skipped his 7:30 p.m. flight, taking a 9:30 p.m.
flight instead. Had Borders taken his scheduled flight, he would have been
on his way to Florida by the time Hastings' delayed flight arrived. No one
actually observed a meeting between Hastings and Borders on the night of
September 11, but a period of time existed when both men would have been
in Washington. Hastings did not check into his hotel that night until after
10:00 p.m., more than two hours after his flight arrived in Washington.
The significance of an opportunity for Borders and Hastings to meet on
the night of the 11th became apparent on the morning of the 12th. Borders
was at that time introduced by Dredge to "Frank Romano," impersonated
by a retired FBI agent named Paul Rico. The conversation between Borders
and Rico was taped by a recorder concealed on Rico's person.
Borders displayed a remarkably detailed knowledge of the Romanos'
case which could only have been the result of contact with someone
intimately familiar with the case. Borders himself had no basis for such
familiarity. He was not counsel in the case. He was not a member of the
Florida Bar. The case had not received the type of publicity which would
have brought it to Borders' attention in Washington. Nevertheless, Borders
knew that the Romanos' property had been forfeited and that their criminal
case was then on appeal. Borders stated to Rico that within ten days the
Judge would sign an order returning a "substantial amount" of the property
which had been forfeited. Thereafter, the Romanos should withdraw their
appeal and their jail sentences would be reduced.
Rico then said, "How do I know... "whereupon Borders cut him off
and responded, "Checks and balances ...I don't get nothin', until the first
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part is done.., that will be a signal showing you that I'm, I know what
I'm talking about, right?"
Borders proposed that the money be placed in escrow with Dredge and
that the money be paid after the Judge issued an order reversing a substantial part of the forfeiture. Rico said he preferred not to use Dredge to hold
the money.
Rico was aware that Borders claimed he could prove his influence with
the Judge by having him appear at a given time and place. Rico now
proposed an appearance by Hastings as a sign of his participation in the
scheme. Rico asked Borders if he wanted to get back to him regarding the
time and place of the Judge's appearance. Borders said that was unnecessary and immediately selected Wednesday, September 16, 1981, as the date
for Hastings to show. Rico selected the main dining room in the Fontainebleau Hotel at 8:00 p.m. as the place for Hastings to appear.
Borders and Rico agreed to meet the following Saturday, September 19,
at the Miami Airport, at which time Rico would make an "upfront" payment
on the deal. As the meeting concluded, Borders reassured Rico, saying,
"that's one hundred percent, one hundred percent, one hundred percent."
Mr. Gorton?
Mr. Graham?
Mr. Gramm?
Mr. Grassley?
Mr. Harkin?
Mr. Hatch?
Mr. Haorield?
Mr. Heflin?

Guilty
Not Guilty
Guilty
Guilty
Not Guilty
Not Guilty
Guilty
Not Guilty

In the eyes of the House Investigators, Borders' statement that a
"substantial amount," rather than all of the forfeited property, would be
returned gives rise to a subtle but weighty inference supporting Hastings'
involvement in the scheme. In order to understand the significance of that
remark, one must review the history of the Romanos' prosecution.
Thomas and Frank Romano were indicted by a federal grand jury on
twenty-one counts of racketeering, fraud, embezzlement, and false tax
filings. The indictment also charged violations of the Racketeer Influenced
Corrupt Organization statute ("RICO") which, under certain circumstances,
could result in the forfeiture of property connected with illegal racketeering
activity. The case was assigned to Judge Hastings within the first week he
was on the bench.
In December 1980, the case was tried before Judge Hastings and a jury.
In the course of the trial, the prosecution proved that the Romanos had
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looted a construction project of over a million dollars. In addition, the
government made a proffer to Judge Hastings, out of the presence of the
jury, that the Romanos had a history of making payoffs. On December 23,
1980, the jury found the Romanos guilty on all counts.
The parties agreed to try the forfeiture issues separately to the Judge,
without a jury. Judge Hastings heard part of the prosecution's proof on
forfeiture on December 30. He then adjourned the hearing until February
20, 1981. Hastings concluded the evidentiary hearing on that date and
asked the parties to submit memoranda of law and proposed findings of fact.
On May 4, 1981, Hastings entered an order adopting the prosecution's
position in its entirety, thereby forfeiting property owned by the Romanos
worth $1,162,016. The forfeiture statute under which Hastings had acted,
however, would soon be modified.
On June 19, 1981, a panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
decided the case of United States v. Martino? At issue was an interpretation of the RICO statute's provisions concerning the definition of an interest
in property that was subject to forfeiture. The appellate court held that the
term did not include income, profits, or receipts from racketeering activity.
This rather esoteric statutory issue had major implications for the
forfeiture aspect of the Romano case. Application of the Martino decision,
which was binding on Hastings, required the return of approximately
$845,000 in property from the original forfeiture of more than a million
dollars. At a hearing on July 8, 1981, there was extensive argument
regarding the impact of Martino on the Romano forfeiture order. The
defense sought to have Hastings reconsider his order of May 4, 1981.
Hastings stated that he was familiar with Martino and had read the briefs.
Counsel for the Romanos argued that, under Martino, $845,939 of the
original forfeiture had to be vacated and the property returned to the
Romanos. The government was reduced to arguing that Martino was
wrongly decided. Hastings had also received a memorandum on the issue
from his law clerk before going on the bench to conduct the hearing. At the
conclusion of the hearing on July 8, Hastings stated from the bench that he
was reaffirming his decision of May 4, 1981, requiring forfeiture of over a
million dollars in property, despite the holding in Martino.
It is a reasonable inference that, on September 12, 1981, when Borders
told the undercover agent that a substantial amount of the property would
be returned, he could only have known that from a contact with Judge
Hastings. Only the Judge could issue an order in the case. Borders was

3. 648 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1981).
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therefore making a commitment which directly involved Hastings' personal
participation. Moreover, as of September 12, 1981, when Borders told the
agent that Hastings was going to reverse his earlier order, there had been no
hearings, briefs or arguments by counsel since July. When Hastings
ultimately did issue an order on October 6, reversing the earlier decision, the
government prosecutor in the case was stunned. There had been no
forewarning that Hastings would change what he had decided in open court
nearly three months earlier. Finally, Borders' representation that the Judge
would return a substantial amount of the property rather than all of it,
reflects a familiarization with the Martino decision and its esoteric reading
of the RICO statute which Borders was unlikely to have acquired independently.
When Borders finished his meeting with the undercover agent, he flew
from Miami to West Palm Beach and drove to a long-planned family
reunion. He had told a friend he was going to spend the weekend at the
reunion but, in fact, he stayed only briefly. He made a series of reservations
and cancellations of airline flights back to Washington and ultimately flew
from Orlando to Baltimore-Washington International Airport, on Saturday,
September 12, 1981, arriving at 8:58 p.m.
Hastings was spending that weekend in Washington at the Sheraton
Hotel. Jesse McCrary, a mutual friend of Hastings and Borders, was
registered in the room next to Hastings. On Saturday night, Hastings,
McCrary, and three women were in the Judge's room. According to the
testimony of two of the women, the group postponed dinner at Judge
Hastings' suggestion because they were waiting for someone. One of the
women testified specifically that they were waiting for Borders. At around
10:00 p.m., Borders knocked on the door of the Judge's room. The group
then went to dinner. Hastings testified at his criminal trial that Borders'
appearance was a surprise and not prearranged. Prosecutors contended it
was a prearranged meeting to discuss Borders' contact that morning with the
man he thought was Frank Romano. There is no evidence to explain how
Borders knew that the two men and three women would postpone. dinner
and be in a hotel room until he arrived at 10:00 p.m. on a Saturday night.
Mr. Heinz?
Mr. Helms?
Mr. Hollings?
Mr. Humphrey?
Mr. Inouye?
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Borders and undercover agent Rico had agreed that Hastings would
appear at the main dining room of the Fontainebleau Hotel at 8:00 p.m. on
September 16 as a signal that the Judge was part of the scheme. The FBI
blanketed the hotel with agents in order to keep Hastings under surveillance.
At 7:45 p.m. on September 16, he arrived in the company of a woman
named Essie Thompson. Hastings had invited Ms. Thompson the previous
night. He made no mention to her of meeting anyone at dinner, nor did he
indicate where they would dine. During the twenty-five minute drive to the
hotel, Hastings did not mention Borders or anyone else joining them.
According to Thompson, the Judge greeted the hostess, stated there were
reservations for Hastings, and they then proceeded to a table. Hastings later
testified that he expected to meet Borders at the restaurant and that he so
informed the maitre d'. Ms. Thompson testified she had no recollection of
Hastings making such a statement.
Hastings' explanation that he was at the hotel to meet Borders has some
distinct weaknesses. At the hotel Hastings did not act as if he were
expecting Borders. The maitre d' seated them at a table for four and
removed two place settings without protest by Hastings. When asked during
the Senate trial why he had only made reservations for two persons,
Hastings replied "that's all I was going to pay for." After about fifteen
minutes, Hastings left the table and walked from the main dining room into
the lobby. He looked into a lounge off the lobby and then returned to the
dinner table. He did not page Borders nor did he look for him in other
restaurants located in the hotel. Prosecutors claimed Hastings walked
around to be certain he was seen.
When Hastings entered the Fontainebleau Hotel, Borders was not within
a thousand miles of Miami. For weeks he had been planning to attend the
championship fight between Tommy Heams and Sugar Ray Leonard,
scheduled in Las Vegas on September 16, 1981. Borders took a female
friend, Madeline Petty, with him to the fight as a birthday present to her.
Airplane tickets had been purchased two weeks before the fight. These
plans were not secret. Borders was known as an avid fight fan who
regularly attended championship matches. Several people, including
Dredge, the undercover agent Rico, and Hemphill Pride, knew Borders
planned to go to the fight. If Borders was manipulating an unsuspecting
Hastings by arranging a meeting in Florida without intending to show up,
he had chosen a risky occasion, when Hastings could easily have discovered
that Borders had planned for weeks to be nowhere near Miami.
Borders and Petty flew to Las Vegas from Washington National Airport
on September 15 and did not return until Friday, September 18. When they
arrived at National Airport, they parted company. Petty went home.
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Borders took a 9:20 p.m. flight to Miami in order to make his scheduled
meeting with the undercover agent the following morning to get his
"upfront" payment. There is no evidence that anyone told Borders that
Hastings had shown up at the Fontainebleau dining room on the 16th as
promised. Nevertheless, Borders proceeded to Miami on the night of the
18th with apparent confidence that the sign had been given and that the
upfront payment would be forthcoming.
Mr. Johnston?
Ms. Kassebaum?
Mr. Kasten?
Mr. Kennedy?
Mr. Kerrey?
Mr. Kerry?

Guilty
Guilty
Guilty
Guilty
Guilty
Guilty

On Saturday morning, September 19, 1981, Borders met at the Miami
Airport with the undercover agent for the second time. Rico, still impersonating Frank Romano, was again wearing a recording device. After some
banter about the fight, Rico stated "you did what you said you'd do."
Borders acknowledged this statement and Rico replied, "Your man arrived
and in fact he arrived a little early and, ah, you said you could do that and
that's, ah, your end of the situation."
Borders got directly to the point. He asked "What's it in?" Rico
replied "it" was in an envelope. He said he would put the envelope in a
newspaper and give it to Borders.
Rico then stated, "Before we go any further, the last time we talked my
understanding was that, ah, some property was going to be released."
Borders replied that the property would be released within ten days.
Borders then told Rico to file a motion for mitigation of sentence. "Just tell
him [the attorney] you're tired of this appeal. Just see if the man will
reduce the sentence."
Rico then left Borders to get the $25,000 in cash which was stored in
a locker. When Rico returned, he placed on the arm of a sofa a newspaper
containing the envelope with the money. Borders picked up the newspaper
and told Rico that the money would cover a sentence reduction for both
Romanos. The two men then discussed when the balance of the bribe
would be paid. Borders suggested it be paid when the order was entered
returning the forfeited property. Rico proposed a second installment
payment and then payment in full when the sentences were reduced.
Borders objected and said this was not the deal. He again proposed that
Dredge hold the money in escrow. Rico rejected that idea. They finally
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agreed that the remaining $125,000 would be paid on Saturday, October 3,
1981, after Judge Hastings issued the order. Borders then took an 11:00
a.m. flight back to Washington.
Mr. Kohl?
Mr. Lautenberg?

Guilty
Guilty

Mr. Leahy?
Mr. Levin?
Mr. Lieberman?

Not Guilty
Not Guilty
Not Guilty

The undercover agent and Borders had no further contact between
September 19 and October 2, 1981. No order returning property to the
Romanos was issued within ten days of September 19. The FBI obtained
a court approved wiretap on Borders' business and residential phones. On
Friday, October 2, Rico placed four calls to Borders' office. Borders was
out of the office each time, but finally arranged to have a call patched
through to him at another office. At 3:11 p.m., Rico spoke to Borders and
expressed concern that nothing had happened regarding the order. Borders
replied, "I think it has ... I'll check into it." Borders suggested that the
meeting scheduled for October 3 be postponed. Rico asked Borders if he
knew what had gone wrong. Borders replied, "It's supposed to, ah, been
done ... the only thing I can say is a lack of communication in terms of
through the mail." Borders promised he would look into the matter and told
Rico to call him at home on Sunday morning.
At 4:50 that Friday afternoon, Borders' secretary phoned Judge
Hastings' chambers and asked if he was available. She was told that he had
left for the day. On Sunday morning, Rico called Borders as agreed and
asked about the order. Borders explained, "I have not, ah, gotten an answer,
'cause I haven't been able to talk to anybody." Borders asked Rico to call
again Monday afternoon.
On October 4. according to Judge Hastings' mother, Borders placed a
telephone call to Hastings' home number. She testified that Hastings was
not there, but she advised him of the call. There is no documented contact
between Hastings and Borders on Sunday, October 4, but on Monday
morning, October 5, Hastings told his law clerk, Jeffrey Miller, to do the
Romano order returning a substantial amount of the forfeited property.
According to Miller, Hastings specifically said, "I want the order today."
Miller testified that it was unusual for the Judge to make such a request.
Another law clerk who observed the conversation between Hastings and
Miller stated that the Judge seemed disturbed that Miller had not completed
the order. The Judge's directive was sufficiently strong that Miller left the
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office and returned home, about a forty-five minute drive from the office,'
because the necessary papers were in his apartment. He worked on the
order overnight and brought it to the office the next day to be typed.
Marilyn Carter, the Judge's deputy courtroom clerk, recalled that
Tuesday evening, the 6th, Hastings stated that he was "sorry for the rush,
but the order has to go out today." The order was signed by Hastings on
October 6 and was mailed special delivery that evening.
In the meantime, Rico called Borders at 4:23 p.m. on Monday, October
5. Rico said he was anxious about the order. Borders said, "Okay, I
understand. Look, I checked on that matter ... and it wasn't in the mails.
It was, it hadn't gone out yet... but that's been taken care of." Rico asked
whether the order had gone out "today, then, probably." Borders replied,
"It was probably today or first thing in the morning... I wanna give it a
little time."
At 5:12 p.m. on October 5, 1981, Hastings placed a call to Borders'
office. The following conversation took place between Hastings and
Borders:
Borders:
Hastings:
Borders:
Hastings:
Borders:
Hastings:

Borders:
Hastings:
Borders:
Hastings:
Borders:
Hastings:
Borders:
Hastings:
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Yes, my brother.
Hey, my man.
Um hum.
I've drafted all those, ah, ah,
letters, ah, for Hemp.
Um hum.
[A]nd everything's okay. The
only thing I was concerned with
was, did you hear if, ah, you
hear from him after we talked?
Yea.
Oh. Okay.
Uh huh.
All right, then.
See, I had, I talked to him and
he, he wrote some things down
for me.
I understand.
And then I was supposed to go
back and get some more things.
All right. I understand. Well,
then, there's no great big problem at all. I'll, I'll see to it
that, ah, I communicate with
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Hastings:
Borders:
Hastings:
Borders:

Vol. 19

him. I'll send the stuff off to
Colombia in the morning.
Okay.
Okay.
Right.
Bye bye.
Bye.

At his criminal trial, Judge Hastings claimed that this was an innocent
conversation with Borders in which they were discussing some letters
Hastings was drafting to help their mutual friend, Hemphill Pride. The
prosecution argued that this was a coded conversation between Borders and
Hastings concerning the bribery scheme. The Judicial Investigating
Committee reached the same conclusion.
On its face the conversation makes no sense. Hastings initiates a call.
He tells Borders he has drafted letters for Hemp and wants to know if
Borders heard from Hemp since Hastings and Borders talked. Borders
replies he had talked to Hemp and Hemp wrote some things down for
Borders. There is no indication what these "things" are, nor does the fact
that Hemp "wrote things down" for Borders seem responsive to Hastings'
inquiry. Hastings nevertheless replies "I understand." Borders then goes on
to state that he was supposed to go back and "get some more things." Since
Borders still has not identified what these "things" are, it is hard to
understand why he was to go back and get some more of them. Nevertheless, the exchange is clear to Hastings. He again replies "I understand" and
goes on to elaborate that, in view of what he has heard from Borders,
"there's no great big problem at all." This is the first time anyone has
suggested the existence of any "problem" and it is difficult to see how
Borders' information has solved the problem, since Borders is still waiting
for more "things." Nevertheless, Hastings states he will send the "stuff off
to Colombia."
Evidence external to the conversation supports the conclusion that this
conversation was not about letters for Hemphill Pride. Pride testified that
he never asked for any letters on his behalf, had no knowledge of them, and
would have regarded any such letters as meddling in his affairs. Pride says
he never wrote anything down for Borders and was not supposed to get
anything for Borders thereafter. Pride utterly disavowed whatever it was
that Hastings and Borders were up to.
A linguist who analyzed the conversation at the request of the House
also concluded that it was a code, although he was not in a position to say
what in fact the conversation was about. The House investigators concluded
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that the interpretation which most readily comports with the facts is that
Hastings, wrho was about to sign the order, wanted to check with Borders
to be certain that the Romano deal was still in place, even though the order
was late. Accordingly, Hastings initiated the call to let Borders know that
he had "drafted all those, ah, ah, letters, ah, for Hemp" (The order is
drafted.), but he wanted to know "did you hear if, ah, you hear from him
after we talked." (Have you talked to Romano and is the deal still on?).
Borders replies that he "talked to him and he, he wrote some things down
for me." (I have spoken to Romano. He gave me the downpayment.)
Hastings acknowledges that he understands what Borders is saying and then
Borders continues, "I was supposed to go back and get some more things."
(I was supposed to get the rest of the money.) Hastings replies again that
he understands what Borders is saying and reassures Borders that "there's
no great big problem at all. I'll send the stuff off to Colombia in the
morning." (The order will go out tomorrow morning.)
Rico called Borders at midday on October 7 to inquire about the status
of the order. This time Borders stated, "It went out yesterday morning."
This assertion is consistent with Borders' October 5 conversation with
Hastings in which the Judge said he would "send the stuff off to Colombia
in the morning." The order was delivered on the 7th and Rico called
Borders to advise him he had received the order and to arrange to make the
final payment of $125,000. They agreed that Rico would come to
Washington and call Borders to arrange to make the payoff.
Mr. Lugar?
Mr. Matsunaga?
Mr. McCain?
Mr. McClure?
Mr. McConnell?
Mr. Metzenbaum?
Ms. Mikulski?

Guilty
Guilty
Guilty
Guilty
Guilty
Not Guilty
Not Guilty

The National Bar Association was holding a testimonial dinner on
October 9, 1981, to honor William Borders for his service as a past
president of the organization. One of the persons sponsoring the dinner was
Judge Hastings. By prearrangement, Borders picked Hastings up at the
airport the morning of October 9. After going to the L'Enfant Plaza Hotel
to register and to contact Hemphill Pride, Borders and Hastings made
several stops before arriving at Borders' law office where a message was
waiting for Borders to call "Frank" at the Twin Bridges Marriott Hotel. It
was, of course, the undercover agent prepared to turn over the rest of the
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money. Borders returned the call and arranged to meet "Frank" at the hotel
in an hour.
The FBI assumed Borders would meet with the undercover agent in the
hotel room. Cameras and microphones were strategically hidden in the
room to record and film what transpired. Borders, however, refused to enter
the room. He told "Frank" to "get it" because he wanted to take a ride.
Borders and the agent got into Borders' car with a bag containing $125,000
in $100 dollar bills on the floor between them. As they started to leave the
parking lot, the FBI pulled them over and arrested Borders. Rico was
wearing a body recorder and Borders can be heard stating calmly, "We're
busted," as sirens begin to wail in the background.
The FBI has been severely criticized for not "letting the money run"
to see if Borders gave part of the money to Hastings. Hastings charged that
the reason the FBI did not let the money run was that the FBI knew he was
innocent and that the money was never intended for him.
A review of FBI files shows that the Bureau's scenario for the payoff
never contemplated that Borders would be permitted to leave the hotel with
the money. The agents planned to confront Borders with overwhelming
evidence of his guilt, including the money and the tape recordings of his
conversations with the undercover agent, in the hope that Borders would roll
over and cooperate in order to gain lenient treatment. If Borders agreed to
cooperate, the plan was to have him contact Hastings and to arrange a pass
of the money under controlled circumstances.
The FBI underestimated Borders. After being confronted with the
evidence, he asked for his lawyer and then refused to talk. Indeed, before
the Hastings impeachment was completed, Borders, rather than testify, went
to jail for contempt on two separate occasions.
At approximately 3:00 p.m. on October 9, 1981, Judge Alcee Hastings
learned that his friend, William Borders, had been arrested. He was told
that the charge was conspiracy to commit bribery in connection with a case
connected with Judge Hastings. Hastings also learned that the FBI wanted
to interview him and he was given the names and telephone numbers of the
agents to contact.
Hastings was at the L'Enfant Plaza Hotel in Washington, D.C. when
he heard the news of Borders' arrest. His reaction was to leave Washington
immediately and return to Florida, thereby avoiding the FBI. He quickly
packed a bag and left the hotel without checking out, leaving behind a suit
he had sent to the hotel's valet service. The suit was retrieved by the FBI
several days later.
Hemphill Pride was also staying at the L'Enfant Plaza. He offered
Hastings a ride to the airport. Pride assumed that Hastings was heading for
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National Airport, located about four miles and a ten-minute drive from the
hotel. Hastings declined the offer and left Pride standing in the lobby.
Outside the hotel, Hastings took a cab to Baltimore-Washington International Airport located thirty five miles away. The ride took an hour and cost
$50.00. Hastings did not check the flights at either airport. Had he done
so, he would have learned there was a 4:30 p.m. direct flight to Miami from
National Airport with fourteen seats available.
Once at the BWI Airport, Hastings engaged in a series of phone calls
to Florida. At 4:37 p.m. he called his home and spoke for about four
minutes. He then placed a second call to his home and spoke for about two
minutes. It is likely that he spoke to his mother, with whom he shared the
house. About twenty minutes later, Hastings placed a collect call from a
second pay phone at the airport to the home of his girlfriend, Patricia
Williams. The call lasted a minute or less. Hastings told Williams to call
him back at a third pay phone, which she did. He then told her to go to a
pay phone and call him again at the same number. About fifteen minutes
later, she called Hastings from a pay phone located in a shopping mall near
her home. This call lasted a minute or less. Hastings then called her at the
mall pay phone from a fourth pay phone at the BWI Airport. This call
lasted about four minutes.
Within a few minutes after his last conversation with Williams,
Hastings made a reservation on a Delta Airlines flight to Miami departing
at 6:30 p.m., with an intermediate stop at Fort Lauderdale. Hastings' airline
ticket was altered at the departure gate by a handwritten notation crossing
out Fort Lauderdale as his destination and substituting Miami. In fact,
Hastings got off the plane in Fort Lauderdale. He then had to rent a car
because his own automobile was in the parking lot at the Miami airport
where he had left it to fly north.
A search for Hastings was initiated in Florida when the FBI could not
locate him in Washington. At no time did Hastings contact the FBI.
Hastings later testified at his criminal trial that upon arriving in Fort
Lauderdale he first drove home and looked in on his mother. However,
when FBI agents visited his home that night trying to locate Hastings, his
mother said he had not been there, nor had she heard from him. It is certain
that Hastings went to Patricia Williams' house. Around midnight, two FBI
agents who were assigned to find and interview Hastings went to Williams'
house on the chance he was there. When the agents appeared, Hastings
agreed to be interviewed.
Hastings acknowledged that Borders had been a personal friend for
many years and that he had been in Washington to attend a testimonial
dinner in Borders' honor. He related that Borders had picked him up at the
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airport, and that he had gone to Borders' law office. Borders had left the
office and Hastings had gone to his hotel by taxi. According to Hastings,
he had a conversation with Hemphill Pride at the hotel and had then taken
a nap. He soon received a call from Pride who said Borders had been
arrested and that it somehow involved Hastings. Hastings decided to return
to Florida immediately because he felt he could defend himself better on his
own turf. Hastings described Borders as a clandestine, cryptic individual,
and he denied any involvement in a bribery scheme.
At his criminal trial, Hastings testified that he was motivated to return
to Florida because he had called his mother from his hotel room in
Washington, had found her hysterical, and had been asked by her to come
home. The computer-generated record of long distance telephone calls from
Judge Hastings' hotel room does not reflect any such call from him to his
mother's home.
On December 29, 1981, a grand jury sitting in Miami returned an
indictment charging Hastings and Borders with conspiracy and obstruction
of justice. Borders was also charged with two counts of interstate travel to
facilitate the conspiracy. The Judge and Borders were tried separately
because Hastings challenged the government's right to indict a sitting federal
judge. He claimed that he had to be impeached and removed from office
before he could be charged. Although Hastings lost this argument, it had
the effect of severing his case from Borders' case and delaying his trial for
nearly a year.
After his indictment, Hastings was represented at various times by a
battery of lawyers, several of whom were veterans of the criminal defense
bar. Throughout the pretrial proceedings, however, Hastings declined to
identify who his trial counsel would be. On the eve of trial, Hastings
announced that he would be represented by Patricia Williams, who was then
also his fiancee. In addition, Hastings intended to act as his own counsel.
Williams had little or no prior criminal trial experience and in representing
himself, Hastings was violating the most hoary of legal maxims: The
lawyer who represents himself has a fool for a client. Why would Hastings
do such a thing? To those who studied the trial, including the Judicial
Investigating Committee, the lack of objective and detached trial counsel
participating in Hastings' representation meant that the propriety of
Hastings' tactics at trial were not subject to appropriate scrutiny.4
Hastings is a formidable witness. He is quick, articulate, even
charming, and he knew every facet of his case down to the smallest details.

4. REPORT, supra note 2, at 356-58.
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At his criminal trial, his bravura performance was sufficient to convince the
jury to acquit. Both the Judicial Investigating Committee and the House
investigators concluded, however, that Hastings had lied repeatedly at his
trial.
At his criminal trial, and at his trial before the Senate, Hastings was
faced with various incriminating facts which called for explanations. He did
not shrink from providing them:
0 Borders was "rainmaking," trading on Hastings' name without the
Judge's knowledge. Hastings had nothing to do with the scheme.
*
He went to the Fontainebleau Hotel on September 16 because he
was supposed to meet Borders.
0
He told his law clerk to complete the Romano forfeiture order on
October 5 only because the law clerk was leaving at the end of October and
Hastings wanted this matter completed before the clerk left.
*
The telephone conversation with Borders on October 5, 1981, was
in fact about letters for Hemphill Pride. At his criminal trial, Hastings even
produced handwritten drafts of letters for Pride which he claimed to have
written on October 5 while sitting on the bench during a jury trial. These
drafts, however, did not surface in the proceedings until a month before his
criminal trial and over a year after they were allegedly written. Indeed,
Senator Specter during the Senate impeachment trial noted that the six pages
of handwritten text were remarkable because they contained no corrections,
scratch-outs, or erasures despite the fact that they were allegedly written
while Hastings was on the bench, presiding at a trial.
a
Hastings explained that he went to BWI Airport instead of
National Airport on October 9, not to avoid the FBI, but because he thought
there were no non-stop flights to Miami from National Airport. It seems
clear, however, that for some period of time Hastings acted in a manner
consistent with a determined effort to avoid the FBI. The reason is obvious
if one accepts the conclusion that Hastings participated in the bribery
scheme. When Hastings learned that Borders was arrested, he would be
desperate to find out what Borders had told the authorities. Had Borders
remained silent? Had he implicated Hastings? Hastings would not want to
confront the authorities until he knew the answers to those questions. The
cab ride to BWI and the elaborate use of pay phones at the airport may have
been intended to buy time and obtain this information before Hastings faced
the FBI.

5.

COMMITEE ON THE JUDICIARY, IMPEACHMENT OF JUDGE ALCEE HASTINGS, REP.

No. 810, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 30-31 (1988).
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Hastings gave various explanations at his criminal trial concerning
his intricate maneuvers with pay phones from the airport. On direct
examination he said a baby was crying nearby which led him to move to
another phone. On cross-examination he said he thought a possible
government agent was "breathing down my whole existence."

Mr. Mitchell?
Mr. Moynihan?
Mr. Murkowski?
Mr. Nickles?
Mr. Nunn?
Mr. Packwood?
Mr. Pell?
Mr. Pressler?
Mr. Pryor?
Mr. Reid?
Mr. Riegle?

Guilty
Not Guilty
Guilty
Guilty
Guilty
Not Guilty
Guilty
Guilty
Not Guilty
Guilty
Guilty

In retrospect there are several nagging questions which are certain to
puzzle legal scholars and historians who study the Hastings case.
The most perplexing factual question is why, if Hastings participated
in the scheme, he failed to issue the order reducing the forfeiture within ten
days of September 19, as Borders had promised. The order did not go out
until October 6, a week later. Surely, Hastings could have ordered his law
clerk to finish the memorandum so that the schedule would have been met.
The simple explanation, which is not wholly satisfactory, is that Borders and
Hastings were careless and simply made an error.
This explanation is hard to accept when one considers that $125,000
was at risk. On the other hand, it may well be that Hastings had no
economic expectations arising from the deal. Senator Slade Gorton of
Washington State issued a statement after the Senate vote suggesting that
perhaps Hastings was helping Borders out without intending to take any
money himself. Hastings may have been obligated to Borders for Hastings'
appointment to the federal bench. Borders had substantial influence in such
matters within the Carter administration. If Hastings had no personal
economic stake in the scheme, it may explain his nonchalance in failing to
issue the order by a certain date. The fact remains, however, that Hastings'
failure to issue the order on time is the single most persuasive fact in
support of his innocence.
Mr. Robb?

Guilty

Mr. Rockefeller?

Guilty
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Mr. Rudman?
Mr. Sanford?
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Guilty
Guilty
Not Guilty

Also puzzling are certain tactical decisions on the part of Hastings and
his counsel. Hastings took the stand and testified at his criminal trial. The
jury acquitted. He declined to testify at the proceedings before the Judicial
Investigating Committee, claiming the proceedings were unconstitutional.
Hastings' next opportunity to testify was before the Subcommittee on
Criminal Justice which was investigating the matter. John Conyers, the
black Congressman from Detroit who had openly expressed concern that
Hastings was being pursued for racial reasons, chaired the hearings. In an
effort to avoid even the appearance of unfairness, Conyers afforded Hastings
extraordinary courtesies during the hearings. At times Conyers extended
these courtesies over the strong opposition of fellow subcommittee members.
On the first day of the hearings, for example, Conyers allowed Hastings to
make an opening statement without being subject to any questioning.
Hastings used it as an opportunity to attack the proceedings and grab a
headline that he was "Not guilty but not free." After all the witnesses had
been heard, Hastings was given an opportunity to testify on his own behalf.
This time he would have been subject to cross-examination. Everyone
expected Hastings to take the stand. Instead, Hastings announced that on
the advice of counsel, he declined to testify.
It is hard to see this as anything other than a major tactical blunder.
This opportunity to testify was Hastings' best chance to stop the impeachment process in its tracks. He had a sympathetic black Chairman in charge
of the proceedings. At least one other member of the Subcommittee, Don
Edwards of California, would be likely to support Conyers if he voted
against impeachment. One thing was clear to anyone in touch with the
political reality of the proceedings-unless Conyers supported the impeachment and, indeed, unless there was unanimity on the articles of impeachment, the matter was dead. Had Hastings testified, it does not follow that
he would have avoided impeachment, but his failure to testify left the
charges unanswered. It was a self-inflicted wound which left observers
baffled.
This failure to recognize the value of using Hastings as a witness also
occurred in the Senate. The Senate Rules Committee held a hearing in
advance of the trial to consider various procedural matters, including
Hastings' plea that he needed funds for his defense. The Rules Committee
includes some of the most influential members of the Senate. Nearly every
Committee member attended the hearing. The hearing room and the halls
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outside were packed with hundreds of Hastings' supporters. Because the
proceedings did not deal with the facts of his case, it was a perfect
opportunity for Hastings, at no risk to himself, to make a favorable
impression on men who would serve as jurors at his trial.
Incredibly, Hastings never opened his mouth. Hastings and his counsel
elected instead to show an inane video tape of a local Miami talk show,
recorded several months earlier, in which a juror from Hastings' criminal
trial gave her thoughts on the trial and the impeachment. Hastings' counsel
then launched into a long speech which had a series of paragraphs each
beginning with the rhetorical refrain, "my children, your children, our fellow
citizens, you and I . . ." which preached to the Senators about their
constitutional obligations. Hastings' failure to speak directly to the
Senators, particularly about a subject as appealing as his need for funds to
defend himself, deprived him of a chance to create some rapport and gain
the sympathy of an important segment of the jury. His counsel simultaneously managed to alienate Senators who did not take kindly to being
lectured before a large audience about constitutional obligations of which
they were well aware. Veteran trial lawyers who observed the proceedings
simply shook their heads in disbelief. It is impossible to say what effect
that strategy had on the final Senate vote, but clearly Hastings missed an
opportunity which could only have helped him. Perhaps it is mere
coincidence, but of the sixteen members of the Senate Rules Committee,
thirteen voted to convict.
Mr. Sarbanes?

Guilty

Mr. Sasser?

Not Guilty

Mr. Shelby?
Mr. Simon?

Not Guilty
Guilty

From the outset, the central legal issue in the Hastings case was
whether an impeachment trial after an acquittal by a jury constituted double
jeopardy under the Constitution. When the House began its inquiry, the first
order of business was to resolve this issue. The House concluded that
principles of double jeopardy simply do not apply to impeachment. The
issue turned on whether an impeachment trial is a criminal proceeding. The
legal and historic precedent was overwhelmingly in favor of the proposition
that impeachment in this country is remedial, rather than criminal, in nature.
Its purpose is not to punish for misbehavior, but rather to remove someone
from office who is deemed unfit to hold a position of public trust. If one
were to accept the argument that an impeachment trial was a criminal
proceeding, it would be unconstitutional to impeach a public official even
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had he been convicted in a prior criminal trial. The prohibition against
double jeopardy prevents a second criminal proceeding, without regard to
the outcome of the first trial. This result is simply untenable.
It is true that some of the constitutional language relating to impeachment, such as "conviction" and "high crimes and misdemeanors," smacks of
the criminal process. This inference stems from the fact that to some extent
the Framers relied on the English impeachment model which was truly a
criminal proceeding. The House was satisfied that by limiting the persons
subject to impeachment to certain officeholders, and by limiting the sanction
to removal from office, the Framers had changed the very nature of the
process.
Hastings brought the issue before the Senate through a motion to
dismiss those articles of impeachment which were related to the facts
presented at his criminal trial on double jeopardy grounds. The full Senate
heard arguments from both sides for two hours. The vote was against
Hastings' position ninety-two to one, with Senator Howard Metzenbaum of
Ohio being the lone holdout.
That vote did not entirely resolve the issue. Even if technical
principles of double jeopardy were inapplicable, it is clear that the acquittal
had a substantial impact on the vote. Several Senators who filed statements
explaining their vote stated that while they rejected the idea that double
jeopardy applied to an impeachment trial and believed that the Senate had
to make an independent determination, they felt that the acquittal had to be
given weight. Senator Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania, for example,
concluded that the jury verdict required the House to prove its case in the
Senate "beyond a reasonable doubt," the standard normally applied in
criminal cases. For Senator Lieberman, on the other hand, the jury acquittal
had no impact on what he regarded as the appropriate standard of
proof--"clear and convincing evidence"--a middle ground between the
criminal law standard and the civil standard of "preponderance of the
evidence." Lieberman essentially discounted the jury verdict. It was not a
finding that Hastings was innocent; it merely established that the jury had
a reasonable doubt as to Hastings' complicity. Lieberman was probably the
exception. It is likely that many Senators felt that the jury acquittal weighed
heavily in the balance.
With the tally sixty-three guilty, twenty-four not guilty, it was now
Senator Simpson's turn to cast his vote. Simpson voted guilty, and Alcee
Hastings was convicted under the first article of impeachment. Hastings
reached over and patted his counsel on the arm. Then he quietly wept. The
final tally of sixty-nine guilty, twenty-six not guilty was enough to convict
even had all one hundred Senators voted.
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Mr. Specter?
Mr. Stevens?
Mr. Symms?
Mr. Thurmond?
Mr. Wallop?
Mr. Warner?
Mr. Wirth?
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Guilty
Not Guilty
Guilty
Guilty
Guilty
Guilty
Guilty
Not Guilty

Senator Byrd announced the guilty verdict on Article One and began
the process of voting on Article Two, which charged that Hastings had lied
when he testified that he did not conspire with Borders to take a bribe. In
light of the vote on Article One, the result of the second vote was inevitable.
After Hastings had been found guilty a second time, Majority Leader
George Mitchell, moved by compassion for Hastings, asked for the
unanimous consent of the Senate to permit Hastings and his counsel to be
excused for the remainder of the votes. Accompanied by counsel, Hastings
immediately left the Senate chamber. Hastings was ultimately convicted on
eight of the articles and found not guilty on three articles. The Senate did
not vote on articles ten through fifteen.
One could almost have predicted that, despite his impeachment, Alcee
Hastings would land on his feet. After a fiercely fought election, he is now
a Congressman from South Florida, a member of the very body which
impeached him as a judge. Some have observed that his charm and street
smarts probably make him more suited for the political arena than the
bench.
Patricia Williams, Hastings' companion and counsel at the criminal
trial, has been disbarred for misuse of client funds and lying to a judicial
grievance committee in matters unrelated to Hastings.6 She has since joined
Hastings in his Washington office as staff liaison/scheduler.
William Borders was sentenced to four concurrent five-year prison
terms as a result of his convictions for conspiracy, corruptly impeding the
administration of justice, and two counts of unlawful travel in interstate
commerce with intent to commit bribery. He began serving his term on
May 25, 1983. He was released to a halfway house on December 10, 1985,
and returned to the community in February 1986. Borders was disbarred as
a result of his conviction. He has sought reinstatement to the bar of the
District of Columbia. To date, readmission has been denied.

6. Florida Bar v. Williams, 604 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 1992).
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American Constitutionalism as Civil Religion: Notes of
an Atheist
Duncan Kennedy
People who study American constitutionalism refer often to religion as
an analogy, or treat constitutionalism as a form of civil religion. I want to
take this analogy to religion somewhat more seriously than seems to have
been fashionable during the bicentennial year.
The religion analogy sometimes indicates that people "reverence" the
Constitution (perhaps as an emanation of the democratic deity The People)
much as they reverence the Bible as God's word in mainstream religion, that
they attribute great power to law, as a kind of analog to the Holy Spirit, an
emanation of divinity, that there is an aura of spirituality to discussions of
the document and of the rights that it supposedly guarantees, that the
Framers are like prophets, and that the document gets exegesis in a spirit
like that of biblical exegesis.
The conclusion that seems most obviously to follow from the analogy
might be something like: "one should not be too rationalistic in trying to
understand what the Constitution is all about and especially in trying to
understand how people react to the United States Supreme Court." The
analogy might be to the cult of the British Royal Family and its role in
British social and political life.
There is an implicit theory of what religion is and how it functions in
social structure that makes the analogy seem interesting and important, and
makes this seem a plausible conclusion to draw from it. That theory seems
to be something like: a religion is a body of metaphysical beliefs, moral
precepts and ritual practices, irrationally founded and self-consciously shared
across some group. The role of religion in society would be something like:

* Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. This article is a lightly edited version of a
bicentennial address I delivered at the University of Miami School of Law and the University
of California School of Law in 1987.
Editorial Note: Duncan Kennedy graduated from Yale Law School and has been a
professor at Harvard Law School for more than two decades. His law review articles are
among the most widely read (and cited) in American legal scholarship and his other
publications include Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy(1983) and Sexy
Dressing Etc., Essays on the Power and Politics of CulturalIdentity, the latter collection
published by Harvard University Press in 1993. The following essay reflects comments
provided by Professor Kennedy on a speaking occasion at the time of the bicentennial of the
United States Constitution. The considerable contribution made by this essay to the critique
of legal realism and the continuing development of critical legal studies amply justifies its
retrieval and publication here.
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shared religious beliefs, precepts, and rituals define patterns of daily life,
bind the members of a society together, and give the society its identity as
against others, such as foreigners and internal deviants (people who profane
the constitutional faith, say, like maybe communists except that they are
always wrapping themselves in it). As long as everyone is being tolerant
(an important proviso), religion is at worst a harmless and at best an enormously socially valuable and spiritually valid part of communal life.
But this British Royal Family model of constitutionalism as civil
religion is only part of the story. We also use the analogy to understand
obedience to the Supreme Court, and here its meaning is that obedience
goes far beyond what one would expect if one saw it as based on rational
agreement, on force, or on contract.
This notion is summed up in the juxtaposition of Justice Brewer's
famous remark in the Debs case,' that the strikers dispersed voluntarily as
soon as they heard that the court had decided their action was illegal, with
Justice Holmes' contemporaneous remark that issues of the kind involved
in that very strike ultimately came down to matters of policy about which
judges of different economic sympathies might well disagree.2 The idea of
religion seems useful to understand the ability of the Court to command
obedience to politically controversial decisions when it lacks what we think
of as the standard instruments of power.
But what kind of religious belief is analogous to this aspect of
constitutionalism? How does the analogy to religion help us understand the
place of constitutionalism in American political culture? The Supreme
Court does not fit the British Royal Family model of civil religion, because
the cult of the BRF followed its loss of real political power.
The Supreme Court is, for those whose attitude we compare to that of
the religious, the authoritative source of true interpretations of the Constitution, and its determinations are understood to have binding force over the
members of the society. The idea of binding force clearly has both a moral
component-people believe they ought to obey the law-and a practical
one---decrees are backed to some extent by state coercion.
It is of course easy to see the Court as a priestly corps, so that it is like
the Pope when he speaks ex cathedra. But then we have to add the element
of state force. The correct analogy might seem to be a theocracy, say
Khomeini's Iran. But here the problem is that in our usual model of
theocracy, the priestly corps has all political power, whereas in our society

1. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
2. Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., Privilege,Malice, and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1894).
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it is clear that the Court has limited power. There are some political acts
we do not expect it to do, and if it tried to do them it would probably fail
to impose itself on the other elements in the political system.
Another analogy would be to the Delphic oracle, which gave answers,
in the form of sophisticated riddles clearly based on inside information, to
political questions brought from far and wide. But here there is lacking
both the coercive aspect and the crucial feature of textual interpretation, with
the authority of the practitioners based on a combination of supposed
reverence for the source of the text and belief in the neutral or at least
impersonal character of the interpretive process.
How about the practice of divination, by looking into the entrails of
animals or interpreting the flight of birds, that seems to have had an
institutionalized place in the political systems of ancient Greece and Rome?
The priest or priestly corps in these cases seems to be able to decisively
control events through the interpretive process, without having a claim to
unlimited political power. For example, I vaguely remember that it was the
priests doing divination who figured out that the lack of wind preventing the
Greek fleet from sailing for Troy was an expression of the anger of the
gods, and that the wind would come up if the Greeks assuaged the gods by
Agamemnon agreeing to sacrifice his daughter Iphigenia.
I do not know that much about divination. It might be better to use the
church courts of the Middle Ages with their jurisdiction over family matters,
an imperium in imperio vis a vis the emerging national states. My point is
simply that if we want a religious analogy to the role of the Court in our
society, we will have to go back a ways, and we will have to choose an
analogy to a form of religious life, and a set of beliefs about what religion
is, that are quite far from mainstream American Protestantism, Judaism, or
Catholicism.
When we try to understand the role of, say, divination in ancient
Greece, or witchcraft in traditional society, it is common (let me put this
delicately) to start from the assumption that the belief of the participants in
the practical, causal efficacy of their rituals and hermeneutic techniques is
incorrect. In other words, in interpreting earlier stages of our own culture,
and some of its present aspects as well, and in interpreting many aspects of
traditional cultures, we sometimes, with more or less trepidation, just reject
the claims that the participants make about what is really going on.
We reject, with more or less trepidation, their claim that the text or
natural event (flight of birds) holds the secret of divine intentions, intentions
that are accessible through an interpretive technique. We just "do not
believe in" their gods or animist spirits, or that divinities reveal themselves
through the disposition of entrails to those who have the secret of interpreta-
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tion, or that they have intentions about specific, currently unfolding events,
or modify their intervention in those events in response to actions like
human sacrifice.
For example, we do not believe that the gods opposed the sailing of the
Greek fleet to Troy. We just reject the Greek idea that there are gods of the
type they believed in (if they really did believe in them). In so much as
they seriously attributed events to their gods' interventions in human affairs,
we tend to think they were (strong word coming) deluded. Deluded.
If we turn now to the practice of divination, we have the priestly corps
making quite specific, strong claims about what it is doing. It is using an
interpretive technique that will allow correct determination of the will of the
gods. But if there were no gods, what were they actually doing? First, they
must have been making what we cannot avoid calling mistakes. In so much
as they believed that they could understand what was happening in their
world through correct divination, and that correct divination was sometimes
accomplished, we think they were (strong word coming) deluded.
I know I am on dangerous ground here, because the American scholarly
community has no consensus about the status of claims of religious
knowledge, beyond the vague injunctions to mutual toleration I have already
mentioned. But I intend to press on across the dangerous ground. The
question I want to pose is, how do we regard those claims of United States
Supreme Court justices that look most like those of a priestly corps engaged
in divination?
More broadly, how do we regard the claims, not just of judges but of
the producers of American political ideology in newspapers and school
textbooks, that there are correct and incorrect interpretations of the
Constitution, and that one correct interpretation of the Constitution is that
the Supreme Court has legitimate power to strike down legislation that
violates the provisions of the Bill of Rights?
My belief is that those of us who more or less professionally study
American constitutionalism carefully nurture within ourselves three quite
contradictory attitudes toward this question, and that we might profit by
trying to be more precise about the jurisprudence that underlies our social
theory.
First, in commentary on constitutional history, the tone is often that the
Supreme Court is a political institution like any other, so that one asks
whether Dred Scott was wise, whether it was right or wrong in the larger

3. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
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sense of political morality, likewise Lochner v. New York,4 Brown v. Board
of Education,5 the Nixon Tapes case,6 and so forth. In this mode, we seem
to assume that the issue of "technical legal correctness" is irrelevant or
insignificant or meaningless in deciding how we feel about what happened,
and also in interpreting the conduct of the actors. We assume that the Court
acted "politically" and is to be judged by criteria of statecraft (was the
Louisiana Purchase wise or foolish?) rather than according to a conception
that clearly differentiates its role from that of other political institutions.
Note that this approach is consistent with at least three underlying
attitudes toward judging. 1) It might be that in some cases there is a
technically correct interpretation of the law and in others there is not. In
these important cases there was not-they were of "first impression,"
perhaps-so that the Court had to proceed in the general mode of statesmanship. The judges' rhetoric of legal necessity could be understood as a
convention or a mystification. 2) It might be that there is never a technically correct solution, so that in all its work the Court proceeds "politically."
3) It might be that there is always a technically correct legal solution, which
moreover is entitled to some weight in the normal case, but fades pretty
much into insignificance in "great cases." Regardless of which of these
attitudes one adopts, in the first mode the judge is judged not by asking
whether he or she has done his or her duty by the Constitution, but whether
he or she has done the right thing in the broadest sense of what is best for
the polity.
A second attitude that is just as common and just as much in each of
us is that the Constitution expresses the commitment of the Founders to the
realization of a particular set of political ideals and principles that everyone
in our society shares or ought to share. Indeed, in this view it encompasses
all the ideals and principles that we as a collectivity subscribe to, so that
constitutional adjudication properly done is morally as well as legally
authoritative. We might say that the Constitution represents the ethical in
our political life.
Ideals and principles have to be reinterpreted over time and also have
always to be compromised to one extent or another in the face of "reality"
or "the fact of scarcity" or "human nature as it is rather than as we would
wish it to be" or "entrenched interests without ethical claims" or "practical
politics." Nonetheless, the Constitution actually has some meaning that
allows its interpreter to adopt a critical attitude toward actual social practices
4. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
5. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
6. Nixon v. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
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and to find them "unconstitutional" in some other sense than just saying
"speaking as a citizen participant in American life my subjective view is that
this practice is morally and politically wrong."
A crucial point about this second view is that although it treats
constitutional adjudication in great cases as very different from crass
everyday legislative politics, and treats the Constitution itself as an
autonomous force in political culture, it places no emphasis whatever on the
merely technical correctness of important decisions. Being "faithful" to the
Constitution, in this view, is a matter of interpreting "broadly," of its
"spirit," rather than of determining the "legally correct" outcome according
to a method of legal hermeneutics clearly autonomous from the other types
of reasoning we use in deciding whether a decision is good or bad.
Yet a third attitude is that legal reasoning (not that very vague word
"law") is distinct as a way of deciding what to do in a concrete situation
from "political," and also from "principled" or ethical decision. When a
judge sets out to do legal reasoning, he or she will end up with an outcome
that may or may not correspond to the one that he or she would have
reached if asked to "do whatever he or she wanted," "make the morally
correct choice," "do what is politically expedient," and so forth. What the
Supreme Court does or ought to do in constitutional adjudication is legal
reasoning, based on the text and whatever other materials the "interpretive
community" deems "relevant."
This view that legally correct constitutional interpretation is possible is
consistent with many mutually opposing views about constitutional law.
1) You can believe that the Constitution is just great, so that decisions that are technically correct interpretations are likely to or sure to be
just what you would have wanted on general moral or political philosophical
grounds. Or you can believe that the Constitution and the body of relevant
materials embody a much more partial set of ideals and principles, say those
of a "capitalist society" or a racialist or patriarchal society, so that correct
interpretations will be authoritative only for those who share the underlying
social vision.
2) You can believe in the liberal program of formal and substantive
equality plus free cultural expression, or in the organicist conservative
program of cultural and class hierarchy and authority, or in the atomist
conservative program of libertarianism restrained only by state enforcement
of a natural right to property, and still believe in correct legal reasoning,
which may or may not come out the way you personally would have wished
it to in any particular case.
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3) You can be an activist or a passivist on the issue of how and when
the Court should overrule the democratically elected legislature, and still
believe in legal correctness.
4) You can believe that all or virtually all questions presented to the
Court have right legal answers, meaning that there is a correct interpretation
of the constitutional law of the question, or that this is true only some of the
time or only occasionally.
The point is that most people most of the time hold the view that it is
at least possible on some occasions to make correct and incorrect interpretations of constitutional law, and that these times are likely to be very
important. This view coexists with the view that it is often or sometimes
if not always all "statecrat," and the view that it is a matter of the conflict
of the ethical, of ideals and principles, with tawdry reality, in each case with
the judges' claims about the legal correctness of their interpretations best
understood as convention or mystification, especially in the very important
cases.
Now let us return to the perspective of divination. What might have
happened in Aulis (treating the story as history)? The priestly corps
interpreted the auguries to mean that the reason why there was no wind was
that the Gods were angry but could be appeased by the sacrifice of
Iphigenia. We believe in neither the cause nor the cure proposed by the
diviners. But it does seem plausible that they did an interpretation, that they
and others believed in its correctness, and that they acted accordingly,
sacrificing Iphigenia, and then concluding that the ensuing wind was caused
by the gods' response to the sacrifice.
If this is what happened, there is a sense in which it was all a
"mistake." If they had understood (i.e. believed as we believe) that
sacrificing her would not in fact bring the wind, then they might not have
done it (there could well have been other motives for sacrificing her) or,
almost certainly, would have done it in some other way.
What emerges is a discontinuity between their way and our way of
understanding their history. We all agree that divination played a major role
in the events, and that as a practice and an institution it was in some sense
responsible for Iphigenia's death. Their explanation of this role, let us
suppose, was that a correct interpretive practice revealed a tragic conflict
between loyalty to the needs of the league of cities and those of the family.
Through divination Agammemnon acquired the information he needed to
make the painful choice to get the show on the road, instead of having to
sit puzzled until the energy for war had dissipated itself.
The structure of the argument by which the diviners claim to be taken
seriously is quite clear: 1) There are awesomely powerful gods. 2) They
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have intentions that are causally efficacious with regard to human affairs.
3) They are responsive to human gestures intended for them. 4) The gods
express themselves through natural phenomena like the flight of birds and
the arrangements of entrails. 5) We have a technique that will allow us to
determine their intentions and also what human gestures will modify those
intentions. 6) Any idiot can see that if we are right in what we have just
said, you had better pay attention to divination. 7) It would not be at all
surprising if you were to reverence us as well as paying attention to the
information we provide, since we are a lot closer to the gods than you are,
and what we do is pretty wonderful in itself.
We can imagine a spectrum of critical attitudes toward this piece of
diviner's history, some focussed on the gods and some on the diviners'
interpretive practices.
The critical move that denies the existence of the gods has a devastating impact on the whole system of thought. Is constitutionalism, treated
as analogous to divination, vulnerable to a similar move? I think not, that
it is indeed quite well protected. We all agree that there was a framing
process and a ratification process that were historical events. It is hard to
imagine that anyone will shake our faith in the existence of the framers or
of the ratifying people in the way nineteenth century skeptics shook people's
faith in the existence of God.
On the other hand, as Peter Gabel points out, the psychological
structure of reverence and obedience seems to depend somewhat on a
fantasy. People seem to believe it is meaningful to talk about, and to
identify with a trans-temporal mythic People, so that they feel that the text
of the Constitution is an emanation of a totality in which they participate in
a way that somehow simultaneously binds and ennobles them. This looks
to me like The Nation or The Chosen People, entities that might have
sometimes for some people just lost their facticity. That might happen to
the Constitutional People as well.
While the Constitution looks like the Bible and the People like the God
of a fundamentalist religion, the situation is actually quite different.
Constitutionalism as a religion weathered, during the New Deal or legal
realism period, a crisis of belief in the possibility of understanding
interpretation as carrying out the Original Intent of the Framers, and came
back strong in the post-World War II period, with adherents of all political
tendencies.
Constitutional fundamentalism, though vulnerable to crises of belief in
the People or in Original Intent, seems destined to endure. But it coexists
with versions of constitutional faith that have achieved varying degrees of
autonomy from the Creation Myth. One such idea is that the judges are
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bound not just by the Constitution but by the whole corpus of materials,
including all previous un-overruled judicial interpretations. Others are that
the Constitution "evolves," and that the "general clauses" simply call on the
judge to interpret "society's fundamental values." Although these ideas are
controversial, and experienced by fundamentalists as sophistical or airily
intellectual or dangerous, they are also probably stabilizing, somewhat in the
manner of the reduction of modem mainstream protestantism to liberal
humanist pieties.
We are now in a position to define constitutional atheism. It is the
conviction that there is no human collectivity, The People, that authors and
consents to constitutional law as laid down by the Supreme Court. Note
that atheism is perfectly consistent with the belief that there are correct and
incorrect interpretations of constitutional law.
The written document is in existence, along with the other conventionally accepted materials preceding and superseding it. These documents
do not directly refer to The People in ways that would require the atheist to
believe in It in order to be able to figure out what the various human
authorities meant for her to do in the case before her. The interpretive
process may therefore generate even in the atheist the experience of closure.
A constitutional atheist could take the oath of office as a judge and promise
to abide by the Constitution, even though she thought that the underlying
beliefs that sustain the institution of constitutional interpretation are deluded.
Contrast the far more problematic situation of a diviner who has lost his
faith in the existence of the gods.
Now let us turn to the question of interpretive technique. There are a
variety of critiques that we might want to direct at the diviners' claim that
they read the flight of birds correctly, as was confirmed when the wind
came up after the sacrifice. We can begin with criticisms that are consistent
with believing that the gods exist in the way the Greeks apparently believed
they did, and that divination is possible, and then move to interpretations of
what happened that presuppose atheism.
1) In fact, the diviners did it wrong. The true interpretation was that
the gods were busy, not angry, and the wind would come up if the army just
waited. Iphigenia was sacrificed to no good purpose, since the wind would
have come up in any case. Perhaps it was an issue of skill, or of bad faith
manipulation of the auguries, or of diligence. Harvard trained diviners
would have done better.
2) This was an instance in which the auguries were undecidable.
Applying the best possible technique, the correct answer to the question
propounded was "we do not know why there is no wind and we do not
know what to do about it." The priests made a mistake in thinking they had
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come up with a correct answer, and Iphigenia was sacrificed quite possibly
in vain, though it is also possible that the gods were in fact angry and in
fact assuaged. But if that is what happened, it was dumb luck rather than
correct divining that caused it.
3) Although divination is a valid procedure, it cannot be used on just
any old question. This was one of the class of cases in which, according to
the correct theory of divination, divination cannot work. It cannot explain
lack of wind or what to do about it. The priests were mistaken even to try
to apply their procedures in this case, because it was outside their institutional competence, although of course it might in fact have been true that
the gods were angry and that they were assuaged by the sacrifice. But
again, if that is what happened, it was just luck rather than an outcome
attributable to correct divining.
If we try to understand divination as based on a delusion about the
existence of gods, or about the relationship of divine to mortal existence, a
parallel set of possibilities emerges.
4) Divination was a determinate but arbitrary procedure, just as in
critique number 1 above (the case where the issue is getting it right or
wrong). There was a right way and a wrong way to do it, but since the bird
flights or entrail arrangements interpreted were random natural events,
unrelated to any will of any divinity, if you believe in a divinity or
divinities, the divining process gave answers much like a coin flip, or trial
by battle or by torture in medieval criminal procedure. The necessity of
sacrificing Iphigenia was (let us suppose) correctly read by the diviners, but
they were doing something like correctly reading a coin as coming up
"heads" after it has been agreed that something will be decided by chance.
(Of course, in this hypothesis the power to frame the question to be decided
by chance would be extremely important.)
5) Divination was not arbitrary but rather manipulable, because the
questions posed were undecidable with the technique used (as in critiques
numbered 2 and 3 above). The diviners constantly and consciously
manipulated the interpretive technique to validate the results they wanted on
other grounds. If they said Iphigenia had to die, there was doubtless a
reason, but it certainly was not that they believed they had correctly read the
entrails or bird flight patterns. They did that after the fact, and given the
ambiguities, gaps and conflicts within the canons, were able to do it
perfectly correctly whichever way they wanted to come out.
6) Yet another possibility is that divination was not arbitrary but
rather manipulable, in what I will call the naive mode. Naive manipulation
occurs when the interpreter imposes a meaning on the materials without
experiencing her own creative part in the process. This occurs in cases of
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undecidability, like critiques 2 and 3 above. From the point of view of the
outside observer, it appears that there were two possible valid interpretations
within the canons, so that someone had to choose according to non-interpretive criteria which way to go. But what occurs is more complex and
important than conscious manipulation, because the critic asserts that the
diviners experienced interpretive closure or compulsion in deciding between
the options, rather than choice.
The necessity they produced through interpretive technique was
routinely false, though not experienced as such. For this reason, it is hard
to see Iphigenia as the victim of a "simple error of interpretation." The
interpretive practice was systematically prone to the error of deciding the
undecidable. But as stated the theory does not explain why the experience
of closure emerges on one side of the choice rather than the other.
This last option, naive manipulation, is the one that strikes me as most
useful in understanding the role of the United States Supreme Court,
although I concede that it is sometimes useful to understand the justices as
proceeding in the modes of statesmanship, of the ethical and of the
technical. I think that the justices are constantly engaged in naive manipulation. I am not going to try to prove this. I base it on my personal
experience as a law clerk to Potter Stewart in the 1970-1971 Term, and on
twenty years of studying Supreme Court opinions. Let us just pretend I
have shown it to be true. What would be the consequences for our understanding of the role of the court in our society?
Let us call the combination of constitutional atheism and the belief that
naive manipulation is at least common if not omnipresent CONSTITUTIONAL SKEPTICISM. If constitutional skepticism is valid, our usual
understandings of American political history and culture are problematic.
The problem is if the Constitution cannot be understood as the will of
The People, but rather of the humans who wrote it and got it ratified, and
if naive manipulation has been common in interpreting it, then what
intelligible order has the judicial process of imposing the indicated outcomes
through state force brought to our political history, and how has it
contributed to the warp and woof of our political culture? Big questions,
but here goes.
First, it is important to see what answers are undermined through the
hypothesis of skepticism. So long as we believe in the constitutional people
and that the interpretive process was done correctly or incorrectly, in good
faith or through conscious manipulation, we could understand our constitutional history in the modes of patriotism and morality.
Patriotism. Our Constitution expresses our particular qualities as a
people, and its interpretation and enforcement against conflicting norms
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sustain those qualities. Constitutional interpretation is therefore a mode of
national self-determination. We can distinguish two ways in which we have
a national identity that sets us apart from other nations: 1) Constitutionalism itself is peculiarly American-others do not engage in our
particular form of self-determination through interpretation, preferring either
violent or merely political modes instead. 2) The particular constellation of
civil and personal rights and liberties we enjoy derive from our particular
constitutional scheme adapted through time to our changing values. If we
have been, are and, God willing always will be the freest people in the
world, we achieved this by adopting a freedom-guaranteeing constitution and
then interpreting and enforcing it as cases arose.
Morality. Our Constitution embodies the moral commitments of our
highest, most idealistic selves. Politics is fallen Earth in relation to the
Heaven of constitutional aspirations. True constitutional interpretation is
therefore a kind of angelic intervention into the affairs of everyday life. We
submit to it in actual, coercive fact to attain a virtue that we would not have
the strength or imagination or resources to achieve if left to our normal
political practices. False interpretation may be mistaken, in which case we
lose this benefit, or consciously manipulative, in which case the profane
invades the divine sphere, corrupting it. Constitutional history is that of the
gradual extension of heavenly sway, as the court has protected but also
expanded basic civil and human rights in the face of the aggressions and
resistances of politics.
I will not develop the point that constitutional skepticism is pretty
devastating for both the patriotic and the moralistic version of what the
interpretive process does for us. Here I will simply list what seem to me
some hypothetical contributions of constitutionalism that we could believe
in even as skeptics.
1) Constitutionalism has had a disordering or randomizing effect on
our political history. This occurs because naive manipulation is an activity
open to influence by all kinds of agendas, including, obviously the political
agenda of the judge. The political process puts judges in office and leaves
them there, possessed of this stock of legitimacy or mana or religious
plausibility for the mass of believers, and no way to avoid, while engaged
in naive manipulation, the use of it to keep dead programs alive or create
new ones. A useful analogy may be the British civil service, or the corps
of prefects in France. The difference may be the bizarre impact of
self-delusion on the implementation of the political agenda by the judge, and
the irrational, non-dialogic, almost mechanical translation of constitutionalist
faith into popular obedience. All this can be good or bad, depending on
who is in charge and what he or she is trying to accomplish.
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2) Constitutionalism has been a constitutive element of our political
culture, not as the form for our collective self-determination but by
providing one of the discourses through which actors pursue their political
and ethical projects. These projects can be good or bad, depending on who
is pursuing them and what they are after. Different discourses, different
cultures has got to be our maxim as soon as we lose faith in the possibility
of transparent language. We might very loosely analogize constitutionalism
to the Sun Dance of the Sioux, which is both a ritual and the site of a
discourse as well. Naive manipulation then becomes just another of the
utterly culturally specific ways in which people are in bad faith.
3) Constitutionalism made legal realism possible. Conservative
control of the Supreme Court in the late nineteenth century, in a context of
naive manipulation, created a vested interest for the progressives in
demystifying legal reason. Because the stakes were higher than in Europe,
where all the roots of realism lay, the enterprise was taken much further.
Just as fascism and stalinism were making the realist impulse look positively
obscene in Europe, the American realists reaped the reward of their general
critique of Classical legal thought, epitomized by the work of Holmes,
Hohfeld, Hale, the Cohens, Arnold, and Llewellyn. The essence of this
critique was that because the private law issue of how to define property
rights was undecidable given the extant interpretive techniques, conservatives must renounce public law power to strike progressive legislation as
unconstitutional. And of course legal realism made critical legal studies
possible.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The long-running debate concerning the scope of the economic loss
rule' presents issues which are important in themselves and as illustrations

1. The significance of the economic loss rule is that a buyer seeking recovery for the
loss caused by product failure must plead the cause in warranty or contract. In most
jurisdictions, the buyer cannot recover if the event did not cause personal injury or damage
to property other than the product itself. A recent decision of the Florida Supreme Court is
representative. The plaintiff alleged flaws in concrete caused the walls and ceilings of a
condominium to crack, and ultimately pieces fell, narrowly missing residents; however, there
were no actual injuries. Casa Clara Condominium Assoc., Inc. v. Charley Toppino & Sons,
Inc., 620 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 1993). The economic loss rule prohibited recovery because the
product did not cause personal injury or damage to anything other than itself. Id. at 1246
(citing East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858 (1986)); Danforth
v. Acorn Structures, Inc., 608 A.2d 1194 (Del. 1992) (treating sovereign error as exception
to economic loss rule); AFM Corp. v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 515 So. 2d 180 (Fla.
1987); Florida Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 510 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 1987));
cf Sunnyslope Grading, Inc. v. Miller, Bradford & Risberg, Inc., 437 N.W.2d 213, 217-18
(Wis. 1989); Spychalla Farms, Inc. v. Hopkins Agric. Chem. Co., 444 N.W.2d 743, 747
(Wis. Ct. App. 1989). Note, it is sometimes suggested that a better term would be
"commercial loss." See the opinion of Judge Posner in Miller v. United States Steel Corp.:
The Millers are attempting to use tort law to recover the cost of replacing a
defective product sold to them for use in their business. This cost is called in
law an "economic loss," to distinguish it from an injury to the plaintiffs person
or property (property other than the product itself), the type of injury on which
a products liability suit usually is founded. It would be better to call it a
"commercial loss," not only because personal injuries and especially property
losses are economic losses, too-they destroy values which can be and are
monetized-but also, and more important, because tort law is a superfluous and
inapL tool for resolving purely commercial disputes. We have a body of law
designed for such disputes. It is called contract law. Products liability law has
evolved into a specialized branch of tort law for use in cases in which a
defective product caused, not the usual commercial loss, but a personal injury
to a consumer or bystander.
Miller, 902 F.2d 573, 574 (7th Cir. 1990).
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of broader questions.2 Litigants and commentators champion the opposing
schools of thought through close analysis of precedent;3 the exchange of
views as to the nature of tort law and contract law;4 and occasionally,
economic analysis.5 Their heartfelt arguments reflect origins in the distinct,
self-sufficient assumptions and insights characteristic of commercial and
product liability law. Perhaps, as a result, neither side answers the others'
contentions directly.6
Those who favor abolishing the rule use an account of a buyer's
predicament as prelude. Once the stage is set, there follows an assertion
that an otherwise dispositive point of law-a statute of limitations, or
perhaps precedent as to the enforceability of waiver-should not apply to the
particular case. Ultimately, references to the humanitarian purposes of

2. SeeNeibarger v. Universal Coops., Inc., 486 N.W.2d 612 (Mich. 1992); Jay M. Zitter,
Annotation, StrictProductsLiability: Recoveryfor Damage to ProductAlone, 72 A.L.R.4TH
12 (1989).
3. See Steven G.M. Stein et al., A Blueprintfor the Duties and Liabilities of Design
ProfessionalsAfter Moorman, 60 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 163 (1984) (discussing a painstaking
effort to reconcile the law of professional malpractice with distinctions between contract and
tort law established by Illinois case law).
4. Some courts and scholars are concerned the possible expansion of the tort system
would distort the laboriously worked out balances of the U.C.C. See Sarah B. Parker, Note,
Economic Loss in ProductLiability: Strict Liability or the Uniform Commercial Code, 28
B.C. L. REV. 383 (1987) (suggesting rough categorization of those who would create a
limitation to economic loss rule on the basis of the type of plaintiff and those who would do
so on the basis of type of injury). A University of Pennsylvania article supports the general
definition of economic loss which plaintiffs' advocates offer. See Comment Manufacturers'
Liability to Remote Purchasersfor"Economic Loss" Damages-Tortor Contract?, 114 U.
PA. L. REV. 539 (1966). However, the author concludes on a broader issue: "[T]he tort
rationale of risk distribution and the doctrine of assumption of risk, while appropriate in
personal injury cases, seem wholly inappropriate when the injury is only the loss of the value
of the purchaser's bargain." Id. at 549. The article goes on to say it would be ironic "if the
tort doctrine which was evolved to rescue the personal injury area from the 'intricacies of the
law of sales' were to imprison the economic loss area with inapposite tort concepts." Id.; see
also State ex rel. W. Seed Prod. Corp. v. Campbell, 442 P.2d 215, 217-18 (Or. 1968), cert.
denied,393 U.S. 1093 (1969); Robert L. Rabin, TortRecoveryNegligentlyInflictedEconomic
Loss, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1513 (1985).
5. William K. Jones, ProductDefects Causing Commercial Loss: The Ascendancy of
ContractOver Tort, 44 U. MIAMI L. REv. 731 (1990).
6. The reason for that failure of communication may be a belief on the part of plaintiffs'
lawyers that the term of art, strict liability, embodies social realities so deep they are beyond
debate. Conversely, the defense lawyers' instinct is that once an issue is labeled as one of
"products liability" and "policy," the battle is lost.
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modem product law arrive at a conclusion that contract law has given way
to tort law and that the individual rule or precedent is no longer pertinent.
However, on closer examination, lawyers have not demonstrated a link
between premise and conclusion. Moreover, the attorney has not shown that
contract law is inadequate in theory, or that the commercial system is unfair
in its practical workings.
Those who defend the rule operate on a different intellectual dimension
than their adversaries. Typically, the defense does not challenge their
adversaries' assumptions that a change in the rule would advance the goals
of product liability. Rather they finesse, by praising contract doctrines as
the natural channel for business 7 to provide the parties with an opportunity
to negotiate an arrangement to satisfy the needs of each.
This article tries to narrow the gap by recasting the case for the
economic loss rule in terms of the general concepts of products liability and
practical litigation.
II. THE AGENDA
Taking the classic "contract" defense of the economic loss rule as a
starting point, we attempt a more utilitarian and literal minded approach.
Our objective is to meet the concerns which lead others to call for change
head on. In the course of that effort, we urge the courts to prohibit strict
liability claims for pure economic injury, even when the potential plaintiff
is not a commercial entity. The economic loss rule, contract law, and the
commercial system have functioned sufficient enough to let people buy and
sell goods for hundreds of years. The working arrangements of everyday
life should not change because of a shift in fashion among tort and contract
theories.

7.
If the ultimate user were allowed to sue the manufacturer in negligence
merely because an article with latent defects turned out to be bad when used in
"regular service" without any accident occurring ... manufacturers would be
subject to indiscriminate lawsuits by persons having no contractual relations with
them, persons who could thereby escape the limitations, if any, agreed upon in
their contract of purchase. Damages for inferior quality, per se, should better
be left to suits between vendors and purchasers since they depend on the terms
of the bargain between them.
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 148 N.Y.S.2d 284, 290 (1955).
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Each suggestion rests on the following observations and contentions:
1) Those who criticize the rule should identify its specific problems
and explain why existing law cannot meet their needs. Often, statutory
reforms or traditional common law rulings, tailored to a specific need,
would solve the problem with minimum side effects. In contrast, a
sweeping pronouncement that tort law rather than contract law is to govern
an undefined group of cases will saddle the lower courts with practical,
doctrinal, and even constitutional problems.
2) A shift to tort liability will force manufacturing corporations to
take steps in self-protection. The ideal would be for those steps to improve
safety and to achieve other goals of product liability; however, there are
reasons to expect different results.
3) Trigger phrases such as "compensation," are important and valid
for their purpose-the identification of the goals of product liability.
However, they are neither specific nor objective enough to answer questions
at the heart of this debate. Plaintiffs' advocates propose a new system
which depends upon a vast increase in the number of tort lawsuits for
"economic loss." The court would be unable to determine whether that
approach would be as efficient as the existing system or whether it would
work at all.
4) The analysis of legal issues in terms of social needs and practical
impact is legitimate. But judges should decide whether a particular social
need exists rather than treat that central question as a background assumption settled long ago in the academic literature. To the extent the argument
for reform takes on that routinized character, strict liability will expand
through momentum and stylishness rather than the reasoned analysis of new
circumstances.
III. AN OUTLINE OF LANDMARK CASES AND THE CLASSICAL
ARGUMENTS FOR THE OPPOSING POSITION

At an early stage in the development of modem product law, the
Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the purchaser could sue in strict
liability for the value lost when a new rug developed a line which would not
9
"walk out."8 The broader teachings of Santor v. A & M Karagheusian
emphasizes that the economic burden of injuries from products should be

8. Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 207 A.2d 305 (N.J. 1965).
9. Id.
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distributed throughout the system"° and that the law should make it easier
for the consumer-plaintiff to recover."
The California Supreme Court led the counterattack in Seely v. White
Motor Co. 2 If any jurist grasped both the significance and limitations of
the new concepts, it was the authors of the opinions in Greenman v. Yuba
Power Products,Inc. " and Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.' 4 Nevertheless, Justice Traynor refused to apply strict liability to a claim for the failure
of a truck to operate properly. 5 Instead, he focused on the difference
between the risk to physical safety and the possibility that a product will not
meet the economic expectations of the buyer. 6 The former danger, he
wrote, is the logical province of the law of torts; the latter, the traditional
subject matter of contract and the law merchant. 7
Two decades later, in East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica
Delaval, Inc.,"8 the United States Supreme Court held there was no tort
claim where a turbine failed, impairing the ship's performance, but not
damaging the vessel itself or any other product. Specifically, Justice
Blackmun reasoned that: 1) a claim of that nature is best understood in
terms of warranty since the product did not meet the consumer's expecta-

10. The court was explicit on that point:
[W]hen the manufacturer presents his goods to the public for sale he accompanies them with the representation that they are safe for the intended use.... The
obligation of the manufacturer thus becomes what in justice it ought to be-an
enterprise liability, and one which should not depend upon the intricacies of the
law of sales.
Id. at 311-12; see Patricia A. Brown & Jay M. Feinman, Economic Loss, Commercial
Practices, and Legal Process: Spring Motors Distributors v. Ford Motor Company, 22
Rutgers L.J. 301 (1991) (emphasizing different concepts of rational analysis).
11.
The purpose of such liability is to insure that the cost of injuries or damage,
either to the goods sold or to other property, resulting from defective products,
is borne by the makers of the products who put them in the channels of trade,
rather than by the injured or damaged person who ordinarily are [sic] powerless
to protect themselves.
Santor, 207 A.2d at 312; see also Parker, supra note 4, at 393 (discussing cases which
followed Santor).
12. 403 P.2d 145 (Cal. 1965).
13. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
14. 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944).
15. Seely, 403 P.2d at 149.
16. Id.
17. Note that the Traynor opinion includes a thoughtful consideration of policy
questions; many of the authors' suggestions are elaborations on those themes. See id. at 145.
18. 476 U.S. 858 (1986).
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tions; 2) contract law is well suited to such commercial disputes because it
enables the parties to define their own agreement and their respective
obligations; and 3) warranty law has built-in boundaries and restraints,
whereas tort law may subject the defendant to limitless damages. 9
19. Id. at 871-74. East River has often been referred to as the "majority rule" in
products liability cases involving the economic loss issue. The Supreme Court of Alabama
adopted the EastRiver rule in Lloyd Wood Coal Co. v. Clark Equipment Co., 543 So. 2d
671 (Ala. 1989), in which the court denied recovery to the lessee of a front-end loader that
caught fire and damaged itself. The court stated the "tort concern with safety is reduced
when an injury is only to the product itself' unlike the situation in which a "person is injured,
the 'cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may be an overwhelming misfortune."'
Id. at 673 (quoting Escola, 150 P.2d at 441 (Traynor, J., concurring)). The opinion urged
that consequential economic loss caused by the failure of the product is more easily and
readily insurable; that the parties should be free to allocate risks among themselves; and
finally, that warranty law contains an adequate remedy with necessary limitations on liability,
that is, privity and remoteness. Id. at 673-74. In his dissent, Justice Jones urged that the
majority view leaves the plaintiffs "remediless" when they do not suffer personal injury or
damage to the property (other than to the product itself). Id. at 674 (Jones, J., dissenting).
In his view, "to be relegated to commercial law (breach of warranty) for their remedy is to
be without a remedy." Id. (Jones, J., dissenting). Indeed, Justice Jones suggested that "[tjhe
manufacturer of standardized products either elects to warrant the product or not warrant the
product, it can limit both the quality and the quantity of that warranty as it sees fit." Lloyd,
543 So. 2d at 675 (Jones, J., dissenting). In contrast, he "never heard of the purchaser of a
piece of machinery having any input into either the nature or the extent of any warranty
given by the manufacture." Id. (Jones, J., dissenting).
Justice Jones urged that:
The law should make no distinction between classes of plaintiffs whose injury
or loss results from a defective product... [and there] is no valid policy reason
for denying a cause of action in tort to those plaintiffs who, fortuitously, have
not suffered personal injury or property damage other than damage to the
defective product itself, but who.., are denied an action in contract because the
defective product is not covered by any form of extended warranty.
Id. (Jones, J., dissenting). This result should be compared to the Alabama Supreme Court's
opinion in Dairyland Insurance Co. v. General Motors Corp., 549 So. 2d 44 (Ala. 1989), in
which the court reversed the trial court's decision granting the defendant's summary judgment
on a negligence theory of liability. In Dairyland,a van caught fire while the plaintiff was
driving it. Although the plaintiff was not injured, the van was totally destroyed. In reversing
the negligence count,the Alabama Supreme Court held that the plaintiff set forth a "scintilla
of evidence" to satisfy the Alabama proof standard to show a defect in the van. Id. at 46.
The court applied Lloyd to bar the plaintiff's claims of negligent manufacture and extended
manufacturer liability, yet distinguished the decision from the plaintiff's negligent repair
theory wherein the plaintiff claimed he reported a problem with the van's lights to the
dealer's service personnel and staff did not follow normal procedures in response to such a
claim. Id.
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania also adopted EastRiverin Rem Coal Co. v. Clark
Equipment Co., 563 A.2d 128 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989), in which the plaintiff company

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol19/iss3/1

58

et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue

Nova Law Review

Vol. 19

The New Jersey court returned to the issue in Spring Motors Distributors v. FordMotor Co.2" The plaintiff, Spring Motors, was a corporation
in the business of selling and leasing trucks. Spring Motors purchased a

purchased a front-end loader from the defendant company to use in a strip mining business.
The plaintiff company sued the seller on a strict liability theory after the loader caught fire
and was severely damaged. The Pennsylvania Superior Court held that contract law defined
the appropriate limits of recovery, regardless of the nature of the risk created by the
malfunction. Id. at 133.
Three years later, in Jones v. General Motors, 631 A.2d 665 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992), the
Pennsylvania Superior Court extended its holding in Rem Coalto cover situations in which
the plaintiff is an ordinary consumer, rather than a commercial enterprise. The plaintiff
purchased a new Chevrolet pick-up truck, which caught fire and was destroyed while parked
and empty. The court affirmed the trial court's summary judgment for the defense. Id. at
665. The Third Circuit decision, Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.,
652 F.2d 1165 (3d Cir. 1981), referred to Rem Coal when the product defect alleged was the
lack of a fire suppression system on a front-end loader. The damage to the loader occurred
as a result of a sudden and calamitous fire. The Third Circuit qualified the defect as
dangerous, and held the plaintiff did have a tort cause of action for the event. Id. at 1174.
This conclusion was premised on the federal appellate court's prediction that the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, if confronted with the issue, would adopt an intermediary position between
Seely and Santor. Id. A conclusion which would ban recovery for economic losses in
general, but allow for tort recovery when the product posed a risk of injury to the person or
other property of the plaintiff. Id. at 1168. In application, however, the Third Circuit held
the plaintiff failed to state a cause of action in tort because it only alleged a non-dangerous
defect and a gradual deterioration of the product, and neither involved a calamitous event.
Id. at 1174-75.
Ultimately, East River led the Third Circuit to reconsider. In Aloe Coal Co. v. Clark
Equipment Co., 816 F.2d 110 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 853 (1987), the purchaser of
a front-end loader suedthe manufacturer in breach of warranty, strict liability, and negligence
when the vehicle unexpectedly caught fire and suffered damage. No other property was
damaged, nor did any personal injury result from the incident. After reviewing East River,
the Third Circuit concluded the Supreme Court's analysis was so persuasive that it would be
followed by the Pennsylvania courts. Id. at 117. The court retreated from the intermediary
position it established in PennsylvaniaGlass, and adopted the "bright-line" test enunciated
in East River. Id. In application, East River mandated the Third Circuit deny recovery in
tort, despite the calamitous nature of the event and the potentially dangerous nature of the
defect. Id. at 117. Similarly, in King v. Hilton-Davis, 855 F.2d 1047 (3d Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 1030 (1989), potato farmers sued in tort alleging the seed potatoes they
purchased were treated with Fusarex, a chemical manufactured by Hilton-Davis. The Third
Circuit reversed the jury verdict in favor of the plaintiffs. Id. at 1048. Referring to East
River as the majority rule, the Third Circuit determined that the distinctive issue of the
economic loss rule was whether the product "injures only itself." Id. at 1050. The court
concluded that the allegedly contaminated seed potatoes did not constitute "other property,"
hence, it was an instance involving only economic loss. Id. at 1051.
20. 489 A.2d 660 (N.J. 1985).
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shipment of thirty Fords, opting for the transmissions the Clark Equipment
Company supplied, rather than standard Ford equipment. When Ford and
Clark Equipment were unable to eliminate malfunctions in the transmissions,
the dealer had to sell the trucks at a loss. A little more than four years after
the purchase, Spring Motors filed suit against Ford and Clark Equipment for
breach of warranty, strict liability, and negligence. The trial court dismissed
the complaint on the ground that all claims were barred by the U.C.C.'s four
year statute of limitations. On appeal, the appellate division held that the
six year statute of limitations for tort actions applied rather than the shorter
warranty limit. After surveying New Jersey opinions on strict liability, the
intermediate appellate court concluded the extension of strict liability to
economic loss would be consistent with that development. 2'
The defendants did not cross-appeal. Accordingly, the issue before the
New Jersey Supreme Court was whether a commercial buyer of defective
goods is limited to U.C.C. remedies and is prevented from asserting claims
in strict liability and negligence.2 2
In the majority opinion, Justice Pollock did not retreat from the Santor
rule insofar as a future case might involve a consumer purchaser.23 The
court held, nevertheless, that the U.C.C. governed the sale of a fleet of
trucks to Spring Motors, a large dealership, and its reasoning left no doubt
that the result should be the same in any litigation arising from a transaction
between commercial parties which results in purely economic loss. 24 In his

21. Id. at 663.

22. Id. at 662.
23. The majority opinion in SpringMotorsconcluded the lack of privity would not have
barred the warranty action. See id. The concurring opinion expresses concern regarding the
effect the majority's reasoning in a case which did not arise from such a clearly commercial
relationship. Id. at 677 (Handler, J., concurring). Each is consistent with an argument that
the result should be the opposite in a pure "consumer" case.
24. Justice Pollock observed the U.C.C. "constitutes a comprehensive system for
determining the rights and duties of buyers and sellers with respect to contracts for the sale
of goods." Spring Motors, 489 A.2d at 665. He emphasized strict liability traditionally
applied to product defects which cause physical injury, but in this case there was a lack of
privity between the consumer and the manufacturer of the defective product. Id. at 674. The
U.C.C. is designed to simplify disputes between business entities. Id. On that basis, the
court concluded commercial parties which suffer economic losses because of defective goods
are limited to their rights and remedies under the U.C.C., and may not resort to tort theories
such as strict liability and negligence. Id.
The majority opinion further stated that the delineation of the boundary between strict
liability and the U.C.C. requires appreciation not only of the policy considerations
underscoring both sets of principles, but also of the role of the legislature as a coordinate
branch of government. Id. By enacting the U.C.C., Congress adopted a carefully conceived
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concurring opinion, Justice Handler approved the result in this instance,
specifically because the parties maintained a long-standing commercial
relationship, and it would be natural to expect the U.C.C. to govern.
Nevertheless, he expressed concern that there would not always be such a
clear-cut distinction between a commercial buyer and a "consumer," and that
there will be instances of unequal bargaining power,25 even though each
participant is a commercial entity.
Our brief synopses would do an injustice if they suggested the courts
ignored the policy dimension of the issue.26 Yet even in the landmark
decisions, the common ground fades into generalization and stylized
abstraction. Those seeking to change the rule speak of steps to equalize
bargaining power, but investigate neither the extent of the disparity of
bargaining power nor the effects of the change. Those who would support
the rule show a sturdy faith in bargaining, but say little of the numerous
instances in which there was no bargaining and never could have been.
IV. HARDER QUESTIONS FOR THE DEFENSE AND SOME ANSWERS

The classic defense of the economic loss rule draws intellectual force
from a faith that individuals and corporations know their own needs and that
bargaining between them is an efficient method for the allocation of risks

system of rights and remedies to govern commercial transactions. Spring Motors, 489 A.2d
at 674. Allowing Spring Motors to recover from Ford under tort principles would dislocate
major provisions of the U.C.C. Id. For example, application of tort principles would obviate
the statutory requirement that a buyer give notice of a breach of warranty, and would deprive
the seller of the ability to exclude or limit its liability. In sum, the U.C.C. represents a
comprehensive statutory scheme satisfying the needs of the world of commerce, and courts
should pause before developing judicial doctrines that might dislocate the legislative structure.
25. The examples Justice Handler used included sales of such vehicles to:
a travelling salesperson or a small-scale trucker, or a carpenter, plumber,
electrician, or landscape gardener. It does not follow automatically that if the
vehicle proves to be defective, the U.C.C. shall apply as the exclusive remedy
to govern recovery of direct or consequential economic loss solely because such
purchaser is in business or bought the vehicle for use in business. Rather, the
analysis should turn on whether a purchase made in that kind of setting, even if
for a business or commercial purpose, is sufficiently distinguishable from a
purchase for personal use by an ordinary private consumer to justify a difference
in remedial treatment.
Id. at 679. Justice Handler went on to discuss the possibility that the remote buyer might not
be able to benefit by the abolition of vertical privity if he did not receive notice of the manufacturer's disclaimer of liability. Id. at 680-81.
26. Spring Motors, in particular, represents a direct and conscientious evaluation of
policy considerations. See id. at 671.
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and burdens.27 Plaintiffs respond, however, that the reasoning grows
hollow when a corporation is pitted against one who does not have the
sophistication or even the opportunity to negotiate.2 8
At the least, the critics of the rule are correct that the purchaser gets no
opportunity to bargain with the intermediate sellers, even those who played
vital roles in the process that led to the complete product.29 The answer,
for the most part, must be that which the Supreme Court suggested in East
River: harshness in some individual cases is the price for a stable commercial system.
Finding the defense of the majority view not completely satisfactory
ourselves, we take consolation in exploring the countervailing unrealities of
some arguments against the rule.

A. The Lure of Oversimplification
In Santor,Justice Francis indicated that the manufacturer's responsibility should be the same whether the damage is to a person or to a rug-one
injury is like another if each is the consequence of a defect in a product.3"
The assertion was epigrammatic and forceful. But symmetry in doctrine
bumps against reality. Personal injury and economic losses are not the same
thing in ordinary speech, in practical effect, or in legal analysis.3 The

27. For example, in Spring Motors the court held when the action is between
"commercial parties with comparable bargaining power," neither strict products liability nor
negligence may be used as a basis for recovering "benefit of the bargain" or consequential
loss damages. SpringMotors, 489 A.2d at 670-71. The disappointed commercial entity will
be left to its remedies, if any, under the U.C.C. Id. at 674; see also Scandinavian Airlines
Sys. v. United Aircraft Corp., 601 F.2d 425, 429 (9th Cir. 1979).
28. For a recent case following the majority position on the economic loss rule, but
distinguishing it on policy grounds, see Detroit Bd. of Educ. v. Celotex, 493 N.W.2d 513
(Mich. Ct. App. 1992), in which the parties did not have an opportunity to negotiate because
even though the defect in the product existed from the outset, it was unknown. Celotex held
that asbestos is unique in the law, and determined the risk was not the type to be allocated
to the parties to the negotiation process. Id. at 518-19.
29. Casa Clara,620 So. 2d at 1248 (Barkett, J., dissenting). There are a number of
cases which take opposing stands as to whether the economic loss rule applies when the
parties are not in privity. See Twin Disc, Inc. v. Big Bud Tractor, 772 F.2d 1329, 1333 (7th
Cir. 1985); Hap's Aerial Enter. v. General Aviation Corp., 496 N.W.2d 680, 681-82 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1992). These cases raise the point that the rule is appropriate only when there is
a commercial relationship.
30. Santor, 207 A.2d at 309.
31. But see Rabin, supra note 4, at 1513-15 (arguing the opposing view).
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distinctions between them are in fact central to modem products liability
doctrine.
One difference lies in the demands each makes on the trial courts.
Commercial cases involve numerous parties in a variety of relationships.
Personal injury cases are often fearfully complex for other reasons.
Nonetheless, they present more concentrated and manageable fact issues in
the sense that the injury victims generally suffer harm of a single type. In
the more significant of these cases such as design litigation, a decision foror against-one claimant on the liability issue would require the same
conclusion as to the others.32
More important holdings, such as Greenman, arose from the human
experience that the economic consequences of major personal injuries tend
to devastate the individual in a way that others do not.33

32. A commentator suggests the reason why recovery is permitted for personal injury
is:
[U]n personal injury situations such as the airplane crash and building collapse,
the injury victims constitute a single class-they suffer a type of harm in
common. Barring recovery for any individual victim would mean barring the
recovery for all victims. Putting aside the accountants' liability cases, incidents
involving widespread economic loss are quite different from the cases of
multiple personal injury. The chain of commercial losses triggered by the
accidental closure of a plant or death of a person are "ripple effect" losses; in
an important sense they implicate a secondary group of victims who suffer
highly diverse types of harm.
Rabin, supra note 4, at 1533.
33. Greenman,377 P.2d at 897. The response might be that there are many economic
catastrophes which are also devastating to human victims, but that question is beyond the
scope of this paper. For better or for worse, the view that personal injury damages are
unique seems established.
Other differences between economic loss and personal injury involve the fact that
economic loss is easily quantified in advance, and thus is easily insurable. See Lloyd, 543
So. 2d at 673 (holding defendant was not strictly liable for having sold front-end loader that
caught fire and damaged itself). Damages which may be quantified in advance of the
transaction are most efficiently handled as part of the bargain, rather than by time-consuming
and expensive litigation after the fact.
Even in the case of defective automobiles-the classic situation enabling tort recovery
for buyers-courts draw a clear distinction between economic losses and personal injuries.
For example, in Hiigel v. General Motors Corp., 544 P.2d 983, 989 (Colo. 1975), the court
refused to invoke strict liability to cover lost profits resulting from a defect in a truck
purchased for business use.
Lost profit is clearly more "economic" than other types of loss which have formed the
basis for strict liability claims. However, the rationale distinguishing lost profit claims from
personal injury claims applies equally as well to other claims for economic loss damages.
See, e.g., Prairie Prod., Inc. v. Agchem Div. Pennwalt Corp., 514N.E.2d 1299 (Ind. Ct. App.
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B. Wolves in Sheep's Clothing
Another observation is equally impressionistic, yet it has both a
pedigree and a moral. Critics urge that the doctrine protects sellers at the
expense of "consumers"--a value-charged phrase. But a closer look at an
opinion which expresses that concern often reveals that it is a business,
rather than a "hapless consumer" which pushes to change the economic loss
rule.34
In Seely, for instance, Justice Traynor observed that the complaint of
overreaching by the seller had little force because the plaintiff itself was a
corporation.3" The working hypothesis drawn is that companies often
struggle to cut back the rule and that they act rationally when they do so.
The benefits of the change would flow to them as much as to individuals.
Corporations, after all, are buyers as often as sellers. Equally important,
they have the resources and institutional attention span to take full advantage
of the change. An argument that the rule protects corporations against
individuals requires a closer and more skeptical scrutiny.
The buyer who is not a corporation is not necessarily so poor or
unsophisticated as the sacred texts of products liability suggest. In Casa
Clara,for example, one of the individual claimants bought his own land and
hired a general contractor and architect.36 Rather being a contract of
1987) (denying recovery of lost profits to farmer who purchased pesticide that failed to
eliminate corn earworms, thus, deferring to legislative framework setforth in U.C.C.); Brown
v. Western Farmers Ass'n, 521 P.2d 537 (Or. 1974) (rejecting lost profit as basis for recovery
when farmer was unable to sell chickens that ate defective feed supplied by defendant); Star
Furniture Co. v. Pulaski Furniture Co., 297 S.E.2d 854 (W. Va. 1982) (refusing to extend
strict liability recovery of lost profits for plaintiff who purchased defective clock). But see
Jones v. Bender Welding & Mach. Works, 581 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1978) (allowing recovery
of lost profits under maritime negligence law by fishermen who purchased defective- boats);
Cooley v. Big Hom Harvestore Sys., Inc., 767 P.2d 740 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 813 P.2d 763 (1991) (allowing recovery on negligence theory to dairy farmers
who lost profits because grain storage system failed to prevent spoilage); Chubb Group Ins.
Cos. v. C.F. Murphy & Assocs., 656 S.W.2d 766 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (holding plaintiff
entertainment companies could recover lost profits from collapse of arena built by
defendants).
34. See, e.g., Mead Corp. v. Allendale Mutual Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 355 (N.D. Ohio
1979) (holding in favor of large corporation that successfully relied on precedent emphasizing
the plight of individual); American Drugstores v. AT&T Technologies, 583 N.E.2d 694 (I11.
2d App. Ct. 1991) (refusing to extend strict liability when several businesses sued telephone
company after fire at switching station disrupted telephone service in community because no
one sustained any injury or property damage).
35. Seely, 403 P.2d at 151-52.
36. Casa Clara, 620 So. 2d at 1249.
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adhesion, the agreement gave him the right to attorneys' fees in the event
of the seller's breach.37
Even a more representative individual buyer need not be a victim per
se. The argument against the rule frequently includes the assertion that an
ordinary person is overwhelmed by contracts and fine print. Yet people
cope with contracts every day; the generality is overbroad and even
patronizing. True, some transactions are difficult. The purchase of a home,
for example, is the largest investment the ordinary person ever makes.3"
Everyone knows that, and as a result, buying a house is the occasion in a
lifetime when the ordinary person is most likely to hire a lawyer to represent
his or her interests.39 The lawyer, moreover, can do that work at an
acceptable cost; this is customary in nature and the issues are well settled.
If the courts open the way to novel tort-based claims, that predictability
would diminish. What would this change bring the public in return?
V. THE LACK OF A SINGLE, COMPELLING OBJECTIVE
Although the debate is one of the great pieces of products liability lore,
it still is unclear what the advocates of change strive to accomplish.4" One
answer, implicit in the complaints of unequal bargaining power, is they
think the change would make the process of negotiation and compromise
more equitable.
Even if given the chance, would the ordinary consumer dicker with
dozens of suppliers over the prices and specifications of engine blocks, seat
springs, shatterproof glass, and hundreds of other individual components
rather than buy a complete automobile?4 To the extent the buyer would
not do such a thing, the case for dismantling the commercial system to cure
the supposed lack of opportunity grows more dubious.
Any initial impression of unfairness fades even more when one
considers the buyer has enforceable rights against the seller of a house or of

37. Id.
38. Id. at 1247 (citing Conklin v. Hurley, 428 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1983)).
39. Id.
40. In the individual case, of course, the change could lead to a plaintiff's victory, but
that is not a coherent intellectual basis for broad change.
41. In theory, if the buyer had an opportunity to bargain, the buyer could demand a
written extension of warranty from the supplier of each component. The common sense
response is that the possibility of product failure of one of the components sometime in the
future is not enough to justify all the paperwork. However, the same possibility could not
justify adding new complexities to lawsuits and imposing new burdens on the courts.
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any other product.42 Further, the
components at a preceding stage.43
own customer might complain and
This put pressure on the business to

seller almost always was the buyer of
To survive, it had to remember that its
even sue if any component should fail.
search for good materials and to bargain

for warranty coverage, for the consumer's ultimate benefit." This indirect

42. See, e.g., Hartley v. Ballou, 209 S.E.2d 776 (N.C. 1974) (extending implied
warranty recovery against builder of house that flooded during rainy weather); George v.
Veach, 313 S.E.2d 920 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984) (allowing recovery for breach of implied
warranty by buyer of house with failed septic system against builder of house).
Recovery under implied warranty in the context of a builder's liability is traceable to
the 1884 United States Supreme Court decision, Kellogg Bridge Co. v. Hamilton, 110 U.S.
108 (1884). In Kellogg, the Court allowed recovery by a railroad company against the
company it hired to build a bridge when the temporary supports of the bridge collapsed
becausethe bridge company breached the implied warranty that the temporary supports would
be reasonably suitable for the use contemplated by both parties. Id. at 118-19.
43. It is true, of course, that the intermediaries hope to keep the benefit of the bargain
for themselves rather than pass it on to the purchaser of home. However, that question is the
subject ofthe negotiations between "homeowners" and "developers" over price, warranty, and
quality.
44. For example, the court may find that an oversight by the maker of a product led to
a defect and the failure of a product, the maker exercised a level of prudence that precluded
any claim under implied warranty, even for the initial purchaser. See, e.g., City of Mounds
View v. Walijarvi, 263 N.W.2d 420, 424 (Minn. 1978) (refusing recovery under implied
warranty against architect when plaintiff's building suffered from water seepage despite fact
that builders followed architect's plans because the "inescapable possibility of error which
inheres in [architectural] services"). But see Broyles v. Brown Eng'g Co., 151 So. 2d 767
(Ala. 1963) (holding defendant civil engineering company liable under implied warranty for
occasional failure of drainage system despite lack of evidence of negligence).
Recovery may also be precluded in situations which neither buyer nor seller could have
reasonably foreseen the defect in the subject of the transaction. CompareWitty v. Schramm,
379 N.E.2d 333 (Ill. 3d App. Ct. 1978) (refusing to imply warranty that no subsurface waters
would be present in unimproved building lots and noting neither party had superior
knowledge as to existence of subsurface waters) with Jordan v. Talaga, 532 N.E.2d 1174
(Ind. 4th Ct. App. 1989) (allowing recovery under implied warranty for buyer of building lot
who found property was in natural water course, and was therefore worthless even though
seller carried out significant improvements on property, was a professional real estate
developer, was in best position to forego development of the lot and knew of the existence
of the natural water course).
When a subsequent purchaser, not in privity with the maker or initial seller, seeks to
recover damages caused by a defect in the product courts may bar recovery unless the
subsequent purchaser is endangered in a way that was foreseeable to the initial seller.
CompareHuang v. Garner, 203 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1st Ct. App. 1984) (allowing recovery under
negligence theory by subsequent purchaser of apartment building built by defendant) with
Stuart v. Coldwell Banker Commercial Group, Inc., 745 P.2d 1284 (Wash. 1987) (refusing
recovery from builder under implied warranty to owners of condominium who had no direct
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protection for later purchasers is neither absolute nor inevitably sufficient.
Its existence, however, calls for rebuttal from the proponents of change.
VI.

SOME COSTS OF REFORM

A. The Uncertaintiesin the New Body of Law
Those who would change the rule speak as if tort theory were a fully
developed body of law which the courts could transplant to the new factual
matrix with little difficulty. The reality is different.
Products liability only recently became a significant branch of the
45
law, and vital doctrinal questions are still unsettled.46 Consider the decades of wrangling over the meaning of "defect" and the extent to which
recent proposals for the revision of section 402(a) of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts have fanned the flames. 7 In addition, there are disputes
as to how the jury should be instructed.

dealings with builder because the defects did not cause a violent occurrence).
45. David G. Owen, A Highly Blameworthy Manufacturer: Implications on Rules of
Liability and Defense of ProductLiabilityActions, 10 IND. L. REV. 769 (1977).
The seminal cases that spearheaded the modem development ofproducts liability
law were decided in 1960 and 1963. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,
32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal.
2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). The predominant treatise on
products liability, L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTs LIABILITY (1976),

was first published in 1960, and the first edition of the other treatise in the field,
R. HURSH (now with H. BAILEY), AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY (2d
ed. 1974), was published one year later. The first Canadian text, S. WADDAMS,
PRODUCTS LIABILITY, was published in 1974, and the first English text has just
been published, C.J. MILLER & P. LOVELL, PRODUCT LIABILITY (Butterworths

1977).
Id. at 771 n.18.
46. RICHARD A. EPsTErN, MODERN PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 69 (1980). Professor
Epstein demonstrated design liability embraces fundamentally different categories, and
currently the law has not created a rigorous standard for the complex, important cases. Id.
Johnson v. General Motors Corp., 438 S.E.2d 28 (W. Va. 1993), is an example of the
fluid and unsettled nature of the products liability doctrine. In Johnson,claims arising from
a head-on collision required the state court to touch on the complexities of"crashworthiness:"
the doctrine and the burden of proof in that context; the relationship between one view of the
burden and the legislation governing the offsets of settlements; the collateral source rule; the
distinction between a defendant's position under a duty to warn based on strict liability and
one based on negligence; the "two issue rule;" and other matters. Id. at 33-42.
47. Alvin S. Weinstein et al., ProductLiability: An Interactionof Law and Technology,
12 DUQ. L. REV. 425, 431 (1974).
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The meaning or effect of some concepts vary in the different context
of tort and contract law. Nothing might seem more familiar or indisputable
than the manufacturer's ability to comprehend the nature of the product's
probable performance better than the consumer who happens to be hurt in
an accident. When the product does not cause physical harm, however, the
balance of advantage is the mirror image of those personal injury cases in
which strict liability took shape. Now it is the buyer who knows where the
product will be used and whether it must act in conjunction with other
devices or components. The manufacturer or intermediate seller may not
know those things; at best, its information comes from the buyer. As a
result, the seller has no greater chance to predict the severity of the damage
than the buyer.4 In fact, quite often the seller has less of a chance.49
The change would also burden routine sales with the tort concept of the
duty to warn. The impact of that departure would be magnified by the
judicial temptation to object to virtually any label or instruction provided for
a jury review." All this clashes with the contractual allocation of risk."'
Further, those new claims will overlap the warranty rights which purchasers
already have.
On a more practical level, if lawyers analyze economic loss cases
through the prism of tort theory, they will be encouraged to try them like
tort cases. Yet it would not add to the efficiency of commercial life to
import more of the theatrics of personal injury litigation. 2 For example,
the plaintiff's tactical reason for pleading tort rather than contract might be
to lay the groundwork for a punitive damage count. That, in turn, would
bring greater uncertainty as to whether jurors will respond to attacks on the
character and morality of the defendant.
48. James A. Henderson & Aaron D. Twerski, A ProposedRevision of Section 402A
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1512 (1992).
49. Id.
50. It is true that sophisticated buyers often give the seller specific requirements for
products, but that is an example of bargaining, the subject of contract law.
51. Courts have recognized that a buyer may consider a "defective" product to be a good
bargain if the defect is apparent and reflected in the price. Holding the seller strictly liable
in these situations would make these transactions unavailable to consumers and reduce the
value of products with patent defects below their true market value. See Aronsohn v.
Mandara, 484 A.2d 675 (N.J. 1984) (denying buyer of house recovery for defects
discoverable upon reasonable inspection, which should have been reflected in price paid);
Meadowbrook Condominium Ass'n v. Southern Burlington Realty Corp., 565 A.2d 238 (Vt.
1989) (denying recovery under implied warranty to condominium purchasers, who
presumably paid less for their units acquired after defects in common areas became apparent).
52. See EPSTEIN, supranote 46, at 107 (discussing the lack of unlimited boundaries to
liability and the extent to which the duty to warn is also in the midst of development).
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B. The Burden at the Working Level
These difficulties are not academic curiosities. If the economic loss
rule was abolished, trial judges would have to revisit settled issues of
contract law in light of tort principles. 3 The proposal, after all, is to set
up a new universe of precedent. This must be parallel to contract law, but
sufficiently distinct from the cases to produce different results in significant
cases. Otherwise, there would be no point. Further, the promise of change
gives the plaintiffs lawyer a professional duty to contest what once
appeared clear.
In turn, those who manufacture and sell goods must foresee the answers
courts would give to those questions. Indeed, in many instances the
boundaries of the manufacturer's risk would be set by the subjective
"expectations" of the purchaser as his or her lawyer chooses to reconstruct
them long after the sale. This necessarily reduces the predictability and
utility of limitations on warranty or waivers.
Equally important is the fact that producers would have to guess
whether another court might decide that a buyer,54 or anyone to whom that
buyer might resell55 the product, lacked "bargaining power., 56 This

53. See, e.g., Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987) (illustrating the possible
dangers judges might face, although the Pennzoil-Texaco situation arose from a different tort
theory).
54. Rabin, supra note 4, at 1536.
When the ripple effects characteristic of widespread economic loss are
involved-that is, the disruption of a heterogenous conglomeration of commercial and financial relationships occur-the prospect of reasonable foresight is
especially attenuated.
Whether this point is equally applicable to the more modest case of
widespread economic loss in which physical harm to a particular individual-the
running down of a pedestrian, for example-triggers a variety of collateral
financial losses, ranging from the victim's boss to his barber, is a closer
question. In this situation, however, the relatively weak deterrence claim is
arguably outweighed by the ethical objection to extended liability for a careless
act.
Moreover, because potentially widespread loss is often either uninsurable
or very expensive to insure against, the superior risk-spreading capability of
defendants, whether commercial or individual, is open to serious doubt.
Id. at 1536-38.
55. Or anyone else to whom the product might pass later.
56. Variations and asymmetry often exist in individual sales transactions "upstream" and
"downstream" from the manufacturer. Contractual bargains up and down the line of
production and distribution would be affected by application of a tort theory of liability for
the failure of the product to live up to the expectations of the purchaser. Should all suppliers
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problem would not be limited to large corporate vendors. Small companies
would have the same risk even when they dealt with relatively wealthy
individuals.
The "horrible" does not always materialize and in fact cases such as
Greenman and Henningsen did not disrupt commerce."
The reason,
however, is not that the danger was imaginary, but that the judges who
developed products liability doctrine recognized that tinkering is justified
only when the disparity in bargaining power is glaring."
Those who
would do away with the economic loss rule have not defined the potential
consequences their proposals.
Arguments stating that a change from contract to tort would simplify
and rationalize the legal system have vigor and simplicity. But that
impression fades upon closer inspection. The supposed reform would
actually complicate the liability analysis in some cases.
The distinctions of the principles between strict liability and contractual
liability, which is seldom clear in product disputes, grow more blurry when
the economic loss case arises from a claim of design defect.59 Potential
plaintiffs urge that the jury should balance the risk, the costs, and the utility
to indicate whether there is a defect. While consumers strike that balance
when they decide whether to buy a product or not, jurors could not make
more precise judgments after the fact. There also would be a question as
to how the jury's finding of a "contract breach" differs from a finding of a
defect in an instance where there is no formal agreement.
To be sure, there are important differences between the two bodies of
doctrine. However, "different" is not necessarily "better."

of raw materials, contractors, distributors, etc., obtain insurance against liability, limitless in
amount, scope, and time? Balancing of the kind required in sales transactions is the function
of the U.C.C. and the law of sales, which provide a flexible means by which to measure the
proper expectations of all of the parties.
57. Even though it is simpler and less time consuming, classification by category might
be inaccurate in many instances. Putting aside the question of fairness, the alternative would
be a time consuming, case by case determination of the relative buying powers of the parties.
More sophisticated academic writing calls for the analysis of the relationship between the
plaintiffs and a determination as to whether or not commercial results will govern. The
argument is logical, but as one of its proponent's put it, it would require sophisticated
analysis of a variety of cases at the trial level, thus it would be impractical.
58. However, many would argue that those legal developments have had adverse
marginal effects on cost and efficiency.
59. See Brown & Feinman, supranote 10, at 341. Only a very significant difference
between the parties' risk-bearing abilities is relevant to the court in its determination of who
is the superior risk bearer. Id.
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VII. THE UNCERTAINTY AS TO WHO WOULD GAIN,
How, AND WHY
The tort statute of limitations is often shorter than that for contract
claims. In addition, the tort action may not survive the death of a party.6"
Notions of causation are less restrictive in tort law than in contract law6
and "foreseeability," already an amorphous concept in contract doctrine, is
still less defined in tort law.62
Finally, tort damage principles are often looser than contract damage
principles. Contract law gives the claimant the benefit of the bargain rather
than compensation for loss.63 Each of the established contract principles
developed as courts examined a variety of cases and refined their responses
to realities. One of the resulting contract doctrines may be error; all may
be mere historical artifacts. Yet before a court accepts either suggestion, it
should ask more specific justification for dismantling a system which has
evolved over centuries and which permits the doing of the world's work, no
matter how imperfectly.

A. The Purchaser Without Tears
Plaintiffs tend to speak as if there was a consensus that the change
would help consumers or buyers as a class, and that this is a public benefit
so great that compels the abolition of the economic loss rule."
The premise, beguiling so long as its not closely examined, is that a
change in the law is desirable if it would make it easier for consumers, or
special subcategories of that broad class, to recover for a particular

60. W. PAGE KEETON Er AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 655 (5th ed. 1984).
61. Similarly, immunities such as those of municipal corporations or charities may bar
tort claims, but not contract claims.
62. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, PROSSER ON TORTS §§ 42, 92 (4th ed. 1971).
63. East River, 476 U.S. at 873-74 n.9.
64. Dean Prosser suggests the tort remedy is often more advantageous to the injured
party because it permits the recovery of larger damages, beyond the prototypical limitations
of Hadley v. Baxendale. KEETON, supranote 60, § 9.2, at 665 (citing Hadley v. Baxendale,
156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854)). A tort action may also allow recovery for wrongful death
whereas, a contract action would not. See East River, 476 U.S. at 874 (placing great
emphasis on the distinction between tort and contract).
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injury.6 The threshold question is whether it should be easier for the
buyer to prevail under the particular circumstances. 6
It is debatable whether plaintiffs, as a class, need more help. Newly
created implied warranties, condominium legislation and other specialized
statutes already have made the balance more favorable for particular
groups.67 A "reform," giving them additional bargaining power, would
help some individual members of those classes win more lawsuits, but it will
not always be the plaintiff who gains from the change. For example, to
demand proof that the other side was guilty of negligence could make
recovery more difficult for some claimants. More generally, traditional
warranty law, the U.C.C., and specialized reform statutes, such as lemon
laws, provide significant protection for the broad class of "purchasers." '
If some need more, the next question is whether the abolition of the
economic loss rule is the best way for the courts to help them. Assuredly,
there are other paths. Even when codified, general contract and warranty
doctrines are flexible enough to allow a court to do justice in the exceptional
case. A judge can refuse to enforce an unconscionable contract,69 or more
specifically, an agreement in which waivers or limitations of liability are so
extreme that the remaining remedy fails its essential purpose.7"
On the other hand, the abolition of the economic loss rule might not
make a significant difference to most individuals, or even to a company
which has a small claim. In practice, if not in theory, a dispute which
involves only property damage at the consumer level cannot often generate

65. The plaintiff's lawyer urging the change in particular cases know what they are
doing. Clients would win the individual matters, but that is not enough to justify judicial

action.
66. Mitchell v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 669 F.2d 1199, 1204 (8th Cir. 1982).
67. That poirnt may seem too obvious to be interesting. Nevertheless, even some
academic writing seems t6 come dangerously close to saying requirements of proof should
be abolished for no reason other than they work to the disadvantage of plaintiff. See Gerald
F. Teitz et al., Crashworthinessand Erie: DeterminingState Law Regardingthe Burden of
62 TEMP. L.Q. 587, 621 n.21 (1989) (criticizing Huddell
ProvinganddpportioningDamages,
requirements of proof in "second collision" or "crashworthiness" case because, as long as
they remain in force, plaintiff would have to base his or her claim on "speculation or
conjecture or both" in instances where an expert can say the design caused the particular

harm).
68. See Casa Clara,620 So. 2d at 1247.
69. See U.C.C. §§ 2-313 (express warranty), 2-314 (implied warranty for merchant-

ability), 2-315 (warranty of fitness for a particular purpose) (1994);

JAMES

L.

WHITE

&

ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 406 (2d ed. 1980).

70. U.C.C. § 2-302 (1994). See generally WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 69
(discussing related doctrines and remedies).
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a contingent fee attractive to the specialized plaintiffs' bar. However, it
seems reasonable to expect that most of these cases will be handled as they
always have been, by a neighborhood lawyer or the associate who takes his
wife's uncle's case in the hope that it will lead to greater things. A typical
trial will be a matter of a half-day in a county court, not a venue in which
a lawyer7 1 often could explore the nuances and complexities of strict
liability.
The differences will matter, of course, in other cases. Strict liability
is more likely to occur in those instances where the litigants have large
amounts at stake and have bargained over difficulties which each side
foresaw. That brings us full circle to Seely and the classical insight that
such disputes are the meat and drink of contract law.
VIII. THE FALSE PROMISE OF EXCEPTIONS AND DISTINCTIONS
A. Assumed Boundaries and Their Life Expectancy
Insofar as the objective is to shield the individual buyer, the answer
might be to preserve the economic loss rule for disputes between corporations or commercial enterprises, but to abolish the doctrine where the
plaintiff is an individual. That, however, would mean one rule for
businesses and another for those who buy products from these businesses.72
The equilibrium could not be stable.
It is the nature of a sales controversy to drag commercial enterprises
into what began as simple disputes between private persons or small
businesses. For example, when an individual plaintiff obtains a tort verdict
against a supplier, builder, or manufacturer, the defendant will usually
demand contribution or indemnity from the corporate suppliers further back
71. For an example of a case discussing the complexities of strict liability see Spring
Motors, 465 A.2d at 530. The essential argument before the Superior Court of New Jersey
was that the extension of strict liability would clash with the statutory scheme and was not
supported by the policies which underlie strict liability or the weight of authority. Id. at 533.
72. Courts more readily apply the economic loss rule in cases in which the plaintiff and
defendant are both sophisticated commercial enterprises. Compare Public Serv. Co. v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 685 F. Supp. 1281 (D.N.H. 1988) (denying tort recovery to
plaintiff company, which sustained losses when steam turbine generator purchased from
defendant company malfunctioned) and Utah Int'l, Inc. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 775 P.2d
741 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 772 P.2d 884 (N.M. 1989) (denying tort recovery to
plaintiff company who purchased from defendant company a coal hauling machine which
caught fire) with McConnell v. Caterpillar Tractor Corp., 646 F. Supp. 1520 (D.N.J. 1986)
(extending tort recovery for economic losses to plaintiff fisherman who purchased boat engine
from defendant company).
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in the chain of distribution. A comparable dynamic requires that lawyers
adapt to the arguments first inspired by the plight of the individual to the
needs of ever-larger clients. The cry, in fact, already has gone up that small
business also lacks bargaining power.73
IX. SOME DRAWBACKS TO THE "CATASTROPHIC RISK" AND
"SEPARATE PRODUCT" EXCEPTIONS

A court may be more receptive to incremental adjustments in the
economic loss rule than to a revolutionary change. Problems still lurk
beneath the surface. The boundaries of the rule are murky74 and they will
grow less settled if each case is to require the analysis of the consequences
which might have come to pass. The ordeal could become a perpetual
motion machine, given the impact of the related argument that there should
be tort recovery where a product failure is "violent" or likely to create "risks
to personal safety."
Plaintiffs struggle to equate their cases to conventional tort claims,
crying out against injuries that would have occurred if the product had failed
in a different way, and possibly killing or maiming someone. At times, this
is only lawyerly melodrama.75
Most product failures can be characterized as involving at least a
"potential" danger to human life if the plaintiff's attorney has even modest
theatrical talent.76 That is not a practical limitation on liability, nor one

73. See CasaClara,620 So. 2d at 1248 (Barkett, J., dissenting); see also SpringMotors,
489 A.2d at 677 (Handler, J., concurring) (stating it would not be long before plaintiffs'
advocates begin to tell trial courts one company concealed information, and as a result, the
other suffered because of its "relative" lack of bargaining power).
74. East River, 476 U.S. at 875.
75. In Bellevue South Associates v. HRH Construction Corp., 574 N.Y.S.2d 165, 170
(1991), the Court of Appeals of New York denied recovery in strict products liability for the
replacement of a defective floor in residential apartments. The court found no reason to
adopt the East River rule because the plaintiff failed to meet even a less restrictive test. Id.
The evidence did not show damage to persons or other property or even risk of such injury
from the defective tiles. Id. Thus, they were not an inherently dangerous product and the
specific failure, delamination of the tiles, was not considered an abrupt, cataclysmic event.
Id.; see Norman L. Greene, Away from Ideology: A Review of ProductLiability Defenses
in the Era of Tort Reform, 13 PACE L. REv. 43, 75 (1993).
76. In CasaClara,lower grade concrete the buyer purchased led to "spalling," cracking,
and staining. It was not unreasonable to extrapolate a situation whereby homeowners found
their roofs falling, subjecting innocent people to broken bones, if not death, and as a result,
shattering families. The fact that injuries did not actually occur did not make the accounts
less blood curdling. Casa Clara,620 So. 2d at 1247.
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In Kodiak Electric Ass'n v. Delaval Turbine, 694 P.2d 150 (Alaska 1984), the plaintiff
electric company sued the maker of a generator that failed, leading to an overload that caused
another to fail, and in turn caused an electrical fire. The plaintiff argued that, since it was
customary for two workers to go near the unit that caught fire, and since-had they been near
it at the time of the fire-they could have been injured, the failure was dangerous, and should
trigger tort liability. Id. at 153. The Alaskan Supreme Court accepted the argument on the
basis of the potential danger to persons. Id. at 154. This result is consistent with the
Alaskan Supreme Court decision in Shooshanian v. Wagner, 672 P.2d 455 (Alaska 1983).
Wagner, the general contractor, insulated the plaintiff's building with urea formaldehyde
foam insulation ("Insulspray"). Id. at 457. The plaintiffs moved into the building, but
months later found the Insulspray gave off noxious and malodorous fumes causing allergic
reactions and creating a health hazard. Id. The plaintiff accused Wagner of negligently
installing the insulation, and sought relief because the fumes drove customers away, reducing
the value of the building to almost nothing. Id. The court permitted the tort claims, holding
the plaintiffs' stated a claim upon which relief may be granted under the theories of both
implied warranty and strict liability. Shooshanian, 672 P.2d at 462-64. The court reached
its decision by contrasting Shooshanian with an earlier opinion, Morrow v. New Moon
Homes. Id. at 462-64 (citing Morrow, 548 P.2d 279 (Alaska 1976)). In Morrow, the
plaintiffs sued in tort, alleging the mobile home they purchased had a leaky roof, ill-fitting
windows and doors, a noisy furnace, and other features that made the mobile home so poor
a bargain that they should not pay. Morrow, 548 P.2d at 281-82. The Shooshanian court
contrasted the "poor product" allegation of Morrowwith the claim in the instant case because
the use of the allegedly toxic substance in the building physically altered the structure in a
manner rendering it harmful to the plaintiffs. Shooshanian, 672 P.2d at 464.
Perhaps, more insightful is the Alaskan Supreme Court's decision Cloud v. Kit
Manufacturing Co., 563 P.2d 248, 249 (Alaska 1977), in which dissatisfied mobile home
purchasers sued, alleging the polyurethane foam rug padding provided to them as part of the
mobile home package ignited, and caused the trailer to catch fire. The Alaskan Supreme
Court held the resulting injury constituted "property damage" rather than unrecoverable
"economic loss," even though the line between the two is "not always easy to discern,
particularly when the plaintiff is seeking compensation for loss of the product itself." Id. at
251. The court stated that it could not "lay down an all inclusive rule to distinguish between
the two categories; however.., sudden and calamitous damage will almost always result in
direct property damage and that deterioration, internal breakage and depreciation will be
considered economic loss." Id. (citing Note, Economic Loss in Products Liability
Jurisprudence,66COLUM. L. REV. 917, 918 (1966) [hereinafter EconomicLoss]). The court
provided, as an example, a scenario in which a "defective radiator causes property damage
when it results in a fire which destroys the plaintiff's store and causes economic harm
because the resulting conditions are so uncomfortable it causes the loss of customer
patronage." Cloud, 563 P.2d at 251 n.8 (citing EconomicLoss, supra,at 918); cf. Northern
Power Eng'g Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 623 P.2d 324 (Alaska 1981) (categorizing
failure of defective oil pressure "shutdown" mechanism that caused engine to stop working
as entirely economic loss since other property was not damaged).
The result in Hiigel v. General Motors Corp., 544 P.2d 983 (Colo. 1976), is antithetical
to the EastRiver doctrine. The plaintiff purchased a motor home from a retailer. The trailer
was manufactured and assembled by the Aspen Coach Corporation and mounted on a
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Chevrolet chassis manufactured by General Motors. On several occasions, the trailer wheel
lug bolts sheared off, causing the dual wheels to fall off the vehicle. Plaintiff sued in strict
liability. The trial court dismissed the claim under the economic loss doctrine. Id. at 987.
On appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court reversed, following Santor. Id. at 989. "Since
under § 402A [of the Restatement (Second) of Torts] the burden of having cast a defective
product into the stream of commerce falls upon the manufacturer, it appears inconsistent to
limit his responsibility to property other than the product sold." Id.
In John R. Dudley Construction Co. v. Drott Manufacturing Co., 412 N.Y.S.2d 512
(App. Div. 1979), a construction crane suddenly collapsed. This resulted in serious damage
to the crane, but no damage to persons or other property. Holding the event constituted
"property damage," the court distinguished Santor, reasoning that where there is no physical
injury, "it could not be claimed that [the] defendant had committed the tort of marketing a
product which contained a defect that made it, when properly used, dangerous to life or limb
or property." Id. at 515; see also Gainous v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 491 F. Supp. 1345, 1347
(N.D. Ga. 1980) (allowing negligence claim for property damage to defective chattel through
analysis of analogous cases even though court found no Georgia precedent to distinguish
between "economic loss" and "property damage").
Moorman Manufacturing. Co. v. National Tank Co., 414N.E.2d 1302 (I1. 1980), rev'd,
435 N.E.2d 443 (III. 1982), focused on a drain storage tank which cracked after 10 years of
use. The reviewing court determined this was not the type of sudden, dangerous occurrence
best served by tort law policy, rather, the loss was seen as "commercial," a type best handled
by contract Id. at 450. Justice Moran expressed the majority view as follows: When "the
harm relates to the consumer's expectation that a product is of a particular quality so that it
is fit for ordinary use" and the defect is of a qualitative nature, contract law is appropriate.
Id. at 451. To hold the manufacturer "strictly liable in tort for the commercial loss suffered
by a particular purchaser, it would be liable for business losses of other purchasers caused
by the failure of the product to meet the specific needs of their business." Id. at 447. The
majority rejected the suggestion that if there is any physical harm, all losses should be
recoverable. Id. at 452. The concurring opinion suggested that in some instances, plaintiffs
could recover, even in the absence of privity. Moorman, 435 N.E.2d at 456 (Simon, J.,
concurring). Obviously, the question does not allow for a uniform answer. The proper
approach is to develop a system of warranties out of privity to protect warranty-like, that is
contract-like, interests, while resorting to tort theories to protect tort interests.
In Prairie Production, Inc. v. Agchem Division-Pennwalt Corp., 514 N.E.2d 1299 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1987), economic losses were not recoverable by a seed corn grower on the basis of
a negligence claim against the manufacturer of a pesticide that failed to eliminate corn
earworms leading to lost profits. The reasoning emphasized a claim for lost profits was
purely economic in nature, and therefore recovery was limited to contract. Id. at 1304.
Further, to allow recovery of economic losses in a tort-based claim would circumvent the
legislative framework set forth in the U.C.C. Id. at 1304-05; see also cases cited supra note
72.
In Detroit Edison Co. v. Nabco, Inc., 35 F.3d 236 (6th Cir. 1994), Detroit Edison, a
utility company, filed suit against Dravo Corporation and Vectura Group, Inc. (collectively,
"Dravo") for damages resulting from the explosion of a 40 foot section of hot reheat pipe
located in a power producing unit. Dravo fabricated and supplied all of the reheat pipe to
Detroit Edison. Detroit Edison sought damages in tort for over $20 million in damages for
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which sellers could evaluate in advance. A part of the truth may be that the
humanitarian basis of the product liability revolution decays into bombast
when the claim is only for property damage."
the cost of repairing or replacing the defective pipe and surrounding machinery; repairing
other machinery and property damaged by the explosion; cleaning up and removing the
asbestos insulation used on the reheat pipe; inspecting all of the reheat pipe; purchasing
replacement power from other utility companies while the damaged power unit was repaired
and inspected and while other units were operating at a reduced capacity to minimize the risk
of another explosion. Id. at 238. Following Neibarger v. Universal Cooperatives, Inc., 486
N.W.2d 612 (Mich. 1992), the trial court granted summary judgment for the defense, holding
that all of Detroit Edison's tort claims were barred under the economic loss doctrine. Detroit
Edison, 35 F.3d at 238. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding:
[The rule which] emerges from Neibarger significantly narrows the "other
property" exception while expanding the definition of economic loss. Under
Neibarger,tort claims for damage to other property are barred by the economic
loss doctrine if those losses are direct and consequential losses that were within
the contemplation of the parties and that, therefore, could have been the subject
of negotiations between the parties.
Id. at 241 (citing Neibarger,486 N.W.2d at 620). The Sixth Circuit reasoned the Michigan
Supreme Court "significantly curtail[ed] the applicability of the 'other property' exception
to the economic loss doctrine, while [simultaneously] expanding the meaning of 'economic
loss."' Id. at 243.
77. See, e.g., PennsylvaniaGlass, 652 F.2d at 1165 (holding seller of front-end loader
liable in tort for defect that caused loader to catch fire, despite fact that it only damaged itself
because fire was sudden and calamitous); Gainous, 491 F. Supp. at 1345 (extending tort
recovery to buyer of plane which malfunctioned in midflight, necessitating emergency landing
resulting in damage to only airplane); Shooshanian,672 P.2d at 455 (holding tort recovery
was available to buyer of product with dangerous defect, regardless of suddenness of
product's failure); NorthernPower, 623 P.2d at 324 (denying recovery to buyer of generator
that seized because there was no evidence of damage to persons or property, and failure
created no risk to persons or property); Cloud, 563 P.2d at 248 (categorizing damage
resulting from fire caused by polyurethane foam rug padding included in mobile home as
recoverable "property damage," and noting that sudden and calamitous damage is generally
put in this category, while deterioration, internal breakage, and depreciation are generally
considered economic loss); Moorman, 435 N.E.2d at 443 (refusing recovery under strict
liability by buyer of grain storage tank that developed crack which buyer did not discover
until months later, and distinguishing cases in which defect causes violence or collision with
external objects); Drott, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 512 (holding construction crane that suddenly
collapsed created "property damage," despite fact that it only damaged itself, because it was
dangerous to life or property); Economic Loss, supra note 76, at 917 (arguing defective
radiator that causes fire and destroys plaintiff's store causes economic harm, while radiator
that creates uncomfortable conditions that leads to drop in patronage causes only economic
loss).
Courts may be more inclined to treat loss which is essentially economic as property
damage when the defect at issue creates severe inconvenience for the buyer, even when it
threatens damage only to itself. In Hiigel, the Colorado Supreme Court extended tort
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In other instances, however, the evidence does suggest a genuine risk.
Where the injuries are tangible, it is difficult to quantify the risk in a
mass-produced product. Where an accident does not occur, the risk itself
becomes indistinguishable from the rhetorical effects which the attorney
creates. And even here, those who would change the rule fail to trace the
link between premise and conclusion.
Under traditional law, if negligence or a product defect creates a danger
and yet does no harm in the specific instance, there is no tort.7" Opening
that gate would give anyone who "might" have been hurt a right to sue-an
idea that courts have rejected for centuries."9
At first glance the contention that a defective product is "separate"
from other components of a building or complex machine"0 may seem to

make more sense. 8 But hours, if not days of threshold testimony must
recovery to the buyer of a motor home trailer that had to be tested to assess the level of
torque pressure at particular intervals of mileage driven. Hiigel, 544 P.2d at 988.
78. See, e.g., A.J.P. Contracting Corp. v. Brooklyn Builders Co., 11 N.Y.S.2d 662 (Sup.
Ct. 1939), afjrd, 28 N.E.2d 412 (N.Y. 1940); MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E.
1050 (N.Y. 1916) (refusing tort recovery when the defective product did not cause injury or
property damage).
79. See Harris v. Forklift, 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
80. See, e.g., Northridge Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 471 N.W.2d 179 (Wis. 1991). In
Northridge, the owners of two shopping centers brought suit against the builder of the
shopping malls. Plaintiff purchased the asbestosproduct directly from the general contractor,
not from the manufacturer. Id. at 180. The owners apparently thought they had some kind
of warranty claim because they sued for breach of warranty, as well as under several tort
theories. Id. Plaintiffs claimed the material was defective and unreasonably dangerous; they
incurred increased expenses for inspection, testing, and removal of the material; and they
suffered diminished value of the properties upon sale. Id. The fire coating manufacturer
successfully argued the only damages claimed for economic loss arose from a perceived
problem with the material itself, and thus, recovery on the tort claims was barred. Id. The
circuit court also held that any warranty claim was barred by the statute of limitations, and
it dismissed the action. Northridge,471 N.W.2d at 180. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin
accepted a petition for bypass and reversed. Id. On appeal, the plaintiffs did not argue the
material failed to perform as expected, but rather the asbestos in the product contaminated
the shopping centers, thereby damaging property other than the product itself. Id. The
defendant argued that the plaintiffs did not allege any damage to such property other than the
reduced economic value of the other property resulting from the mere presence of the
material. Id.
81. In East River, the Supreme Court pointed out the complex nature of modem
industrial products would make the rule meaningless if it were limited to individual
components. East River, 476 U.S. at 871. East River was decided under admiralty law.
Therefore, one might posit its holding as non-binding on state courts or even on federal
courts in non-admiralty cases. Nevertheless, the opinion appears persuasive, wholly aside
from Justice Blackmun's analysis beginning with the premise that admiralty law incorporated

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol19/iss3/1

78

et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue

Nova Law Review

Vol. 19

drag by as plaintiffs try to prove the "separable" nature of each "product"
or component.82

general principles of product liability law. Id. at 863.
In King v. Hilton-Davis, 855 F.2d 1047 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1030
(1989), the Third Circuit considered the "separability" of a product under East River. The
plaintiff farmers purchased seed potatoes which failed to germinate when they were treated
by another farmer with a chemical manufactured by the defendant. Id. at 1049. The
plaintiffs premised their tort claim on the idea that the chemical and the seed potatoes were
separate products. Since the chemical damaged the seed potatoes, the "product" did not
"injure only itself' for the purposes of applying EastRiver. Id. at 1051. The jury found for
the plaintiffs because Hilton-Davis failed to warn the plaintiffs of the properties of the
chemical that caused the failure. Id. at 1049. The Third Circuit reversed, holding the
relevant "product" in the context of the East River rule is the product purchased by the
plaintiffs (the treated seed potatoes), rather than the product sold by the defendant (the
chemical). Id. at 1051. Thus, the "product" involved in the case "injured only itself," and
under East River, the plaintiff farmers were limited to the warranty provided by the seller of
the treated seed potatoes. King, 855 F.2d at 1051.
The Alaska Supreme Court rejected a separability argument in Northern Power &
Eng'g Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 623 P.2d 324 (Alaska 1981). In that case, a low oil
pressure shutdown mechanism in a tractor failed, causing the engine to overheat and seize.
The plaintiff argued the shut-down mechanism damaged another "component part" of the
engine, and thus caused the property damage. The court rejected this "separate product"
argument in cases where the components are provided by one supplier as part of a complete
and integrated package. Id. at 330. "Since all but the very simplest of machines have
component parts, such a broad holding would require a finding of 'property damage' in
virtually every case where a product damages itself. . . .[and would] eliminate the
distinction between warranty and strict products liability." Id.
Separability issues also arise in the context of construction projects, which combine the
"products" of architects, engineers, suppliers, subcontractors, and general contractors. Even
the completed building may be separable from the property on which it is located, as the
plaintiffs in a 1983 Montana case argued. See Chubb Group of Ins. Cos. v. C.F. Murphy &
Assocs., Inc., 656 S.W.2d 766 (Mont. 1983) (allowing recovery from builders of arena under
strict liability when arena collapsed because value of leasehold, a separable piece of property,
reduced).
82. Tony Spychalla Farms, Inc. v. Hopkins Agric. Chem. Co., 444 N.W.2d 743, 747
(Wis. Ct. App. 1989). In Spychalla, a potato farmer brought a strict liability action against
the manufacturer of a dust designed to prevent potatoes from rotting. As a result of applying
the dust, the farmer's potatoes petrified. The plaintiff did not claim the manufacturer's potato
dust failed to prevent the potatoes from rotting. Rather, the plaintiff claimed that the product
actually injured the potatoes by causing them to petrify. The Spychalla court recognized an
exception to the economic loss doctrine, finding it inapplicable where an allegedly defective
product caused actual damage to other property. See also D'Huyvetter v. A.O. Smith
Harvestore Products, 475 N.W.2d 587 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991). Farmers brought suit against
the manufacturer and retailer of a "Harvestore" system. A "Harvestore" system is a large
grain silo for preserving and storing feed for livestock. Among the plaintiffs' claims against
the manufacturer and retailer were claims of negligence and strict liability. The trial court
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There would also be a less tangible cost: the decline of the moral
In a building product controversy, for
authority of the trial system.
example, the judge could conclude that the seller of concrete would be liable
to the buyer of a house. 4 In a different court, the holding might be that
granted summary judgment for the defendants, because the only losses were economic. On
appeal, the plaintiffs contended that the alleged defective nature of the Harvestore system
caused damage to feed stored in the system and to their livestock. They contended this
constituted damage to other property. The court rejected the plaintiffs' arguments, finding
their alleged damages were economic losses not exempted by the "other property" exception.
Id. at 595. The court stated, "[t]he expected function of the Harvestore was to enrich the
feed, providing enhanced nutrition for the cows. The damages stem from the failure of the
Harvestore to perform 'as expected,'.. . and not from 'injury to another person or property."'
Id. (quoting Tony Spychalla Farms, Inc. v. Hopkins Agric. Chem. Co., 444 N.W.2d 743, 746
(Wis. Ct. App. 1989)).
83. James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial Review of Manufacturers Conscious Design
Choices: The Limits ofAdjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 1531, 1542 (1973).
84. Commentators trace the modem basis of the builder's liability to Kellogg Bridge
Co. v. Hamilton, I10 U.S. 108 (1884). The bridge company agreed to build a bridge for the
railroad. The work began with the construction of "false work" (essentially platforms) in the
river. The company contracted with Hamilton to finish the work. Hamilton paid the
company for the work completed until that point. The "false work" inadequate and one
platform sank under the weight of the bridge. River currents destroyed a second platform.
Hamilton sued and recovered damages for the defective structures. The Supreme Court held
the bridge company made no representations as to the "false work" in place, but found it
portrayed itself as competent enough to build such structures. Id. at 117. The deficiencies
in the "false work" were unknown and undiscoverable until the foundations were subjected
to practical testing in the course of construction. Under those circumstances, the Court held
the bridge company breached an implied warranty that the "false work" would be "reasonably
suitable" for such use as was contemplated by both parties. Id. at 119. The Hamilton court
relied on analogies to warranties implied in the sale of goods and treated the transaction at
issue as a "sale" of the "false work" by the bridge company to Hamilton. The Court stated:
[The false work] was constructed for a particular purpose, and was sold to
accomplish that purpose; and it is intrinsically just that the company, which held
itself out as possessing the requisite skill to do work of that kind, and therefore
as having special knowledge of its own workmanship, should be held to
indemnify its vendee against latent defects, arising from the mode of construction, and which the latter, as the company well knew, could not, by any inspection, discover for himself.
ld.; see William K. Jones, Economic Losses Caused by Construction Deficiencies: The
Competing Regimes of Contract and Tort, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 1051 (1991) (suggesting
Hamilton's theme was reiterated a century later in Hartley v. Ballou, 209 S.E.2d 776 (N.C.
1974)). In Hartley,the basement of the dwelling, which Hartley purchased from the builder,
flooded during rainy weather. Ballou, the builder, made extensive repairs, and as a result the
basement stayed dry during hurricanes and periods of extraordinarily heavy rain. The court
held the buyer could recover his damages from the initial flooding, but not for damages
associated with subsequent episodes. Hartley,209 S.E.2d at 776. The implied warranty only
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applied to latent defects, not to those which would be visible on reasonable inspection of the
dwelling. Moreover, the implied warranty was not an absolute guarantee against flooding in
the event of hurricanes or other extreme weather conditions. See also George v. Veach, 313
S.E.2d 920 (N.C. 1984). In George, the builder breached the implied warranty that a
residential home would be fit for human habitation when the septic system failed. The court
opined that the implied warranty imposed strict liability on the warrantor. Id. at 922.
Professor Jones criticizes this decision, suggesting that the failure of the septic tank was no
more than an "economic loss"-a diminution in the value of the purchased property not
accompanied by injury to person or other property. Jones, supra,at 1056. While Professor
Jones recognizes holdings of economic loss as an inappropriate basis for an action in tort, he
urges the matter requires further analysis and not mere analogy. Id. Thus, he suggests the
court was correct in referring to an "asymmetry" in the information available to the buyer
and the seller. The seller is in a better position than the buyer to learn of the defects or the
potential defects. The buyer could hire experts and conduct inspections to test the soundness
of the property to be purchased, but the buyer and his experts are not normally present during
the construction when most of the information about any defects is not hidden from view.
Moreover, Jones suggests it is socially wasteful to impose an obligation on the buyer to do
extensive tests to learn what the seller already knows or could have easily ascertained. Id.;
see alsoCity of Mounds View v. Walijarvi, 263 N.W.2d 420 (Minn. 1978) (refusing to apply
such a warranty in suit against an architect, although recognizing the city could sue a building
contractor for such a defect). The City of Mounds court noted that:
Architects ... deal in somewhat inexact sciences and are continually called upon
to exercise their skilled judgment in order to anticipate and provide for random
factors which are incapable of precise measurement. .. . Because of the inescapable possibility of error which inheres in these services, the law has traditionally
required, not perfect results, but rather the exercise of that skill and judgment
which can be reasonably expected from similarly situated professionals.
Id. at 424; see also Huang v. Garner, 203 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1984) (denying recovery in
warranty, yet permitting recovery under negligence theory emphasizing: 1) foreseeability of
harm to purchaser; 2) extent to which transaction was meant to effect plaintiff; 3) certainty
that plaintiff suffered injury; 4) closeness of connection between defendant's conduct and
injury suffered; 5) moral blame attached to defendant's conduct; and 6) policy permitting
future harm); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Eng'r, Inc., 136 Cal. Rptr. 890 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977)
(holding engineer's contract with water district made successful project bidder intended
beneficiary, permitting it to sue engineer in contract for damages suffered when engineer
prepared documents in late and defective manner); Witty v. Schramm, 379 N.E.2d 333 (Iii.
App. Ct. 1979) (refusing recovery for breach of implied warranty of habitability for discovery
of subsurface waters that hampered construction because neither party has such knowledge
and no one was at fault); cf. Broyles v. Brown Eng'g Co., 151 So. 2d 767 (Ala. 1963)
(permitting an implied warranty claim against a civil engineer who warranted the "sufficiency
and adequacy of the plans and specifications to reasonably accomplish the purpose for which
they were intended" and distinguishing engineering work from the professionalism at issue
in City of Mounds, reasoning it is far less subject to factors beyond the control of the
professional); A.R. Moyer, Inc. v. Graham, 285 So. 2d 397, 402-03 (Fla. 1973) (rejecting
premise that design professional's contract was intended to benefit any one other than
contracting parties absent clear intent of parties as evidenced by terms of contract); Jordan
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the seller of plywood or electrical wiring is not subject to tort claims
because it is a separate product. Each ruling could follow from characteristics which one judge thought critical on that particular day and in that
particular context. But the public would not have faith in a principle of law
which produced different outcomes in similar transactions.
X.

WHO IS THE HAND AND WHO IS THE EYE?

Whether or not it is wise, the impetus for change arises from a humane
impulse. But at what point must the courts leave those profound matters to
the elected branch? We add little to the vast literature on that question,85
other than to say that product liability law is notoriously vague. The task
of trial judges and intermediate appellate courts is to decide a particular case
on a relatively traditional, limited nature, such as the existence of a statute
of limitation, a waiver, or the particular product's failure, regarding the
adequacy or inadequacy of a defect. If the economic loss rule were to
vanish or weaken significantly, even these islands of certainty in the product
liability sea would shrink. Judges would have to operate on a border
between law, technology, and public policy. They would have no guidance
other than benign emanations from earlier, different cases which had dealt
with clear-cut injustices and a demonstrated need for action.
There is more at stake, remember, than technical jurisdiction. A broad
shift away from contract principles must clash with the constitutional ideal
of comity between the branches of the government.
In the past decade, state legislatures have enacted a wide variety of tort
reform measures. 6 Their common denominator is the intent to cut back
the scope of liability and to impose specific limitations on key aspects of
damages. The courts would mock that legislative initiative by broadening
tort liability and creating difficult new issues of damages across an already
ill-defined spectrum.

v. Talaga, 532 N.E.2d 1174 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (holding seller breached implied warranty
where it was later determined flooding was so prevalent in area that house he built was
worthless and emphasizing: 1) seller had subdivided land; 2) seller was real estate development professional; 3) seller was in better position to leave lot undeveloped and, hence, absorb
losses; and 4) seller knew of natural water course and was in better position to use
information).
85. The courts regard controversies of that type as the constitutional prerogative of the
legislative branch. See generally MORTON J. HOROWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960: THE CRIsIs OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY (1992).
86. Smith v. Department of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1987).
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There are considerations of institutional expertise and resources as well.
The proponents of change do not quantify the costs of their proposal, or the
economic impact that the shift in the doctrine would have. For that matter,
they offer little data as to the number of cases which would be decided
differently,87 or even specifics as to how the new results would be fairer,
or more socially beneficial. To the extent a court accepts those arguments,
it acts on the basis of predictions of social consequences which are
essentially guesswork.
At some stage, even necessary guesses, educated or irresponsible,
become indistinguishable from managerial or political decisions. If that lack
of information were unavoidable, courts might have to act in partial
ignorance for the sake of doing justice. There is no such necessity. Other
constitutional branches have the resources to gather data and to assess the
merits of competing solutions.
The legislative staff's function is to gather expert opinions concerning
technical and economic factors."8 Equally important, is the legislators'
ability to focus on a particular question and formulate a remedy that is
tailored to broad social needs rather than the plight of an isolated litigant.89
At the level of implementation, federal and state agencies, rather than an
individual attorney, can make a more realistic and fair evaluation of the
costs and benefits to both individuals and the public.
XI. THE POSSIBILITY OF LESS DISRUPTIVE ALTERNATIVES
The prominent issue of contract or tort tends to obscure the important
technical questions. For instance, one commentator has suggested that since
building contractors are prone to bankruptcy, a shift to a tort doctrine would

87. Returning to the construction cases, plaintiffs have often brought lawsuits against
their builders, general contractors, and architects. They do not tell the courts why those suits,
each permissible under existing law, would not give them reasonable compensation for
whatever losses they may have suffered.
88. Bills are accompanied by a statement of economic impact to aid the legislative staff
in this task. See FLA. STAT. § 11.075 (1993).
89. If the object is to govern future conduct, the task may be accomplished better
through administrative regulations or statutes, each of which expresses public goals arrived
at by the public's elected representatives or their deputies. This ideal may not be achieved
in every instance, but the serious question is whether the task should be entrusted to judges
or even juries, neither of which are elected. Note, it is common for economic loss rule
controversies to arise in the context of regulated industries. See Florida Power & Light Co.
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 510 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 1987).
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reduce the danger for the ultimate purchasers of building materials.9"
Legislators could enact statutory reform, focusing more closely on the
specific problem, 9' such as an increase in the performance bond requirement. That approach, tailored to the individual problem, would be both
more effective and less dangerous than a sweeping change from a contract
to a tort doctrine. 92
As another example, the objections and difficulties previously discussed
might be brought under control if the reform impulse were expressed
through the abolition of the vertical privity requirement in existing warranty
law.93 The effect would be to put the buyer in the same position as a
sophisticated commercial purchaser. This would be consistent with both
traditional law and the expectations which a business has in launching a
product. On the other hand, the change would not undermine express
waivers or limitations of warranty. Nor would it subject sellers to
unmeasured damages.
The question, however, is not an easy one.94 The authors suggest that
it should be addressed only on its own merits. If treating the validity of a
privity requirement is dependent upon a philosophical debate over the
virtues of contract and tort law, then neither side is likely to reexamine the
policy aspects of the particular question. Such an examination, supposedly,
is a hallmark of modem law.95

90. Michael D. Leider, Constructinga New Action for Negligent Infliction of Economic
Loss: Building on Cardoza& Coase, 66 Wash. L. Rev. 937, 1016 (1991).

91. Compare the specific reforms in various recent tort reform statutes such as Florida's
Tort Reform and Insurance Act of 1986. See Smith, 507 So. 2d at 1080.
92. Indeed, the California Supreme Court made precisely those limited adjustments in
Seely. The policy in product liability analysis is to advance the interests of plaintiffs by
resolving future issues in favor of the plaintiff.
93. In fact, that was the approach the New Jersey court took in Spring Motors. The
change in existing law would not be radical. The U.C.C. is neutral as to the vertical privity
requirement. See section 2-318 and the express statement in the comments to this section
explaining that the provision is not meant to limit the "developing case law" which tends to
diminish the requirements of privity. See Parker, supra note 4, at 410.
94. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 69, § 11-5, at 463 (exemplifying buyer who
obtains goods secondhand from intervening vendor to support that the question is debatable
and consequential economic losses should be denied to buyer not in privity).
95. The closer the focus, the better. If the basic fact pattern is characterized as a
question of privity, there are overtones of archaic learning that cut off the rights of the buyer
for no practical purpose. On the other hand, when the general idea is expressed in terms of
the absence of face-to-face dealings and the lack of opportunity for either side to bargain, the
fundamental considerations seem more appealing.
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XII. GOALS OR ANALYSIS
"General propositions do not decide concrete cases."96 The proposal
that the economic loss rule be abolished endures, in part, becausejudges and
attorneys have been conditioned to think of the expansion of product
liability as the path of the future. Moreover, they give exaggerated
deference to insights which were appropriate to the pioneering decisions.
In a sense, they confuse the ends of product liability law with the means.
Our thesis is not that those insights are necessarily wrong or outdated, but
that they cannot effectively provide the tools for the analysis of every
controversy.
A.

Compensation

To say compensation for an injured party is a traditional objective of
tort law 97 is not to demonstrate that the buyer should recover in tort.98
Rather, in its more brutally direct form, the argument is that the change
would make it easier for the plaintiff to win. But that would be an effect,
not a reason. The change in the balance of power cannot be a policy
argument in and of itself.
There is a need for a closer and more skeptical look at the related
suggestion that courts should give homeowners, fishermen, or any other
category of litigant favored treatment across the board. In other fields of
law, the starting point for analysis is not the status of the claimant99 but the
circumstances of the individual matter. The impulse reflects the belief that
"homeowners," as well as other groups, suffer from a disparity in bargaining
power. Accordingly, the courts can and should correct this imbalance.
However, there are flaws in the syllogism. If it were taken literally, the
contention would mean courts should find for homeowners in every other
instance, regardless of facts or law. There are few cases in which the
individual buyer would have "greater bargaining power" over a corporate
96. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
97. See RICHARD A. POSSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 20 (4th ed 1988).
98. See generallyChristopher D. Stone, The Place of EnterpriseLiability in the Control
of CorporateConduct, 90 YALE L.J. 1 (1980). The author notes "risks of over deterrence
are heightened when there is no certain expenses, such as the installation of known
technology, that will avoid the liability with certainty." Id. at 25-26. Similarly, the
conclusory statement that the buyer's expectations were not met does not identify a test which
trial courts could apply. Often it is only a label for the result reached for other unstated
reasons.
99. See J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 598 P.2d 60 (Cal. 1979) (proposing that the
circumstances, not the status of the claimant controls).
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seller."1 In any event, the leading cases agree that relative bargaining
power is not the touchstone of the economic loss rule, nor even an
element. 1 ' And were the law different in principle, trial judges would still
face difficulties.
The concept of relative bargaining power is itself indistinct and
subjective. It is a function of talent, resources, luck and other intangibles
inherent in a vast array of relationships. Leading cases such as Spring
Motors and Seely show that judges who lead the charge for product liability
can differ in their evaluation of the balance of power
even where the
02
business relationships are relatively straightforward.
Beyond that, reliance on "policy" combines with limitations inherent
in the trial process itself to make the assessment of relative bargaining
power a rudimentary exchange for lawyers' arguments based upon stereotypes. Delphic rulings by trial judges denying or granting summary
judgment without explanation could offer little or no precedent for the next
case, much less guidance to business.

100. The occasional Astor who lost an eye to a champagne cork would not make the
generality invalid. See David G. Owen, Rethinking the PoliciesofStrict ProductsLiability,
33 VAND. L. REV. 681 (1980) (criticizing the "one directional" nature of other arguments
which frequently are offered in support of plaintiff oriented proposals for changes in products
liability law); see also Edward T. O'Donnell, Public Policy and the Burden of Proofin
EnhancedInjury Litigation: A Case Study in the Dangersof Trendsand EasyAssumptions,
17 W. ST. U. L. REv. 325 (1990); David G. Ownen, ProductsLiability: PrinciplesofJustice
for the 21st Century, 11 PACE L. REV. 63 (1990) (elaborating on the same theme).
101. In Spring Motors, the court sometimes spoke of equal bargaining power and the
ability to spread the loss as prerequisites to contract. Spring Motors, 489 A.2d at 670-71.
The New Jersey Supreme Court specified "perfect parity is not necessary to a determination
that the parties have substantially equal bargaining positions," and further, a commercial
purchaser "may be better situated than the manufacturer to factor into its price the risk of
economic loss caused by the purchase of a defective product" 1d. at 671. Thus, if
commercial purchasers miscalculate their risk when bargaining for their contract or err in risk
allocation by not purchasing appropriate insurance, the consequences are not to be borne by
the manufacturer under a false or fictitious tort theory. The law of warranty is not limited
to parties in a somewhat equal bargaining position. Such a limitation is not supported by the
language and history of the sales act and is unworkable. Moreover, it finds no support in
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
102. The fact the dealership could select a Clark transmission for the Ford trucks it
bought showed significant bargaining power to some members of the court, but to another
member of the court, the same facts showed the manufacturer only chose to make the
component available as an option. See Spring Motors, 489 A.2d at 678 (Handler, J.,
concurring); see also Brown & Feinman, supranote 10, at 348-59 (discussing the thoughtful
debate between the majority and concurring opinions and the academic benefits of relational
analysis).
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B. Deterrence-Goalor Mirage?
Plaintiffs suggest that giving property holders the right to sue in tort
rather than contract would advance the cause of product safety. Their
premise is that existing law does not give an owner reason to repair
dangerous conditions before an accident occurs. On the contrary, the
opposite is true. A property holder knows full well that he or she may be
sued if someone is injured on the premises. In Casa Clara,for instance,
each of the corporate amici,"° which supported the plaintiffs, took care
to assure the appellate court that its workers had repaired the roofs in
dispute before the company sought legal remedies against suppliers further
back in the distribution chain. There is no reason to think other businesses,
equally public spirited, or just as worried about their products' reputation,
would not have taken similar precautions.
On the other hand, at least one consequence of a shift from contract to
strict liability is clear. The change would tell manufacturers that greater
care would not be a defense.'0 4 Then, where lies the incentive for those
businesses to take greater care?
One of the early critics of the economic loss rule, Justice Peters,
remarked that the threat of a strict liability claim could not be a significant
deterrent to businessmen who already know that they are subject to suits for
negligence or breach of contract.0 5 On similar lines, it is significant that
the product liability revolution has reduced qualitative standards of proof of
causation and defect." 6 The purpose and effect of that change is to make
it easier for plaintiffs to recover. But the same dilution of proof must make
it more difficult for a manufacturer to interpret society's message. The
product should have been safer, but in what way and at what cost? 0 7

103. The reference is to those participants who joined in the attack on the economic loss
rule.
104. Strict liability subjects the seller to judgment even if the seller "has exercised all
possible care in the preparation and sale of his product .. "
TORTS § 402(A)(2)(a) (1965),

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF

105. Seely, 403 P.2d at 152-58 (Peters, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
106. Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978); Edward T. O'Donnell, Design
Litigation and Strict Liability: The Problem of Jury Instructions Which Do Not Instruct, 56
U. DET. J.URB. L. 1052 (1979).
107. See generally Edward T. O'Donnell, Design Litigation and the State of the Art:
Terminology, Practiceand Reform, 11 AKRON L. REV. 627 (1978).
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C. Higher Prices-The Skull Behind the Mask
Eventually, arguments for the expansion of tort remedies will lead to
the development of a system in which product liability costs can be shared
among all consumers through higher product prices. Familiar and reassuring
as the litany may be, it goes too far. If that were all there were to it, every
product liability issue would be decided in favor of a plaintiff. The change
must increase the number of lawsuits-and the costs of insurance and the
products themselves-if it is to serve its doctrinal purpose. Isolated and
infrequent cases could not distribute the loss effectively.
And, in ordinary speech, higher prices are not a public benefit. When
prices go up, fewer people can buy goods and the manufacturer must restrict
its production and lay off workers. Given that reality, it is not self-evident
why hypothetical buyers need a tort remedy, in addition to the contract
rights they already possess. Nor is it clear that a court would help even
favored groups such as potential home owners, if it were to take steps
leading to an increase in the prices of building materials. The ordinary
citizen would have to make a larger down payment in order to buy a home.
Many would not be able to do so.
D. Insurance and the Sharing of Pain
A more abstract and sophisticated variant, the concept of the manufacturer as a superior risk distributor,"0 8 has gained numbing force through
repetition." 9 Yet Dean Prosser terms this a "make weight," even as to
personal injury."0 Other commentators"' point out that the reasoning,
if valid, must apply whenever anyone is injured by a superior risk-bearer,
and that logic would call for a governmental compensation scheme for all
108. See Emerson G.M. Diesel, Inc. v. Alaskan Enter., 732 F.2d 1468, 1474 (9th Cir.
1984); Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 626 F.2d 280 (3d Cir.

1980).

109.
The manufacturer knows the purpose for which its product is to be used and by
whom. Although all purchasers are not identical, the manufacturer can
determine within a reasonable range of predictability the ramifications of a
product failure for the ordinary user. Having this information, the manufacturer
can include in its cost the expense of adequate insurance coverage.
Emerson, 732 F.2d at 1474.
110. William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50
MINN. L. REV. 791, 799-800 (1966).
111. See Owen, supranote 100, at 707.
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resulting injuries. That formulation is extreme, to the point of being a
caricature, and not what the proponents of the change desire. However,
bounds have not yet been set to prevent well-intentioned reforms from
surging beyond their original purposes. Instead, the arguments for risk
distribution dwindle toward assertions that the law could be changed without
hardship.
The magical painkiller is said to be "insurance." Yet, courts have
assured manufacturers and other defendants a thousand times that they will
not be subjected to an insurer's liability. 2 That language must degenerate into incantation if judges now were to create a whole new spectrum of
liabilities on the basis that defendants could buy insurance. 3
To be fair, it is not only plaintiffs' advocates who have been lulled by
superficial talk of insurance. In EastRiver, Justice Blackmun supported his
refusal to alter the economic loss rule by writing that the seller of a product
could buy insurance against liability. The observation gained resonance
from its seeming consistency with product liability lore. Yet on closer
inspection, there is no difference between tort and contract to the extent that
the question is one of theoretical insurability."
Indeed, the expectation
that a manufacturer will obtain coverage, or self-insure through higher
prices, for personal injury liability against third parties is one of the more
widely accepted premises for the expansion of tort liability.

112. West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80, 86 (Fla. 1976); Royal v. Black &
Decker Mfg. Co., 205 So. 2d 307, 309 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1967), cert. denied, 211 So.
2d 214 (1968); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 402(A) cmt. g (1965); W. Page
Keeton, ProductsLiability--LiabilityWithout Fault and the Requirementof a Defect, 41 TEX.
L. REV. 855, 858 (1963).
113. There is potential for unfairness. As one example of an obvious injustice, the
effect might be to subject insurers to a new form of liability long after they negotiated their
rates and the state approved them-an obvious injustice. See Dimmitt Chevrolet, Inc. v.
Southeastern Fidelity Ins. Corp., 636 So. 2d 700, 701-02 (Fla. 1993). See generallyOwen,
supra note 101, at 681 (demonstrating the inadequacy of the more general assumption that
the expansion of tort liability can be based upon the availability of insurance).
114. If the seller of a product can buy a policy against personal injury liability, as
Justice Blackmun asserts, it can insure against claims by the buyer of disappointed economic
expectations. However, Brown and Feinman state insurance is not available for such a claim.
Brown & Feinman, supranote 10, at 341. The difference may be explained by the fact that
Justice Blackmun cites admiralty authorities for the availability of insurance: perhaps there
are special maritime policies. That coverage is still common, even though expensive and it
may be more prevalent than that against the costs attributable to the disappointed expectations
of a buyer. Recent studies suggest 86% of the country's 500 largest corporations purchase
some form of commercial casualty insurance. George L. Priest, The CurrentInsuranceCrisis
in Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1561 (1987).
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Justice Blackmun was correct insofar as he spoke of a difference in
the factual and logical conclusions he would
degree. But scholars challenge
15
draw from that distinction.
As have so many others, Professor Priest deplores the high cost of tort
litigation. ' He goes further, however, to question its practicality as a
means to accomplish either insurance, compensatory, or regulatory
functions.17
The traditional argument is that the availability of insurance justifies the
expansion of tort liability. Priest's answer is that the expansion of tort
115. Some question the relative distribution power among the parties to the transaction,
suggesting the buyer is in a better position to buy insurance against the loss because of the
greater knowledge of the context in which the product must do the work. William K. Jones,
ProductDefects Causing Commercial Loss: The Ascendancy of ContractOver Tort, 44 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 731, 765 (1990).
The standard casualty policy protects the buyer from losses associated with
accidents caused by product failures, without segregation of risks or charges.
The premium on such policies will be related to the value of the buyer's
property and the general risk involved in the buyer's activities. These are
matters about which the seller has limited knowledge and almost no control. As
to such losses, the buyer is in the best position to obtain optimal coverage under
its own policy, described as first party insurance....
The avoidance of unnecessary transaction costs is a major advantage of
having the buyer look to its own insurance company. Litigation over the
liability of the seller can consume substantial resources, whether the suit is
ultimately resolved in favor of the buyer or the seller.
...As to the consequences of the defect, the buyer exercises significant
control, both in the manner in which the product is used and in precautions
taken to avoid loss (such as periodic inspections and sensitivity to signs of
trouble). In sum, the problem is one of joint care. In such cases, it is not
possible to devise a liability rule that is optimal in all instances. For example,
the diligence of the seller may be enhanced by increasing the probability that the
seller will be held accountable for losses resulting from product defects. But the
enhancement of seller diligence comes at the expense of buyer caution ....
Id. at 765-67 (footnote omitted).
116. Putting that concern in quantitative terms, he adds that the administrative costs of
tort liability amounts to about 53% of the plaintiffs net recovery of benefits, whereas
comparable insurance arrangements have an expense figure closer to 10%. Priest, supranote
114, at 1560.
117. Id. Priest also suggests that the burden of the change may fall disproportionately
on the poor. Id. They receive less benefit through litigation since pain and suffering and
disability payments are highly correlated with the individual's expected future income, while
the insurance premium (ultimately incorporated in the price of the product) is set for the
average loss. Id. at 1559. Conversely, the increases in prices which are necessary to
accomplish the insurance function have a severe impact on them. Id. at 1525.
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liability in fact makes insurance less available." 8 The commentator goes

118. Professor Priest reminds us that deterrence is different from insurance and the two
functions are not necessarily consistent. Priest, supranote 114, at 1525. In an oversimplified
outline, his analysis is that it is not the simple increase in the amount of judgments which
undermines the insurance market, but the tendency for expanded liability to undermine the
advantages of the scale of the ability to predict the consequences and to apply the "law of
large numbers" and for the tendency for higher premiums to drive low risk insureds to
become self insurers, thus reducing the size of the pool of insureds and the cost for others.
That process in turn feeds on itself as the fees grow higher, making it questionable whether
the next level of insureds have a reason to stay with the carrier rather than become a self
insurer. Id. at 1525-45. The central concept is the idea that the insurance defense depends
upon the attendance of risks, and that the broadening of tort liability tends to eliminate the
distinctions among risks, all are thrown together into a huge pool.
Consumers who systematically face a lower injury probability are likely to find
the insurance provided with the product or service not worth its added premium.
Many commentators have tended to view product-or service-related injuries as
occurring randomly, generating an equal injury probability to each consumer.
Many product-and service-related injuries, however, are systematically associated
with particular product uses. Most modem products can be employed in a wide
range of diverse activities. Those consumers who use products in typically less,
rather than more, risky ways are likely to drop out of the consumer pool if tort
law requires the manufacturer to insure all customer uses. These consumers will
shift to alternative products or services that cannot be used in equally risky
ways-products which, as a consequence, will be cheaper because of the lower
attendant insurance premiums.
A familiar modem example is consumers use of four-wheel drive vehicles.
In recent years, the liability of manufacturers of such vehicles has been
expanded under design defect and warning law and, more generally, as courts
have limited the defense of contributory negligence, misuse and assumption of
risk....
Manufacturers must respond to this increased liability either by changing
product design to protect drivers in extreme conditions or by increasing
insurance coverage for the consumer set as a whole. Whether the manufacturer
changes the design or merely increases insurance coverage, product costs will
increase and the product price will increase. The price increase, of course, may
seem desirable for consumers who drive in extreme back road conditions. But
consumers who purchase four-wheel drive vehicles for any other purposes...
[for] driving on snowy or muddy roads-may not find the increased price
worthwhile. These consumers could be lured away if they were offered a fourwheel drive vehicle suitable for snow and mud, but not for extreme grades
which, if only because of the lower attendant insurance premium, could be
offered at a lower price. It is not surprising that many manufacturers have
begun offering van and station wagon models with a four-wheel drive option.
Id. at 1564-65 (footnotes omitted); see also Bruce Chapman & Michael Trebilock, Punitive
Damages: Divergence in Search of a Rationale, 40 ALA. L. REV. 741, 778 (1989); Jones,
supranote 115, at 731; Ernest J. Weinrib, The InsuranceJustificationand PrivateLaw, 14
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on to explain that insurance rates are set by predictions of future losses and
that increased tort liability tends to force low-risk participants out of the
insurance pool. 19 This, in turn, drives up premiums across a broad range,
making some activities too expensive to continue. 20 He suggests, as well,
that the comparative advantage which insurance companies have in the
aggregation of risks-one of the theoretical foundations of the industry-is
overwhelmed by the coverage obligations which tort law inflicts upon them
as well as the concomitant reduction in their ability to segregate risks.

J. LEGAL STUD. 681 (1985).

119.
This process is adverse selection in the product market. . . . Because the
manufacturer was prohibited byproduct liability law from making this additional
insurance optional, low-risk consumers within the pool-those not intending to
expose themselves to backcountry risks-dropped out of the pool, either by
shifting to domestic four-wheels, or by declining to buy the product at all.
When low risk consumers drop out, the insurance premiums added to the price
of backcountry four-wheels must be increased by an ever greater amount.
The second set of low-risk consumers affected by the expansion of
provider liability are the low-income or poor, who bring low risk to a liability
insurance pool because of the lower damages they will receive because of their
lower income and poorer future employment prospects. As the insurance
premiums tied to products and services increase, these consumers also drop out
because the price they must pay is increasingly greater than the value received.
Such consumers will shift to substitute products . . . Again, as this set of
low-risk consumers drops out, the attendant insurance premiums must be
commensurately increased.
Adverse selection and consumer risk... also provides the only explanation of why increases in corporate tort liability compel providers to withdraw
products and services from markets altogether. Again, if there were no adverse
selection, increases in insurance premiums or self-insurance costs could largely
be passed on to consumers. Sales may decline, as must be expected from any
price increase, but there would be no reason to withdraw products from the
market. There is a different effect, however, where a price increase derives
from increasing risk pool variance. Increasing variance generates adverse
selection by low-risk consumers who successively drop out of the pool. The
pool, as a consequence, unravels. At some point, demand for the product sold
with the necessary insurance premium simply disappears. There remains no set
of identifiable consumers to whom the product or service is worth its price.
.. . The large number of products and services that have been totally
withdrawn from markets demonstrate the severity of the effects of contemporary
tort law's shift to the third-party insurance mechanism.
Priest, supra note 114, at 1565-67.
120. Id. at 1569-70 (providing asbestos production as an example).
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XIII. CONCLUSION
Product liability law rests on the moral perception that the economic
burdens of death or incapacitation are too much for an individual. But in
Santor v. A & M Karagheusian,Inc.,' that exception transformed itself
into a norm for commercial transactions in which no one is injured.
Disturbing in itself, the metamorphosis illustrates a recurring paradox.
The field traditionally is thought to be governed by a sense of practical
justice which cuts through technical limitations and restraints. Yet as a new
principle gains acceptance, advocates shove practical difficulties to the
background and urge the courts to carry the approach to extremes in
deference to its theoretical basis.'22
At least in the instance of the economic loss rule, that reasoning has
grown conclusory and even circular. Ignoring the need for empirical
evidence of social need and effect, courts too often react automatically to
slogans of past product liability battles.
To the unfriendly eye, this is little better than the Mandarin theorizing
which led Traynor and other reformers to take up arms decades ago. Overused, the Marseillaise has decayed into Muzak.

121. 207 A.2d 305 (N.J. 1965).
122. See Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Punitive Damages, Due Processand the Jury, 40 ALA. L.
REV. 975 (1989).
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I. INTRODUCTION
It is with the unfortunate, above all, that humane conduct is necessary.'

* Bachelor of Religious Education (B.R.E.), Talmudic University of Florida, 1983;
M.S., Bernard Revel Graduate School, Yeshiva University, 1988; J.D., New York Law
School, 1993; LL.M., New York University Law School, 1994. The author received his
Rabbinical Ordination in 1988 from the Rabbi Isaac Elchanan Theology Seminary, where he
majored in Talmudic Law. The author dedicates this article to his parents, Susan and Marvin
Shuster.
1. JOHN BARTLETr, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 618 (13th ed. 1955) (quoting Fyodor
Dostoyevsky (discussing prison life in Siberia)).
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America's punishment system is not working.2 In the United States,
in 1991 alone, a murder was committed every twenty-one minutes, a woman
was raped every five minutes, a person was robbed every forty-six seconds,
and a burglary occurred every ten seconds.3 This translates into increases
in rates of murder 4.3%, rape 2.7%, and robbery 6.1%.' During that same
year, federal prisons housed 56,696 inmates, and state correctional
institutions held 732,565 prisoners.' The state of New York imprisoned
57,862 individuals, close to 10% of the national total of state prisoners.6
As these numbers make clear, this crime increase cannot be attributed to a
less than zealous use of the prisons. Indeed, during 1991, because of
increases in both crime and incarcerations, American prisons operated at 1631% above capacity." While a regime of aggressive imprisonment does not,
therefore, serve as a general deterrent,' rampant incarceration does not
promote special deterrence.9 A recent study of recidivism in eleven states
concluded that, during the past ten years, over 60% of released prisoners
were rearrested; almost half of all prisoners released during that same period
were reincarcerated. ° This prevalence of recidivism suggests that many
criminals are more dangerous when they leave prison than when they
enter." Moreover, incarceration is expensive. For example, New York

2. It is quite possible that the following crime rates would be worse were it not for
present crime-reduction devices such as incarceration. By "not working," it is suggested that
contemporary American society, through its law enforcement mechanisms, is not deterring
crime nearly as effectively as it could be.
3. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM
CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES 4

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

(1991).

THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 948

(Mark S. Hoffman ed., 1993).

Id. at 949.
Id.
Id.
General deterrence is a theory of punishment that seeks to deter all potential offenders

from committing crimes.

SANFORD

H.

KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW

AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 149 (5th ed. 1989).
9. Special deterrence is a theory of punishment which seeks to prevent convicts from
repeating their crimes. Id.
10. See David C. Leven, CuringAmerica 'sAddictionto Prisons,20 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
641, 642 (1993).
11. Id. at 641-42. Prisoners may be more violent when they leave prison due to the
violence that is routinely inflicted on a significant number of inmates by fellow prisoners.
See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 314-15

(1993) (describing prison violence); RONALD GOLDFARB, JAILS: THE ULTIMATE GHETTO 9697 (1975) (describing prison gang rape); CARL WEISS & DAVID JAMES FRIAR, TERROR IN
THE PRISONS ix (1974) (remark of then Philadelphia District Attorney, Arlen Specter, that
prison violence makes prisoners "worse" when they leave prison than when they enter).
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City spends $58,000 to jail an inmate for one year. 2 Since prison is
obviously not solving America's crime problems, why do we continue to
incarcerate so many people?
One reason is that imprisonment is perceived as satisfying an important
goal of punishment. If criminals are prevented from harming society, the
argument goes, the purpose of punishment is fulfilled. 3 To be sure, a
criminal who is locked up cannot harm the majority of society. 4
Another reason for the increase in incarceration rates is the determinate,
minimum sentencing guidelines adopted by both the federal system and
approximately one-third of the states. 5 Under these guidelines, criminals
who would not have been incarcerated are being imprisoned. 6 Exactly how
many offenders are being jailed due to the guidelines is hard to tell. What
is clear is that, partly due to the guidelines, it has been estimated that by the7
end of 1994, United States prisons will hold about 1,000,000 Americans.'
There are at least four problems with indiscriminately using incarceration as punishment. First, incarceration is only effective as long as it lasts.
Therefore, at least regarding all but the most hardened prisoners who are
serving life sentences, it is more appropriate to employ punishments that
will have a positive impact on a criminal even after the criminal is released.
Second, while imprisonment has value when applied to dangerous criminals,
it has no merit when applied to individuals who pose no direct danger to
Because American law allows for the incarceration of both
society.'

12. David J. Rothman, The Crime ofPunishment,N.Y. REV. BOOKs, Feb. 17, 1994, at
34.
13. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 457.
14. Id. ("If the crooks are behind bars, they cannot rape and loot and pillage."). Of
course, violent criminals are able to terrorize fellow inmates behind bars. See infra notes 18,
21.
15. See Rothman, supra note 12, at 36. "Fixed sentences were introduced ... both in
the federal system and in roughly one third of the states.... They have promoted prison
overcrowding.... The impact of these guidelines has been to increase the prison population.
." Id. at 36-37.
16. Id.
17. See Rothman, supranote 12, at 34.
18. One reason prison is inappropriate for nonviolent offenders is, given prison
conditions, nonviolent inmates may experience violence that is not warranted by their
offenses. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 314-15 (describing problems of rape, gang
violence, and general despotism in American prisons); DavidM.Siegal, Rape in Prisonand
AIDS: A Challengefor the Eighth Amendment Frameworkof Wilson v. Seiter, 44 STAN. L.
REV. 1541, 1550-51 (1992). Also, as a result of such violence, criminals who are not
dangerous when they enter prison may become violent through experiencing prison life.
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violent and non-violent individuals,' 9 a punishment agenda that is just as
applied to all criminals is preferable. Third, as the prevalence of recidivism
illustrates,2" imprisonment has value only when it separates dangerous
persons from mainstream society.2 Incarceration does not rehabilitate
offenders,2 2 provide restitution to victims,23 nor deter most criminals. 4
It would be better to replace imprisonment with punishment programs based
on rehabilitative, restitutive, and deterrent perspectives." Fourth, given the
prevalence of rape and other violence in American prisons,26 incarceration
arguably does more both to teach inmates more efficient means of
committing crime and to transform inmates into more hardened criminals
than it does to deter offenders from illegal conduct. Indeed, a repeated
theme of this article is that because of the dangers an inmate may face in
prison, a sentence of imprisonment is a potential death sentence, and

19. The result is that two-thirds of the national male prison population are non-violent
offenders. See Leven, supra note 10, at 646. The number of non-violent female inmates has
also been increasing. See Clifford Krauss, Women Doing Crime, Women Doing Time, N.Y.
TIMES, July 3, 1994, § 4, at 3; see also Mireya Navarro, Mothers in Prison, Children in
Limbo, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1994, at BI (number of female inmates has risen 55%
nationally since 1984).
20. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
21. Again, although incapacitation may protect mainstream society, prison communities
remain exposed to overcrowding and serious violence. See EDGARDO ROTMAN, BEYOND
PUNISHMENT: A NEW VIEW ON THE REHABILITATION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS 82-83
(1990). ("This . . . could lead to the . . . conclusion that some positive aspects ... can
compensate for... horrendous overcrowding, racial discrimination, and... serious prison
violence.").
22. See Leven, supra note 10, at 641.
23. See CHARLES F. ABEL & FRANK H. MARSH, PUNISHMENT AND RESTITUTION: A
RESTITUTIONARY APPROACH TO CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL 4 (1984) ("[V]ictims ... bear
an unrelieved burden. The perpetrator may be punished ...but the victim is left with his
or her losses intact.").
24. See Leven, supra note 10, at 642.
25. An extended discussion of rehabilitation, deterrence, retribution (including
incapacitation), restitution, and their interrelationship is beyond the scope of this article. For
such discussion, see KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 8, at 136-65.
26. WEISS & FRIAR, supra note 11, at 69-72 (describing incidents of prison violence and
gang rape). Prison rape and violence are so prevalent that the Supreme Court recently ruled
that officials must protect prisoners from other inmates even in the absence of a specific
request for protection from the potentially victimized inmates. Linda Greenhouse, Supreme
Court Roundup; Prison Officials Can be Found Liablefor Inmate-Against-Inmate Violence,
Court Rules, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 1994, at A18.
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constitutes cruel and unusual punishment 7 when imposed on all but the
most dangerous and hardened of offenders.
Consideration of alternative punishment sanctions based on religious
foundations is long overdue.2" This article attempts to rectify this neglect
by reviewing how talmudic29 Judaism, through the halacha,3" applied
theories of deterrence, rehabilitation, restitution, and retribution to its
punishment practices"' without an aggressive use of imprisonment.3 2

27. The cruel and unusual punishment standard is not static but "may acquire meaning
as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 171 (1976). For another judicial expression of the flexible nature of cruel and unusual
punishment mentioned in Gregg,see infra note 164 and accompanying text. See also J. Mark
Lane, "Is There Life Without Parole?": A Capital Defendant's Right to a Meaningful
Alternative Sentence, 26 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 327, 361 (1993).
28. The value of looking to religious principles to inform American legal practice is
underscored by the fact that the Supreme Court has consulted religious practice to decide
American law. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160 (1973) (citing religious authority as
guidance for the doctrine that life begins at birth versus conception). By suggesting that
American legal practice may be informed by talmudic thought, it is not intended that other
religions, such as Christianity, Islam, or Far Eastern belief systems, cannot appropriately
contribute to the manner in which American penal law is employed. This discussion is
confined to talmudic and American law solely because the author's education as a rabbi and
as an American trained lawyer inhibits the expression of opinions on non-talmudic religious
penal methods. For interesting treatment of how non-talmudic religious systems deal and
have dealt with punishment, see 12 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION4 362-68 (Mircea Eliade
ed. 1987).
29. The Talmud is a rabbinic commentary on the Old Testament (called "Torah" in
Hebrew); "talmudic" means pertaining to the Talmud; "Talmudic Judaism" means Judaism
as practiced during talmudic times. There are Babylonian and Jerusalem editions of the
Talmud because when the Talmud was compiled, Jewish scholarship centered in Pumbaditha,
Babylonia and Jerusalem, Israel. See PAUL JOHNSON, A HISTORY OF THE JEWS 153 (1987).
Work on the Jerusalem Talmud finished by the end of the fourth century, A.D., and the
Babylonian Talmud was finished during the fifth century, A.D. See Kenneth Shuster, An
Halachic Overview ofAbortion, 26 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 641 n.2 (1992). This article cites
to the Babylonian edition of the Talmud exclusively.
30. "Halacha" refers to Jewish law; "halachic" means pertaining to Jewish law. HAYIM
H. DONIN, To BE A JEW 29 (1972). For an informative description of the evolution of the
halacha, see Suzanne L. Stone, In Pursuitof the Counter-Text: The Turn to the Jewish Legal
Model in ContemporaryAmericanLegal Theory, 106 HARV. L. REV. 813, 816 n.13 (1993).
"Halachic"and "talmudie" are used interchangeably throughout this article.
31. See 13 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA 1387 (1972) (stating that "[a]ll talionic punishment
...reflects its underlying purpose, namely the apparent restitution ... [and] punishment
[which] is inflicted ... for the deterrence of others."); HYMAN E. GOLDiN, HEBREW
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 13 (1952) ("[Mlayhem ... is a serious offense, and is
punishable by... the law of retaliation."); MYER S. LEW, THE HuMANITY OF JEWISH LAW
165 (1985) ("[T]he main purpose of punishment was.., to reform the character of the
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This article begins by presenting an overview of halachic punishment,
examining how halacha viewed capital and corporal punishment, penal
servitude, and excommunication.33 The article then examines the extent
to which American law can employ halachic methods of punishment. It is
suggested that communities that enjoy spiritual values, because they will
have more success implementing penal systems which actually compromise
crime, are prepared to combat crime communally, and they prefer deterrence, restitution, rehabilitation, and retribution theories over incarceration.
Communities that emphasize individual and collective responsibilities over
individual rights are also more likely to benefit from halachic punishment
schemes. American society has caused much of its present penal problems
by focusing too much on imprisonment as a punishment, by promoting
individual rights over individual and societal responsibilities,3 4 and by deemphasizing spiritual values in everyday life. Finally, the article concludes
that, although constitutional considerations of slavery and cruel and unusual
punishment may preclude American law from adopting halachic penal
methods, halacha can inspire reforms, such as victim-oriented community

offender.").
32. Although from the talmudic period on Judaism incarcerated criminals for serious
crimes, like homicide and treason, most talmudic imprisonment tended to be detentive or
coercive in nature. See 8 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA 1301-02 (1972). "Detention ...pending
completion of the judicial proceedings .. .continued to be the most common form of
imprisonment in this [the talmudic] period .... The sages interpreted the passage... as
authority ... to imprison a person refusing to comply with its instructions." Id. at 1300; see
also LEW, supranote 31, at 62. "[I]n the Torah we find but few references to sentences of
imprisonment." Id.
33. This discussion is limited to these halachic punishment methods becausethey provide
a comprehensive survey of how Jewish law dealt with crime and because they refer to
Judaism's use of rehabilitation, deterrence, retribution, and restitution theories. For example,
halachic capital punishment presents crime as an offense against both society and offender,
it also provides for a deterrence and rehabilitation-oriented regime of halachic punishment.
Halachic indentured servitude teaches there are offenses, such as theft, which require
restitution be made to crime victims; it, therefore, shows the restitutive aspect of halachic
punishment. Halachic corporal punishment further illustrates Judaism's conception of
deterrence and demonstrates that such punishment can be implemented in a humane manner.
Halachic excommunication presents the thesis that because crime impacts on society, its
commission warrants societal ostracism; it also is predominately based on a deterrence
notion.
34. It is not suggested that individual rights are not as important as individual responsibilities, but that individual rights should not be emphasized over the duties that persons have
to each other and society in general. When rights are honored more than responsibilities,
people often have no incentive to behave properly-they can behave with impunity and then
hide behind their rights.
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service 5 and shaming sanctions,3 6 which apply more humane solutions to
the realities of contemporary American life.
However, it must first be ascertained whether halachic penal methods
are more humane and why American society should adopt halachic
punishment systems. Accordingly, halachic punishment schemes, beginning
with halachic capital punishment are examined.
II. HALACHIC PUNISHMENT

A. CapitalPunishment
Ancient Judaism employed four methods of execution: stoning,
burning, decapitation, and strangulation. 7 Stoning was the most severe
form of capital punishment a8 and was reserved for such crimes as blasphemy,39 idol-worship,4" witchcraft,4" and sabbath-desecration.42
Stoning

35. Such community service programs would be "victim-oriented" inasmuch as offenders
would be required to repay their victims out of the offenders' earnings.
36. See infra text accompanying notes 218-20.
37. 3 THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD, SEDER NEZiKIN, TRACTATE SANHEDRIN 49b, at 330
(I. Epstein ed. & H. Freedman trans., 1935). "Four deaths have been entrusted ... stoning,
burning, slaying [by the sword] and strangulation." Id.; GOLDIN, supranote 31, at 141; see
also 5 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA, supranote 3 1, at 142 (defining four methods of talmudic
judicial execution as stoning, burning, slaying, and strangling).
38. See 3 THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD, supranote 37, 53a, at 359; GOLDIN, supra note
3 1, at 28 ("Of the thirty-six capital crimes, eighteen are punishable by stoning, . . . [which
was] regarded as the severest of the four methods of capital punishment.").
39. See 3 THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD, supra note 37, 49b, at 332. Leviticus 24:14
states: "Take the blasphemer outside the camp ... and let the whole community stone the
criminal." This article modifies traditional translations of biblical and talmudic passages to
render them gender-neutral. For example, in the above passage, the Hebrew literally
translates, "let the whole community stone him." However, "criminal" for "him," is
substituted since biblical capital punishments applied to men and women equally. See
Deuteronomy 17:5 (stating that "[y]ou shall take the man or woman who did that wicked
thing... and you shall stone them.") (emphasis added).
40. See 3 THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD, supranote 37, 49b, at 332. This was based on
Deuteronomy 17:2-5 ("If there is found among you ...a man or woman who has affronted
the Lord ... turning to the worship of other gods ... you shall stone them.").
41. See Exodus 22:8. The Talmud punishes witchcraft with stoning. See also
BABYLONIAN TALMUD, supranote 37, 67a.
42. 3 THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD, supra note 37, 66a, at 448; 3 THE CODE OF MOSES
MAIMONIDES (MISHNEH TORAH), BOOK 14, THE BOOK OF JUDGES, Laws Concerningthe
Sanhedrin and the Penaltieswithin their Jurisdiction15:10, at 44 (Julian Obermann et al.
eds. & Abraham M. Hershman trans., 1949) [hereinafter 3 MOSES MAIMONIDES].
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was accomplished by throwing stones at the criminal from a specified
height;4 3 often witnesses to the capital offense, as representatives of the
Jewish community, did the stoning."
Burning was the second most severe form of capital punishment4 5 and
was reserved primarily for the sexual offenses of incest and adultery.46
Burning was accomplished through a three-step process. First, the criminal
was placed in dirt up to his or her armpits to prevent the convict from
moving or falling.47 Then a scarf was placed around the offender's neck,
after which each witness seized an end of the scarf"s and pulled until the

The hierarchy of halachic punishment underscores Judaism's theocratic perception of
crime. For example, stoning, the most severe form of halachic punishment, was employed
mainly to stem conduct that expressed either disbelief in God or the observance of precepts,
such as the Sabbath, that symbolize divine creation. See DONIN, supra note 30, at 65-67.
43. BABYLONIAN MISHNEH SANHEDRIN 45a (I. Epstein ed. & Jacob Shachter trans.,
1936); 5 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA 142 (1972) (noting that "a 'stoning place' was designed
from which he [the criminal] was to be pushed down to death."); Haim H. Cohn, The
Penology of the Talmud, 5 ISRAEL L. REV. 53, 56 (1970) (Talmud established "stoninghouse" two floors high from which the convict was thrown).
44. GOLDIN, supra note 31, at 3 1; see also Cohn, supra note 43, at 57. The Talmud
required the witnesses to a capital offense be the criminal's executioners to test the veracity
of the witnesses's testimony and to provide executions with a modicum of humaneness not
attainable via other forms of public capital punishment. GOLDIN, supra note 31, at 136-3 7
n.17; Cohn, supra note 43, at 56.
45. See GOLDIN, supra note 31, at 34.
46. Id.; see also 5 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA, supra note 37, at 143. Incest, in Jewish
law, refers to sexual intercourse between ancestors and descendants, siblings of the whole or
half blood, aunts and nephews, in-laws, and stepparents and stepchildren. See 8 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA 1316 (1972). Halacha defines adultery as "[v]oluntary sexual intercourse
between a married woman.., and a man other than her husband." See 2 ENCYCLOPAEDIA
JUDAICA 313 (1972). Even maried men cannot commit adultery by sleeping with a single
woman, perse, according to halacha, since Jewish men, unlike women, are biblically allowed
to be married to more than one woman at the same time. See 4 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA
986 (1972) (noting that biblically permitted polygamy was practiced throughout the talmudic
period); 12 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA 258 (1972).
47. See 3 THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD, supra note 37, 52a, at 349; GOLDIN, supra note
31, at 142.
48. Talmudic law required the testimony of at least two witnesses who both witnessed
the offense at the same time, to convict a defendant, based on Deuteronomy 17:6 (stating that
"[a]t the mouth of two witnesses.., shall an offender worthy of death be put to death.").
See 2 J. DAVID BLEICH, CONTEMPORARY HALAKHIC PROBLEMS 347 (1983).
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offender opened his or her mouth.49 At that point, molten lead was poured
down the criminal's throat,5" internally burning him or her to death.
The third most severe form of capital punishment was decapitation.5
It was reserved for homicide and communal apostasy. 2 Israeli kings also
used decapitation to execute rebellious subjects.53 Strangulation, the least
severe method of execution54 was the only form of capital punishment not
founded on the Old Testament.55 The procedure for strangling was the
same as that for burning,5 6 except molten lead was not poured down the
criminal's throat.
Regardless of the method of execution employed, the criminal had to
be killed on the day he or she was sentenced.
This requirement was
intended, in part, to reduce any anxiety the criminal might experience while
awaiting death.58 Immediately before execution, judges urged the condemned to recite a formula of contrition.59 This practice was designed to
induce the convict to repent and to underscore the rehabilitative function of

49. 3 THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD, supra note 37, 52a, at 349; 5 ENCYCLOPAEDIA
JUDAICA, supranote 37, at 143 ("[T]wo kerchiefs were then to be... drawn... until [the
offender] opened his [or her] mouth.").
50. 3 THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD, supranote 37, 52a, at 349-50; GOLDIN, supranote
31, at 143. The "[executioner] kindled the string and threw it into his [the offender's] mouth,
and it went down into his stomach and burned his entrails." kId
51. GOLDIN, supra note 31, at 36.
52. See id. at 36, 180; 3 THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD, supra note 37, 52b, at 355; 5
ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA, supra note 37, at 143 (stating that "[s]laying by the sword was
the mode of executing murderers and the inhabitants of the subverted town").
53. Halacha permitted Jewish kings to execute on their own authority, without prior
judicial approval; such execution was accomplished by decapitation. See 5 ENCYCLOPAEDIA
JUDAICA, supra note 37, at 144.
54. See GOLDIN, supra note 31, at 37.
55. Id. Because strangulation was not founded on the Old Testament, it may be
considered a rabbinic punishment.
56. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
57. See 3 MOSES MAIMONIDES, supra note 42, 12:4, at 36.
58. See 1 J. DAvID BLEICH, CONTEMPORARY HALAKHIC PROBLEMS 332 (1977)
(mentioning immediate execution of accused to avoid agonizing suspense). For an appreciation of this sentiment in a secular context, see EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND, PRINCIPLES OF
CRIMINOLOGY 524 (1934) (describing that "principal distress is due to the anticipation of
death rather than to the actual execution").
59. 3 THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD, supranote 37, 43b, at 283. "When [the condemned]
is about ten cubits away from the place of stoning, they say to him, 'confess."' Only if the
accused did not know how to repent was he or she instructed to recite "may my death be an
expiation for all my sins." Id. at 283-84; 3 MOSES MAIMONIDES, supra note 42, at 37.
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halachic capital punishment.6" After the execution, the criminal's corpse
was hung from a tree to heighten deterrence. 6
While halachic capital punishment was geared to underscore the
severity, and to deter the commission of capital crimes, it was almost never
used.62 Procedural safeguards, such as the requirement that potential
offenders be warned within a certain time before the commission of a capital
offense of the penalty for the crime,63 made convicting a defendant of a

60. It is difficult to appreciate how capital punishment facilitates rehabilitation, except
sarcastically. See, e.g., Stephen C. Hicks, The Only Argument for CapitalPunishment in
Principle-AFrankAppraisal,18 AM. J. CRIM. L. 333 (1991) (discussing that movie character played by W.C. Fields, about to be hanged, says "it'll sure be a lesson to me"); see also
Samuel J.M. Donnelly, Capital Punishment: A Critique of the Politicaland Philosophical
Thought Supporting the Justices's Positions, 24 ST. MARY'S L. J. 1, 12 (1992) (noting
"rehabilitation is not a goal of capital punishment"). However, rehabilitation applied to
halachic capital punishment is comprehensible when it is realized that Judaism treats crime
as an affront to God; a fundamental goal of all Judaic punishment is thus the expiation of sin.
Cohn, supra note 43, at 55 ("Like all theocratic law, the laws prescribing punishments...
their primary purpose is expiation."). Expiation may be understood, therefore, as metaphysical rehabilitation because it provides atonement thus allowing for a peaceful afterlife.
See 3 MOSES MAIMONIDES, supranote 42, at 37 (stating confession bestows portion in World
To Come). This article entertains the expiatory element in halachic punishment as manifested
in halachic capital punishment, corporal punishment, and excommunication, but generally
refrains from discussing the expiatory characteristic of halachic punishment. This is because
any examination of halachic punishment is intended primarily to provide insights on that
system's practical applications, if any, to the present American punishment regime;
application of theocratic notions of punishment to a predominately secular society is
inappropriate. For discussion of the theocratic and rehabilitative elements in halachic
punishment, see 13 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA, supranote 31, at 1386; 2 MOSES MAIMONIDES, THE GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED 534, 534-36 (Shlomo Pines trans., 1963) ("For the Law
is a divine thing .... [and] abolition of punishments ... would be cruelty itself.").
61. See Deuteronomy 21:22-23 (stating "if a person [has] committed a sin worth death,
and that person is put to death, and you must hang the defendant from a tree."); see also
GOLDIN, supra note 31, at 33 and 137 n.18; 3 THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD, supra note 37,
45b, at 299 ("All who are stoned are [afterwards] hanged.").
62. Three famous instances of capital punishment mentioned in the BABYLONIAN
TALMUD TRACTATE SANHEDRIN are: 1) the execution of a man for riding a horse on the
Sabbath (SANHEDRIN 46A); 2) the execution of Bat Tavi, the daughter of a cohain (priest),
for having illicit sex (SANHEDRIN 52B); and 3) the hanging of eighty witches on a single day
(SANHEDRIN 45B). See BASIL F. HERRING, JEWISH ETHICS AND HALAKHAH FOR OUR TIME
153-54 (1984). However, even these executions were not imposed pursuant to strict halachic
standards but were implemented as "temporary" deterrent measures. Id.
63. See 3 MOSES MAIMONIDES, supra note 42, 12:2, at 34; Aaron M. Schreiber, The
Jurisprudenceof Dealing with UnsatisfactoryFundamentalLaw: A Comparative Glance at
the Different Approaches in Medieval Criminal Law, Jewish Law and the United States
Supreme Court, 11 PACE L. REv. 535, 546 (1991).
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capital offense nearly impossible.' These safeguards were so extensive
that the talmudic sages referred to a Jewish court which dispensed a capital
sentence only once in seventy years as "murderous."6
Various reasons have been advanced as to why Judaism provided for
such elaborate capital punishment schemes and then minimized their use.
First, it has been suggested that halachic capital punishment served not as
a practical means of executing criminals, but to illustrate Judaism's hatred
of capital offenses.66 Moreover, Judaism accomplished this illustration by
establishing a hierarchy of punishment schedules,67 with those of capital
punishment being the most severe.
Another explanation is that, whereas the Torah prescribed a program
of capital punishment, the rabbis made implementation of that program
nearly impossible because they recognized human beings can never be
absolutely certain of factual guilt and innocence, and thus innocent people
may occasionally be executed. 8 They premised this position on the belief

64. See Arnold N. Enker, Aspects of Interaction between the Torah Law, the King's
Law, and the Noahide Law in Jewish CriminalLaw, 12 CARDOzO L. REV. 1137, 1139 (1991)
(discussing impracticality of halachic capital punishment making conviction and execution
extremely unlikely); see also Schreiber, supranote 63, at 546 (discussing how technical rules
made it nearly impossible to execute under Jewish criminal law).
65. See 5 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA, supranote 37, at 145. "A Sanhedrin that puts a
man to death ...is called a murderous one. R[abbi] Eleazar ben Azariah says 'Or even once
in 70 years."' Id.
66. See HERBERT L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY 65 (1963) (providing
secular expression of this sentiment) ("The punishment for grave crimes should adequately
reflect the revulsion felt by the majority of citizens for them."); see also Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) ("[C]apital punishment is an expression of society's moral outrage
at particularly offensive conduct.").
67. See Enker, supra note 64, at 1145.
68. See Gerald J. Blidstein, Capital Punishment-The Classic Jewish Discussion, 14
JUDAISM 159, 163 (1985). This position is based on a famous argument among Rabbis
Akiva, Tarfon, and Shimon ben Gamliel. Akiva and Tarfon testified that if they sat on the
Sanhedrin, the Jewish Supreme Court, criminals would not be executed. Shimon ben Gamliel
countered that without capital punishment there would be more murders among the Jewish
People. See 4 THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD 7a, at 35 (I. Epstein ed. & H.M. Lazarus trans.,
1935); Cohn, supra note 43, at 64. The positions of Akiva and Tarfon were based on the
fear of executing an innocent individual. See HERRING, supra note 62, at 157 (Tarfon and
Akiva were motivated by possibility of mistaken verdict). This fear of mistake is often cited
in contemporary discussions of capital punishment. See, e.g., CHARLES L. BLACK, CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT: THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICEAND MISTAKE 1, 10, 14-22 (1974); HERBERT
L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 89 (1968); ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL
EXPLANATIONS 377 (1981); Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriagesof
Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21, 21-22, 75-81 (1987).
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it is better that more factually guilty criminals be spared than it is that
innocent persons be executed.69
Yet another suggestion is that the Talmud made capital punishment
impractical, not out of a fear innocent persons would be executed, but
because of a reluctance to terminate even guilty lives.7" This view was
premised on the sanctity of human life and the belief that all killing destroys
the image of God in the world.7'
Another reason the talmudic rabbis rendered employment of the death
penalty nearly impossible was they understood deterrence to be promoted
more by the frugal use of capital punishment than by a regime of extensive
execution.7' To be sure, the rabbis only refrained from employing capital

69. For an expression of this sentiment in a secular context, see Alan H. Goldman,
Beyond the DeterrenceTheory: Comments on Van Den Haag's "Punishmentas a Device
for Controlling the Crime Rate." 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 721 (1981) (explaining why it is
worse to punish the innocent then free the guilty).
70. See Blidstein, supra note 68, at 164.
71. Id. at 165.
72. See 13 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA, supranote 31, at 1387. "[l]n order to retain the
deterrent effect of the death penalty, .. . the judges must do everything in their power to
avoid passing death sentences." Id. At first blush, this appears counterintuitive-certainly,
more executions would seem to deter more capital offenses. See Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238, 312 (1972) (White, J., concurring) (discussing decreased use of executions
diminishing deterrence); HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 287
(1968) (discussing how fewer uses of capital punishment diminish deterrence). Yet, the
talmudic scholars may have appreciated, as other legal thinkers have, that the taking of
human life, even with judicial sanction, tends to cheapen the value of life in society. See,
e.g., RONALD DwORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION 182 (1993) (questioning whether capital
punishment creates callousness in society); JOHN LAURENCE, A HISTORY OF CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT xvii (1960) (quoting Clarence Darrow: "[T]he spectacle of the state taking life
must tend to cheapen it."); Donnelly, supra note 60, at 24 (explaining Hart's statement that
death penalty might actually reduce respect for life); HART, supra note 68, at 88-89 (stating
that use of death penalty by state may actually lower respect for life). Accordingly, the
rabbinic stance on deterrence and capital punishment may reflect a talmudic balancing of the
ideal of capital punishment as a deterrence with the reality that such punishment often
impacts negatively on society. Halacha often balances the appropriateness of observing law
in its ideal state against societal realities that preclude such observance. For examples, see
3 J. DAVID BLEICH, CONTEMPORARY HALAKHIC PROBLEMS 329-43 passim (1989) (discussing
whether antenuptial agreements may be employed to circumvent problem of agunot (women
who cannot remarry because they are not halachically divorced)); 7 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA
1159 (1972) (noting no restriction may be imposed on a congregation that cannot as a
practical matter observe the restriction); Cohn, supra note 43, at 56-58 (describing
replacement of biblical stoning with rabbinic stoning out of societal need).
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punishment 73 after becoming convinced that such punishment no longer
served a deterrent function, even when practiced sporadically.74 Biblical
and rabbinic methods of capital punishment remained "on the books,"
however, as pedagogical expressions of Judaic disgust with capital crime."
While talmudic capital punishment was more of an academic than
practical concern during the talmudic period, including the period surrounding the destruction of the Jerusalem Temple,76 Jews used the death penalty
extensively when they were domiciled in the diaspora." This was due to
the perception by diasporic rabbis that emergency measures were needed to
protect Jewish communities from assimilation and destruction by informers.

78

73. The institution of talmudic capital punishment was abolished 40 years before the
Temple's destruction in 70 A.D. See Stone, supranote 30, at 828 n.78 (dating Jerusalem's
destruction at 70 A.D.). The talmudic rabbis formally ended capital punishment 40 years
before Jerusalem and its Temple were destroyed, because that is when the Romans exiled the
Jewish Supreme Court (Sanhedrin) Judges from Jerusalem; biblical authority to execute
criminals existed only when the Sanhedrin could convene within the Temple walls, based on
Deuteronomy 17:8-9 ("[Y]ou shall go to the place the Lord your God shall choose... And
you shall go to the priests, ... and the judges who shall be in those days."). See 3 MOSES
MAIMONIDES, supra note 42, 14:12-13, at 41. The Talmud interpreted this passage, with its
juxtaposition of priests and judges, as requiring that judges only rule when priests perform
(i.e., when there is a temple in Jerusalem). See BLEICH, supra note 48, at 343.
74. See HERRING, supra note 62, at 161.
75. 10 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA 1483-84 (1971) (describing the impact of morality on
Jewish law through rabbinic use of capital punishment penalties to communicate rabbinic
disgust with misbehavior).
76. See supra note 73.
77. See 5 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA, supra note 37, at 812 (describing capital
punishment dispensed by Jews in Spain and Poland); 13 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA, supra
note 31, at 1388-89 (discussing Jewish use of death penalty in Muslim and Christian Spain
on informers); see also HAIM H. COHN, HUMAN RIGHTS INJEWISH LAW 30 (1984) (noting
that Jewish courts were permitted to impose even capital punishment when required by
"necessities of the day"); Suzanne L. Stone, Sinaiticand Noahide Law: Legal Pluralismin
Jewish Law, 12 CARDOZo L. REV. 1157, 1198 (1991) ("To preserve communal unity ... the
Jewish community must have the ability to impose . . . capital punishment.").
78. See HERRING, supra note 62, at 159 (finding that death penalty may be invoked
without "conventional considerations" to safeguard Torah interests). Id. at 161 (explaining
that the death penalty is necessary for those who inform on Jews to non-Jewish authorities).
The informer who disparages Jews to the secular authorities, to receive an award or curry
favor, is the most despised figure in Jewish history. To illustrate this point the siddur, or
Jewish prayer book, includes a supplication that God eradicate informers. See 8 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA, supranote 32, at 1364 (addition of special blessing to counter increase of
informers). For an example of the hatred Jews felt for informers, see Schreiber, supra note
63, at 547-48. For an interesting discussion on the impact of informers on Jewish
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This cursory examination of halachic capital punishment demonstrates
it was premised on four beliefs. First, the main purpose of and justification
for the death penalty is deterrence; since any taking of human life,
especially in public, tends to cheapen such life. Deterrence is promoted
more by the frugal use of capital punishment combined with expressions of
disgust concerning capital offenses, than it is by a more extensive use of the
death penalty. Second, deterrence is promoted by exhibiting the convict's
corpse to the public. Third, deterrence and retribution are advanced by
allowing society, represented by the witnesses to the respective crime, to
carry out executions. Finally, offender rehabilitation is realized through the
expiatory function of capital punishment.
Having examined how the Talmud dealt with capital criminals, this
article now explores how the Talmud treated thieves who were unable to
repay the amount of their theft.

B. Indentured Servitude
Indentured servitude79 was the biblical remedy both for those who
were unable to support themselves and those who had stolen and were
unable to repay for what was stolen.80 Because indentured servitude based
on an inability to support oneself was not imposed as a punishment, this
article deals solely with the latter category."1
communities generally, see 8 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA, supra note 32, at 1364-73.
79. Servitude is purposefully used instead of slavery to describe Judaic penal servitude
in order to emphasize that Judaic servitude differed acutely from other forms of slavery in
its humane treatment of slaves. Examples of this treatment noted in the article include the
provision that ideally limited Judaic penal servitude to a maximum period of six years and
the ultra humane manner in which the master had to treat the Hebrew servant. Only if the
servant himself requested an extended period of servitude was servitude beyond six years
permitted. See 5 THE CODE OF MOSES MAIMONIDES (MIsHNEH TORAH), BOOK 12, THE
BOOK OF ACQuISITON, Laws ConcerningSlaves 2:2, at 249 (Leon Nemoy et al. eds. & Isaac
Klein trans., 1951) [hereinafter 5 MOSES MAIMONIDES]; 14 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA 1656
(1972). For examples of the humane treatment Judaism afforded indentured servants, see id.
at 1656-57, 1659-60; 5 MOSES MAIMONIDES, supra, 1:6, at 247 (forbidden to work servant
needlessly); id. 1:7, at 248 (forbidden to assign servant only menial tasks); id. 1:9, at 248-49
(master must treat slave as an equal regarding food, drink, etc.).
80. See 5 MOSES MAIMONIDES, supra note 79, 1:1, at 246 ("The Hebrew slave...
refers to an Israelite whom the court sells into servitude against his will or to one who sells
himself voluntarily."); 14 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA, supra note 79, at 1655; GOLDIN, supra
note 3 1, at 57.
81. Detailed discussion of how indentured servitude was practiced throughout Jewish
history is beyond the scope of this article. For more comprehensive treatment, see COHN,
supra note 77, at 56-63.
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According to Exodus 22:8,82 a thief was obligated to pay his8" victim
a fine in addition to the amount of his theft. A thief, who was able to repay
the theft but unable to pay the fine, could not be sold into servitude; only
a thief who was unable to repay the actual theft was sold into servitude.8"
Judaic penal servitude was designed primarily to accommodate restitution
on the part of and the rehabilitation of the thief, and to demonstrate that the
dignity of the offender-servant need not be actively compromised to achieve
those goals." Because the offender-servant was sold into the service of his
victim, 86 restitution, which consisted of the servant 7 working for his
victim for six years," was accomplished rather easily. This restitution was

82. In all charges of theft, concerning an ox, an ass, a sheep, a garment, or any other
loss, both parties must come before God-whoever God declares guilty must pay the winner
double [the market value of the stolen item]. "God" in this context refers to the judges who
pronounce sentence. See 9 THE CODE OF MOSES MAIMONIDES (MISHNEH TORAH), BOOK 11,
THE BOOK OF TORTs, Laws ConcerningTheft 1:5, at 60-61 (Julian Obermann ed. & Hyman
Klein trans., 1954) [hereinafter 9 MosES MAIMONIDES].
83. An Israelite woman was not permitted to sell herself into servitude nor could she be
sold into service to repay her theft. See 5 MOSES MAIMONIDES, supra note 79, 1:2, at 246.
84. See 5 MOSES MAIMONIDES, supranote 79, 1:1, at 246; GOLDIN, supra note 31, at
58. Our discussion of halachic penal servitude is limited to consideration of Jewish servants.
For treatment of the laws regarding non-Jewish or so-called "alien" slaves, see 14
ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA, supra note 79, at 1658.
85. Of course, the very status of being an indentured servant probably lowered the selfesteem of the thief. This may have been part of the reason why the talmudic sages insisted
that the servant be treated humanely.
86. See COHN, supra note 77, at 57 (service of slave to compensate for theft against
master).
87. While the Hebrew servant had to work for his employer, the employer had to treat
the servant almost as an equal; in an incredible expression of sympathy for the stigma most
indentured servants experience, the talmudic scholars ruled that a master had to provide his
servant with food, clothing, and shelter equal to that of the master. See 5 MOSES
MAIMONIDES, supra note 79, 1:9.
88. Id. 2:2, at 249. Although Jewish law prescribed a six year period of penal servitude,
there were three ways in which penal servitude could be terminated within the six years.
First, a servant could free himself by paying his master the value of his remaining years of
service in proportion to the purchase price the master paid for the servant. For example, if
the master paid $6000 for the servant, the servant could free himself at the end of four years
by paying his master $2000, or the value of the remaining two years that the servant owes
his master. See 4 THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD, SEDER NASHIM, KIDDUSHIN 14b, at 59 (I.
Epstein ed. & H. Freedman trans., 1936) [hereinafter 4 BABYLONIAN TALMUD]. Second, a
servant could be freed by receipt of a "deed of redemption" delivered by the master to the
servant. Id. 16a, at 68. Finally, an indentured servant became free on the death of his
master, unless the master left male descendants, in which case, the servant was required to
work for his master's male children for the balance of the six year period. Id. 17b, at 77.
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realized through a face-to-face encounter between thief and victim. The
thief was made to appreciate that he had wronged a fellow human being,
and not merely an "owner" or "possessor." The victim was able to perceive
the thief as a person, not as some impersonal monster.8 9 Moreover,
because Jewish law insisted the purpose of penal servitude was not merely
to achieve pecuniary restitution, such servitude served to rehabilitate the
offender-servant by providing him with the opportunity to progress and
advance from the low level at which his conduct had placed him.9"
Unlike their continued practice of capital punishment after the
destruction of the Jerusalem Temple, Jews did not practice indentured
servitude from the time celebration of the jubilee year ceased.9 1 Halachic
penal servitude demonstrates four points. First, because Judaism considered
theft a crime against the victim as well as society, a thief who was sold into
servitude to repay his debt had to work for his victim. Second, a servant
usually had to work for his victim for six years. Third, a master was
obligated to treat his servant in the most humane manner possible. Finally,
a main purpose of halachic servitude was rehabilitation of the offender.
These factors further illustrate that Jewish law combined restitutive and
rehabilitative principles in its punishment programs. Having examined
halachic capital punishment and halachic penal servitude, this article now
turns to the most prevalent form of halachic punishment: corporal punishment.

89. For a secular suggestion that the absence of such victim-offender interaction is at the
root of the present American prison over-population problem, see Leven, supra note 10, at
650-53.
90. See 14 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA, supra note 79, at 1659-60.
91. 4 THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD, SEDER NASHIM, TRACTATE GITrEN 65a, at 306 (I.
Epstein ed. & Maurice Simon trans., 1936); 5 MOSES MAIMONIDES, supranote 79, 1:10, at
249. The jubilee year prescribed by Leviticus 25:8-17 was tied to the issue of indentured
servitude, inasmuch as even individuals who desired to remain servants past the mandatory
six year period had to be freed at the beginning of the jubilee year. Id. The talmudic
scholars, therefore, felt it was inappropriate to practice penal servitude once the jubilee was
abolished, since at that point, an individual could theoretically remain an indentured servant
forever. There is dispute as to when celebration of the jubilee actually ended. Some scholars
date cessation of the jubilee at approximately 730 years before the death of Christ, while
others believe that the jubilee did not end until the destruction of the Jerusalem Temple in
70 A.D. See COHN, supra note 77, at 61.
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C. CorporalPunishment
Halachic corporal punishment, 92 or flogging, was the standard form
of punishment for crimes that did not have biblically prescribed penalties.93
There were two forms of flogging, biblical and rabbinic. 94 Biblical
flogging was limited to thirty-nine lashes, 9 and served as a metaphoric96
substitute for the death penalty. Rabbinic whipping served to discipline an
offender97 who had flouted a rabbinic precept, and was not limited to a
specific number of lashes. Theoretically, a candidate for rabbinic whipping
could be flogged to death. 98

92. Discussion of the ways in which corporal punishment is practiced in other religions
and countries is beyond the scope of this article. For a summary of how corporal punishment
is administered in the countries that practice it, see Tom Kuntz, BeyondSingapore: Corporal
Punishment,A to Z, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1994, § 4, at 5.
93. See 6 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA 1348 (1972).

94. The distinction between biblical and rabbinic corporal punishment reflects the
difference between biblical law and rabbinic law generally. Biblical law mainly refers to the
commandments and prescriptions found in the canon known as the Old Testament (including
the Pentateuch, or Five Books of Moses, Prophets, and Chronicles). Biblical law as used in
talmudic parlance also refers to ordinances which the talmudic rabbis and halachic codifiers
derived from biblical precedent, and to ordinances which, though dedu~ed from passages in
the Old Testament, were believed to have been revealed to Moses at the Revelation at Sinai.
See DAVID M. FELDMAN, MARITAL RELATIONS, BIRTH CONTROL, AND ABORTION INJEWISH

LAW 3-4 (1968). Rabbinic law refers both to the modification of biblical law by the talmudic
rabbis and halachic codiflers, and to practices that the halachic authorities enacted to protect
biblical principles. Id; see also 7 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA, supra note 72, at 1159.
95. See 3 MOSES MAIMONIDES, supranote 42, 17:1, at 47-48. Now, Deuteronomy25:23, which provides the authority for biblical flogging, authorizes a criminal to be given 40
lashes. The talmudic scholars ruled, however, that only 39 lashes should be inflicted to
prevent the possibility of exceeding the biblically authorized number of 40. Id. LEW, supra
note 31, at 63; 6 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA, supranote 93, at 1348; Cohn, supranote 43, at
71.
96. See GOLDIN, supranote 31, at 11-12.

97. Id. at 259 n.4. Rabbinic whipping is referred to in Hebrew as makkat mardut, or
"whipping of rebellion." This underscores that such punishment was imposed to discipline.
See id; see also Shuster, supranote 29, at 644 n.18.
98. Literally, "until the defendant's soul departs." See 2 THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD,
SEDER NASHIM, TRACTATE KETHUBOTH 86a-b, at 545 (I. Epstein ed. & Israel W. Slotki
trans., 1936); 6 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA, supranote 93, at 1350. Rabbinic lashings were

not limited in number because their purpose was disciplinary; they had to be enforced until
the offender resumed observation of the rabbinic precept he had disavowed. See id.
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Once the Jewish court established that an offender deserved to be
flogged, 99 the criminal was publicly whipped by a court attendant, on his
or her body, and not through the clothes.' 00 One-third of the lashes were
administered on the convict's chest, and two-thirds were administered on the
convict's upper back.' ' The talmudic scholars applied three unique
procedures to corporal punishment. First, all whipping candidates received
a physical examination immediately before being flogged. Only those
deemed physically able to withstand the beating were lashed. 2 Second,
halachic corporal punishment was imposed publicly to promote deterrence.'0 3 Third, the sentencing judges had to attend and monitor the
imposition of corporal punishment. Their presence ensured both that the
whipper did not whip the criminal excessively,'0 4 and, if the criminal
became ill during punishment, the whipping would cease.'
These
requirements established that halachic corporal punishment was not intended
to be, nor was it, a form of torture or cruel and unusual punishment, 0 6 but
rather served to promote both general and specific deterrence. 0 7 It may
be because halachic corporal punishment was considered to be both a
humane act and an effective deterrent, rabbinic flogging0 8 was extensively
employed by many Jewish communities even when Jews did not have
complete autonomy. 9 In fact, some Orthodox Jews still practice symbol99. To be eligible for biblical lashing, the prospective offender had to receive a warning
from two witnesses immediately before committing the particular offense. See 3 MOSES
MAIMONIDES, supra note 42, 16:4, at 45. The warning and witness requirements concerning
halachic corporal punishment differed, however, from those pertaining to halachic capital
punishment. Unlike capital cases, which required that two witnesses warn the prospective
offender against commission of the crime and testify to having seen the crime performed,
corporal punishment could be imposed if only one witness warned the prospective offender
of the criminal nature of the contemplated crime. See id. 16:6, at 45-46.
100. Id. 16:8, at 46.
101. Id.16:9, at 46.

102. See 6 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA,
TALMUD MAKKOT 3:11).

supra note 93, at 1348 (citing

BABYLONIAN

103. See id. at 1350.
104. See LEW, supra note 31, at 62-63.
105. See 3 MOSES MAIMONIDES, supra note 42, 17:2, at 48.
106. On whether halachic corporal punishment is cruel and unusual, under the Eighth
Amendment, see infra notes 185-207.
107. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
108. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
109. ISRAEL NUN, JEWISH LIFE IN THE MIDDLE AGES 7-8 (1981) (flogging in
seventeenth century Amsterdam). See also 6 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA, supra note 93, at
1350-51 (regarding flogging in post-talmudic times); 8 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA, supra note
32, at 1367 (flogging by Jews in Spain); 13 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA, supra note 31, at
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ic flogging on the eve of Yom Kippur (the Day of Atonement), to
encourage themselves to repent."'
Having reviewed several physical and liberty-restrictive talmudic
punishments, this article now discusses halachic excommunication, the
penalty that perhaps best illustrates the halachic tenets that crime is a sin,
that crime is an affront to God, and that crime requires societal ostracism to
be eradicated effectively.
D. Excommunication
There are two forms of halachic excommunication, niddui and cherem.
Niddui refers to the initial imposition of excommunication.' and is
reserved primarily for individuals who fail to observe rabbinic teaching, to
respect court judgments, or to honor their communal obligations."' First,
the offender is warned to desist from the respective inappropriate behavior.
This reprimand lasts for seven days."' Niddui is imposed against an
offender who continues the aggravating conduct after expiration of the initial,
warning period and requires the offender to comport himself or herself in
an uncomfortable manner."4 The purpose of niddui is to render the
menuddah unattractive to himself or herself and to others,' 15 and thereby
induce him or her to reform. Niddui lasts for thirty days. It is extended for
another thirty days if the offender does not inform the court at the end of

1389 (flogging by Jews in Germany).
110. See SCHNEUR ZALMAN OF LIADI, SIDDUR TEHILLAT HASHEM (Prayer Book of the
Lubavitch Chassidim) 296 (Merkos Linyonei Chinuch ed., 1978) (prescribing flogging on
Yom Kippur eve) (on file with the author).
111. See 8 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA, supranote 32, at 350-51. Niddui derives from
menuddah, which means "defiled." Id. at 350 (Menuddahalso refers to the excommunicant).
112. Id. at 350-5 1. These examples are merely illustrative. For a complete list of the
offenses that are punishable by niddui, see 8 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA, supra note 32, at
351-52; MOSES MAIMONIDES (MISHNEH TORAH), HILCHOT TALMUD TORAH at 268-72
(Eliyahu Touger trans., 1989).
113. See 8 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA, supra note 32, at 351; THE BABYLONIAN
TALMUD, MO'ED KATAN 16A (I. Epstein ed. & H.M. Lazarus trans., 1984).
114. For example, a menuddahwas enjoined from washing and grooming himself, from
washing clothes, from wearing shoes, from unnecessary social intercourse, and from
participating in formal communal prayer. See MOSES MAIMONIDES, supranote 112, 7:2, at
276-78; 8 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA, supranote 32, at 351.
115. Support for this proposition may be found in the fact that the menuddah was not
permitted to wash or groom as if he or she were in a state of mourning. See MOSES MAIMONIDES, supranote 112, 7:4, at 276.
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the initial thirty days that he or she will abstain from the offensive
conduct." 6 Finally, the coffin of one who dies menuddah is symbolically
stoned."' 7
Cherem, the second and more severe form of excommunication, is
placed on offenders who refuse to acknowledge wrongdoing even after the
second thirty day period of niddui."8 Cherem differs from niddui in that9
the muchram can engage only in limited work and has to study alone,"
whereas the menuddah is permitted to conduct his or her regular profession
and study the Torah with others.
While these restrictions demonstrate the punitive nature of both forms
of halachic excommunication, niddui and cherem also have a direct impact
on the offender's community. In the case of niddui, the rabbis issue an
edict that friends and neighbors cannot interact with the menuddah except
to study and to pray. The impact on the community of a cherem is greater.
Every Jew is obliged to keep a prescribed distance from the muchram"'
when not patronizing the muchram s place of business. Halachic excommunication is designed, therefore, to punish and reform the offender and to
deter others from the criminal's conduct.'
Thus, it utilizes concepts of

116. See id. 7:6, at 278-80; 8 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA, supra note 32, at 350-51.
117. See MOSES MAIMONIDES, supranote 112,7:4, at 278; 8 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA,
supra note 32, at 351. The stoning of a menuddah's coffin consisted of placing a single
stone on the coffin.
118. See MOSES MAIMONIDES, supra note 112, 7:6, at 278-80; 8 ENCYCLOPAEDIA
JUDAICA, supra note 32, at 351. Cherem, from the Aramaic charama, means to "be
forbidden." See id. at 344. Muchram refers to the individual in a state of cherem. See id.
at 351. Eliyahu Touger has translated niddui, in the passages from MAIMONIDES, supranote
112, as "ban of ostracism," and cheremas "excommunication." Rabbi Touger may have done
so simply to underscore that niddui and cherem differ in severity. Niddui and cherem may
both be translated into English as "excommunication" without compromising their Hebrew
meaning. See BEN-YEHUDA'S POCKET ENGLISH-HEBREW HEBREW-ENGLISH DICTIONARY 29
(Ehud Ben-Yehuda & David Weinstein eds., 1961) (defining cheremas "ban" or "excommunication"); id. at 196 (defining niddui as same); see also 8 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA, supra
note 32, at 350 (describing cherem as aggravated niddui and not separate punishment).
119. See 8 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA, supranote32, at 351; MOSES MAIMONIDES, supra
note 112, 7:5, at 278.
120. It is forbidden to be within four cubits [six feet] of the excommunicant. See
MOSES MAIMONIDES, supra note 112, 7:4, at 276-78. Non-family members are not allowed
near excommunicants. See 8 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA, supra note 32, at 351.
121. Of course this deterrence was predicated on the assumption the Jewish community
would respect rabbinic authority enough to sanction ostracism for the disobedience of
rabbinic teachings. Interestingly, this halachic reliance on communal observance permeates
Jewish law. Consider the rabbinic edict that forbids a Jew to climb a tree on the Sabbath.
See 3 YISROEL MEIR HA-COHEN, MISHNEH BERURAH, Laws of Shabbos § 336:1 (Aviel
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general and specific deterrence and rehabilitation, and involves both the

offender and his or her community in eradicating misconduct.
Short of death, excommunication is the most horrible censure an
observant Jew can suffer. It is designed to sever the Jew's relationship with
the community.'
Such detachment can be devastating for the religious
Jew because, in contrast to other religions, interaction with other members
of society is a central religious element of Judaism." 3 Halacha requires
the Jew to pray with a minyan (a quorum comprised of ten Jews), 124 to
contribute to charity," to study Torah (preferably in public), 26 and to
generally take an interest in his or her community.'27 Excommunication
prevents such interaction, thus providing a most miserable and deterrenceeffective condition for a practicing Jew.

Halachic excommunication was utilized from the initial post-talmudic
period through the middle ages, and is still employed in certain orthodox
communities. 12 Today, however, in the absence of a central binding

Orenstein ed., 1986); 14 THE

CODE OF MAIMONIDES (MISHNEH TORAH), BOOK 3, THE BOOK
OF SEASONS, The Sabbath, 21:9, at 131 (Leon Nemoy et al. eds. & Solomon Gandz &

Hyman Klein trans., 1961). The rabbinic penalty for willfully climbing a tree on the Sabbath
is that the offender must remain in the tree until the Sabbath ends. See id. at 131-32. The
halachic codifiers apparently did not entertain the thought that the Jew who willfully offended
a rabbinic teaching might not adhere to the penalty for that offense.
122. SeeHAROLD KUSHNER, To LIFE: A CELEBRATION OF JEWISH BEING AND THINKING
12 (1993).
123. See 5 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA, supranote 37, at 808-09; KUSHNER, supranote
122, at 13 (stating that the "essence of religious identity is... membership in a God-seeking
community").
124. See 1 SOLOMON GANZFRIED, CODE OF JEWISH LAW (Kitzur Shulhan Aruh) 41
(Hyman E. Goldin trans., Hebrew Publishing Co. revised ed. 1961) (describing appropriateness of praying together with congregation described as minyan, or quorum, of 10 Jews).
125. See id. at I10.
126. See id. at 87.
127. See DAILY PRAYER BOOK (HA-SIDDUR HA-SHALEM) 486 (Philip Bimbaum trans.,
Hebrew Publishing Co. ed. 1977).
128. See 8 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA, supra note 32, at 353-54 (describing use of
cherem in post-talmudic Jewish history); id. at 1368 (discussing excommunication in
medieval Eastern and Central Europe); 13 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA, supranote 31, at 138990 (noting that cherem is the most severe form of post-talmudic punishment); NUN, supra
note 109, at 52-53 (emphasizing the effect of excommunication on the offender during the
middle ages); see alsoSHLOMO EIDELBERG, JEWISH LIFE INAusTRIA INTHE XVTH CENTURY
67 (1962) (noting use of excommunication in fifteenth century Poland).
Excommunication may initially have been an effective deterrent against certain crimes and sins during
the middle ages because of the manner in which it was celebrated. While the "lighter"
reprimand and nidduiweresimply publicized by the rabbinical court, cheremwas pronounced
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halachic authority, excommunication, like other forms of halachic punishment, has lost its general deterrence value. It remains primarily as an
expression of ultra-orthodox disapproval of modem, secular conduct.129
Having presented an overview of halachic punishment, the article next
compares how the halachic penal methods mentioned above compare with
their counterparts in American law. This article also examines the
implementation of halachic punishment methods in American law.
III. AMERICAN LAW

A. Capital Punishment
Although contemporary American capital punishment finds its origins
in the Old Testament, 3 ' modem American capital punishment differs
markedly from its biblical ancestor. First, halachic Judaism theorized that
executions should be as public as possible to promote deterrence. Conversely, modem American executions are generally conducted in private.'
Second, halachic Judaism required that capital punishment occur on the
same day as sentencing. In contrast, American executions often occur years
after a defendant is sentenced.' 32 Third, Jewish law allowed appeal of a

in a manner intended to induce terror: a proclamation was made in the synagogue that the
offender was a muchram (excommunicant) while all in attendance held lit candles. After the
proclamation was read, the shofar (ram's horn traditionally blown on the Jewish New Year
and at other significant national events) was blown, and the candles were extinguished,
signifying the damnation of the excommunicant's soul. See 8 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA,
supra note 32, at 355. Perhaps the most famous public cherem of the post-talmudic era that
was imposed in such a manner was the one pronounced on the Jewish philosopher Benedict
de Spinoza (1632-1677) for his pantheism in Amsterdam on July 27, 1656; JOHNSoN, supra
note 29, at 288-93 (describing cause and text of Spinoza's cherem).
129. See 8 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA, supranote 32, at 354-55 (noting that cherem has
lost its deterrent influence, and depicting Hebrew text of modem cherem imposed on the
owner of a television set).
130. See KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 8, at 560; DAVID M. WALKER, THE
OXFORD COMPANION TO LAW 184 (1980) (relating the origin of capital punishment and the
modem justifications for capital punishment based on religion and morality); Robert A.
Friedlander, Punishing Terrorists: A Model Proposal, 13 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 149, 151
nn.12-13 and accompanying text (1986).
131. In this context, "private" refers to the fact that American executions are not
televised or otherwise made visually available to most Americans. American executions are
public insofar as they are reported in various media and are often witnessed by family
members and other attendants.
132. See Vivian Berger, Justice Delayed or Justice Denied?--A Comment on Recent
Proposalsto Reform Death PenaltyHabeasCorpus, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1665 (1990) (stating
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sentence as of right as often as the defendant wished, provided the appeal
was "cogent."' 33 Others were permitted to present exculpatory evidence
on the convict's
behalf as often as they wished, without a prior showing of
"cogency.' ' 3 4 American law, after Herrera v. Collins,'35 only requires
appellate courts to entertain new exculpatory evidence after conviction if the
evidence is sufficiently competent to overcome a criminal's convictionacquired presumption of guilt.'36 Finally, while halachic Judaism punished
a host of crimes and sins with capital punishment,' 37 American
law
3
reserves the death penalty primarily for aggravated homicide.1 1
American executions are carried out years after an offender is sentenced
primarily because of the sheer volume and frequency of executions in
America today. Whereas halachic Judaism rarely sentenced a criminal to
death, ' there are over 2500 death row inmates throughout the United
States. 4 This volume of capital convicts, most of whom receive numer-

that the average time between sentence and execution is six and one-half to eight years);
Stephen P. Garvey, Death-Innocenceand the Law of Habeas Corpus, 56 ALB. L. REv. 225,
225 (1992) (estimating a lapse of six or seven years between sentence and execution); Lewis
F. Powell, Jr., Capital Punishment, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1035, 1038 (1989).
133. See 3 MosEs MAIMONIDES, supra note 42, 13:1, at 36-37.
134. See id.

135. 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993). Herrerahas generated much controversy. For discussions
of the case, see Marcia Coyle, Innocence vs. Executions, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 27, 1993, at 1;
Joseph L. Hoffmann, Is Innocence Sufficient? An Essay on the US. Supreme Court's
Continuing Problemswith FederalHabeasCorpus and the Death Penalty, 68 IND. L.J. 817,
832-34 (1993): J. Thomas Sullivan, A PracticalGuide to Recent Developments in Federal
Habeas Corpusfor PracticingAttorneys, 25 ARZ. ST. L.J. 317, 336-38 (1993).
136. See Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 860 (noting that upon conviction, criminal loses
presumption of innocence and acquires presumption of guilt); id. at 869 (stating that because
of need for finality in criminal adjudications, post-conviction claims of actual innocence must
pass extraordinarily high threshold).
137. See supra notes 39-52 and accompanying text.
138. See Glenn L. Pierce & Michael L. Radelet, The Role and Consequencesof the
Death Penalty in American Politics, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 711, 713 (19901991). While capital punishment was imposed well into the twentieth century for other
crimes such as rape, most states today reserve the death penalty for intentional homicides.
See BLACK, supranote 68, at 10 (rape was often grounds for execution); FRIEDMAN, supra
note 11, at 318 (Supreme Court allows rape to be capitally punished); at 319 (rape can no
longer be capitally punished); Pierce & Radelet, supra,at 713 n.5 (death penalty is no longer
appropriate for rape of adult not resulting in victim's death).
139. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
140. FRIEDMAN, supranote 11, at 321; Michael D. Hintze, Attackingthe DeathPenalty:
Towarda RenewedStrategy Twenty Years afterFurman,24 CoLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 395,
417 n.124 and accompanying text (1992-1993).
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ous judicial reviews of their convictions,"' makes delayed executions in
America the norm. 42 Unlike that of the halacha, the American penal
system does not employ a hierarchy of capital punishments to reflect a
difference between crimes. Halachic Judaism treats many sins as crimes and
accordingly differentiates sins and crimes that pose significant theological
dangers to Judaism's theocratic structure, from sins and crimes that
compromise physical and social well-being. American law appropriately
defines and punishes only the latter category of offenses as crimes.
Furthermore, because American law only capitally punishes crimes it deems
especially heinous, American law does not need an array of capital
punishment methods to deter capital crimes. Because the death penalty is
only used to combat truly egregious crime ab initio, the American notion of
capital penal deterrence is satisfied.'43
In sum, the nature and reality of contemporary American capital
punishment appropriately precludes the practice of same-day executions in
contemporary America. The establishment of a hierarchy of execution
methods is unnecessary in American jurisprudence, since American law only
uses the death penalty to punish especially egregious crimes. Yet, other
aspects of American capital punishment that differ from their halachic
counterparts are infirm and can benefit from a reformation modeled after
halachic practice, or at least after halachic principles.
An important example of an area where such reformation is warranted
is federal habeas corpus law.' 44 Herreraholds that habeas review is not
required in a capital case on the basis of even newly found exculpatory
evidence, unless that exculpatory evidence is competent enough to overcome
the convict's conviction-acquired presumption of guilt. 45 To the extent
Herrera holds even a claim of factual innocence may be incompetent to
overcome a criminal's conviction-acquired presumption of guilt, 46 the
Court implies that a naked claim of factual innocence of a convicted

141. See Garvey, supra note 132, at 225 n.1 and accompanying text.
142. See Powell, supra note 132, at 1035.
143. See Donnelly, supra note 60, at 34.
144. An extended discussion of habeas corpus is beyond the scope of this article. For
an interesting examination of habeas corpus and its development throughout American
history, see James S. Liebman, Apocalypse Next Time?: The AnachronisticAttackon Habeas
Corpus/DirectReviewParity,92 COLUM. L. REV. 1997 (1992); Note, Successive Chancesfor
Life: Kuhlmann v. Wilson, FederalHabeas Corpus, and the CapitalPetitioner,64 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 455, 457-59 (1989).
145. See supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
146. See Herrera,113 S. Ct. at 860.
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147
individual, by itself, is insufficient to save the convict from execution.
Herrera probably resulted from a judicial desire to secure
finality in
14
criminal proceedings, thus relieving judicial docket clogging. 1
However, Herrera,by expressing a preference for judicial economy and
finality over the formulation of a standard to help avoid the execution of
factually innocent persons, exemplifies the attitude that it is better to risk
executing factually innocent individuals than it is to compromise rules of
criminal procedure. This exemplification is disturbing considering that it
may not be necessary 149 and that it contradicts most constitutional and
philosophical theories of punishment and government. 50 Moreover, viable

147. Chief Justice Rehnquist, for the majority, Justice O'Connor, concurring, and Justice
White, concurring in the judgment, all, one way or another, claimed to support the notion that
the Constitution prohibits the execution of an individual who has made a "persuasive"
showing of "actual innocence." See id. at 869 ("We may assume ...that in a capital case
a truly persuasive demonstration of 'actual innocence' .. . would render the execution of a
defendant unconstitutional."). The majority noted "the execution of a legally and factually
innocent person would be a constitutionally intolerable event." Id. at 870 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). Justice White added that "I assume that a persuasive showing of 'actual
innocence' made after trial ... would render unconstitutional the execution of petitioner."
Id. at 875 (White, J.,
concurring in the judgment); see also Hoffmann, supra note 135, at
832-33. These protestations, however, amount to no more than lip service to a constitutional
ideal, inasmuch as Herreradid not provide for how much persuasiveness is required to find
actual innocence. Herreraalso failed to define what it intended by "actual innocence." See
id. at 832. That the above Justices may have no articulable notions of what constitutes actual
innocence is suggested by their use of quotation marks, no less than nine times, when
referring to petitioner's claim of actual innocence.
148. See Herrera,113 S. Ct. at 869 (stating claims of actual innocence are disruptive
of finality in capital cases and place an enormous burden on states); see also id. at 874
(noting that "[a]t some point in time, the State's interest in finality must outweigh the
prisoner's interest in yet another round of litigation") (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 875
(Justice Scalia expressed concern that "we not appear to make it harder for the lower federal
courts, imposing upon them the burden of regularly analyzing newly-discovered-evidence-ofinnocence claims ... which ... will become routine.") (Scalia, J., concurring).
149. It has been suggested, for example, contrary to the Justices' protestations that rigid
habeas rules are needed to prevent the glut of capital habeas petitions from worsening, the
number of yearly death inmate habeas filings is quite small. See Berger,supranote 132, at
1669 n.23, 1671 n.40 and accompanying text.
150. Explanations asto why a preference for procedural considerations over factual guilt

or innocence is philosophically wrong include, IMMANuEL

KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL

ELEMENTs OF JUSTICE 100 (J.Ladd trans., 1965), cited in Donnelly, supranote 60, at 43
n.240 and accompanying text; HART, supranote 68, at 4-5 (including a requirement that the
offender committed an actual offense among the conditions that constitute "standard" or
"central" case for punishment); idat 31-52passim (discussing doctrines of legal responsibility and excuse, and justification for punishment being conditioned on the commission of
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alternatives to Herreracan be modeled after halachic penal philosophy that
would facilitate reduction of the judicial backlog and promote the finality
of judgments while limiting the possibility that innocent individuals are
judicially murdered. 5'
One such alternative is to limit use of the death penalty to even more
particularly egregious crimes than those that presently warrant capital
punishment; such offenses could include homicide committed in an
especially heinous manner or treason in wartime. This would help to reduce
potential federal habeas backlogs by limiting the number of criminals subject
to government-administered death; the fewer death row inmates there are,
the fewer habeas petitions will be filed. Such a limiting of capital
punishment could be premised on the halachic understanding that deterrence
is best promoted when capital punishment is imposed more infrequently
since frequent government executions may cheapen life in the eyes of
society. 5 '
Another option, also modeled after halachic practice, would be to
differentiate between newly found exculpatory, cogent evidence submitted
by death row inmates themselves, and evidence presented by others.' 53
This distinction might be realized by setting a strict cap on the number of
habeas petitions a convict can bring while granting a more generous
allowance to the number of habeas petitions others can present on behalf of
convicts. While this alternative would not be free from abuse since family
members and friends will certainly continue to bring frivolous petitions to
help an accused, and while it would be difficult to precisely limit the
number of habeas petitions family members or friends could bring, this

crime); NOZICK, supra note 68, at 380-84; Joseph L. Hoffiann, Starting From Scratch:
Rethinking FederalHabeasReview of Death PenaltyCases, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 133, 161
(1992) (execution of an innocent prisoner is so offensive to basic fairness and justice that
federal habeas should be available to all colorable claims of innocence, despite potential costs
of such review); Donald P. Lay, The Writ of Habeas Corpus: A Complex Procedurefor a
Simple Process,77 MINN. L. REV. 1015, 1045-46 (1993) (desire for finality is not sufficient,
and human fallibility is too great to overcome need for judicial review). For other reasons
as to why it is inappropriate to prefer considerations of procedure over determinations of
factual guilt or innocence in the area of criminal liability generally, see Herrera,113 S. Ct.
at 880 (actual innocence is sufficient to obtain habeas review even after a conviction in a
constitutionally perfect trial) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Justice Powell in Kuhlmann
v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 452 (1986)).
151. See Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 884 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("The execution of a
person who can show that he is innocent comes perilously close to simple murder.").
152. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
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option would at least reduce such misuse. Such a reduction could be
realized by limiting the habeas petitions an accused, who has the most
motivation to postpone the execution, could bring absent a demonstration
that the newly found evidence is competent.'54
Talmudic punishment could also be instructive concerning American
law's notion of capital deterrence. Presently, American law promotes
capital deterrence for the most part, by moderately publicizing executions. 5 To further and perhaps more effectively promote deterrence,
American executions, reminiscent of the ancient Judaic practice of postexecution hangings, could be televised and broadcast over radio.' 56 The
visualization of executions may have more of a deterrent effect on potential
capital criminals than does the mere reading or hearing about executions. 57
Of course, televised executions may imbue public executions with a
measure of levity and callousness like public hangings did throughout
American history." 8 Since executions could be broadcast via television
and radio, individuals could watch or listen to executions without congregating in large crowds and without access to convicts;' 59 this could be

154. One plausible standard for determining whether newly found exculpatory evidence
is sufficient to merit additional capital habeas review was suggested by Justice Blackmun in
Herrera,113 S. Ct. at 882-83 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun's opinion, that
to obtain subsequent habeas relief, a capital defendant must demonstrate that he or she is
"probably, actually" innocent, is an appropriately fair standard for two reasons. First
Blackmun's suggestion favors the state insofar as the defendant bears the post-conviction
burden of demonstrating his or her innocence beyond a preponderance (which is how this
author understands "probably"). Second, it favors the defense inasmuch as a defendant who
can make a probable, as opposed to the majority's "extraordinarily high" showing of actual
innocence (which seems to suggest a measure of "beyond a reasonable doubt"), is not
estopped from bringing even numerous habeas petitions.
155. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
156. For general support of this proposition, as well as arguments against televising
executions, see Jef I. Richards & R. Bruce Easter, TelevisingExecutions: The High-Tech
Alternative to Public Hangings, 40 UCLA L. REV. 381 passim (1992) .
157. See Patrick D. Filbin, Picturesat an Execution, 9 COOLEY L. REV. 137, 149-50
(1992); see also Officials Hail Effort to Offer an Alternative to Jail, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2,
1994, §1, at 25.
158. See Louis P. MASUR, RITES OF EXECUTION: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN CULTURE,

1776-1865, at 95-97 (describing sentiments that

public executions blunt moral sensibilities and brutalize people). The 1835 New York
Committee found that "public executions ... are of a positively injurious and demoralizing
tendency." Id. at 116.
159. Executions may have been made private to diminish the racist implications of
hanging blacks (who were hanged much more often than whites) and to keep lynch mobs
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facilitated by having executions on week nights when bar and club crowds
are usually not as large as they are on weekends. Televised executions do
not need to appreciably promote communal levity or violence to offenders. 60 Furthermore, televised executions could be limited to late-night
hours to prevent young children from being exposed to such violence. In
any event, executions could be televised on an experimental basis and could
be discontinued if studies begin to indicate that such executions are losing
their deterrent effect or are promoting an indifferent attitude among the
public to the loss of life.
In sum, certain aspects of the ways in which American capital
punishment is carried out do not imitate halachic capital penal practice--but
should, and would benefit by doing so. After analysis of some of these
aspects, such as the protracted delays between sentencing and execution, this
discrepancy is understandable. It is desirable that American legal punishment differs from halachic punishment in its scope. While talmudic capital
sanctions were levied for theocratic-based infractions, 6 ' American capital
punishment constitutionally may not be applied to matters of religion and
belief in a manner that would excessively entangle government with
religion.'62 However, other aspects of American capital punishment are
infirm and can be cured by halachic example. These include Herrera's
preference for procedural integrity over a preference for establishing a
convict's factual innocence, and the relative privatization of American
executions.
Having compared halachic and American capital punishment practices,
this article now examines the adaptability of halachic servitude to American
penal law.

from harming black criminals. See Steven A. Blum, PublicExecutions: Understandingthe
"Cruel and UnusualPunishments" Clause, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 413, 418-21 (1992).
160. Moreover, recent studies have confirmed that televised executions would not have
a detrimental effect on the viewing public. For an example of such findings, see RAYMOND
PATERNOSTER, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 232 (1991) (citing a 1990 study that
television execution publicity had no "brutalization nor ... deterrent" effect on public).
161. See supra notes 39-42, 52 and accompanying text.
162. Secular punishment for religious or otherwise faith-based crime, intended as
halachic punishment to promulgate religious truth, would involve the government in
"doctrinal entanglement' with religion, in violation of the constitutionally mandated
separation of church and state. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 14-11, at 1231-32 (2d. ed. 1988); see also DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE
SUPREME COURT: THE SECOND CENTURY 1888-1986, at 529-31 (1990).
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B. Indentured Servitude
To determine whether contemporary American society can use a system
modeled after halachic indentured servitude, examining whether such
servitude is barred by the Thirteenth and Eighth Amendments to the
Constitution is necessary. The Thirteenth Amendment prohibits slavery and
involuntary servitude, except as punishment for crime, anywhere in United
States territory.'63 The Supreme Court honored the punishment exception
to the Thirteenth Amendment in United States v. Kozminski 64 Specifically, the Court held that while peonage, or the threat of criminal sanction,
may not be used to induce forced labor,'65 involuntary servitude may be
imposed to either coerce compliance with a civic duty,'66 or as a criminal
punishment. 67 Based on Kozminski, the Thirteenth Amendment does not
bar American legal application of halachic penal servitude, which was solely
levied for theft.'6 8 Yet, because involuntary servitude may constitute cruel
and unusual punishment, halachic indentured servitude must be examined
from an Eighth Amendment perspective.' 69

163. "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any
place subject to their jurisdiction." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIII, § 1.
164. 487 U.S. 931, 943 (1988).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 943-44.
167. See supranote 163.

168. The Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 were primarily intended to
abolish the inhumane treatment of African slaves at the time of the Civil War. See
Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 942; Robert J. Reinstein, Completing the Constitution: The
Declarationof Independence, Bill of Rights and FourteenthAmendment, 66 TEMP. L. REv.

361, 383 (1993). Halachic penal servitude always required that servants be treated with the
utmost humaneness, and so does not fall into the class of slavery that the Amendment was
intended to eradicate. See supranotes 85, 90 and accompanying text.
169. It may seem inappropriate to entertain the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and
unusual punishment regarding slavery since the author has found that the Thirteenth Amendment does not block application of halachic servitude to American criminal law. However,
unlike the mandates of the Thirteenth Amendment, what qualifies as cruel and unusual
punishment varies according to the "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of
a maturing society." Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101
(1958); 3 THE GUIDE TO AMERICAN LAW 401-02 (1983). Accordingly, this article examines
whether halachic penal servitude constitutes cruel and unusual punishment by contemporary
American standards of decency; halachic servitude, while permitted by the Thirteenth
Amendment, may be outlawed by the Eighth Amendment.
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The Eighth Amendment's. 7 prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment outlaws primarily penalties that are grossly disproportionate to
their underlying offenses'7 ' or that are unnecessary and wanton in the
amount of pain they inflict.'7 2 Applying these elements to halachic
indentured servitude, the unnecessary pain ban on punishment is honored by
halacha. If anything, halachic penal servitude erred on the side of humane
treatment as reflected 1in
the manner in which the halacha required masters
73
to treat their servants.
Nevertheless, halachic servitude probably does amount to cruel and
unusual punishment under the proportionality test of the Eighth Amendment.
This is because halachic indentured servitude was often imposed in
disproportion to its underlying offense; biblical law fixed penal servitude for
a period of six years, irrespective of the amount a thief had stolen. For
example, two thieves who stole $1000 and $100,000, respectively, were
sentenced to identical periods of servitude if they were unable to repay their
debts. While this fixed period of service is understandable insofar as it was
designed to rehabilitate the offender as much as to compensate the
victim,' 74 such disproportionality would probably render halachic penal
servitude cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment.
Yet, although halachic indentured servitude would probably be cruel
and unusual punishment as applied to American penal law, modifications of
such servitude, fashioned after the halachic principle of victim compensation, may appropriately be utilized in American society. These modifications may be achieved in numerous ways. It is important, however, to
appreciate that the most important aspect of halachic indentured servitude
was not the specific manner in which it was implemented, but the fact that
the offender was forced to compensate his victim.
First, consider a program of community service in which the respective
offender is sentenced to a prescribed number of hours or days of community

170. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
171. See Gregg,428 U.S. at 173 (1976); 3 THE GUIDE TO AMERICAN LAW, supra note
169, at 401. For historical treatment of the Eighth Amendment's proportionality requirement,
see Anthony F. Granucci, Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted: The Original
Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REv. 839, 844-47 (1969).
172. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173. For historical treatment of what has become the Eighth
Amendment's unnecessary pain element, see Granucci, supra note 171, at 848-52.
173. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
174. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
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work instead of prison."5 Determining the length of service by the
severity of the crime would prevent any form of victim compensation from
constituting cruel and unusual punishment due to a disproportionality
concern. Now, such community service could consist, for example, of
counseling youths against drug use or theft; such service would amount to
victim compensation in cases in which an offender has "pushed" drugs onto
a youth. If necessary, the offender in such a scenario would additionally
have to reimburse his or her victim's family for any treatment costs they had
to bear as a result of the offender's drug pushing. Another example of
community service would apply to offenders convicted of vandalism or
other forms of property damage; such offenders would be required to restore
the property they damaged as a condition of parole. Yet, in instances of
private theft or property damage, for example, offenders could be allowed
to work off their debts to their victims according to payment schedules
determined for the most part by the victims. Should a victim not desire the
offender's company or not want his or her family exposed to the criminal,
the convict could compensate the victim indirectly by having a portion of
his or her salary paid to the victim. A criminal who refuses to participate
in such victim restitution would have a portion of his or her income
garnished to the victim. The criminal who refuses to cooperate in victim
compensation even at this stage, would be incarcerated as all prisoners
should be who violate their parole. Finally, criminals who are not bothered
by the prospect of being imprisoned or who perceive prison as a "badge of
honor"'76 could be employed by prison chain gangs that would work them
aimlessly and arduously. Such prison work would probably have to be
aimless and non-productive for two reasons.
First, psychologists have determined that most people find a certain
degree of satisfaction in doing any type of productive work, or work that
"involves the ego.. 77 Inasmuch as this proposed sanction is addressed to

175. New York's Midtown Community Court recently began to experiment with
community service punishment instead of incarceration for misdemeanors. Such community
service is not limited to restitution for victims of theft, but is imposed for a host of low-level
crimes. See Jan Hoffman, A Manhattan Court Explores Service-OrientedSentencing,N.Y.
TIMEs, Nov. 27, 1993, §1, at 1. Connecticut also began to offer the options of community
service and home detention as alternatives to prison. A Connecticut judge, quoted in a recent
New York Times article, averred that such sentencing alternatives save Connecticut almost
$20,000 a year per criminal. See Officials Hail Effort to Offer an Alternative to Jail, supra

note 157, § 1, at 25.
176. See Mimi Silbert, Wrong Way to Get Tough, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 29, 1994, §1, at 19
(describing how some people "dream" of being incarcerated).
177. See GORDON R. TAYLOR, ARE WORKERS HUMAN? 176 (1950).

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol19/iss3/1

124

et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue

Nova Law Review

Vol. 19

the criminal who refuses to compensate his or her victim, and who is not
afraid of being imprisoned, participation in a work gang must not provide
the prisoner with any degree of satisfaction-it should make prison an even
more hellish experience. 7
Second, throughout American history, labor unions have consistently
opposed organized, productive prison work.'79 Moreover, such opposition
has been successful. During the latter part of the nineteenth century when
prison work was most popular, California, Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota,
New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania either banned specific and
productive prison labor, or modified existing prison work laws to accommodate the powerful political demands of organized labor unions. 8 '
In any event, these gangs should be monitored by boards to ensure that
prisoners are not being worked beyond what they can endure, and that
prisoners in such gangs are not being discriminated against on the basis of
their race, religion, or national origin. Such boards should be comprised of
both whites and members of minorities to prevent such boards from being
or becoming partial or racist.
Regardless of what form of victim restitution is used, the essential goal
of punishment for crimes like drug-pushing and theft should be that victims
and communities are somehow compensated either directly or indirectly by
their criminals. Criminals who do not wish to participate in such compensation should be persuaded to do so, or at the very least, serve to inspire other
convicts to do so. Therefore, incarceration as a penalty for crimes which
are compensable, and which does not help to remunerate victims, is
inappropriate and should be replaced by victim compensation, community
service oriented solutions.
Other reasons why community service, victim compensation programs
are to be preferred over the incarceration of all but the most dangerous of
criminals include: 1) the wages of non-incarcerated convicts can be
taxed;' 8' 2) non-incarcerated criminals can support themselves;' 81 2 3)
because individuals can usually earn more outside prison than within, non178. While prison labor would ideally be aimless and arduous, it would probably
necessitate compensation. The Fair Labor Standards Act requires that prisoners must be paid
for their labor. See 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988); see
also Joseph M. Kelly, Prison Reform in Anglo-American Law: A ComparativeDiscussion
of the Approaches Taken by New York State and England, 14 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 39, 44 n.29 (1993).
179. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 158.
180. Id. at 158-59.
181. See Leven, supra note 10, at 654.
182. Id.
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incarcerated persons would be able to more expediently compensate their
victims; and 4) because of the high incidence of (gang) rape and other
violence in prisons,' a sentence of imprisonment has the potential to
become an experience which none but the most dangerous and hardened of
criminals deserve.
C. CorporalPunishment
Before entertaining whether American law can and should adopt
halachic corporal punishment it is emphasized that halachic corporal
punishment is a method of punishment in which thirty-nine lashes are given
to a criminal. This is done only after the sentencing court determines through a medical exam that the convict is physically capable of enduring a
flogging, and in which the flogging is monitored by impartial judges or
other officials to ensure that the criminal does not receive more than thirtynine lashes. The flogging must cease in the event a criminal becomes ill
while being lashed. The author also has in mind a punishment in which the
offender is punished with a device that does not leave permanent marks or
scars on the body. The author does not suggest, for example, that flogging
be administered in an overly cruel and disproportionate manner, like the
caning practiced in Singapore. Such caning is generally administered in a
particularly cruel fashion, across the naked buttocks with a stick that is as
much as half an inch thick.'85 Such caning also usually splits the skin and
causes permanent scarring.'86 Cruel and unusual punishment under the
Eighth Amendment consists of penalties that are inflicted in disproportion
to their underlying offenses, and punishments that inflict unnecessary and
wanton pain on criminals.' 87 Therefore, it is apparent that halachic
corporal punishment amounts to cruel and unusual punishment under
American law. However, this is probably true only under the proportionality prong of cruel and unusual punishment; halachic corporal
punishment is probably not unconstitutional under the unnecessary and
wanton cruelty aspect of the standard. This is because, just as halachic
indentured servitude was prescribed for a usual period of six years,'

183. Id.
184. See supra notes 18, 26 and accompanying text.
185. See Six Lashes in Singapore-Caning: A Yank in a Jam, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 14,
1994, at 29.
186. See id.
187. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
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halachic corporal punishment was imposed, at least for biblical offenses,
according to a fixed measure of thirty-nine lashes.8 9 Of course, this
problem could easily be obviated in American practice, by American law
imposing corporal punishment according to a schedule of lashings that
depend on the nature of the respective underlying crime, for example, the
number of lashes a criminal receives could depend on whether his or her
crime is a misdemeanor or a felony.
More problematic, of course, is whether corporal punishment constitutes unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain under the Eighth Amendment. The author submits corporal punishment, at least limited to the
manner in which it was halachically imposed, 9 ' does not constitute such
infliction because many of the judicially accepted capital and other
punishment methods currently employed by American law seem to be much
more cruel than thirty-nine lashes.
Consider electrocution which has, except for the period between
Furman v. Georgia'91 and Gregg v. Georgia,'92 been judicially recognized as a constitutionally permissible form of execution.' 93 Such judicial
notice seems to ignore the fact that, as a result of electrocution, the capital
convict is usually burnt to death through suffering 2000 to 2200 volts for
sixty to ninety seconds.'9 4 Electric chairs also often malfunction necessitating multiple attempts at execution with inherent pain to criminals. 9 '
It is inconceivable that halachic whipping, limited as it was to thirty-nine
lashes, preceded by a medical exam to determine the physical capacity of
an offender to withstand the whipping, constitutes unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain if electrocution does not. 96 Now, while electrocution

189. See supranote 95 and accompanying text.
190. See supranotes 102-05 and accompanying text.
191. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (outlawing all capital punishment as it was then being
imposed).
192. 428 U.S. 153(1976) (reactivating capital punishment with certain conditions); see,
e.g., supra notes 171-72.
193. See Lonny J. Hoffman, The Madness of the Method: The Use of Electrocutionand
the Death Penalty, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1039, 1040 (1992) (death penalty held constitutional
from 1890).
194. Id.at 1055.
195. Id.at 1056.
196. The author does not suggest that electrocution is a constitutionally acceptable
execution method, which it may not be, only that compared with electrocution, halachic
corporal punishment certainly cannot be considered cruel and unusual. See Philip R. Nugent,
Pulling the Plug on the ElectricChair: The Unconstitutionalityof Electrocution,2 WM. &
MARY BILL RTs. J. 185, 186 (1993).
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is the second most common method of execution in the United States,
the nature of other methods of American capital punishment underscores the
fact that halachic corporal punishment cannot cogently be considered cruel
and unusual applied to American penal practice.'98
Consider cyanide gassing. Justices Stevens and Blackmun, dissenting
in Gomez v. United States District Court for the Northern District of
9 9 provided an intricate depiction of the horrible physical pain
California,'
that is incident to execution by gassing. This pain is caused by hypoxia
which is defined as a lack of oxygen in the body.2"0 Hypoxia typically
causes severe pain in the arms, shoulders, chest, and back, similar to the
pain of a massive heart attack.20 ' Hypoxia is frequently accompanied by
"seizures, incontinence of stool and urine, salivation, vomiting, retching,
ballistic writhing ...[and] grimacing,"2 2 and usually lasts for eight to ten
minutes or longer.2" 3
An objection may be made that the constitutionality of painful capital
punishment methods, like execution, does not of itself, legitimize corporal
punishment unless one allows that corporal punishment should only be
imposed as a substitute for the death penalty. This is because, while pain
incident to the implementation of a capital sentence may be constitutionally
tolerable, the infliction of even a lesser degree of pain for a non-capital
offense may be "cruel and unusual." Yet, such an objection is without merit
for two reasons.
First, the pain incident to whipping would not be as severe as the pain
most prisoners experience during electrocution.2"4 Second, while this
article has discovered the permissibility of corporal punishment, in part, by
comparing such punishment with capital punishment, it is not suggested that
corporal punishment be a substitute for the death penalty-only that corporal

197. See Hoffman, supranote 193, at 1039 (noting that electrocution is second only to
lethal injection as a method of choice for death penalty administration). Lethal injection is
not mentioned in the present discussion, since lethal injection probably does not amount to
cruel and unusual punishment.
198. Other methods of capital punishment practiced in the 36 states that impose the
death penalty are gassing, which is used in Arizona, California, Maryland, Mississippi, and
North Carolina, and shooting, which is employed in Idaho and Utah. See PATERNosTER,
supra note 160, at 22.
199. 112 S. Ct. 1652, 1653-56 (1992) (Stevens & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
200. Id. at 1654.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. See supra text accompanying notes 194-95.
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punishment be a substitute for most instances of imprisonment. Therefore,
the appropriate valuation of corporal punishment is one that balances the
consequences of corporal punishment with those of incarceration. Such
balancing is convincing that corporal punishment, at least as administered
in halachic practice, is not cruel and unusual compared with being locked
up under present prison conditions.20 5 Indeed, this author would much
rather be whipped even a hundred times for a crime he did not commit than
be placed for any appreciable amount of time in prison.20 6
While halachic corporal punishment should theoretically therefore be
constitutional, there is sufficient Supreme Court and lower court authority
to the effect that American law would probably consider any amount of
whipping, imposed as punishment, to be cruel and unusual by contemporary
standards.2"7
Yet, American penal practice would probably have more success
eradicating crime if it displayed a true sensitivity for the sanctity of life and
the value of truly proportional punishment. By implicitly holding that death
is a just penalty, while a life-affirming though possibly more painful
punishment is not, American law teaches that life is not as important as the
absence of physical pain.20 8 Moreover, because corporal punishment
would most probably be considered cruel and unusual while imprisonment
with its present dangers is not, the absurd nature of the contemporary
American criminal justice system is emphasized.
In sum, the author suggests that, while there should be nothing
unconstitutional with applying corporal punishment fashioned after halachic
practice to American society, in all probability, American law, at least as
205. See supra note 18.
206. See supra notes 18, 26.
207. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345 n.11 (1981) (citing Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 669 (1977)) (corporal penalties constitute cruel and unusual
punishment when imposed as punishment); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 689 n.5
(1977) (White, J., dissenting) (holding that bodily punishment invades constitutionally
protected liberty interest); see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 313 (citing 1965 Arkansas
federal district court case which held that corporal punishment, in absence of fair safeguards,
is unconstitutional). The above cases deal only with whether excessive corporal punishment
is unconstitutional, since the Court has understood the Eighth Amendment to reflect the
"evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." See Gregg,
428 U.S. at 173 (opining that halachic whipping, if not all corporal punishment, probably
would be considered cruel and unusual punishment today).
208. This sentiment is premised on the notion that where there is life, there is hope, or
that life, even with great suffering, is to be preferred over even painless death. Of course,
not all agree with this, as the existence of organizations like the Hemlock Society, and the
recent efforts of Dr. Jack Kevorkian make clear.
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decided by the Court, would not sanction any form of whipping as a form
of non-cruel and unusual punishment. Excommunication, however, may be
more adaptable to American society, at least in modified form.

D. Excommunication
It would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to apply halachic
excommunicative punishment, as it was practiced, to American penal
procedure. This is because, to begin with, halachic societies were and are

extremely homogenous. Most halachic communities not only tend to be
closed to all non-Jews, 0 9 but were and are, for the most part, exceedingly
religious."' Jews in halachic groups also share a commitment to daily
More important perhaps, all segments of the Jewish
Torah study.2"
community are linked; the same Jews who shop, eat, and commerce together
during the week, worship together on the Sabbath.21 2 Because of this
communal closeness, the Jew always has a meaningful incentive to conform
to his or her society's standards; the Jew knows that if he or she does not
follow his or her community's standards, or if the Jew otherwise fails to
obey a commonly-known practice, he or she will be embarrassed. 3 On

209. See 3 BLEICH, supranote 72, at 82 (noting that a halachic community (kahal in
Hebrew) is not permitted to accept non-Jews as members).
210. See JOHNSON, supra note 29, at 158-60 (describing aspects of and reasons for
religious communal observance).
211. See GANZFRIED, supranote 124, at 87-88 (describing importance of daily Torah
study and establishment of societies for public Torah study).
212. See I BLEICH, supranote 58, at 34 (Jewish Sabbath-observance has been honored
even through hardship).
213. It seems that all societies that effectively implemented measures akin to those of
the halacha to eradicate crime as well as social and theological non-conformity were
grounded on comparable notions of communal closeness and religious adhesion and valued
the importance of societal ostracism in maintaining that closeness. For examples, consider
colonial-American communities that practiced whipping, victim-restitution, defendantembarrassment, indentured servitude, and capital punishment. See Toni M. Massaro, Shame,
Culture, andAmericanCriminalLaw,89 MICH. L. REv. 1880, 1881-82 (1991) (stating that
methods such as whipping, branding, placing in public stocks, and victim-compensation were
employed in colonial America). The social intimacy of colonial communities increased fear
of disgrace. Id. at 1912. Another example was standing in the pillory with a sign describing
the offense. Id. at 1913; Mark D. Cahn, Punishment, Discretion,and the Codification of
PrescribedPenalties in Colonial Massachusetts,33 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 107, 119 (1989).
Offenses made capital under the Massachusetts Body of Liberties of 1648, such as
blasphemy, witchcraft, homicide, and idolatry, closely resembled or were identical to those
which were capital under the halachic system. See id. at 119 n.73; FRIEDMAN, supra note 11,
at 52 ("Every colony also had a mass of indentured servants."); see also supranotes 37, 39-

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol19/iss3/1

130

et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue

1002

Nova Law Review

Vol. 19

the other hand, modem American communities tend to be extremely
heterogenous;214 because of this, most American communities do not
worship, interact, or share common values enough as a community to
facilitate efficient excommunicative goals.215
Another reason why halachic excommunication would probably be an
unrealistic punishment under present American jurisprudence is that
contemporary American society has come to reflect what Professor
Lawrence Friedman calls a "culture of rights," ' 6 which places a premium
on individualism. While any increase in personal freedom is better than the
alternative, such freedom comes at a great price; society has become
acclimated to the idea that the individual is more important than the
community of which he or she is a part.2 17 Such an attitude hinders
effective excommunication which is premised on societal cohesiveness, or
the belief that members of a community have responsibilities to each other
as collectives of a shared reality, perhaps even beyond totally self-centered
obligations.
The fact that halachic excommunicative procedures most probably
cannot be applied to contemporary American communities, however, does
not instruct that such societies cannot benefit from applying practices
premised on halachic excommunication. To be sure, shame was the essence
of halachic excommunication and there is no reason why shaming should
not be employed as a punishment in American societies. The shaming of
offenders could be achieved by a range of methods, imposed individually
or in combinations. For example, convicted criminals could be required to
wear, or post on their property and cars, signs, or other devices describing
their crimes.
One such device that could be used to both shame criminals and put the
community on notice of the propensities of the offender, is the electronic
"tether" that is attached to the criminal and transmits radio signals to a
receiver located in a police station or court.21 8 The tether may be used to
shame offenders inasmuch as others who see it will be aware of its wearer's
40, 51 and accompanying text.
214. See Massaro, supra note 213, at 1922-23 (referring to cultural complexity and
pluralism of American society).
215. Of course, most American communities sustain places of communal worship and
the like. Yet, because of the heterogenous nature of American society, these places tend to
be insular, and as a result do not facilitate broad societal adhesion.
216. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 303, 445.
217. Id. at 13.
218. See Nick Jackson, Internal Exile: A Proposalfor a FederalSystem, 4 DET. C.L.
REV. 1085, 1098 (1990).
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criminal conduct. The tether could also serve to warn the public of the
criminal's disposition for misconduct.
Examples of the use of cars to effect shaming include a Florida bumper
sticker program that required convicted drunk drivers to affix signs to their
bumper stickers or license plates identifying themselves as drunk drivers. An
Oregon judge forced a repeat child molester to post signs, at least three
inches high, on his residence and car, warning children that he is a
convicted sex offender. 9
For greater evils, offenders could be forced to pay for newspaper
advertisements in which they apologize for their crimes. Examples of such
a penalty include an Ohio judge's ordering of first-time offenders to publish
apologies in local newspapers and an Oregon judge's mandate that certain
criminals pay for advertisements in which they apologize for their
crimes. 220
For even more egregious crimes, offenders could be required to
describe and apologize for their offenses on television. 22 ' That these
media would be effective in shaming offenders and reducing crime, is
strongly indicated by the impact these media have on the American
public.22 2 Nevertheless, Professor Toni Massaro, in a thorough and
interesting study of the causes and effects of shame throughout American
and foreign cultures,223 has argued that shaming is an inappropriate aim
of American law for basically four reasons.
First, it is impossible to reintegrate shamed offenders into mainstream
society.224 Second, because of the heterogenous nature of American
society, and because criminals often belong to social classes that are
different from those of their victims, there will probably not be enough of

219. See Massaro, supranote 213, at 1886-88; see also DriverMustKeep 'DWI' License
Plate,N.Y. TIMEs, July 8, 1994, at B4 (New York Appeals Court upholds judge's sentencing
repeat drunken driver offender to post sign "Convicted DWI" on license plate).
220. See Massaro, supra note 213, at 1888.
221. It is suggested that televised shaming should be limited to instances of particularly
heinous criminal activity, since television, through its ability to reach a broad audience, has
the potential to seriously impair the offender's social integrity.
222. See Fred Graham, Keynote Address: The Impact of Television on the Jury System:
Ancient Myths and Modern Realism, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 623, 623-24 (1991) (discussing the
impact of television on society); Newton N. Minow & Fred H. Cate, Who is an Impartial
Jurorin an Age of Mass Media, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 631, 635 (1991) (more than half of
American households read newspapers in 1990).
223. See Massaro, supra note 213, at 1880.
224. Id. at 1884 (federal and state laws do not provide for reintegrating offenders).
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an audience to actualize any shaming.225 Closely related to this objection
is the proposition that shaming will frequently be ineffective in achieving
any measure of deterrence since many offenders come from cultures that
view crime or imprisonment as worthy of praise; in certain communities,
individuals who have been incarcerated are honored more than persons who
have not been.226 Third, shaming, if employed excessively, may lose its
effectiveness.227 Fourth, effective shaming would amount to punishment
that is disproportionate,2 28 unequal,22 9 and cruel.23°
The criticism that shaming would not allow for offender-reintegration
is infirm since, at least in regard to the shaming techniques which have been
described above, the criminal need not be outside society to be embarrassed
by his or her conduct. Rather, the criminal may, like a contrite child, be
considered part of his or her social "family" while expressing remorse for
his or her crime.2 3 Of course, for a criminal to not be considered an
"outsider," society must be prepared to accept the convict's contrition and
not regard criminals as "different from us" or as persons with whom "we"
cannot genuinely relate.
The arguments that shaming is an impractical sanction, since either the
only meaningful audience to the shaming, like an offender's family, will not
approve of the technique, or because the criminal or her peers may consider
criminal activity and punishment to be praiseworthy, fail to consider that
there are other benefits to ostracizing a convict than simply embarrassing
him or her. One obvious benefit is through shaming the criminal, society

225. See id. at 1917, 1922 (sub-cultural variations with different definitions of shame
may confound effect of shaming).
226. See id. at 1923 nn. 216-17 and accompanying text (prison sentence may promote
status in certain cultures).
227. Id. at 1930.
228. See Massaro,supranote 213, at 1937-38 (shaming may offend proportionality since
shaming may not be experienced equally by equally culpable offenders and effective shaming
may be disproportionate to crime since it may cause irreversible stigma).
229. See id. at 1941 (shaming is not the result of reflective, individualized sentencing).
230. See id. at 1942-43 (speculating that authorizing public officials to shame offenders
may create an Orwellian society).
231. In American society it is not always apparent which group constitutes an offender's
"family." Frequently a criminal will live in one culture, work in another, and socialize in a
third. However, sign, newspaper, and television sanctions would all ensure that a malefactor
is shamed in any or all of those cultures. Consider that signs listing or apologizing for
criminal conduct could be large enough to cause the criminal to suffer embarrassment in his
or her immediate vicinity; use of the newspaper to shame would further expose the offender
to a larger audience; finally, televised apologies would ensure that a convict was shamed
before all of his or her associates-where he or she lives, works, and plays.
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is made aware of the criminal's propensities, and is thus in a better position
to either avoid his or her company or to judge for itself whether he or she
poses a danger to the community. 2 2 This societal advantage resulting
from public shaming is appropriate regardless of a particular offender's
personal or class attitudes toward crime and punishment.
The goal of danger avoidance also explains why even excessive
shaming procedures are valuable to contemporary American society. This
is because the more that criminals are exposed to the public, the more the
public can protect itself from either those criminals or from such conduct in
the future.23 It should be noted that this theory should only be used to
protect society from violent criminals or from individuals who have been
convicted of crimes for which there is a high prevalence of recidivism.
Professor Massaro's final contention-that effective shaming would amount
to disproportionate, unequal, or cruel punishment-is initially more
promising, since, as Massaro notes, it has considerable constitutional
implications."
Yet the shaming techniques advocated here235 need not
be disproportionate, unequal, or cruel; at least no more so than other, more
conventional punishment mechanisms. In fact, in contrast to much
acceptable punishment, shaming is arguably more crime-proportionate, more
equal and more dignified. Shaming may be said to be more dignified, for
example, than imprisonment, given present violent prison conditions. 6
Shaming has the potential to be a most equal penalty, since various shaming
techniques can be connected to respective crimes. Such a connection can
ensure that all offenders of a particular class or nature are subject to the
same shaming devices.
Finally, shaming may be a proportionate sanction. For example,
televised shaming, with its ability to reach large audiences, could be

232. Professor Massaro cites law enforcement officials to the effect that it is this goal
of societal danger-avoidance that prompts many shaming sanctions. See id. at 1888 n.52
(publication of offenses warn of offender dangerousness).
233. The overwhelming majority of American criminal convictions are arrived at and
dealt with in relatively private conditions. See Massaro, supranote 213, at 1921 nn.209-10
and accompanying text. Given the high rate of recidivism, the public should have the
privilege of protecting itself from future offender-specific activity. Seesupranotes 10-11 and
accompanying text.
234. See Massaro, supra note 213, at 1936 n.262 (whether shaming violates eighth
amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment depends on whether shaming is
disproportionate, unequal, and cruel).
235. See supra notes 218-20 and accompanying text
236. See supra note 18.
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reserved for the most egregious non-violent crimes.237 Newspaper shaming could be used to punish less offensive conduct. Shaming through signs,
posters, and license plates could be applied to the least offensive criminal
activity. Such a shaming methodology would help to ensure that a more
morally culpable actor is embarrassed to a wider extent than a less offending
criminal.
Other arguments that may be made against using shame as a penal
device include first, unlike more conventional and private punishment
methods, the public shaming of an offender may impact adversely on the
offender's immediate family as well as on the criminal. Second, in the
event a convict is found to be innocent, he or she will not have the
opportunity to clear his or her publicly tarnished name effectively. Yet,
these complaints fail to acknowledge that penology is far from an exact or
ideal science, and, in any event, any adverse impact that public shaming
would impose on innocent family members and friends, will often be less
than the pain, suffering, loss of income, etc., the offender has caused to
innocent family members and friends of the victim."' Also, it is only
advocated that shaming sanctions serve as suitable substitutes for the
incarceration of non-violent offenders; it should be obvious that even
mistaken shaming will not adversely impact on innocent family members
and friends to the same degree that an inmate's exposure to prison violence
and H.I.V. will.239
The possibility that publicly shamed persons who are later found to be
innocent will have no adequate means of clearing their names is more
disturbing. Yet, the proper valuation of penalties is one that allows for the
unfortunate reality that any penalty may sometimes unfortunately be levied
against a factually innocent person in our less than perfect world.
Therefore, even the argument that shaming is inappropriate because it may
be administered against innocent persons, fails since many people, certainly
those who are aware of the realities of prison life, would rather be wrongly
accused and embarrassed than unjustly incarcerated and embarrassed.
The argument of innocent shaming also loses potency when it is
appreciated that measures can be taken to at least minimize such danger;

237. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
238. In fact, the danger that innocent family members and friends may be harmed by
even false criminal allegations may add an appropriate measure of deterrence in the fight
against crime. Potential criminals may be more hesitant to commit crimes if they realize that
such conduct may result in their families and friends being embarrassed.
239. See supra notes 18, 26.
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television time or newspaper space can conceivably be provided to unjustly
accused individuals.
IV. OTHER ARGUMENTS AGAINST PENAL SERVITUDE
AND SHAMING

Various arguments have been examined against proposed sanctions and
modifications involving capital punishment,24 indentured servitude, 24'
Other
corporal punishment,242 and excommunication (shaming). 243
of
the
practice
objections may be made regarding prison servitude and
forcing offenders to wear or post signs or other advertisements as part of a
shaming sanction. Because of their importance, these arguments are briefly
examined separately.
A. Prison Servitude
It may seem inappropriate to advocate a program of prison servitude,
notwithstanding any such program's constitutionality, when it is recalled that
such servitude was consistently used to grossly discriminate against AfricanAmericans, in the American South, until well after abolition.244 Even
more disturbing are the facts that such discrimination was done legally,
pursuant to the punishment exception to the Thirteenth Amendment, 245 and
such discrimination not only caused African-Americans to be treated the
same as or worse than animals, 246 but inured to the benefit of such
discrimination's white perpetrators.247 When it is further remembered that

240.
241.
242.
243.

See supra notes
See supra notes
See supra notes
See supra notes

144-47, 158-62 and accompanying text.
163-72 and accompanying text.
187-90 and accompanying text.
223-30, 234, and infra notes 249-53 and accompanying text.

244. See DAVID A.J. RIcHARDs, FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 263

(1989) ("[F]actionalized racist attitudes would continue after the Thirteenth Amendment
(1865) abolished slavery and, if allowed ... would justify imposing a de facto ... slavery

status."). For expressions of northern and southern racism, see WILLIAM E. NELsON, THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 96-100

(1988).
245. "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any
place subject to their jurisdiction." U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
246. WILBERT E. MOORE, AMERICAN NEGRO SLAVERY AND ABOLITION: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY 113 (1971).
247. See FRIEDMAN, supranote 11, at 95 (describing the Black Code's consequence of
free black labor benefiting white employers).
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African-Americans constitute the majority of the present prison population
in this country,248 it is apparent that most of the victims of any regime of
prison servitude are going to be African-Americans, and such servitude may
all too easily become a sanctioned outlet for harsh racial discrimination.
Nevertheless, there are two elements to the call for prison servitude that
distinguishes such punishment from that imposed on African-American
convicts in the South. First, the prison labor program advocated in this
article is only intended as an eleventh hour sanction to be used when all else
has failed. Unless and until a time when the American criminal justice
system is prepared to write-off an entire segment of our criminal society, we
must be prepared to take extraordinary steps to either deter offenders from
future misconduct or, at the very least, to use non-reachable convicts to
deter other criminals from harmful activity. Arduous prison labor should
be used only on those prisoners who refuse to voluntarily compensate their
victims and who are not deterred by the prospect of doing time. Yet, the
intent behind such punishment may be adequate only in theory to prevent
such punishment from becoming a racist nightmare. Accordingly, measures
would have to be taken to prevent such prison labor from becoming a
pretext to discriminate against African-Americans or other minority
members in the real world.
One such measure could be to establish prison boards, comprised of
both whites and members of minorities, to supervise the treatment of prison
laborers. These boards would also be required to monitor the physical and
mental fitness of all participant prisoners to guarantee that such prisoners are
not being worked beyond what they can emotionally and physically endure.
Another condition of such labor programs would be, instead of having to
work for fixed periods of time, prisoners sentenced to hard labor for
refusing to participate in victim-compensation programs would be freed
from such programs as soon as they agree to compensate their victims. As
such, prison labor would amount to a criminal contempt sanction.
There is still another important problem that needs to be addressed
regarding prison labor, however. This article has presumed that even those
prisoners who desire to leave the prison chain gang and compensate their
victims will be able to do so. It is more probable that, because of the
diminished status ex-convicts enjoy, such prisoners will not have a plausible
shot at doing so. One solution to this dilemma would be for Congress to
make it illegal for employers to discriminate against ex-convicts who have
been sentenced for non-violent crimes in the same way in which it is illegal

248. Id. at 378.
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to discriminate against prospective or incumbent employees on the basis of
their race, sex, national origin;249 whatever punishment is imposed on and
endured by an offender must be the extent of that offender's debt to
society-to punish an individual beyond that is excessive and unjust.
Employers will no doubt resist such innovation; many such employers will
be motivated by the legitimate desire to keep bad influences and potentially
disruptive persons from their businesses. Congress may be the most
appropriate entity to address such concern. One possible solution could be
to legally differentiate between past criminal activities; employers would
only be legally allowed to discriminate against those ex-cons who have done
time for violent or otherwise dangerous crimes.
Another solution to the problem of ex-convicts not being able to
realistically enter the work force would involve society creating jobs for
these individuals in the public sector. Examples of such employment would
include cleaning and otherwise rehabilitating the aesthetic appearances of
highways, parks, and municipal streets. Other forms of such service might
include ex-drug offenders counseling youths against drug use, ex-drunk
drivers lecturing against drunk driving, and ex-thieves teaching people how
to protect themselves from criminal attack. The exact form of such
community service is not as important as the need for society to provide exconvicts with paid work; employment that somehow allows ex-criminals to
use their criminal experience to benefit society (as in the above examples)
would be an extra bonus to the addition of many ex-offenders to the
productive work force.
In summary, the implementation of prison work forces designed to
employ criminals in such a manner as to make incarceration a true deterrent,
must be understood as a proposed eleventh hour solution to an otherwise
intolerable problem. Aimless and arduous prison labor may be, in the
absence of a judicial recognition of corporal punishment, the only way to
"reach" a certain segment of violent prisoners. For non-violent prisoners it
should be used only on those convicts who refuse to cooperate in victim or
community compensation programs. Something must be done to remedy the
warehousing of both violent and non-violent human beings together in
dangerous, rape-conducive, and disease infested environments. Yet prison
labor programs must be conducted with boards comprised of members of
minorities who can ensure that such programs do not become pretenses for
racial discrimination. Such programs also should be viewed as contempt
249. The 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibits employers from discriminating against
employees on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
(1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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sanctions that prisoners can abandon upon demonstration of a willingness to
comply with victim-restitution. Finally, society must provide means by
which ex-convicts can enter the work force; such rehabilitative efforts
should allow ex-convicts to use their criminal backgrounds to benefit society
through counseling against various criminal activities.
B. Sign and Advertisement Shaming Sanctions
The author has advocated shaming of non-violent criminals through
having such individuals post signs on their persons, properties, and cars,
advertising their offenses to the public. 5 The intended benefits of such
a sanction are that it would embarrass offenders to a degree sufficient to
deter crime, and would serve to wam the public of the inherent criminal
tendencies of such offenders. Numerous cogent objections may be made
against the use of sign sanctions beyond those already entertained in this
article.
To begin, there is significant precedent for the reality that signs, worn
or posted, can easily become tools for gross discrimination. Examples of
this phenomenon in its extreme form include the yellow triangle that Jews
" ' and
were forced to wear,25
the pink triangle that homosexuals were forced
to wear25 2 by the Nazis.253 What could ensure that comparable discrimination does not result from such shaming activity today?
A crucial distinction between the yellow and pink patches and the
shaming sanctions advocated, is that the advertising of criminal behavior to
the public would be an activity reserved for convicted criminals. As such
this punishment would not be focused on a particular class like whites and
African-Americans or on specific types of criminals like child molesters.
Instead, shaming sanctions would be imposed on offenders for whom
incarceration is not necessary. This would include nonviolent criminals and
offenders who stand a strong chance of being rehabilitated and deterred
from future misconduct through non-incapacitating means. Second, the

250. See supra notes 219-21 and accompanying text.
251. See JOHNSON, supra note 29, at 489 (Jews had to wear a star of David that was
black with a yellow background and that had the word Jude in the middle).
252. See FRANK RECTOR, THE NAZI EXTERMINATION OF HOMOSEXUALS 108 (1981).
253. Signs have been used throughout history to discriminate against individuals for their
crimes or status. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 75. A famous literary casualty of such
treatment is Hester Prynne who is forced, in Hawthorne's The Scarlet Letter, to wear an "A"
to advertise her adultery. Id. at 40; see also Rosalind K. Kelley, Sentenced to Wear the
Scarlet Letter: JudicialInnovations in Sentencing---Are They Constitutional? 93 DICK. L.
REv. 759, 774 (1989).
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shaming sanctions entertained in this article would last for legislatively fixed
periods and would, therefore, help reduce the likelihood of non-offense
specific discrimination since such discrimination usually occurs indefinitely.
It may still be objected that even shaming sanctions that are initially
imposed on criminals may come to be inflicted on innocent minority
members. My proposals, however, are made with the assumption they will
only be used in an environment that is respectful of human rights and that
is opposed to invidious discrimination.
V. CONCLUSION
This article has presented an overview of halachic and American
punishment methods and suggested how American law can benefit from
halachic precedent in its losing battle against crime. It has been posited that
halachic punishment was geared to rehabilitating offenders, compensating
crime victims, and deterring crime. To be sure, halachic sanctions were
based on the notion that all crime entails sin which must be expiated
through punishment, and halacha viewed incapacitation as an ineffective
way to control crime. Penalties designed to shame and impose responsibility on offenders were preferred over imprisonment.
Another reason why halachic societies probably did not have the crime
problems that modem American communities have, is halachic societies
were more community oriented, with neighbors enjoying shared beliefs and
values. That reality also helps explain why certain halachic punishments,
like excommunication, may be unsuitable for American society; unlike the
homogenous halachic culture, most of contemporary American society is
composed of diverse, heterogenous communities. Other halachic penal
methods, like servitude and lashing, are not realistic alternatives for
American penal practice because such practices would probably be judicially
considered "cruel and unusual." However, while exact copying of halachic
punishment methods by the American legislature and judiciary would be
inappropriate, American society can benefit from talmudic penology by
adapting sanctions modeled after the principles of halachic punishment.
American law could emulate halachic deterrence in its capital
punishment methodology by publicizing executions and by limiting the
death penalty to especially egregious capital offenses. American law could
copy halachic notions of fairness and humaneness in its habeas law by
allowing even questionable claims of factual innocence to be presented on
behalf of a capital defendant, even after the defendant is convicted.
American law could imitate halachic excommunication by shaming
offenders-on a very local level through requiring nonviolent criminals to
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wear and post signs describing their offenses and to a broader degree by
forcing criminals to apologize to their victims and communities through the
mass media. Halachic servitude could inform American penology, through
the implementation of community-service programs whereby criminals could
compensate their victims and communities for the adverse consequences of
their crimes. Prisoners who refused to participate in such programs could
be, through prison work programs, for example, encouraged to do so.
Numerous opportunities have been taken here to present the reality that
prisons are violent, rape-conducive, and disease-infested environments that
are grossly inappropriate for all but the most hardened and "unreachable"
of criminals. Prisons do not rehabilitate offenders nor deter crime. To the
contrary, prisons arguably promote criminal activity by perpetuating
atmospheres where non-violent individuals are made violent and embittered
and where hopelessness dominates. The author's thesis that American
society can compromise its crime problems through the application of
halachic principals, however, may be no more than a naive optimism. This
is because crime is, ultimately, probably something that the police, judges,
and prosecutors cannot eradicate by themselves. Effective crime reduction
must come from a voluntary and automatic compliance with law254 that is
promoted through the view that societal responsibilities are as, if not more
important, than individual rights, and that crime is a communal problem;
from which all segments of society suffer. Successful crime reduction also
requires that our criminal justice professionals have the courage to dismantle
outmoded and ineffective punishment methods, like incarceration, for all but
the most violent or repeat offenders, and replace them with more practical,
humane measures. Otherwise, our crime problems are destined to remain
with us.

254. See Charles E. Silberman, Truth and Justice: Why the Best Hope In a 'War' on
Crime May Be a Stalemate, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1994, § 4, at 1.
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OVERVIEW

This article discusses the right of publicity, beginning in Part II with
the difficulty in defining a legal right of publicity, and the resulting various
legal doctrines upon which the right has been analyzed. Part III discusses
four types of actions commonly involving publicity rights. Part IV presents
a theoretical background, discussing four of the legal theories under which
the right of publicity has been analyzed, and also the underlying policies
common to copyright and publicity right protection. The application of
copyright law to right of publicity cases is discussed in Part V, and Part VI
discusses the two primary limitations to the right of publicity doctrine:
descendibility and First Amendment conflicts. Part VII then ends with a
summary, conclusion, and recommendation.
II. INTRODUCTION
The right of publicity is, basically, the right to own, protect, and profit
from the commercial value of one's name, likeness, activities, or identity,
and to prevent the unauthorized exploitation of these traits by others.'

1. Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). The right of publicity
has also been described as: "a valuable proprietary right, a kind of property right in [a
person's] name and image, and.., an exclusive right to market it, to assign it, or to benefit
from its use commercially." Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors, Etc., Inc., 441 F. Supp. 1323,
1330 (W.D. Tenn. 1977), afj'd, 578 F.2d 1381 (6th Cir. 1978); the right giving a person
"personal control over commercial display and exploitation of his personality and the exercise
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Disputes involving right of publicity issues commonly arise out of the
unauthorized commercial exploitation of a celebrity's name or likeness in
advertisements, endorsements, or commercial merchandising of items such
as T-shirts or posters.
The right of publicity has not yet been fully developed or uniformly
applied as a legal doctrine. The right is not specifically recognized by the
United States Constitution or the Bill of Rights, nor is there any federal
codification to govern it, such as the federal copyright, trademark, and
patent laws. In the absence of such federal guidelines, courts must then
look to state statutes and common law to decide right of publicity cases.
Many states, however, do not recognize or even address the right of
publicity statutorily, and may have no substantive common law on the topic.
In addition, there are few secondary sources, such as treatises, restatements,
or uniform codes for the courts to turn to for guidance.2 Courts are thus
left with minimal standards by which to interpret publicity rights, and must
often turn to other states' common law. The result is that courts are often
free, or forced, to create new law, which leads to inconsistency and a lack
of predictability regarding the right of publicity.
Protecting a person's likeness does not fit neatly into one specific legal
category, as it involves elements of tort, copyright, property, contract, and
labor law. It must also be weighed against First Amendment rights.
Although the right of publicity has traditionally been analyzed under the

of his talents." Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 569 (1977);
"the publicity value of one's name or likeness." Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp.
426, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); "in addition to and independent of [the] right of privacy ... a
man has a right in the publicity value of his photograph[s] ....
here, as often elsewhere, the
tag 'property' simply symbolizes the fact that courts enforce a claim which has pecuniary
worth." Haelan Lab., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc. 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied,346 U.S. 816 (1953); and "the right to be free from having one's name, likeness, and
identifying characteristics expropriated for commercial purposes without consent." J. Eugene
Salomon, Jr., The Right of Publicity Run Riot: The Casefor a FederalStatute, 60 S.CAL.

L. REV. 1179, 1179 (1987).
2. Nimmer & Nimmer's six-volume treatise on copyright law devotes only one small
subsection, under "invasion of privacy and publicity." MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.01 [B][c] (1994). Neither Dean Prosser's nor Dean
Keeton's renowned treatises on torts address the matter directly. See W. PAGE KEETON ET
AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS (5th ed. 1984 & Supp. 1988) [hereinafter
PROSSER & KEErON]; WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS (4th ed.
1971). There is, however, one treatise which focuses directly on the right of publicity. See
J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY & PRIVACY (1994).
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common law right of privacy, 3 courts and plaintiffs have also applied other
bodies of law, such as unfair competition,4 misappropriation,' dilution,6
and contract7 in order to recognize a protectable interest in the monetary
value of names and personal features. These factors further contribute to the
lack of uniformity or consistency in publicity right cases.
III. FOUR TYPES OF ACTIONS WHERE THE RIGHT OF
PUBLICITY ARISES
Right of publicity issues usually involve at least one of four general
types of infringements: 1) appropriation of one's name or likeness for
advertising or endorsement; 2) unauthorized use of one's name or likeness
on commercial products; 3) appropriation of one's unique style or characteristics; and 4) appropriation of one's performance.
A. Appropriationfor Advertising or Endorsement
Right of publicity infringements commonly arise when a celebrity's
name or likeness is used, without authorization, to advertise or endorse a
product or service. This type of exploitation results in several forms of
harm:
1) It creates a false impression that the celebrity endorses the product
or has a business relation with the product or manufacturer;
2) It may inhibit the celebrity's ability to obtain other endorsement
opportunities, especially from competing brands;
3) It may undermine the celebrity's credibility and, therefore, his or
her marketability, especially if the celebrity becomes overexposed, or if the
advertisement or the product itself arouses controversy or negative feelings;

3. See Harold R. Gordon, Right ofPropertyin Name, Likeness, PersonalityandHistory,

55 Nw. U. L. REv. 553 (1960); see also infra text accompanying notes 54-64.
4. See, e.g., Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied,402 U.S. 906 (1971); Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256 (1st Cir. 1962); Wyatt
Earp Enter., Inc. v. Sackman, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Lone Ranger, Inc. v.
Currey, 79 F. Supp. 190 (M.D. Pa. 1948); Fisher v. Star Co., 231 N.Y. 414, cert. denied,257
U.S. 654 (1921).
5. See, e.g., Zacchini, 433 U.S. 562.

6. See, e.g., Edgar Rice Burroughs, Inc. v. Manns Theatres, 195 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 159
(C.D. Cal. 1976).
7. See, e.g., Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 433 (Cal. 1979); infra text
accompanying notes 65-71; see also Corliss v. E.W. Walker Co., 64 F. 280 (C.C. Mass.
1894); Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 203

(1954).
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4) It unjustly enriches the infringer, who reaps the benefits of the
celebrity's good will or fame without paying for that benefit;
5) It penalizes those sponsors who do legitimately pay for the
celebrity's endorsement;
6) Most important (to the celebrity), it deprives the celebrity of fees
and royalties.
A typical example of an unauthorized use of a celebrity's name in an
advertisement is Hogan v. A.S. Barnes & Co., Inc.,' where the defendant
used, without authorization, golfer Ben Hogan's name and picture to help
promote sales of its book. Although Mr. Hogan was successful in his
challenge,9 other celebrities have not always received such protection. In
Carson v. National Bank of Commerce Trust & Savings,0 for instance,
comedian Johnny Carson attempted to prevent a Nebraska bank from using
his name in an advertisement promoting a trip to Las Vegas. Although the
bank had clearly appropriated Carson's name without his permission, Carson
was still denied relief, because Nebraska law did not yet recognize a right
of publicity." Johnny Carson had better luck, however, in a later case,
Carsonv. Here'sJohnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 2 where he sought to enjoin
the defendant's product name and marketing slogan, "Here's Johnny." The
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld Carson's
publicity rights, finding the defendant's use of "Here's Johnny" constituted
an appropriation of Carson's identity."
These two Johnny Carson cases exemplify the lack of consistency and
predictability in right of publicity cases. The Nebraska bank blatantly used
Carson's name and picture in its advertisements and brochures, which
infringed upon Carson's right of publicity far more directly and extensively
than the toilet company's use of the "Here's Johnny" slogan, which never
even used Carson's name or picture. Carson was, however, unsuccessful
against the bank, yet found relief against the toilet company. This apparent
dichotomy exists not because of the factual or legal issues involved, but
merely because the right of publicity was recognized as a legal cause of
action in Michigan, but not in Nebraska.

8. 114 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 314 (Pa. Ct. C.P. 1957).

9. Mr. Hogan prevailed on his claim. Id. at 320.
10. 501 F.2d 1082 (8th Cir. 1974).
11. Id. at 1084-86.
12. 498 F. Supp. 71 (E.D. Mich. 1980), vacated, 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983).
13. Carson, 698 F.2d at 836. Although Michigan law had not yet recognized the right
of publicity, the Sixth Circuit, in remanding to the district courtflushedawaythe lower court

decision, predicting that Michigan courts would adopt the right. Id. at 834, n.1.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol19/iss3/1

146

et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue

Nova Law Review

1018

B.

Vol. 19

Unauthorized Use of a Name or Likeness on a Commercial
Product

Right of publicity infringements frequently involve the unauthorized
use of a celebrity's name or likeness on commercial products such as Tshirts or posters. The first case to recognize the right of publicity, Haelan

Laboratories,Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 4 involved such commercial memorabilia. Other leading right of publicity cases have involved
unauthorized commercial memorabilia such as statuettes 5 and memorial
posters of Elvis Presley, 6 and plastic busts of Martin Luther King, Jr.'

C. Appropriationof a Person's Unique Style or Characterizations
Right of publicity protection may go beyond a person's name and
likeness, and extend to his unique character, characterization, or personal
style. This recognition of a person's unique style differentiates publicity
rights from other more tangible intellectual properties such as copyrights,
trademarks, and patents.'
The first case to apply the right of publicity to a performer's style was
Estate of Presley v. Russen, 9 where Elvis Presley's estate succeeded in
stopping the defendant's stage production, "The Big El Show," which
featured an Elvis impersonator who duplicated an Elvis concert.2" Less
than six months after the Russen decision, the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York recognized protection of the Marx

Brothers' characters in Groucho Marx Productions,Inc. v. Day & Night Co.,

14. 202 F.2d 866, 868 (recognizing a common law right of publicity in photographs,
specifically, photos on trading cards of professional baseball players).
15. Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 953 (1980).
16. Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 908 (1979), rev'd, 652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 927 (1982); see

infra text accompanying notes 150-51.
17. Martin Luther King, Jr. Ctr. for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Prods.,
Inc., 508 F. Supp. 854 (N.D. Ga. 1981), rev'd,694 F.2d 674 (11th Cir. 1983); see infra text

accompanying note 156.
18. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988);

NIMMER

& NIMMER, supra note 2, § 2.12.

19. 513 F.Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981).

20. Id. at 1348. The plaintiffs sought to prevent the defendant from using the name
"The Big El Show," as well as "the image or likeness or persona of Elvis Presley [and any
of the various names by which Presley is popularly known] on any goods, in any promotional
materials, in any advertising or in connection with the offering or rendering of any musical
services." Id. at 1344.
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Inc.,21 where a satirical musical play imitated the famous comedians. The
court held the defendant's play was an infringement of the Marx Brothers'
unique characteristics and style,22 concluding the play had "reproduced [the
Marx Brothers'] manner of performances by imitating their style and
appearance... [thus] infring[ing] the plaintiffs rights of publicity in the
'
The Laurel and Hardy characters have also
Marx Brothers characters." 23
received similar protection under the right of publicity. In Price v. Hal
Roach Studios, Inc.,24 the court specifically recognized the actors' publicity
rights included the impersonation of their physical likenesses or appearances,
costumes and mannerisms, and/or the simulation of their voices for
advertising or commercial purposes.25 The Price holding was later relied
upon in a similar case, brought by the same plaintiff to prevent unauthorized
imitation of the Laurel and Hardy characters in the television show Stan 'n
Ollie.26 The court granted the injunction, again recognizing the publicity
rights in the comedians' appearances and mannerisms.27 California courts
have also recognized the legal protection of a celebrity's style as far back
as 1928, when an appellate court prevented an unauthorized imitation of
'
Charlie Chaplin's distinct "characterizations and expressions." 28
More recently, courts have extended publicity rights to grant protection
against unauthorized vocal imitations. Singer Bette Midler, for example,
successfully challenged an unauthorized imitation of her voice used in a
Ford Motors commercial, 29 and a vocal imitation of singer Tom Waits was
likewise found to infringe upon his publicity rights." It is interesting to
note how the right of publicity has evolved to protect against vocal
imitation, when as recently as 1971 the right of publicity did not protect
21. 523 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd, 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982).
22. Id. at 493-94.
23. Id. at 494 (emphasis added).
24. 400 F. Supp 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
25. Id. at 843.
26. Price v. Worldvision Enter., Inc., 455 F. Supp. 252 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), affd, 603 F.2d
214 (2d Cir. 1979).
27. Id. at 256.
28. Chaplin v. Amador, 269 P. 544 (Cal. Ct. App. 1928). But see Sinatra v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711, 712 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971)
(denying singerNancy Sinatra's claim that the defendant's television commercial, which used
the music to "These Boots Are Made For Walkin'," imitated her dress, mannerisms, and style
of delivery).
29. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub nom.
Midler v. Young & Rubicam, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 1513-14 (1992).
30. Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
1047 (1993).
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Nancy Sinatra against the blatant imitation of her voice, dress, style, and
mannerism.3
These holdings demonstrate how the right of publicity may be extended
beyond the actors' physical traits, to protect their acting styles or fictional
creations. These cases also exemplify how courts may turn to the right of
publicity in order to find some protection for performers, perhaps confusing
the creators with their characterizations, because other bodies of law, such
as copyright or trademark, do not provide adequate protection.32
D. Appropriationof an Actor's Performance
The fourth and least common type of publicity right infringement
involves the unauthorized use or appropriation of the actor's live performance itself, rather than his or her unique style, as discussed supra.
Because statutory copyright law does not protect a live performance which
has not been fixed in a tangible medium of expression, performers turn to
the right of publicity to find protection for their performances.3 3 This type
of appropriation was at issue in the first and only right of publicity case
decided by the United States Supreme Court, Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
BroadcastingCo.34 Plaintiff Hugo Zacchini, a human cannonball performer, alleged that the defendant had usurped his right of publicity by airing a
fifteen-second broadcast of his performance on a local news telecast without
his permission.
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Mr. Zacchini,
recognizing a right of publicity in an actor's performance, and further
recognizing that this right was violated by the unauthorized broadcast of the
performance.36
Zacchini stands apart from most right of publicity cases, in that: 1) it
was the first right of publicity case to be decided by the United States
31. Sinatra, 435 F.2d at 712 (denying relief despite the defendant's use, in a tire
commercial, of a singer whose voice, style, and even boots were deliberately intended to
imitate Sinatra's).
32. The usual rationale is that human characterizations cannot be copyrighted apart from
some "work." See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988); NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2, § 2.12.
33. Although section 106 of the Copyright Act of 1976 lists the right to perform a work
as one of the exclusive rights held by an owner of a copyright, statutory copyright law does
not protect works which are not fixed in a tangible medium of expression, such as live
choreographic works, jazz improvizations, and other "unfixed" performances. Thus, if the
work is the performance, it may not be protected by statutory copyright. See 17 U.S.C. §
301 (1988).

34. 433 U.S. 562.
35. Id. at 563-64.
36. Id. at 574-76.
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Supreme Court; 2) it is still the only such United States Supreme Court case
to date; 3) it involved appropriation of a live performance, while most
publicity right cases involve infringement of a person's name, likeness, or
style; 4) Mr. Zacchini was relatively unknown, where almost all other cases
involve well-known celebrities; 5) Mr. Zacchini was alive and asserting his
own publicity rights, whereas many other cases are brought by the estate or
license holder of a celebrity who is deceased; 37 and 6) the First Amendment was more at issue than in most publicity cases, because this infringement involved a newscast, rather than a commercial exploitation.3 8
IV. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND: FOUR PUBLICITY RIGHT
THEORIES AND THE UNDERLYING POLICIES BEHIND COPYRIGHT
AND PUBLICITY RIGHT LAW

A. Lugosi v. Universal-FourRight of Publicity Theories
The right of publicity was thoroughly analyzed in the 1979 landmark
case, Lugosi v. Universal Pictures,39 where the California Supreme Court
proffered the four models under which the right of publicity may be
analyzed. Because Lugosi still stands as the seminal right of publicity
case, 40 a more in-depth analysis is warranted.
Bela Lugosi portrayed Count Dracula in Universal Pictures' 1931
motion picture, Dracula. Although the character of Dracula has been

37. Most leading right of publicity cases have been brought by the estate of a deceased
celebrity, including Bela Lugosi, Elvis Presley, The Marx Brothers, Laurel and Hardy, Martin
Luther King, Jr., Charlie Chaplin, and Agatha Christie. See descendibility discussion, infra
text accompanying notes 138-56.
38. The First Amendment issue is addressed in Part VI of this article. See infra text
accompanying notes 157-87. For a more detailed analysis of the Zacchini case and its
implications, see generally Thomas H. Hannigan, Jr., FirstAmendment TheoryAppliedto the
Right of Publicity, 17 PUB. ENT. ADVERT. & ALLIED FIELDS L.Q. 339 (1979); Pamela
Samuelson, Reviving Zacchini: Analyzing First Amendment Defenses in Right of Publicity
and Copyright Cases, 57 TUL. L. REV. 836 (1983).
39. 603 P.2d 425.
40. For a more in-depth analysis of Lugosi and its progeny, see generally, Jon B.
Eisenberg, Lugosi v. Universal Pictures: Descent of the Right of Publicity, 17 PUB. ENT.
ADvERT. & ALLIED FIELDS L.Q. 311 (1979); David R. Ginsberg, Transfer of the Right of
Publicity: Dracula'sProgeny and Privacy's Stepchild, 22 UCLA L. REv. 1103 (1975);
Miles P. Zatkowsky, DraculaDrawsBlood from the Right of Publicity, 15 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 181 (1981); Stephen F. Rohde, Dracula: Still Undead; (UnresolvedRight-of-Publicity
QuestionsAre Sure to Haunt the Courts), CAL. LAW., Apr. 1985, at 51-55.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol19/iss3/1

150

et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue

1022

Nova Law Review

Vol. 19

portrayed in many different fashions by many different actors,' it was
Lugosi's portrayal which has defined the popular image of Dracula, and left
the most memorable impression.4 2 During the early 1960s, Universal
began licensing the Count Dracula character to various commercial
merchandisers, resulting in a plethora of T-shirts, masks, toys, models,
lunchboxes, and other items bearing Lugosi's distinct image of Dracula.
Lugosi's estate43 then sought injunctive relief and recovery of Universal's
profits, claiming Universal was exploiting a valuable property right
belonging to Bela's estate.44 In determining whether the plaintiffs could
assert a postmortem right to Bela's portrayal of the Dracula character, the
Supreme Court of California delineated four different theories under which
the right of value45 to one's name and likeness may be analyzed: 1)
property; 2) privacy; 3) work product; and 4) copyright.
1. Property-The Trial Court's View
The Lugosi trial court interpreted the right of publicity to constitute a
property right. 46 The property theory recognizes the right to one's
commercially valuable name and likeness as a possessory right, which
accrues as the fruits of one's labor.4 7 This right, therefore, belongs to its
creator, who has the right to profit from, as well as manage and control the
likeness and image.
The property theory was also the basis for the court's decision in
Haelan,4 8 the first case to recognize the right of publicity. Haelan

41. This includes Gary Oldman's portrayal in Columbia Pictures' recent (Fall 1992)
Oscar-winning release, BRAM STOKER'S DRACULA.
42. LES DANIELS, LIVING IN FEAR: A HISTORY OF HORROR IN THE MASS MEDIA 130

(1975). The Lugosi character, with slicked-back black hair, rich Hungarian accent, and
piercing eyes differs tremendously from the white-haired, shabby, mustachioed old man
described by DRACULA'S author, Brain Stoker. Id. See also IVAN BUTLER, HORROR IN THE
CINEMA 42 (2d ed. 1970).

43. Bela died in 1956. Apparently the actor, unlike his character, could not come back
to assert his rights. Lugosi's widow, Hope Linninger Lugosi, and son, Bela George Lugosi,
were awarded all causes of action belonging to the estate.
44. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures Co., Inc., 172 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 541, 542 (Cal. Super.
Ct. 1972), rev'd. 139 Cal. Rptr. 35 (1975), and vacated, 603 P.2d 425 (Cal. 1979).
45. Dean Prosser is credited with creating the "right of value" term, which was used by
the Lugosi majority. Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 428; see PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 2, § 117,
at 854.
46. Lugosi, 172 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 551.
47. See Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1282 (D. Minn. 1970).
48. Haelan, 202 F.2d at 866.
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represents a landmark precedent in recognizing a proprietary right of
publicity distinct from a privacy right:
[I]n addition to and independent of [the] right of privacy... a man has
a right in thepublicity value of his photograph[s] .... [H]ere, as often
elsewhere, the tag "property" simply symbolizes the fact that courts
enforce a claim which has pecuniary worth. This right might be called
a "right of publicity."49
New York courts have followed the Haelan decision, finding the right
of publicity to be a proprietary right." As the Lugosi court recognized,5 '
a very significant consequence of labeling the right of publicity as a
property right is that it confers two additional rights: assignability 2 and
descendibility 3
2. Privacy-The Appellate Majority's View
Right of publicity issues have most often been construed under the right
of privacy doctrine. 4 Rather than emphasizing the commercial right to
55
control one's image, as the property theory does, the privacy model
mainly protects a person's "right to be let alone."56 The right of privacy
theory was first conceived in an 1890 law review article,57 and was later

49. Id. at 868 (emphasis added).
50. See, e.g., Price v. Worldvision, 455 F. Supp. at 257; Price v. Hal Roach, 400 F.

Supp. at 844.
51. Lugosi, 172 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 551; see also Price v. Hal Roach, 400 F. Supp. at

844.
52. See, e.g., Haelan, 202 F.2d at 867.

53. See, e.g., Russen, 513 F. Supp. at 1355. The descendibility issue is discussed in Part
VI of this article; see also infra text accompanying notes 138-56.
54. See, e.g., Factors,579 F.2d at 220; Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E.
68 (Ga. 1905); Roberson v. Rochester Folding-Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (1902) (finding the use
of a young lady's picture to advertise a product (flour), without her knowledge or permission,
violated her right of privacy).
55. See generally.NIMMER & NIMMER, supranote 2, § 1.01 [B]; Gordon, supranote 3;
Victor A. Kovner et al., Recent Developments in Intrusion, Private Facts, False Light, and
Commercialization Claims, in COMMUNICATIONS LAW 1994 (PLI Patents, Copyrights,

Trademarks, and Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. 400, 1994).
56. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193, 205 (1890).
57. Id. The right of publicity was not judicially recognized, however, until 1953, in
Haelan, 202 F.2d 866. See Peter L. Felcher & Edward L. Rubin, Privacy,Publicity, and the
PortrayalofReal Peopleby the Media, 88 YALE L.J. 1577, 1581 (1979) [hereinafter Felcher
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expanded by Dean Prosser, who, in his 1960 law review article, identified
four distinct kinds of intrusions into a plaintiff's privacy interests which
could be protected:"8
1. Intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude, or into his
private affairs.
2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff.
3. Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public
eye.
4. Appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the plaintiff's
name or likeness. 9
The Lugosi appellate court relied upon the privacy model, which the
Supreme Court of California majority also adopted. This analysis proved
monumental, in that it directly contradicts the Haelan conclusion that the
right of publicity is completely separate and distinct from the right of
privacy.60 The Lugosi interpretation results in certain benefits to the
plaintiff, as privacy actions, under tort law, can offer several advantages
over property law. As a tort action, a privacy infringement allows for
punitive and emotional damages which may not be available through other
remedies. It also provides an already developed body of case law, as well
as numerous treatises and restatements 61 which may provide some consistency and predictability to an otherwise murky area of law.
The advantages of the right of privacy analysis are, however, outweighed by its inherent disadvantages. First, and perhaps most important,
the privacy theory does not recognize publicity rights as descendible. Under
the privacy model, the exploited person's privacy rights terminate upon his
or her death, and third parties, including family members, may not claim a
legal interest in the deceased's emotional or dignitary interests. This
weakness is particularly apparent in the right of publicity context, which
tends to be dominated by actions brought by the estates of deceased
celebrities.6 z

& Rubin I].
58. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960); see also PROSSER &
KEETON, supra note 2, § 117, at 851.
59. Prosser, supranote 58, at 389. The fourth interest listed is the one most relevant
to right of publicity actions.
60. Haelan, 202 F.2d at 868; see supra text accompanying notes 48-53.
61. See, e.g., PROssER & KEETON, supra note 2.
62. See supra note 37. The descendibility issue is discussed further in part VI of this
article; see also infra text accompanying notes 138-56.
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Second, the "invasion of privacy" rationale may not be appropriate for
celebrities, who thrive on public exposure and publicity. Infringers are
quick to invoke a waiver defense, arguing that public figures assume the risk
of exploitation and waive their privacy rights as part of the price of entering
the public arena. The waiver defense does have some merit in certain
circumstances, particularly in slander and libel cases,6" but should not be
used to deny anyone protection from the unauthorized exploitation of their
name or likeness.
A third inherent flaw lies within the general policies underlying the two
doctrines. The right of privacy is primarily meant to protect personal
interests (i.e., a person's mental and emotional well-being), whereas the
right of publicity is, or should be, primarily intended to protect the person's
proprietaryand financial interests. The privacy theory may therefore not
be the appropriate way in which to interpret publicity rights.
A fourth potential weakness is that the privacy theory would deny
human owners the ability to assert a right of publicity for property which
has no privacy right, such as an animal, inanimate object, or institution. Yet
another disadvantage is that under the privacy model, a person's publicity
rights are considered dignitary, rather than proprietary, therefore denying
one the ability to transfer or assign publicity rights to others.
The inherent flaws of determining publicity rights under the right of
privacy model have spawned a continuous flurry of criticism over the
Lugosi ruling.64 By classifying the right of publicity as a privacy right, the
Lugosi majority has drastically limited the availability of right of publicity
actions, as it essentially denies standing to all estates of deceased persons.
3. Work Product-The Concurrence's View
The third theory elicited by the Lugosi court was the work product
model, as espoused by Justice Mosk in his concurrence. Under the work
product analysis, an actor is an employee of the studio, and is paid to create

63. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), cert. denied,459 U.S. 1226
(1983); Martin Luther King, 508 F. Supp. at 863; see also PROSSER & KEETON, supranote
2, § 113, at 805; RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 2.06 (1994).
64. See Haelan, 202 F.2d at 868; see also Felcher & Rubin I, supranote 57, at 1588-89;
Peter L. Felcher & Edward L. Rubin, The Descendibilityofthe Right of Publicity: Is There
CommercialLifeAfterDeath?,89 YALE L.J. 1125, 1128 (1980) [hereinafter Felcher & Rubin
II]; Ginsberg, supra note 40; Gordon, supra note 3, at 555-57; Melville B. Nimmer, The
Right ofPublicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, 204-10 (1954); Lionel S. Sobel, Count
Draculaand the Right ofPublicity, 47 L.A.B. ASS'N BULL. 373, 377-78 (1972); Zatkowsky,
supranote 40, at 181-90; Rohde, supra note 40.
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a product-the portrayal of a character, which then belongs to the employer,
rather than the actor. According to Justice Mosk, Lugosi did not obtain any
proprietary rights in his Dracula image because the image of the character
Count Dracula, rather than the actor Bela Lugosi, was marketed, 65 and an
employee's creation in the course of his employment belongs to the
employer, pursuant to the California Labor Code.6 6 Lugosi's portrayal of
Dracula was part of his employment contract with Universal, who owned the
fruits of the employee's labor67 under California labor law. As Justice
Mosk concluded, "[m]erely playing a role . . . creates no inheritable
property right in an actor .... "68
Justice Mosk did, however, recognize that an actor may claim a right
to the exclusive use of his portrayal of a character when the actor also
creates that character. Thus, an inheritable property interest will vest for an
actor's creation of a marketable character, but not for mere performance.6 9
This philosophy has been used to protect the characters created by
performers such as Groucho Marx 7° and Laurel and Hardy. 7'
4. Copyright-The Dissent's View
The fourth method of interpreting the right of publicity involves
analyzing it under copyright law. The Lugosi dissent, lead by Chief Justice
Bird,72 adopted this approach, concluding that "the right of publicity
recognizes an interest in intangible property similar in many respects to

65. Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 431-34 (Mosk, J., concurring).
66. Id. at 433. California labor law provided that: "Everything which an employee
acquires by virtue of his employment, except the compensation which is due to him from his
employer, belongs to the employer, whether acquired ... during or after.., the term of his
employment." Id. (citing CAL. LAB. CODE § 2860 (West 1971)).
67. Id. at 433. Universal's employment contract with Lugosi gave Universal the right
to exploit "any and all of the artist's acts, poses, plays and appearances of any and all kinds
. . . [and] to use and give publicity to the artist's name and likeness, photographic or
otherwise ... in connection with the advertising ... of [the film]." Id. at 426-27 n.2.
68. Lugosi,603 P.2d at 432. The trial court rejected the work product argument, finding
Universal had contracted for Bela's performance, which was separate and apart from the
commercial rights to his name and likeness, for which Universal had not contracted. Lugosi,
172 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 543-44.
69. Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 432.
70. Groucho Marx Prods., 523 F. Supp. at 485; see supra text accompanying notes 2123.
71. Price v. Hal Roach, 400 F. Supp. 836; see supra text accompanying notes 24-27.
72. Chief Justice Bird was joined in her dissent by Justices Tobriner and Manuel.
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creations protected by copyright law, [and therefore] that body of law is
instructive."7 3
A major advantage for plaintiffs through the copyright analogy is that,
unlike the privacy model, the right of publicity becomes descendible unto
the estate of the owner.74 Justice Bird suggested this monopoly on the
control of a person's name and likeness should fall into the public domain
after a fixed period, as does a copyright, and further suggested adopting the
same term of "life of the author and fifty years after the author's death" of
copyright law as the standard time period.75 Furthermore, the underlying
policies of copyright law are compatible with the right of publicity, as
discussed below.
B. Underlying Policies of Copyright and Publicity Right Law
1. Overall Goals and Objectives
Adopting the copyright model to the right of publicity reflects the
underlying policy behind copyright law: to promote creative expression76
while accommodating the free exchange of ideas and information.77
Copyright law attempts to realize this goal through two general objectives:
providing economic incentives to the creator, and preventing unjust
enrichment. In deciding right of publicity cases, especially when adopting
the copyright approach, courts give careful attention to these two objectives,
balancing them against the countervailing interests of promoting free trade
and preserving First Amendment protection.78

73. Lugosi, 603
74. Part VI of
accompanying notes
75. Lugosi, 603

P.2d at 446 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
this article discusses the descendibility issue. See also infra text
138-56.
P.2d at 446-47 (Bird, C.J., dissenting); see also 17 U.S.C. § 302(a)

(1988).
76. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cf. 8 (intending "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts").
77. See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975); Melville
B. Nimmer, Does CopyrightAbridge the FirstAmendment Guaranteesof Free Speech and
Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180-93 (1970).
78. See, e.g., Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 575-77; see also supratext accompanying notes 3438 and infra notes 163-64.
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2. Economic Incentive
The primary impetus behind copyright law is to encourage creative
endeavor by providing economic incentives to the creator. 79 This rationale
has likewise played a prominent role in most right of publicity cases. In
Zacchini, the United States Supreme Court recognized the public interest
benefit of providing financial incentives to encourage artists and entertainers
in pursuing creative endeavors" and continuing to perform. 8 The Court
specifically recognized "the State's interest [in recognizing a right of
publicity] is closely analogous to the goals of patent and copyright law,
focusing on the right of the individual to reap the reward of his endeavors
... ,82 By recognizing the publicity rights in Mr. Zacchini's performance, the Court protected his drawing power and promoted his incentive
to perform.83
Other courts have also specifically recognized the economic incentive
policy behind protection of the right of publicity. In Lugosi, for example,
Chief Justice Bird noted how the right of publicity "creates a powerful
incentive for expending time and resources to develop the skills or
achievements prerequisite to public recognition."84 The Sixth Circuit
reached a similar conclusion in Memphis Development, discussed in Part V,
holding that "[t]he basic motivations [of performance] are.., the desire to
receive the psychic and financial rewards of achievement. . . ."" and
"should be regarded as... an economic opportunity available in the free
market system." 6 In Haelan, the Second Circuit also noted "many
-prominent persons ...would feel sorely deprived if they no longer received
money for authorizing advertisements, [or] popularizing their countenances
,87

While economic incentive is certainly a valid policy, it is not without
criticism. The economic incentive argument may fall short when used in the
context of an estate seeking to assert a post mortem publicity right of a

79. See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1010 (1988).
80. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 567-77.
81. Id. at 576.
82. Id. at 573.
83. Id. at 575-76.
84. Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 441 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
85. Memphis Dev., 616 F.2d at 958.
86. Id. at 960.
87. Haelan,202 F.2d at 868; seesupra text accompanying notes 48-53; seealsoGordon,
supra note 3.

Published by NSUWorks, 1995

157

Nova Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 3 [1995], Art. 1

Spahn

1995]

1029

deceased celebrity, because a performer's primary incentive is usually fame
and fortune during his lifetime, rather than the ability to pass these
marketing rights onto his estate. 8
Another potential drawback is that the economic incentive rationale
grants the celebrity or the celebrity's heirs a monopoly power over his or
her name and image. This monopoly control can lead to a general "chilling
effect," as the free and open exchange of information about the celebrity
may be restricted. 9 Ironically, although it was Chief Justice Bird who
propounded the free enterprise argument in Lugosi,9" she also expressed
this chilling effect criticism in a companion case, 9' stating "prominence
invites creative comment. Surely, the range of free expression would be
meaningfully reduced if prominent persons in the present and recent past
were forbidden topics for the imaginations of authors of fiction."92
3. Prevention of Unjust Enrichment
The second economic policy of publicity right protection is to prevent
infringers from unjust enrichment, i.e., "reaping what others have sown."'93
The United States Supreme Court in Zacchini,for instance, reasoned that to
allow Scripps-Howard to film and broadcast Mr. Zacchini's act without
compensating him would unjustly benefit the defendant at no cost beyond
its relatively insignificant production expense. 94 The Second Circuit also
noted that to allow the defendant in Factors to merchandize its unauthorized Elvis posters without compensating Presley's estate would result in
unjust enrichment by "grant[ing the defendant] a windfall in the form of
profits from the use of Presley's name and likeness."96 The Pennsylvania

88. See, e.g., Memphis Dev., 616 F.2d at 960 (recognizing the minimal motivation of
"allowing a person to pass on his fame for the commercial use of his heirs or assigns").
89. See id. (holding that the publicity right of a deceased performer does not outweigh
the unencumbered "commercial, aesthetic, and political use of the name, memory, and image
of the famous").
90. See supra text accompanying note 84.
91. Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454 (Cal. 1979).
92. Id. at 460, (Bird, C.J., concurring) (footnotes omitted).

93. See Samuelson, supra note 38, at 850 (stating that "[b]oth [copyright and publicity
right] law are concerned not only with direct economic injury to the owner, but with
prevention of unjust enrichment as well") (citing Kevin S. Marks, Comment, An Assessment
of the CopyrightModel in Right of Publicity Cases, 70 CAL. L. REV. 786, 795 (1982)).
94. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 575-76.
95. Factors, 579 F.2d at 221.

96. Id.
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court in Hogan97 reached a similar conclusion in awarding damages to Ben
Hogan to compensate him for the defendant's unjust enrichment in
appropriating Hogan's name.98 Other examples where the unjust enrichment rationale has been applied to publicity rights include defendants'
unauthorized publications of pictures of Muhammad Ali,99 Cary Grant,'00
and author Jackie Collins Lerman.'
V. APPLYING COPYRIGHT LAW TO THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY

Interpreting the right of publicity under copyright inevitably incorporates many of the aspects inherent in copyright law. First, as discussed in
the preceding section, the two underlying policies behind copyright
law-promoting creative endeavor and preventing unjust enrichment-also
apply to the right of publicity. Second, as addressed in the following
section, both doctrines potentially involve First Amendment freedom of
speech conflicts. °2 Finally, both doctrines fail to provide clear standards
regarding the extent of protection for an actor's performance or style,
including whether or not such rights are assignable or descendible. This
section examines certain issues where the right of publicity may be used to
fill the gaps where copyright law does not provide adequate legal protection.
A. Protection of a Person's Likeness, Image, or Character
Most right of publicity cases involve the exclusive right and control of
a performer's image. Memphis Development0 3 is a typical example,
where the defendants marketed an unauthorized statuette of Elvis Presley.
The court adopted the traditional copyright approach, considering the

97. Hogan, 114 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 314; see supra text accompanying notes 8-9.
98. The court awarded Mr. Hogan $5000 in compensatory damages. Id. at 321-23.
99. Ali, 447 F. Supp. at 728-29 (involving Playgirl'spublication of an objectionable
portrait of the former champion to advertise its magazine).
100. Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876, 879 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (involving the
magazine's superimposition of a photograph of Cary Grant's head onto the torso of a model
as part of an article dealing with clothing styles).
101. Lerman v. Chuckleberry Publishing, Inc., 521 F. Supp. 228, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(involving a magazine's use of the plaintiff's name in a publication which included pictures
of a nude woman who the magazine incorrectly identified as the plaintiff).
102. The First Amendment is discussed in part VI of this article; see also infra text
accompanying notes 157-92.
103. Memphis Dev., 616 F.2d 956; see supra text accompanying note 15.
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personal interest in economic reward and societal interests in encouraging
performing arts. 0 4
Copyright law protects creative expression when fixed in a tangible
medium, but does not protect the ideas expressed. While this general rule
is a basic precept of copyright law, it becomes very unclear when applied
to a right of publicity situation. To illustrate, this rule does not provide any
clear standard of distinguishing between Bela Lugosi's personal features and
characteristics in his portrayal of Dracula, which could be considered
proprietary, from the Dracula character itself, to which Lugosi would not
have a proprietary claim.'0 5 This area of confusion presents a clear
example of how a properly developed right of publicity law can help fill a
void left open by copyright law.
B. Protection of a Performance
A second area where the right of publicity can fill certain legal gaps is
the protection of an actor's performance itself. Zacchini1 °6 still stands as
the seminal application of this concept, as the entire case revolved around
the protection of Mr. Zacchini's human cannonball performance.'0 7 In
reaching its decision, the Supreme Court strived to comply with the
underlying goals of promoting artistic endeavor by providing the financial
reward for the performer's investment into developing his act,0 8 and
preventing unjust enrichment to the infringer.0 9
C. Protection of FictionalCharacters
Fictional characters, from Mickey Mouse and Tarzan, to Barney and the
Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles, are becoming an increasingly prevalent part
of American culture, and are the subject of much infringement litigation.
Protection of fictional characters is usually analyzed under copyright
law."0 Courts often employ the "story being told" standard,"' which

104. Id. at 958-59.
105. See, e.g., Factors,579 F.2d at 221; Lerman, 521 F. Supp. at 232; Ali, 447 F. Supp.

at 728-29.
106. Zacchini,433 U.S. 562; see supra text accompanying notes 34-38.
107. Id.at 563.

108. Id. at 576-77; see supra text accompanying notes 79-92.
109. Id. at 576; see supra text accompanying notes 93-101.
110. For a more detailed analysis of the legal protections of fictional characters, see
David B. Feldman, Finding a Home for FictionalCharacters: A Proposalfor Change in
CopyrightProtection,78 CAL. L. REV. 687 (1990); Leslie A. Kurtz, The Independent Lives
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holds that a character may only be protected under copyright law if "the
character really constitutes the story being told, but if the character is only
the chessman in the game of telling the story he is not within the area of the
protection afforded by the copyright."'" 2 Under this standard, a character
cannot receive copyright protection unless the character itself is the story3
(i.e., the character is inseparable from the work in which it appears)."
Plaintiffs may also turn to the "protected expression" theory to protect their
fictional characters. The protected expression analysis looks beyond the
fictional character's mere physical appearances, delving further into the
character's expressions. This standard was used to find that Mickey
Mouse" 4 and the H.R. Puff n'Stuff characters"' were protectable apart
from the stories in which they appeared.
Copyright law is, however, flawed by many inherent voids in protecting
fictional characters. A character may not be entitled to copyright protection
if the character is not sufficiently delineated to be considered copyrightable.
Even when copyright law does apply, it may protect only the entire final
work," 6' but not the individual components of that work. Fictional
characters may thus be left virtually unprotected, especially as they migrate
into new works and other mediums. As a result, plaintiffs and courts may
of FictionalCharacters.1986 Wis. L. REv. 429 (1986); Dan D. Niro, ProtectingCharacters
Through Copyright Law: Pavinga New Road Upon Which Literary, Graphic,and Motion
PictureCharactersCan All Travel, 41 DEPAUL L. REv. 359 (1992); Kenneth E. Spahn, The
Legal Protectionof FictionalCharacters,9 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 331 (1992).
111. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys.. Inc., 216 F.2d 945 (9th
Cir.) (the Sam Spade case), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 971 (1954).
112. Id. at 950.
113. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2, § 2.12, at 2-175. The Nimmer treatise
points out that the Sam Spade ruling denies copyright protections for all fictional characters,
because it "envisage[s] a 'story' devoid of plot wherein character study constitutes all, or
substantially all, of the work;" Id. Nimmer further concludes, "although the Sam Spade
[rule] protected [the author's] right to reuse his characters, the rule potentially relegated all
fictional characters to the public domain." Id.
114. Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 756 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1132 (1979) (concluding that the infringing character's visual similarities to Mickey
Mouse were substantial enough to constitute infringement). Id. at 756.
115. Sid & Marty Kroffi Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp. 562 F.2d 1157
(9th Cir. 1977). The McDonald's commercials featuring McDonaldlandcharacters (Ronald
McDonald et al.) were found to so closely resemble the "total concept and feel" of Krofft's
Puffin'Stuff television program as to constitute copyright infringement. Id. at 1167. The
decision represented an important progression in fictional character protection, because the
court looked beyond the mere visual images of the characters themselves, and delved into the
entire setting and feel of the characters' environments.
116. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988); NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2, § 2.12.
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look to the right of publicity and other alternative legal doctrines to protect
fictional characters." 7
D. Protection of "Pure" Characters
Copyright law may provide little or no protection for creators of a
"pure" character, which is a character who does not appear in an incorporated work. Because the Copyright Act protects works," 8 a performer
who creates and develops a character such as Pee Wee Herman, the Church
Lady, or Hanz and Franz may not have any copyright protection in that
character unless the character is itself considered a work, or is incorporated
into a work
of authorship, and is "fixed in a tangible medium of expres9
sion."'
This weakness in copyright protection was dramatically evidenced in
Columbia Broadcasting System v. DeCosta.'2 ° Actor Victor DeCosta
created the fictional character "Paladin," which he portrayed at public
appearances, carnivals, rodeos, etc.'
Ten years after his retirement,
DeCosta attempted to prevent CBS's use of an identical character in its
television show, Have Gun Will Travel.'22 The television character went
far beyond a mere resemblance, as CBS duplicated almost every detail of
DeCosta's creation. The CBS character, like DeCosta's character, was also
named "Paladin," was a good guy wearing a black outfit and a mustache,
came from San Francisco, used a chess knight as a trademark, and handed
out business cards bearing the chess knight and the inscription, "Have Gun
Will Travel, Wire Paladin, San Francisco."'
Although the jury
found' 24 that CBS blatantly pirated almost every detail of DeCosta's
character, the actor was denied relief because his pure character had never
2
been incorporated into any copyrightable work. 1

117. See generallyFeldman,supranote 110; Kurtz, supranote 110; Spahn, supra note
110.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
constitute

17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988).
Id.
377 F.2d 315 (Ist Cir. 1967).
Id. at 316.
Id. at 316-17.
Id. at 317.
Id. at 321.
377 F.2d at 321. The court reasoned that DeCosta's public appearances did not
a "tangible medium," and thus were not sufficient to provide copyright protection

for the character. Id.
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The court also denied DeCosta protection because he did not take the
affirmative step of copyrighting his performance, business cards, or
photos." 6 Note, however, that even if DeCosta had copyrighted his cards
and pictures, those copyrights would only have protected against reproductions of the actual cards or photos, not the Paladin pure character itself."7
Also note that neither trademark nor unfair competition law would have
protected DeCosta because his limited personal appearances would not have
been sufficient to establish a secondary meaning28 or create consumer
confusion between his character and the CBS show.1
Protection of pure characters represents another area where the right of
publicity can help fill in a gap left open by copyright and trademark law.
The right of publicity doctrine would protect Mr. DeCosta's performance,
as was done in Zacchini, as well as his style and character as in Groucho
Marx Productions,Russen, Price v. Hal Roach, and Chaplin v. Amador.
E. Applying the Fair Use Doctrine
The fair use doctrine, which is found in the federal Copyright Act,
provides that "the fair use of a copyrighted work ... for purposes such as
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching,... scholarship, or research,
is not an infringement of copyright."'2 9 Certain infringements of a
copyright are thus permitted when the infringement furthers "the greater
126. Id. Although the business cards and photographs which DeCosta handed out did
satisfy the writing requirement to warrant copyright protection, the actor had not obtained
copyright on these materials, thus opening his character up to the public domain; see also
Compco Corp. v. Day-Bright Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964); Sears. Roebuck & Co. v.
Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
127. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988). Even if the Paladin chess knight symbol was original,
it still would not "tangibly fix" DeCosta's character, which incorporates his cards, props,
characterization, performances, and physical appearance. See Michael V.P. Marks, The Legal
Rights of FictionalCharacters,25 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 35, 60 (1980).
128. Federal trademark law is governed under the Lanham Act, Title 15 of the United
States Code. See Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd. 604 F.2d 200
(2d Cir. 1979); Eden Toys, Inc. v. Floralee Undergarment Co., Inc. 526 F. Supp 1187
(S.D.N.Y. 1981); DC Comics, Inc. v. Filmation Ass'n, 486 F. Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1980);
Tomlin v. Walt Disney Prods., 18 Cal. App. 3d 226 (1971); see also J.T. MCCARTHY,
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 4, 5, 23 (2d ed. 1984); NIMMER & NIMMER,
supra note 2, § 2.12, at 2-178.1; Daniel M. McClure, Trademarksand Unfair Competition:
A Critical History of Legal Thought, 69 TRADEMARK REP. 305, 314 (1979).
129. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988). Factors used to determine whether infringement falls
under the fair use exception include: the purpose and character of the use; the nature of the
copyrighted work; the amount and substantiality of the portion used; and the effect upon the
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. Id.
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public interest in the development of art, science and industry."'13 Fair
use also establishes a privilege to use copyrighted material in a reasonable
manner without the copyright 32owner's consent,13 ' and is most commonly
applied in the case of parody.
The fair use doctrine was applied to the right of publicity in Namath
v. Sports fllustrated,3 3 where quarterback Joe Namath claimed that an
advertisement for Sports fIlustrated magazine, featuring an issue of the
magazine with his picture on the cover, had violated his publicity right. The
court denied relief to Namath, finding the use of his picture was only
incidental, and raised no implication of his endorsement.'3 4 The use of
Namath's photograph was deemed incidental and thus permissible, as
compared to Scripps-Howard's unauthorized broadcast of Mr. Zacchini's act,
which was considered far more than incidental, having taken the performer's
"entire act."'3 5 The fair use doctrine was also argued by the defendants
in Groucho Marx Productions,but was rejected by the court.' 3 6 Also note
that if the DeCostacourt would have recognized a protectable interest in the
plaintiff's Paladin character, the fair use doctrine likely would not have
protected CBS, because the network's wholesale duplication of DeCosta's
37
character was clearly more than incidental.

130. Berlin v. E.C. Pubs., Inc. 329 F.2d 541, 544 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,379 U.S. 822
(1964).
13 1. Stephen S. Morrill, Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enterprises: Emasculating
the Fair Use Accommodation of Competing Copyright and FirstAmendment Interests, 79
Nw. U. L. REv. 587, 610 (1984).
132. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S.Ct. 1164 (1994) (holding that rap
music group 2 Live Crew's parody of Roy Orbison's "Pretty Woman," although commercial
in nature, did not create a presumption against fair use of Orbison's copyrighted work);
Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980). "A parody
is entitled ... to 'conjure up' the original." Id. at 253 n.1; see also Victor S. Netterville,
Copyright and Tort Aspects of Parody,Mimicry and Humorous Commentary, 35 S. CAL. L.
REV. 225 (1962). But see Groucho Marx Prods., 523 F. Supp. at 493 (denying fair use
defense when parody goes beyond conjuring up the original, to the point of wholesale
appropriation of the original's characterizations); supra text accompanying notes 23-25.
133. 352 N.E. 2d 584 (1976).
134. Id. at 386.
135. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 575.
136. Groucho Marx Prods., 523 F. Supp. at 493-94; see supra text accompanying notes
21-23.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 120-28.
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VI. LIMITATIONS TO THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY DOCTRINE

As discussed in Parts IV and V, the theoretical policies behind the right
of publicity are essentially analogous to those of copyright law, which can
generally be applied to publicity right issues. Such application would help
resolve two primary limitations on the right of publicity law as it currently
exists: descendibility' 38 and First Amendment conflicts.
A. Descendibility of Publicity Rights
One of the most debated issues concerning one's right of publicity is
whether that right dies with the person, or descends to the person's heirs or
estate.' 39 This is particularly important, because publicity right cases often
involve the exploitation of a celebrity who is deceased, and must therefore
be brought by that celebrity's estate. 4
As with other publicity right issues, the descendibility question has no
uniform standard, and the answer varies from state to state and court to
court. In order to successfully assert a claim on behalf of the deceased, the
estate must first establish the existence of the decedent's right of publicity,
and the defendant's infringement upon that right. Even after successfully
meeting this burden, the estate may still be denied relief if that jurisdiction
does not recognize the right of publicity as descendible. 4 ' As a general
rule, publicity rights are not descendible when viewed under the privacy
model, as the Lugosi majority held,' 42 .because a privacy right terminates
upon the death of the infringed person, and third parties, including the
celebrity's family, may not assert a legal interest in another person's
dignitary or emotional rights.
However, when analyzed under the property or copyright model, a
person's publicity rights become his personal property, and may descend to

138. For a more in-depth analysis of descendibility under the right of privacy doctrine,
see generally, Felcher & Rubin II, supra note 64, at 1129; Ginsberg, supra note 40; Andrew
B. Sims, Right of Publicity: Survivability Reconsidered,49 FORDHAM L. REv. 453 (1981).
139. The same analysis and arguments concerning the descendibility issue of publicity
rights apply equally as well to the transferability and assignability issues. This article
therefore limits its discussion to descendibility.
140. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
141. See, e.g., Factors, 579 F.2d at 222; Memphis Dev., 441 F. Supp. at 1330.
142. See supra text accompanying notes 54-64.
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his estate upon death.' 43 The Lugosi dissent agreed with the trial
court.. that publicity rights should be descendible. As Chief Justice Bird
concluded, "the right of publicity recognizes an interest in intangible
property similar in many respects to creations protected by copyright law
45
... [and] that body of law is [therefore] instructive."'
The publicity rights of the deceased performer have been asserted most
frequently by the estate of Elvis Presley. In Russen,"' the estate was able
to prevent an unauthorized stage production which mimicked an Elvis
Presley concert147 The descendibility issue has, however, prevented the
Presley estate from prevailing in similar actions. In Memphis Development, 48 the Sixth Circuit recognized that the defendant's unauthorized
production of Elvis statuettes violated "The King's" publicity rights, yet still
denied relief to his estate, because the law of Tennessee (the domicile of
49
Presley at his death) did not consider publicity rights to be survivable.
Presley's estate was also unable to prevent unauthorized production of Elvis
memorial posters in Factors,5 ' again because Tennessee law did not
recognize the descendibility of publicity rights.'
The Second Circuit followed its Factors decision in Groucho Marx
Productions,'52 denying the Marx Brothers' estates the right to assert the
comedians' post mortem publicity rights, because publicity rights were not
survivable under the law of the Brothers' domicile, California. Because the
California court in Lugosi defined the right of publicity as a privacy right
which terminates upon death, the New York court "conclude[d] that

143. See, e.g., Russen, 513 F. Supp. at 1354-55; Price v. Hal Roach, 400 F. Supp. at
844; see also supra text accompanying notes 19-20.
144. Lugosi, 172 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 551.
145. 603 P.2d at 446 (Bird, C.J., dissenting). Justice Bird further suggested adopting
copyright law's life plus fifty years time period before celebrity's name and likeness become
public domain. Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 72.
146. Russen, 513 F. Supp. at 1382-83; see also supratext accompanying notes 19-20.
147. Russen, 513 F. Supp. at 1382-83.
148. Memphis Dev., 616 F.2d 956, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980); see also supra
note 15 and accompanying text.

149. Id. at 958.
150. Factors,652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981), cert.denied, 456 U.S. 927 (1982); see also
supranote 16.
151. Factors, 652 F.2d at 284. The Second Circuit initially granted relief to the
plaintiffs, recognizing the right of publicity as descendible under New York common law,
citing Factors,579 F.2d 215, but then reversed its decision in response to the Memphis Dev.
holding that Tennessee law should govern. Id.
152. Groucho Marx Prods., 523 F. Supp. at 489-90; see supra notes 21-23 and
accompanying text.
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California would not recognize a descendible right of publicity that protects
13
against an original play using a celebrity's likeness and comedic style."'
Other estates have been able to successfully assert the postmortem
publicity rights of a deceased celebrity, when thejurisdiction involved is one
which recognizes the right of publicity as descendible. New York allowed
the estates of Laurel and Hardy to assert the comedians' postmortem
publicity rights in the first case to recognize a descendible right of publicity,
Price v. Hal Roach,'54 and again in Price v. World-vision.'
Georgia
has also recognized publicity rights as descendible in a case involving the
estate of Martin Luther King, Jr.'56
B. First Amendment Conflicts
The second major limitation to right of publicity protection concerns
First Amendment conflicts,' 57 as any discussion regarding the use of a
person's name or likeness inherently involves freedom of speech and
freedom of press issues. 5
Defendants who are accused of infringing
upon a person's publicity rights often rely on the First Amendment as a
defense, which courts must weigh against the plaintiff's personal interests.
Any First Amendment issue, particularly free speech, will always invoke
strong judicial deference. The United States Supreme Court has affirmed
"the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic,
moral, and other ideas and experiences . . . .""' First Amendment
guarantees may also extend beyond newsworthy information to protect
entertainment 160 and citizens' privacy interests.' 6' In determining public-

153. Groucho Marx Prods., 689 F.2d at 323 (footnote omitted). Although the New
York court could not extend the right of publicity to the estate, it did, however, use the
misappropriation doctrine to find another basis on which to enjoin the defendant's play. Id.
154. 400 F. Supp. at 844 (concluding that "[t]here appears to be no logical reason to
terminate this right upon death of the person protected").
155. 455 F. Supp. at 266 (holding that the defendant's unauthorized Stan 'n Ollie
television program violated the comedians' publicity rights, which passed onto their heirs).
156. Martin Luther King, 508 F. Supp. at 866 (allowing the estate to prevent the
defendant from producing and distributing unauthorized plastic busts of Mr. King, Jr.).
157. See generally Felcher & Rubin I, supra note 57; Hannigan, supra note 38;
Samuelson, supra note 38.
158. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (stating that "Congress shall make no law... abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press ...").
159. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
160. Purely commercial speech receives only minimal First Amendment protection. See
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.. 425 U.S. 748,
771 n.24 (1976).
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ity right issues, courts must weigh the publicity rights of the plaintiff against
the First Amendment protection of the defendant's infringing work. This
section briefly reviews the First Amendment considerations found in
publicity right cases, which typically involve either commercial exploitation
such as unauthorized advertisements and sale of commercial memorabilia,
or unauthorized biographies.
1. Commercial Exploitation
The First Amendment balancing test was dramatically put to test in
Zacchini,162 where the United States Supreme Court weighed the performer's right of publicity against the defendant's First Amendment protection
to broadcast news. In holding for the plaintiff, the Court concluded the
newscast exceeded the bounds of the First Amendment protection, as it
appropriated the performer's "entire act."'163 The Court also considered
that its decision would not withhold the material completely from the public,
64
but merely determined who would benefit from its dissemination.
In Russen, 65 the New Jersey court acknowledged that First Amendment protection may override the plaintiffs infringement claims when such
exploitation disseminates information or "contributes to society's cultural
enrichment,"' 66 but not when the exploitation is purely for commercial
gain. 67 Focusing on whether the defendant's expression "serve[d] a social
function valued by the protection of free speech,"' 6 the court found The
Big El Show to be a commercial exploitation "without contributing anything
of substantial value to society.' 69 The court concluded the show lacked
its own "creative component and [did] not have a significant value as pure
entertainment,"' 70 and therefore did not merit sufficient First Amendment
protection.'
The Second Circuit reached a similar result in Groucho

161. By entering the realm of public figures, however, a person's privacy interest
protection under the First Amendment may be less than that afforded to private citizens. See
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974).
162. Zacchini,433 U.S. 562.
163. Id. at 575.
164. Id.
165. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339; see supratext accompanying notes 19-20.
166. Id. at 1356.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.at 1359.
170. Russen, 513 F. Supp. at 1359.
171. Id.at 1361.
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17 2
concluding that the defendant's musical play lacked
Marx Productions,
the creative component to constitute societal value, 73 and that any literary
or entertainment value of the infringing play was "substantially overshadowed . . . by the wholesale appropriation of the Marx Brothers characters. 174
An interesting and very different decision was reached in Paulsen v.
Personality Posters, Inc., ' when comedian Pat Paulsen mockingly
declared himself a candidate for President in the 1968 presidential election.
The defendants capitalized on the popularity of Paulsen's schtick by
merchandising "Pat Paulsen for President" posters, which Paulsen then
alleged were an unauthorized appropriation of his name and likeness.'76
Although the Supreme Court of New York agreed that the poster infringed
upon Paulsen's publicity rights, it still refused to grant him relief. Because
the poster was political, it warranted First Amendment protection, which
outweighed the privacy and publicity rights of the plaintiff. The court
reasoned that a presidential candidacy, even one that is a sham, is a
Amendment protection sufficient to
newsworthy matter, warranting First
77
claim.
infringement
an
overcome
The Factors78 defendants relied on Paulsen to argue their Elvis
memorial poster should also receive First Amendment protection, because
the death of "The King" was protected as a privileged celebration of a
newsworthy event. 179 This defense was, however, rejected, as the court
refused to classify the defendant's Elvis poster "in the same category as one
picturing a presidential candidate, albeit a mock candidate."' 8 °

172. Groucho Marx Prods., 523 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'don othergrounds,
689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982): see supratext accompanying notes 21-23.
173. Id. at 493.
174. Id.
175. 299 N.Y.S.2d 501 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968).
176. Id. at 503.
177. Id. at 507-08 (further stating "[w]hen a well-known entertainer enters the
presidential ring, tongue in cheek or otherwise, it is clearly newsworthy and of public
interest. . . . sufficiently relevant to a matter of public interest to be a form of expression
which is constitutionally protected and 'deserving of substantial freedom') (quoting Berlin,
329 F.2d at 545).
178. Factors,579 F.2d 215.
179. Id. at 222.
180. Id.
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2. Unauthorized Books and Biographies
As discussed above, unauthorized appropriation of one's publicity rights
is generally entitled to only minimal First Amendment protection when used
for purely commercial exploitation. However, when such appropriation
takes the form of a book rather than a poster, statuette, stage production, or
rebroadcast, First Amendment protection is heightened, because of the high
literary value associated with (almost) any book. This issue arises most
commonly in the context of an unauthorized biography of a celebrity.
In Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc.,' 81 the defendant's unauthorized biography of the late Howard Hughes was challenged
as an infringement upon the billionaire's publicity rights. The Supreme
Court of New York denied relief, holding that the First Amendment
protection inherent in the nonfiction book outweighed the deceased's
publicity rights. 82 This First Amendment protection has been extended
even further to protect fictional books. In Hicks v. CasablancaRecords,'83 the estate of mystery writer Agatha Christie challenged the
defendant's fictional novel about Christie as an infringement upon the
deceased author's right of publicity. In following the Rosemont holding, the
court ruled the First Amendment protection granted to the defendant's book
outweighed the plaintiff's publicity rights. As the court concluded, "the
[F]irst [A]mendment protection usually accorded novels and movies
outweighs whatever publicity rights plaintiffs may possess."' 4
This First Amendment deference given to books Was perhaps best
exemplified in Frosch v. Grosset & Dunlap Inc.,'85 where Marilyn
Monroe's executor claimed that Norman Mailer's book, Marilyn, infringed
upon the late celebrity's right of publicity. The plaintiff argued the
defendant's book should not merit First Amendment protection because it
was not a true biography.' 86 The court, however, soundly rejected this
argument, concluding:

181. Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 58 Misc. 2d I (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co.
1968), aff'd mem., 32 A.D.2d 892 (N.Y. App. Div. 1969).
182. Id. at 7. The court further denied the descendibility of publicity rights, noting that
the "plaintiff, in any event, has no standing to assert another's right of privacy .... such
right is a purely personal one which may be enforced only by the party himself." Id.
183. 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
184. Id. at 433. Note, however, that Ms. Christie would most likely have been able to
prevail under a right of privacy action, had she been alive when the book was published.
185. 427 N.Y.S.2d 828 (App. Div. 1980).
186. Id. at 829.
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We think it does not matter whether the book is properly described as
a biography, a fictional biography, or any other kind of literary work.
It is not for a court to pass on literary categories, or literary judgment.
It is enough that the book is a literary work and not simply a disguised
commercial advertisement for the sale of goods or services. The
protection of the right of free expression is so important that we should
not extend any right of publicity, if such exists, to give rise to a cause
of action against the publication of a literary work about a deceased
person." 7
Thus, under the Frosch holding, a court will not delve into attempting to
draw a line between protected and non-protected books, but will almost
routinely grant First Amendment protection to any kind of literary work.
Courts apply a sliding scale in balancing a defendant's First Amendment protection against the plaintiffs publicity rights. Newsworthy
information, political speech, and books receive maximum First Amendment
protection,"8 while purely commercial speech, which lacks the inherent
values considered worthy of constitutional protection,' 89 warrants less
protection. Commercial memorabilia is entitled to even less (i.e., minimal)
protection, because it is considered to be exploitative, motivated entirely by
pecuniary return, and lacking any substantial informative or cultural values.
This multi-tiered standard is perhaps best exemplified by the two poster
cases. The Elvis poster in Factors was considered pure commercial
exploitation, void of any political significance, and therefore entitled to only
minimal First Amendment protection. The Paulsen poster, however,
qualified (arguably) as political speech, thereby invoking heightened First
Amendment protection which outweighed the comedian's publicity rights.
In general, a defendant's First Amendment protection may prevail over
the plaintiffs publicity rights when the infringement is found to contain
sufficient literary or informative value, 9 ' which the courts will almost
automatically find in books of any kind.' 9 ' An infringer's First Amendment rights may also prevail if the infringement is limited to the minimum

187. 1d. (emphasis added).
188. See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390.
189. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980);
Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771; Russen, 513 F. Supp. at 1359.
190. See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 389; GrouchoMarx Prods., 523 F. Supp. at 493; Russen,
513 F. Supp. at 1359.
191. See, e.g., Hicks, 464 F. Supp. at 426; Rosemont, 32 A.D. at 892; Frosch, 427
N.Y.S.2d at 829.
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necessary to conjure up the plaintiff's unique
characteror style, especially
192
in the cases of parody, spoof, or satire.
VII. SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATION
A. Summary
The right of publicity may protect a person's name or likeness, his or
her actual performance, and even his or her unique style or characterization,
but it is still a very uncertain and murky area of law.' 93 Right of publicity
issues involve many diverse and often conflicting individual and societal
interests. Issues such as an individual's privacy rights, whether or not
publicity rights are property, the descendibility of such rights, the employer's interest in its work product, the underlying policies of encouraging
creative endeavor and preventing unjust enrichment, and the promotion of
free market competition must all be weighed against each other and against
society's interest in free speech.
This balancing act presents a very difficult task for the courts, resulting
in unclear standards and inconsistent results. In order to assert a right of
publicity claim, the plaintiff must establish the existence of his publicity
rights, and the infringement of these rights. After meeting these initial
burdens of proof, however, the plaintiff may still be denied relief if he has
not taken adequate copyright precautions, as in DeCosta; or when the
defendant's infringement is protected by the fair use doctrine, as in Namath;
or by the First Amendment, as in Paulsen, Rosemont, Hicks, and Frosch.
Even after all of these obstacles have been overcome, the right of publicity
may still not afford protection when the plaintiff's state does not recognize
the right of publicity, as in Factors,Groucho Marx Productions,and Carson
v. NationalBank of Commerce; or, even when recognized, is not considered
to be descendible, as in Lugosi, Memphis Development, Groucho Marx
Productions,and Factors.

192. See Groucho Marx Prods., 689 F.2d at 492; Elsmere Music, 623 F.2d at 252;
Russen, 413 F. Supp. at 1359; see also Netterville, supranote 132, at 254.

193. See, e.g., Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481, 485 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 926 (1956) (stating "[tihe state of the [right of publicity] law is
still that of a haystack in a hurricane"); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Creative Card Co., 444 F. Supp.
279, 282-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (acknowledging that many courts address the right of publicity
under the guise of a right of privacy); Eisenberg, supra note 40, at 311 (stating "[t]he
ultimate contours of the right of publicity are as yet unclear"); Gordon, supranote 3, at 554;
Samuelson, supra note 38, at 836 (stating "[the right of publicity's] boundaries ... [and]
standards ...

are not yet defined").
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B. Conclusion
The right of publicity reflects many of the attributes and policies found
in copyright law. One major difference, however, is that copyright law 194
is
guided by a uniform national standard under the federal Copyright Act,
whereas right of publicity is inconsistent and varies by state. Some states
recognize the right of publicity statutorily,'9 5 other states only through
common law, 96 and still other states do not recognize publicity rights at
all. 197 Even when recognized, the durational limits of publicity rights also
vary from state to state.'9 8 The right is descendible in some states, but
terminates upon death in other states, and is inheritable in other states only
if the depicted person exercised the right during his or her lifetime.' 99
The right of publicity exists on a continuum. On one end, the
copyright theory may protect a purely fictional character such as a comic
book or cartoon character, while on the other end, the privacy theory may
protect the celebrity himself. A jointly created image such as Count
Dracula, however, falls uncomfortably in between the two extremes. The
end product is a synthesis of the actor's distinct performance, and the
studio's enhancement of costume, makeup, lighting, and direction. The
closer an actor's character resembles the actor himself, the less copyright
protection the character will receive. This is, after all, "the penalty an
author must bear for marking [his or her characters] too indistinctly." '
The right of publicity is bound to become a pertinent issue as the O.J.
Simpson saga continues to unfold. Mr. Simpson's trial, and its ensuing
media frenzy, may thus create precedent in areas of law well beyond
criminal prosecution.

194. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1010 (1988).
195. See MCCARTHY, supra note 2, at §§ 6.2-.15 (discussing the statutory protection
provided in thirteen states: California, Florida, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Nevada,
New York, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin).
196. Id. § 6.1[C] (discussing states such as Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois,
Michigan, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, and Pennsylvania, which recognize a common law
right of publicity).
197. Id. § 6.1 [B] at 6-6 (stating that the right of publicity is recognized either by statute
or under common law, in less than half of the states).
198. See id. § 6.3[A].
199. See id.
200. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).

Published by NSUWorks, 1995

173

Nova Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 3 [1995], Art. 1

1995]

Spahn

1045

C. Recommendation
Right of publicity protection is currently in a state of flux, marred by
a lack of uniformity and standards. The result is confusion, inconsistency,
and a lack of predictability in this legal arena. Publicity rights have
traditionally been considered under the privacy doctrine, which the Lugosi
majority adopted. Applying the privacy doctrine, however, is not the right
solution. The privacy model may not provide adequate protection for a
public figure, is not intended to protect a person's proprietary or financial
interests, and does not recognize publicity rights as descendible. The
privacy doctrine should not be allowed to drift so far from its conceptual
mooring as to interfere with the objectives and rationale of publicity rights.
Rather, the right of publicity should be recognized as a body of law distinct
and separate from the right of privacy.
A uniform standard guideline to define publicity rights, as found with
federal copyright, patent, and trademark law, would provide such guidance
to state courts. This national standard would provide uniformity and
predictability to a murky and uncertain arena, accommodate the underlying
policies behind publicity and copyright law, and reduce potential First
Amendment conflicts. A uniform right of publicity doctrine, if properly
developed, can provide the legal protection needed to fill the voids left open
by current copyright, trademark, and privacy law. This will play a
particularly important role when attempting to protect creations such as an
actor's style or characterization, live performances, fictional characters, and
pure characters-in essence, a performer's identity.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Employers are now turning in increasing numbers to Health Maintenance Organizations ("HMO") and Preferred Provider Organizations
("PPO") to deliver health insurance benefits to their employees. The
organizations provide savings to both the worker and the business owner.
As with the traditional role of physicians, however, concerns have been
raised regarding liability arising from the administration, implementation,
and operation of HMOs throughout the United States. Courts have seen
cases where parties have sought to impose liability against HMOs for
malpractice based upon an HMO's member physicians with respect to
services provided to members, quality assurance programs related to the
HMOs, and the cost-containment mechanisms common to HMOs.
Courts (as well as legislatures) are now faced with issues presented in
heretofore uncharted waters of HMO liability in the context of medical
malpractice actions. The Plaintiffs' Bar has sought to graft theories of
* Senior Litigation Associate with Gobelman & Love in Jacksonville, Florida. B.A.,
University of Florida, 1984; J.D., Cumberland School of Law, Samford University, 1988.
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liability asserted in traditional malpractice cases in the context of an HMO
liability action. The Defense Bar has, in turn, developed several defenses,
the most significant of which is the application of the Employment
Retirement Income Security Act. This article will briefly explain the
structure of the HMO, outline the theories of liability used most commonly
by plaintiff lawyers, and explore in detail the ERISA defense which is
currently being asserted with varying degrees of success in the federal and
state courts of the United States.
II. THE STRUCTURE OF HMOs
In the context of health care, the HMO systems are generally categorized into several basic structures: the staff model HMO; the Indorsement
Practice Association ("IPA"); and the group model. The staff model HMO
employs its own physicians who receive their salaries directly from the
HMO. The IPA model usually is made up of an association of physicians
which contracts separately with the HMO to provide medical services to the
organization's members. The IPA, in turn, contracts with physicians who
agree to provide health care to HMO members. The IPA physicians also
treat patients who are not enrolled under an HMO plan. The group model
HMO provides prepaid services to members who usually enroll either at
work (through their employers) or through individual medical provider
groups.
In addition to the three HMO models, there also exists what is known
as the PPO. A PPO brings together physicians, hospitals, and other medical
service providers to give discounted services to a specific patient group. A
PPO subscriber will usually pay a premium to the organization. This
organization then pays the providers for the services which were rendered.
The benefits of belonging to a PPO include deductibles which may be lower
than those found in traditional HMOs, additional levels of benefits, and
other protections.
III. THE THEORIES OF LIABILITY
Claims seeking to establish HMO liability for injuries arising from
medical malpractice are usually classified into two main theories: vicarious
liability and direct liability.
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A. Vicarious Liability
Vicarious liability is a theory of liability which is made up of several
sub-theories: respondeat superior, ostensible/apparent agency, and nondelegable duty.
1. Respondeat Superior
Respondeat superior is the type of theory commonly alleged in cases
against doctors in a malpractice setting. In certain instances, an HMO was
held liable based upon this doctrine; in fact, this theory is considered the
substantive bedrock for an HMO-based malpractice action. Courts have
ruled in favor of HMO liability for physician negligence based on a
respondeat superior theory.' In the cases where it was found that an HMO
could be held liable for the malpractice of provider physicians, the courts
focused on the degree of control exercised over the negligent physician and
the identity of the person directly responsible for supervising the physician.
An HMO is more likely to be held liable where the supervising
individual is a medical professional rather than a lay person. For example,
in Sloan v. Metropolitan Health Council, Inc.,' the court found liability
against an HMO based upon respondeat superior. The court reasoned that
the HMO's staff physicians were under the control of the HMO medical
director (a physician), who supervised medical services and established
policy.3 Relevant to the Sloan decision was a state statute entitled the
Professional Corporation Act of 1983 which detailed the elements of
vicarious liability of a corporation. The court stated that it saw "no reason
why [the HMO] should be exempt from the doctrine of respondeat superior
while professional corporations are not." The court held that "where the
usual requisites of agency or an employer-employee relationship exists, a
corporation may be held vicariously liable for malpractice for the acts of its
employee-physicians." 5

1. Lighterman v. Porter, 548 So. 2d 891, 892 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Variety
Children's Hosp., Inc. v. Perkins, 382 So. 2d 331, 335 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
2. 516 N.E.2d 1104 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987).
3. Id. at 1105. In Sloan, the members of the HMO paid a monthly charge in return for
certain enumerated medical services. The member would choose one physician, who
essentially served the role of the personal physician, directing care and referring the member
to other health providers. Id.
4. Id. at 1109.
5. Id.
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The federal courts have likewise applied respondeat superior in the
context of a malpractice action. In Schleier v. Kaiser Foundation Health
Plan of the Mid-Atlantic States, Inc.,6 the court found liability based upon
respondeat superior where the physician "acted neither on his own initiative
nor independently of the [HMO] physician" but merely made recommendations to the HMO's physicians."
Neither the Sloan court nor the Schleier court specified the degree or
manner of control necessary to find vicarious liability. The Schleier court,
however, noted that the power to control a servant's conduct was the only
controlling factor in its test for determining whether the requisite "masterservant" relationship existed.' Both the Schleier and Sloan courts found
that a degree of evidence of control may be enough to find vicarious
liability.
Other state courts have held likewise. In Florida, an appellate court
held that "it is the right of control, and not actualcontrol, which determines
the relationship between the parties."9
Therefore, evidence of actual
control over the physician is not necessary to establish that an employer/employee relationship exists. Rather, it must be shown that the HMO is
in a position to control the physician to establish the requisite relationship
for respondeat superior.
2. Ostensible/Apparent Agency
In the absence of an actual employment relationship, apparent/
ostensible agency (or agency by estoppel) may be used as a theory of
liability. While the two theories have distinct and separate elements, the
courts have not necessarily drawn a clear distinction between the two."0
Apparent agency is divided into three elements: a representation by the
principal; reliance on the representation by a third person; and a change of
position by the third person in reliance upon such representation to his
detriment."1

6. 876 F.2d 174 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (per curiam).
7. Id. at 178
8. Id. at 177.
9. Nazworth v. Swire Fla., Inc., 486 So. 2d 637, 638 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1986)
(citations omitted).
10. See, e.g., Tampa Sand & Material Co. v. Davis, 125 So. 2d 126, 127 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1960) (referring to actual authority and ostensible authority as two theories of
liability, but not discussing estoppel).
11. See Orlando Executive Park, Inc. v. Robbins, 433 So. 2d 491, 494 (Fla. 1983)
(approving Orlando Executive Park, Inc. v. P.D.R., 402 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
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The elements of ostensible agency are found in section 429 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, "Negligence in Doing Work Which Is
Accepted in Reliance on the Employer's Doing the Work Himself:"
One who employs an independent contractor to perform services for
another which are accepted in the reasonable belief that the services are
being rendered by the employer or by his servants, is subject to liability
for physical harm caused by the negligence of the contractor in
supplying such services, to the same extent as though the employer were
supplying them himself or by his servants.' 2
The elements of ostensible agency in the physician/HMO relationship are:
whether the patient looks to the institution, rather than the individual
physician for medical care; and whether the hospital or HMO holds out the
physician as its employee. Numerous cases have been decided under this
theory. In Florida, one court held that a hospital would be liable for a
physician's negligence where the hospital "holds out" the physician as its
employee and the patient accepts treatment from the physician "in the
reasonable belief that it is being rendered in behalf of the hospital."' 3
The leading case on ostensible agency in the HMO context is Boyd v.
Albert Einstein Medical Center.'4 In Boyd, the decedent and her husband
were HMO participants. Upon enrolling, the decedent was given a directory
listing the participating physicians. Restricted to this list, the decedent chose
two primary care physicians. She contacted one of the doctors for
treatment; he referred her to a surgeon who was also a participating HMO
physician. The treatment provided by the surgeon ultimately led to her
death. In the complaint it was alleged that the HMO physicians were
represented to be competent, and that the decedent relied upon these
representations.
In Boyd, the court set out the factors of ostensible agency as: "(1)
whether the patient looks to the institution, rather than the individual
physician for care, and (2) whether the HMO 'holds out' the physician as

1981), and setting forth the three elements in the context of a tort action, not a medical
malpractice action).
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 429 (1965).

13. Irving v. Doctors Hosp. Inc., 415 So. 2d 55, 59 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982). The
court referred to the theory of liability as "apparent authority," but not as ostensible agency,
calling it "an admixture of the agency doctrine of apparent authority and the doctrine of
estoppel." Id at 57.
14. 547 A.2d 1229 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
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its employee."' 5 The court then looked to the Restatement (Second) of
Agency, rather than to the Restatement (Second) of Torts for further elucidation on ostensible agency. 16 The Boyd court expanded the ostensible
agency theory in the hospital/physician setting to the HMO/physician
relationship on the rationale that the changing role of health care providers
in recent years justified the extension.' 7
Several facts are central to an understanding of Boyd and its holding:
the HMO covenanted to provide health care to protect and promote the
health of its members; the HMO operated on a direct service rather than on
an indemnity basis; doctor's fees were paid to the HMO, not to the physician; the HMO provided a list from which patients had to choose their
primary care physician; primary care physicians were screened and regulated
by the HMO; a primary physician's referral was required in order to see a
specialist; and patients had no choice as to the specialist.' The court held
that these factors created the inference that the patient looked to the HMO
for care, and not solely to the physicians. 9
3. Nondelegable Duty
The nondelegable duty theory of liability has been utilized in actions
against the HMO. Generally, courts follow the rule of law that a principal
is not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor. An exception
arises, however, where it is determined that the principal owes a nondelegable duty to another party regardless of who else undertakes such duty.
The law of the nondelegable duty was recognized in Florida in Mills
v. Krauss.2" The Mills court stated that "[i]n some circumstances duties
may devolve upon an employer which he cannot delegate to another, and in
such cases the employer is liable for breach or non-performance of such
duties even though he employs an- independent contractor to do the
work."'" Once the duty is established, the employer will be held liable for
an employee's negligence as a matter of law.

15. Id. at 1234.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1235.
19. Boyd, 547 A.2d at 1235. Agency by estoppel is more difficult to prove than
ostensible agency because one must show detriment or reliance upon the representation made
by the principal. Under an ostensible agency theory, there is no need to show detrimental
reliance on the principal's conduct in "holding out" the agent as its employee.
20. 114 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
21. Id. at 819.
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In Irving v. Doctors Hospital of Lake Worth, Inc.,22 the plaintiffs
filed a negligence claim against an emergency room physician. The court
held that it was error not to instruct the jury that a party may not escape its
contractual liability by delegating performance under the contract to an
independent contractor.' The court, noting that Mills involved an express
contract, stated that the same nondelegable duty rests with a hospital in the
implied contractual relationship between a hospital and an emergency room
patient.24 Therefore, a hospital does not absolve itself of the duty to
provide nonnegligent care to emergency room patients by contracting with
a physician to provide medical treatment. The Irving case is instructive
because the hospital/emergency room physician-patient relationship is
analogous to that of the HMO physician-patient.25
B. Direct Liability
Plaintiffs seek to hold the HMO directly liable for negligent behavior
through application of direct liability. The main theories of direct liability
are the corporate negligence doctrine and liability arising from costcontainment systems. Corporate negligence is then further divided into
negligent selection/retention and negligent supervision or control.
1. Corporate Negligence
The doctrine of corporate negligence in the context of hospitals was
26
first introduced in Darlingv. CharlestonCommunity Memorial Hospital.
In Darling,the court found liability when the defendant hospital failed to
properly review the patient's treatment and require proper consultation.27
The court established that a hospital had an independent responsibility to
patients to supervise the medical treatment provided by medical staff.28
Liability was found as to the hospital's own negligence, not that of the
physician.

22. 415 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
23. Id. at 59.
24. Id. at 60.
25. See William A. Chittenden III, MalpracticeLiability and Managed Health Care:
History and Prognosis,26 TORT & INS. L.J. 451, 461 (1991).
26. 211 N.E.2d 253 (Ill. 1965).
27. Id.
28. Id at 260-61.
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In Pedroza v. Bryant,3" the Washington Supreme Court traced the
history of the corporate negligence doctrine concisely, and explained its
operation and effect in plain terms.
The Pedroza court noted that the
doctrine has been used to require a hospital to exercise reasonable care to
insure that those physicians selected as part of the hospital's medical staff
are competent.3 The court viewed the corporate negligence doctrine as a
theory separate and apart from others because of the "increased public
reliance upon hospitals."32 Faced with the duty that a hospital independently owes to a patient, the court then defined the standard of care as the
degree of care of an average, competent hospital acting in the same or
similar circumstances.33
The seminal case on corporate negligence in Florida is Insinga v.
LaBella.34 Insinga involved a hospital which had admitted a man impersonating a doctor (under the name of Dr. LaBella) to its medical staff with
full privileges. While on the staff, LaBella admitted plaintiff's wife to the
hospital where she died nearly three weeks later.35 The Supreme Court of
Florida adopted the corporate negligence doctrine and held that hospitals
"have an independent duty to select and retain competent independent
physicians seeking staff privileges., 36 The court, citing Pedroza, reasoned
that hospitals are in the best position to protect their patients. 37 The public
policy supporting the decision was phrased by the Insinga court as "the
present day view that a hospital is a multifaceted health care facility that
should be responsible for proper medical treatment on its premises.' 3s
Elaborating further, the court opined that the "hospital is in a superior
position to supervise and monitor physician performance and is, consequent'39
ly, the only entity that can realistically provide quality control.
Insingaencompassed both negligent supervision/control and negligent
selection/retention. Negligent selection or retention requires proof of two
concurrent negligent acts, the negligent selection or retention of the

30. 677 P.2d 166 (Wash. 1984).
31. Id. at 168; see alsoElam v. College Park Hosp., 183 Cal. Rptr. 156 (Ct. App. 1982);
Mitchell County Hosp. Auth. v. Joiner, 189 S.E.2d 412 (Ga. 1972).
32. Pedroza,677 P.2d at 169. The Pedrozacourt noted that the role of the hospital is
changing rapidly and is becoming that of a community health center.
33. Id. at 170.
34. 543 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1989).
35. Id. at 210.
36. Id. at 214.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Insinga, 543 So. 2d at 214.
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physician and the physician's malpractice." The plaintiff must also show
that the negligent selection or retention proximately caused the injury."
Negligent supervision or control arises "when the hospital fails to detect
physician incompetence or to take steps to correct the problems upon
learning of information raising concerns of patient risk.""2 Once again, by
analogizing the relationship between the hospital and the emergency room
to the relationship between the physician and patient, a plaintiff may be able
to apply the doctrine to an HMO."3
2. Cost-Containment Systems
Courts have also recognized the potential for liability stemming from
the negligent implementation of a cost-containment system used by the
HMO to pay for medical services provided'to its members. In a costcontainment system medical services are reviewed prior to being provided
in order to determine whether a less expensive treatment is available which
would accomplish the same purpose." In order to contain costs, employers
turn to a PPO or HMO to furnish health care. Because of the emphasis on
prospective cost containment, the HMO's involvement in a potential
malpractice situation arises. An adverse determination of whether to pay for
a service may result in a claim that a patient did not receive the needed
medical help.
A cost-containment system was first implicated in Pulvers v. Kaiser
FoundationHealth Plan."5 In Pulvers, the doctors were part of a health
care plan which provided incentives to refrain from unnecessary tests and
treatments. The plaintiff brought suit alleging that a death was caused by
a physician's malpractice resulting from the doctor's failure to conduct
proper treatment. The court noted that incentive plans were required by

40. Chittenden, supra note 25, at 472.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Other states have also followed the corporate negligence doctrine. See, e.g., Tucson
Medical Ctr., Inc. v. Misevch, 545 P.2d 958, 960 (Ariz. 1976); Elam, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 160;
Ferguson v. Gonyaw, 236 N.W.2d 543, 550 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975); Raschel v. Rish, 488
N.Y.S.2d 923, 924 (App. Div. 1985); Johnson v. Misericordia Community Hosp., 301
N.W.2d 156, 164 (Wis. 1981).
44. See Robert C. Macaulay, Health Care Cost Containment and MedicalMalpractice:
On a Collision Course, 21 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 91 (1987) (detailing the various control

costs).
45. 160 Cal. Rptr. 392 (Ct. App. 1979).
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federal statutes and supported by public policy.46 The court also intimated
that in order for liability to attach, the treating physicians would have to
refrain from ordering tests or treatments which the accepted standards of the
medical profession would require in order to receive certain incentives.47
The litmus test for liability resulting from cost-containment programs
was explained in Wickline v. State.48 In Wickline, no liability was attached
because the third party payor did not override the treating physician's
medical judgment.4 9 The court addressed the responsibility of a third party
payor (the State of California) for harm suffered by a patient under a costcontainment program. The court stated that "[t]hird party payors of health
care services can be held legally accountable when medically inappropriate
decisions result from defects in the design or implementation of cost
containment mechanisms."50 The Wickline court went on to say that a
doctor "cannot avoid [the] ultimate responsibility for his patient's care"
when he "complies without protest with the limitations imposed by a third
party payor, when his medical judgment dictates otherwise.'5
IV. A DEFENSE BASED UPON ERISA
As plaintiffs throughout the United States have expanded the medical
malpractice horizon to include actions against HMOs, so too have new
defenses been asserted. Of particular interest and significance is a defense
based upon the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
("ERISA")5 2 The successful application of ERISA effectively serves to
eviscerate a malpractice action, because it eliminates any chance for a jury
to consider the alleged wrongdoing and substantially narrows the recoverable
damages, excluding pain and suffering as well as other consequential
damages.

46. Id. at 394. The court did, however, rule that no malpractice was committed.
47. Id.
48. 228 Cal. Rptr. 661 (Ct. App. 1986).
49. Id. at 671. The same court, however, in Wilson v. Blue Cross, 271 Cal. Rptr. 876,
882-83 (Ct. App. 1990), dismissed a motion for summary judgment on a similar fact pattern
based on the treating physician's testimony that the patient was dismissed because of a lack
of funds to pay for a longer hospital stay. See also DeGenova v. Ansel, 555 A.2d 147 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1988) (remanding the trial court's dismissal of a suit based on the negligence of
a reviewing physician when the plaintiff sought a mandatory second opinion prior to
accepting health services).
50. Wickline, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 670.
51. Id. at 671.
52. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988).
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ERISA5 3 was promulgated subsequent to the rapid rise of employee
benefit plans used to provide health, medical, and pension-related services
to employees throughout the United States.5 The purpose of the ERISA
statute is to protect the interests of participants in the plan by requiring
disclosure of plan specifics and by establishing standards of responsibility
and conduct, as well as providing access to the federal court system.5 ' As
a result, "ERISA comprehensively regulates ... employee welfare benefit
plans that, 'through the purchase of insurance' provide medical, surgical, or
56
hospital care, or benefits in the event of sickness, disability, or death.,
ERISA's application to a dispute is significant because of its myriad of
procedural requirements, the federal law's incorporation of trust law
principles, and its elimination of the right to proceed with a jury trial.
The statute is implicated when a dispute arises which involves an
employee benefit plan. As a result, most state laws and state law related
claims are preempted by the terms of the statute. The preemptive effects are
found in three statutory provisions.5 7 ERISA provides for preemption if
a state law relates to an employee benefit plan; 58 the saving clause excepts
from the preemption clause laws that regulate insurance; 59 and the deemer
clause makes clear that a state law that purports to regulate insurance cannot
deem an employee benefit plan to be an insurance company.6
How then does ERISA impact a malpractice action brought against an
HMO? A Louisiana case provides an explanation. In Rollo v. Maxicare,
Inc.,6 the plaintiff was injured in an accident and his dispute centered
upon the subsequent medical treatment he received. 2
The court began by explaining that a threshold issue in a case which
may implicate ERISA is whether the case involves a plan of the type

53. The statute sets out the congressional declaration of policy, id. § 1001(a)-(c), and
sets forth regulatory provisions, id. §§ 1021-1030, among other things. ERISA has been
called a "symbol of unnecessarily complex government regulation." Id. § 1001 (quoting
President Jimmy Carter in a message to Congress).

54. Id. § 1001(a).
55. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a), (b) (1988).
56. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeux, 481 U.S. 41, 44 (1987) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)

(1982)).
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

29 U.S.C. §§ 1144(a), (b)(2)(A), (b)(2)(B) (1988).
Id. § 1144.
Id. § I144(b)(1)(A).
Id.
695 F. Supp. 245 (E.D. La. 1988).
Id. at 246.
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contemplated by ERISA.63 As noted, ERISA makes reference to a welfare
benefit plan, which is "any employer program ... which provides medical,
surgical or other hospital benefits in the event of sickness, accident or
disability."64 Notably, as in Rollo, a welfare benefit plan is typically
involved in a medical malpractice case brought against an HMO. Thus, a
cause of action involving such a plan should immediately raise a red flag as
to ERISA's application. Once it is determined that the relevant plan is of
the type contemplated by ERISA, one must look to ERISA's statutory
language to determine whether the damages claim is preempted. The import
of the application of ERISA is that damages are very limited. Therefore,
the usual damages associated with a medical malpractice action are not
generally recoverable.
In a traditional medical malpractice action an aggrieved plaintiff may
seek, and a jury may award, economic damages such as past and future
wage loss, and compensatory damages such as past and future medical
expenses, including costs associated with life care plans. Further, noneconomic damages based upon pain and suffering or emotional distress
visited upon the plaintiff may be sought. A derivative claim sounding in
consortium may also be made by the spouse of the injured plaintiff.
ERISA, however, limits or eliminates extra-contractual damages. A
number of circuit courts of appeal have held that no extra-contractual money
damages may be awarded. 5 Notably, courts adhere to the statutory
language that requires preemption of state-promulgated extra-contractual
damages that may seek to circumvent ERISA's dictates.66
A decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals also explains the effect
of ERISA on a medical malpractice action. In Corcoran v. United
Healthcare, Inc.,67 the plaintiffs filed a wrongful death action against
United Healthcare, Inc. and Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama ("Blue
Cross"), alleging that their unborn child died as a result of various acts of
negligence in the administration of an employee plan from which the
plaintiffs sought medical treatment for their unborn child.68 The issue
before the court was "whether ERISA pre-empts [sic] a state-law malprac-

63. Id. at 247.
64. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1002(l) (1982)).
65. Drinkwater v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 846 F.2d 821 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 909 (1988); Sokol v. Bernstein, 803 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1986).
66. See Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1324.
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tice action brought by the beneficiary of an ERISA plan against a company
that provides 'utilization review' services to the plan."69
In analyzing the nature of the claims, the Fifth Circuit noted that the
plaintiffs alleged that Blue Cross wrongfully denied appropriate medical care
and failed to oversee the medical decisions adequately.7" Notwithstanding
the state law basis of the claims, the court held that ERISA governs.
ERISA contains three provisions addressing preemption: the preemptive clause, the saving clause, and the deemer clause.'
Quoting the
Supreme Court, the Rollo court summarized the effects of the three clauses
as follows: "'If a state law 'relate[s] to ... employee benefit plan[s],' it is
pre-empted [sic].... The saving clause excepts from the preemption clause
laws that 'regulat[e] insurance.' . . . The deemer clause makes clear that a
state law that 'purport[s] to regulate insurance' cannot deem an employee
benefit plan to be an insurance company."' 72 Congress intended the
preemptive clause, and thus the language "relate to," to be broadly
interpreted. 3 In determining whether the claim relates to the plan, one
must examine the nature of the claim. Claims for personal injury, whether
physical or nonphysical, resulting from design or implementation of costcontainment or claims handling systems are typically preempted by ERISA
because they are based on the HMO's administration of the plan.74 Claims
for personal injuries resulting from provider malpractice, however, may
withstand preemption because the connection between claims such as
medical malpractice and employee benefits plans do not relate to administration. Such claims may be deemed too tenuous, remote, or peripheral to
warrant preemption. The saving clause relates to the regulation of
insurance.75 Under the clause, "the state law at issue must be said to
directly regulate insurance."7' 6 The scope of the saving clause is accordingly very narrow. It is not enough that the relevant state law have some
application in an insurance context or generally impact on the business of
insurance.

69. Id. at 1322.
70. Id. at 1326.
71. Rollo, 695 F. Supp. at 247 (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 1144(a), (b)(2)(A), (b)(2)(B)

(1982)).
72. Id. at 247-48 (quoting Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 44-45 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1144

(1974))).
73. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 47.
74. Chittenden, supra note 25, at 487-88.

75. 29 U.S.C. § l144(b)(2)(A) (1988).
76. Rollo, 695 F. Supp. at 248.
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Section 1132(a) of ERISA provides for civil remedies. Outside of
these listed remedies, legislative policy dictates that no other actions shall
be maintained against an ERISA plan." Therefore, the analysis that a
plaintiff is entitled to a remedy because preemption would leave him or her
without a remedy is improper.78 The claim simply must be one included
under section 1132(a) of ERISA.
Essentially, the determination of preemption of a claim depends upon
the claim's relation to the plan at issue. In Independence HMO, Inc. v.
Smith,79 the court held that Smith's state court medical malpractice claim
was not preempted by ERISA because of the claim's relation to the welfare
benefit plan.8 Smith sued Independence HMO on a theory of ostensible
agency. The court reasoned that the state law based tort action did not
impact upon the employee benefit plan or affect the congressional scheme
in the ERISA statute, and therefore was not preempted.8 ' Additionally, the
court held that the plan's grievance procedure could not, by virtue of its
design, adequately redress state tort claims against Independence HMO. 82
The court also held that Smith had no obligation to exhaust the available
remedies under the plan before filing suit. 3 The court reasoned that
Smith's state tort action sought a remedy that did not arise under ERISA
and the action did "not depend upon her contractual entitlement to health
plan benefits."84 The court cited Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency &
Service, Inc., 5 for support of its position that the claim was not preempted.86 The Mackey court stated that ERISA plans may be sued for run-ofthe-mill state law claims such as torts committed by an ERISA plan.87
Thus, under the Independence HMO rationale, not all claims involving
ERISA plans would be preempted.

77. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 54.
78. See Corcoran,965 F.2d at 1338-39; see also DeGenova, 555 A.2d at 150 (holding
that the action was only remotely related to ERISA and thus not preempted).
79. 733 F. Supp. 983 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
80. Id. at 989; see also Elsesser v. Hospital of the Philadelphia College of Osteopathic
Medicine, Parkview Div., 802 F. Supp. 1286, 1290 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (holding that claims of
state medical malpractice actions are not preempted by ERISA).
81. Independence HMO, 733 F. Supp. at 988.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. 486 U.S. 825 (1988).
86. Independence HMO, 733 F. Supp. at 989.
87. Mackey, 486 U.S. at 833.
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In contrast to Smith, the Fifth Circuit held that certain state law causes
of action are preempted by ERISA.88 In Corcoran,the court held that a
tort claim based upon a wrongful death cause of action was preempted.89
The court concluded that even though the provider made medical decisions
and gave medical advice, it did so for the purpose of making a determination about the availability of benefits under the plan. 90 The court found
that the claim was preempted by the Pilot Life principle found that ERISA
preempts state law claims which allege that benefit claims were improperly
handled. 9 ' The Corcoran court also stated that allowing such a suit to
proceed could contravene Congress's policy of providing a uniform body of
law relating to benefit plans. 92
The Corcoran court distinguished its case from Independence HMO,
Inc. v. Smith.93 The court stated that Independence HMO involved the
medical decisions of a doctor made in the course of treatment, whereas
Corcoran involved a medical decision made in connection with a costcontainment feature of a plan.94 Although the court found it "troubling"
to hold that the plaintiffs had no available remedy, it stressed that the
statutory scheme of ERISA demanded such a holding.95 Any hope for a
remedy in similar cases must be created by a congressional amendment to
the ERISA legislation.96
V. CONCLUSION
The states whose courts have developed the greatest amount of case
law on HMO liability are California, Pennsylvania, and Louisiana.
California has opened the door to HMO liability for the negligent design or
negligent implementation of cost-containment systems. The California
courts have implied a willingness to hold HMOs liable when cost limitation
programs corrupt medical judgment. For example, a plaintiff would stand

88. Corcoran,965 F.2d at 1339.

89. Id. at 1331; see Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 66 (1987)
(holding that in ERISA cases, preemption defense provides sufficient basis for removal to
federal court, notwithstanding the "well-pleaded" complaint doctrine).
90. Corcoran,965 F.2d at 1331.

91. Id. at 1332; see alsoElsesser,802 F. Supp. at 1291 (holding that claims of negligent
refusal to pay benefits are preempted by ERISA).
92. Corcoran,965 F.2d at 1332.

93. Id. at 1333 n.16.

94. Id.
95. Id. at 1338.

96. Id. at 1339.
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a good chance of recovering from an HMO if the plan suggested the
provider physician refrain from ordering medical tests or treatment required
by the accepted standards of the profession. Furthermore, California courts
have also recognized the potential for liability where the HMO overrides the
judgment of a plaintiff's treating physician to deny funding for diagnostic
tests or for an extended hospital stay. The Pennsylvania courts are also
developing HMO law which is decidedly pro-plaintiff. The Superior Court
of Pennsylvania has held that a physician may be the ostensible agent of an
HMO. Pennsylvania has also been hesitant to preempt claims under ERISA.
While it is generally agreed among courts that claims involving the
administration of a plan are preempted, courts in different states differ as to
the reach of the ERISA preemption. For example, Pennsylvania courts have
held that ERISA does not preempt medical malpractice claims. Pennsylvania has also expressed a willingness to allow a claim for personal injuries
when a remedy for the injury is not provided by ERISA. Allowing such
claims is a liberal interpretation of Supreme Court cases addressing ERISA
preemption.
Louisiana courts, on the other hand, have been more restrictive than the
Pennsylvania courts in allowing claims where an ERISA plan is at issue.
Louisiana courts have held ERISA preempts state medical malpractice and
other state law tort claims. The Louisiana courts have noted that where
Congress has explicitly exempted an area of state law, e.g., insurance, there
is no reason to imply exemptions in areas which Congress did not specifically address. Had Congress intended to create further exemptions it could
have drafted such exceptions into the legislation. Therefore, the Louisiana
courts have stated that if a claim would interfere with ERISA's "carefully
constructed scheme of legislation" then it should be preempted. It does not
matter that preemption would leave the plaintiff without a remedy. The
Louisiana courts have stated their preference for disallowing state law claims
relating to ERISA plans, true to Congress's intent, thereby deferring to
Congress in the fashioning of remedies under ERISA. Accordingly, it is
relatively difficult to recover for a claim in which a welfare benefit plan is
at issue in Louisiana.
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I. INTRODUCTION
If a man shall steal an ox, or a sheep, and kill it, or sell it; he shall
restorefive oxen for an ox, andfour sheep for a sheep.

Arbitration is an effective alternative method to litigation which
alleviates the tremendous strain currently burdening our judicial system.?
Disputes submitted to arbitration are resolved by arbitrators.3 A model
arbitrator is impartial, knowledgeable, and well versed in the area of
controversy.4 A popular type of dispute frequently resulting in arbitration
is securities transactions.'

1. Exodus 22:1 (King James).
2. Anthony M. Sabino, Awarding PunitiveDamages In SecuritiesIndustry Arbitration:
Working For A Just Result, 27 U. RICH. L. REv. 33, 33 (1992).
3. SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION, ARBITRATION PROCEDURES,

at 3 (1989).
4. Id.
5. Id.
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The major advantages of arbitration are that the disputes are resolved
more expeditiously and cost effectively than in court. Additionally, the
arbitrator's decision is final and binding, with limited grounds for reversal.7
Therefore, time and money, the two most important concerns of investors
and brokerage firms, are saved
Until recently, one of the uncertainties in securities arbitration was the
power of the arbitrators to award punitive damages. 9 Punitive damages are
defined as compensation in "excess of actual damages" and are awarded
"only in instances of malicious and willful misconduct."'"
The dual
purpose of punitive damages is to punish the wrongdoer and to deter similar
future misconduct." The question of whether securities arbitrators have
the power to award punitive damages was decided on March 6, 1995, when
the United States Supreme Court decided Mastrobuonov. ShearsonLehman
Hutton, Inc.,2 holding that, under the parties' agreement, arbitrators had
punitive power. 3 However, the decision, based on contractual interpretation, did not universally empower securities arbitrators with the power to
award punitive damages. Rather, the Court stated that contracting parties
are free to agree to include punitive damages within the arbitrable issues."
The Mastrobuono decision will affect not only investors and brokerage
firms, but also attorneys who practice in this complicated area of law.
This article first analyzes two recent cases which have conflicting
holdings and rationales concerning the power of arbitrators to award
punitive damages. 5 Next, the article discusses how the United States
Supreme Court seemingly resolved this conflict. Additionally, the article
explains some of the policy reasons behind giving securities arbitrators the
power to award punitive damages. Finally, the article concludes with

6. Id.
7. See infra note 129.
8. See Sabino, supra note 2, at 33.
9. Marilyn B. Cane, Punitive Damages in SecuritiesArbitration: The Interplayof State
and FederalLaw (Or a Smaller Bite of the Big Apple), 1993 J. DisP. RESOL. 153, 153.
10. BARRON'S LAW DICTIONARY 117 (3d ed. 1991).
11. Id.
12. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., No. 94-18, 1995 WL 86555 (Mar.
6, 1995).
13. Id.at *6.
14. Id.at *4.
15. See generally Mastrobuono, 20 F.3d 713 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 305
(1994), and rev'd, No. 94-18, 1995 WL 86555 (Mar. 6, 1995); J. Alexander Sec., Inc. v.
Mendez, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 826 (2d Ct. App. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2182 (1994).
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recommendations on how the various arbitral forums can improve the
arbitration system.
II. CONFLICT AMONG THE COURTS
The Second and Seventh Circuits of the United States Court of Appeals
have held that securities arbitrators do not have the power to award punitive
damages. 16 This was in direct conflict with the majority view, and, prior
to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Mastrobuono, was the
cause of the legal inconsistency that baffled many arbitrators, judges, and
attorneys.17
A.

Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.: The Minority
View

The Seventh Circuit's most recent decision concerning the issue of
punitive damages in securities arbitration was Mastrobuono v. Shearson
Lehman Hutton, Inc.' In 1985, the plaintiff-appellants, Antonio and Diana
Mastrobuono, opened a securities account with Shearson Lehman Hutton,
Inc. (Shearson). 9 The client agreement between the plaintiffs and
Shearson provided, in relevant part: "This agreement... shall be governed
by the laws of the State of New York .... [A]ny controversy arising out
of or relating to [the plaintiffs'] accounts ...shall be settled by arbitration
",20

In 1989, the plaintiffs sued Shearson in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, claiming unauthorized trading, churning,
and breach of fiduciary duty.21 Plaintiffs requested compensatory as well
as punitive damages; 22 however, Shearson successfully moved to compel
arbitration before the National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD").2
16. See, e.g., Mastrobuono, 20 F.3d at 714; Barbier v. Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc.,
948 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1991).
17. Cf Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line, Ltd., 943 F.2d 1056 (9th Cir. 1991);
Raytheon Co. v. Automated Business Sys., Inc., 882 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1989); Bonar v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 835 F.2d 1378 (11th Cir. 1988).
18. 20 F.3d 713.
19. Id. at 715.
20. Id. Additionally, the agreement provided the plaintiff with the choice of the arbitral

forum. Id.
21. Id.
22. Mastrobuono, 20 F.3d at 715.
23. Id.
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After hearing the arguments of both sides, the arbitrators awarded the
plaintiffs $159,327.00 in compensatory damages and $400,000.00 in
punitive damages.24 Shearson filed a motion in the district court to vacate
the award of punitive damages, 25 arguing that New York law, the governing law of the client agreement, denied arbitrators the power to award
punitive damages. 26 The district court granted Shearson's motion and
vacated the punitive damages award. 27 The plaintiffs appealed, and the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.2 8
First, the court of appeals rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the
district court violated the scope of review imposed by the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"). 29 The court explained that "the FAA permits a court to
vacate an award '[w]here the arbitrators exceeded their powers. '
Furthermore, in order to support the decision, the court relied heavily upon
the Second Circuit's rationale in Barbier v. Shearson Lehman Hutton,
Inc. 31 The Barbier court stated that when arbitrators are not empowered
with the ability to award punitive damages due to a choice of law provision
in the parties' agreement, then the arbitrators would exceed their powers by
awarding such damages. 32 Therefore, in the instant case, the court of
appeals held that the lower court properly reviewed the arbitrator's authority
to award punitive damages.33
The court then examined the arbitration agreement itself and recognized
that it contained a New York choice of law provision.34 Under New York
law, arbitrators cannot award punitive damages; this is referred to as the
Garrityrule.35 The plaintiffs' argument that the FAA preempts the Garrity
rule, and thereby authorizes the arbitrators to award punitive damages, was
rejected. 36 The court explained that the policy supporting the FAA "is
simply to ensure the enforceability, according to their terms, of private

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Mastrobuono, 20 F.3d at 716.
Id. at 719.
Id. at 716.

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (1988)).
948 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1991).
Id. at 122.
Mastrobuono, 20 F.3d at 716.
Id.
Id. (citing Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1976)).
Id.
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'
agreements to arbitrate."37
Therefore, following the rationale of Volt,38
the court enforced the parties' agreement according to its terms, which was
to arbitrate all of their controversies under New York law.39
The Seventh Circuit continued its reasoning by examining a case
similar to Mastrobuono, which was decided in the same circuit ten years
earlier.40 In Pierson," a brokerage agreement also contained a New York
choice of law provision.42 The court reasoned that although the Piersons
may not have realized that the wording of the arbitration clause precluded
a punitive damage award, they could not "use their failure to inquire about
the ramifications of that clause to avoid the consequences of agreed-to
arbitration." '3 Relying on Pierson, the Mastrobuono court concluded that
the choice of law provision incorporated the Garrity rule." Therefore,
since New York law applied, and securities arbitrators did not have the
power to award punitive damages in New York, the court found that the
arbitrators exceeded their authority."
The Mastrobuonos then argued that the arbitration rules of the NASD
clearly authorized arbitrators to award punitive damages."6 The court
disposed of this argument by explaining that New York law applies no
matter which arbitral forum the plaintiffs happen to choose."7 The court
explained that the parties did not intend for the availability of punitive
damages to vary with the plaintiffs' choice of arbitration rules."8 Therefore, the arbitration agreement, signed by the Mastrobuonos, enforced the
Garrity rule whether the arbitration occurred at the New York Stock
Exchange ("NYSE"), NASD, or any other arbitral forum."9
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Mastrobuonoreinforced the minority
view that securities arbitrators did not have the power to award punitive
damages. The Second Circuit was the only other federal court of appeals

37. Id. (quoting Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468, 476

(1989)).
38. Volt, 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
39. Mastrobuono, 20 F.3d at 717.
40. Id. (citing Pierson v. Dean, Witter, Reynolds, Inc., 742 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1984)).
41. Pierson,742 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1984).
42. Id. at 336.

43. Mastrobuono, 20 F.3d at 717 (quoting Pierson, 742 F.2d at 339).
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id.
Id. at 718.
Id.
Id.
Mastrobuono, 20 F.3d at 718.
Id.
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which subscribed to this view.50 Some of the possible reasons these two
courts had for taking their stance against punitive damages will be explored
later in this article.
The Mastrobuonos appealed to the United States Supreme Court. On
March 6, 1995, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in
Mastrobuono,holding that the choice of law provision in the parties' client
agreement covered the rights and duties of the parties, while the arbitration
clause covered arbitration, thus giving the arbitrators the power to award
punitive damages. 5 The decision is analyzed in Part III of this article.
B. J Alexander Securities, Inc. v. Mendez: The Majority View
Mendez was decided by a California state court of appeal." Although
this case was decided at the state level, the opinion represents the majority
view of the federal courts. 3 The majority holds that securities arbitrators
have the power to award punitive damages, even though a New York choice
of law provision is present.54 In making its decision, the Mendez court
relied upon the rationales of previous cases which were decided in the First,
Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits. 5
In 1980, Signe Mendez, an elderly widow, opened a securities account
with J. Alexander Securities, Inc., a brokerage firm located in Los Angeles. 56 Upon opening the account, Mendez signed a Cash Account Agreement which contained an arbitration clause for disputes, as well as a New
York choice of law provision."

50. See, e.g., Barbier, 948 F.2d at 117.
51. Mastrobuono, 1995 WL 86555, at *6.
52. Mendez, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 826.
53. See generallyTodd Shipyards,943 F.2d at 1062 (relying on federal law, rather than
New York law, the court held that the arbitrators had the authority to award punitive
damages); Raytheon, 882 F.2d at 12 (upholding a punitive damage award rendered by a
commercial arbitration panel, whereby the agreement expressly provided that all disputes
would be settled by arbitration according to the rules of the American Arbitration
Association); Bonar, 835 F.2d at 1387 (holding that a choice of law provision in an
arbitration agreement does not deprive arbitrators of their power to award punitive damages).
54. E.g., Todd Shipyards, 943 F.2d at 1062; Bonar, 835 F.2d at 1387.
55. See Mendez, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 829 (citing Todd Shipyards, 943 F.2d at 1062;
Raytheon, 882 F.2d at II; Bonar, 835 F.2d at 1387).
56. Id. at 826-27.
57. Id. at 827. The agreement stated, in pertinent part:
This agreement and its enforcement shall be governed by the laws of the
State of New York .... Any dispute or controversy between us arising under
any provision of the federal securities laws can be resolved through litigation in
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A dispute arose in 1991, whereby Mendez claimed that the brokerage
firm and the broker, Weber, had engaged in securities fraud, deceptive
practices, churning, unsuitability, and unauthorized stock trading." As a
result, Mendez suffered substantial financial losses.59 The parties agreed
to arbitrate their dispute at the NASD, and hearings on the controversy were
conducted in 1992.60 The arbitrators awarded Mendez $27,000.00 in
compensatory damages, as well as $27,000.00 in punitive damages against
the firm only."' The arbitrators explained that the firm failed to adequately
supervise its employee, Weber, thereby, not meeting the required standards
to assure compliance with applicable securities regulations.62
The firm proceeded to the trial court and moved to correct the award
pursuant to the California Code of Civil Procedure, on the grounds that the
arbitrators had exceeded their powers by awarding punitive damages.6 3
The trial court denied the motion and confirmed the award; however, the
firm appealed." The court of appeal affirmed and provided a thorough
explanation.6
The court held that the arbitrators were not precluded from awarding
punitive damages by virtue of the New York choice of law provision. 6
The reasoning was based on the cash account agreement, which "evidenced
a transaction in interstate commerce[;]" therefore, the FAA applied. 7 The
court explained that the purpose of the FAA is to encourage arbitration, and
the underlying principle is that any doubts concerning the scope of
arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration. 8 The court
refused to follow the minority view of the Second Circuit which held that
state law is not preempted by federal substantive law on the issue of
the courts if the undersigned so chooses. The undersigned also understands that
arbitration is available with respect to such disputes. Additionally, all other
disputes or controversies between us arising out of your business or this
agreement, shall be submitted to arbitration conducted under the provisions of
the [rules of the NYSE or NASD], as the undersigned may elect ....

Id. at 827-28.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 828.
Mendez, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 828.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (referring to CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1286.6(b) (1993)).
Mendez, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 828.
Id. at 829.
Id.
Id. at 830.
Id. (citing Moses H. Cone Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983)).
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punitive damage awards by securities arbitrators. 69 Rather, the court
concluded that the choice of law provision designates only the substantive
law that the arbitrators must apply in determining whether the parties'
conduct warrants an award of punitive damages; it does not deprive them
of the power to award such damages.7"
The firm also contended that there was nothing in the parties'
agreement which permitted punitive damages. 7' The court agreed, but
stated that there was also nothing in the agreement that expressly excluded
the possibility of a punitive damage award either.7" The court held that the
arbitration provision "contained in the Cash Account Agreement encompassed 'any dispute or controversy between [the parties] arising under any
provision of the Federal securities laws' and 'all other disputes or controversies between [the parties] arising out of [appellant's] business or this
agreement."' 73 Therefore, the court found the arbitration agreement broad
enough to contemplate punitive damages.74
The appellant then argued that the agreement to arbitrate under the
rules of the NYSE or the NASD, which are silent on the issue of punitive
damages, exemplified that such an award was not contemplated by the
parties.75 The court rejected this argument based on public policy which
was enunciated by other federal courts that punitive damage awards clearly
support arbitration as an effective method of resolving disputes.76 The
court explained that the failure of the NASD to expressly state in its rules
that the arbitrators have the power to award punitive damages should not bar
the availability of that remedy.77 Therefore, in the absence of an express
provision in the Cash Account Agreement or an NASD rule prohibiting an
award of punitive damages, the arbitrators did not exceed their powers.7"
There was a constitutional question of due process raised by the
appellant which the court also rejected.7 9 The appellant, relying on a

69. Mendez, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 830 n.7 (citing Barbier,948 F.2d at 122; Fahnestock
& Co. v. Waltman, 935 F.2d 512, 518 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1120 (1992), and
affd, 989 F.2d 490 (3d.Cir. 1993)).
70. Id. (citing Bonar, 835 F.2d at 1387).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See id.; see also supra note 55.
74. Mendez, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 83 1.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 832.
79. Mendez, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 832.
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United States Supreme Court case, contended an absence of constraints upon
the arbitrators and a lack of judicial review."0 Similar arguments were also
rejected by the Ninth Circuit in Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line,
Ltd.8 1
In Todd Shipyards, the court found that the punitive damage award
rendered by an arbitration panel did not violate due process because the
appellant had notice that the respondent sought punitive damages, and was
given the opportunity to argue its position by presenting evidence. 2
Relying on Todd Shipyards, the judge explained that the appellant did not
claim that it lacked notice of Mendez's claim for punitive damages, nor that
it was unable to present evidence or legal theories against such an award. 3
Therefore, no violation of due process occurred. 4
A California case, Baker v. Sadick,"5 was relied upon to quickly
dispose of the lack of judicial review issue. 6 Baker involved a punitive
damage award in a medical malpractice claim which was submitted to
arbitration. 7 The court in Baker held that although the arbitration
agreement was broad, the parties had the power to control the scope of that
agreement.8 8 Similarly, the parties in the instant case could have expressly
agreed, in the Cash Account Agreement, to no awards of punitive damages;
but they did not. 9 Consequently, the lack of judicial review argument was
rejected.9" The court of appeal upheld the punitive damage award and the
California Supreme Court denied review.91 The firm then filed a petition
for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, but it was
denied.92 Nevertheless, an interesting dissent followed the denial of
certiorari.93

80. Id. (citing Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991)).
81. 943 F.2d 1056, 1063 (9th Cir. 1991).
82. Id.

83. Mendez, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 833.
84. Id.

85. 208 Cal. Rptr. 676 (4th Ct. App. 1984).
86. See Mendez, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 833.
87. See Baker, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 678.
88. Id. at 684.

89. See Mendez, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 827.
90. Id. at 833.
91. Id.

92. Mendez, 114 S. Ct. 2182.
93. See id. (Rehnquist, C.J., & O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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C. The Mendez Dissent
Although Mendez was denied certiorari, a clear and concise dissenting
opinion followed, evidencing much interest in settling the conflict among the
lower courts.94 After giving a brief description of the facts in Mendez,
Justice O'Connor recognized that the decision followed the majority view
which holds that the FAA preempts state law prohibitions of punitive
damages in arbitration. 95 However, she explained that the decision was
directly contrary to the views of the Second and Seventh Circuits, which
held that state law was not preempted by federal substantive law for the
purpose of an arbitrator's power to award punitive damages.9 6 Realizing
that the FAA was created to avoid these differences, she would have granted
certiorari to solve the recurring problem. 97
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN MASTROBUONO
One of the functions of the United States Supreme Court is to settle
conflicting decisions among the lower federal courts, especially when the
issue is of great public importance.98 The cases analyzed above demonstrate a direct conflict among the federal courts concerning the power of an
arbitrator to award punitive damages. 99 Additionally, since millions of
dollars are awarded in punitive damages in securities arbitrations every year,
the issue is of great public importance.' 0 This placed the Supreme Court
in an excellent position to rule on the issue. The Court, following the lead
of Justice O'Connor and the Chief Justice, realized that it was not up to the
legislature or the arbitral forums to resolve this issue; therefore, the
Mastrobuonos' petition for certiorari was granted.'
On March 6, 1995, by an eight to one decision,'0 ° the Supreme Court
reversed the Seventh Circuit's ruling in Mastrobuonoand granted arbitrators

See Mendez, 114 S. Ct. 2182 (Rehnquist, C.J., & O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. (citing Todd Shipyards, 943 F.2d at 1056; Bonar, 835 F.2d at 1378).
Id. (citing Mastrobuono, 20 F.3d at 713; Barbier, 948 F.2d at 117).
Id.
98. ROBERT L. STERN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, § 4.2, at 165 (7th ed. 1993).
99. See generally Mastrobuono, 20 F.3d at 713; Mendez, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 826.
100. See generallyPunitiveAward Survey, SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR. at 3 (May 1993)
[hereinafter SAC].
101. Mastrobuono, 115 S. Ct. 305.
102. Justice Clarence Thomas was the lone dissenter. See Mastrobuono, 1995 WL
86555, at *6 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
94.
95.
96.
97.
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the power to award punitive damages.0 3 The majority opinion was
written by Justice Stevens and the central theme was that the FAA ensures
that arbitration agreements will be enforced according to their terms. °4
However, the New York choice of law provision contained in the parties'
agreement created an ambiguity.0 5 Applying common law rules of
contractual interpretation, the Court construed the ambiguous language
against the interest of the party0 6that drafted it; in this case, as in most, that
party was the brokerage firm.1
The Court then examined some of the NASD rules, as well as an
NASD manual given to the arbitrators which included a section permitting
the consideration of punitive damages." 7 The holding was also based on
the belief that it was unlikely that the plaintiffs were actually aware of the
New York choice of law provision which prohibited punitive damages in
arbitration.'
However, it was noted that parties can structure their
arbitration agreements as they see fit and specify by contract the rules under
which that arbitration will be conducted. 10 9
Although the decision appears to be a victory for disgruntled investors,
the Court's analysis left many issues unresolved. First, brokerage firms now
may consider rewording their customer agreements in order to clearly state
the unavailability of punitive damages. However, this could lead to the
issue of whether the agreements are contracts of adhesion, thereby making
the provisions unenforceable. Furthermore, the NASD rules provide, inter
alia, that no predispute arbitration agreement shall limit the ability of the
arbitrators to make any awardY" The Court recognized this rule; however, it was inapplicable in Mastrobuonobecause the agreement was executed
before the effective date of the rule."'
Additionally, before individuals contract away an "important substantive right" such as punitive damages, they should be made aware of the
implications of what they are doing." 2 A related issue pertains to the

103. Id.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. at *4.
Id. at *5.
Id.
Mastrobuono, 1995 WL 86555, at *5.
Id.

109. Id. at *3 (citing Volt, 489 U.S. at 479).
110. See NATIONAL ASS'N OF SECURITIES DEALERS, RULES OF FAIR PRACTICE

2171,

Rule 21(f)(4) (1993).
111. Rule 21(f)(4) only applies to agreements signed after September 7, 1989. See id.
Rule 21(f)(5). The Mastrobuonos signed their agreement in 1985.
112. See id. at *5.
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proper standard of review to be applied in arbitration appeals as to the scope
of an arbitration." 3 Considering these unanswered questions, it will be
interesting to note the impact this decision will have on securities arbitration.
IV.

ARBITRATOR USE OF THE POWER TO AWARD
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Many factors must be considered in empowering securities arbitrators
with the authority to award punitive damages. First, the use of punitive
power must be used only in instances in which the purposes of such
damages are served. Next, there must be a mechanism to ensure that
safeguards exist in order to prevent unjust awards. Finally, use of the
punitive power must be done in a way that keeps the arbitration process fair
and efficient.
A. Accomplishing the Purposes of Punitive Damages
Punitive damages, as stated earlier, serve two purposes: to punish the
wrongdoer and to deter similar future misconduct." 4 Members of the
securities industry must fear this type of punishment in order to help reduce
the amount of unscrupulous and malicious conduct that plagues this
otherwise professional field."'
The nature of the securities industry creates a fiduciary duty bestowed
upon the individual brokers and firms." 6 The brokers give financial
advice to their clients and then invest their money." 7 These brokers are
compensated on a commission basis which may cause a conflict of interest
between themselves and their clients." 8 The more frequently the client
buys and sells securities based on representations made by their broker, the
greater the commission the broker and his firm will earn. This conflict
sometimes leads to fraudulent conduct by the broker in order to generate
commissions."'9

113. The Court recently granted certiorari on this issue in First Options of Chicago. Inc.
v. Kaplan, 115 S.Ct. 634 (1994).
114. See BARRON's LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 10, at 117.
115. Brief for Respondent at 14, In re Dreyfus Serv. Corp., 584 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1992)
(No. 11629/90).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.

19. This type of misconduct is known as "churning."
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If punitive damages are awarded against a broker or a firm for
fraudulent or grossly negligent conduct, the firm will surely eliminate such
behavior. 2 Conversely, if arbitrators had no authority to award punitive
damages, firms would lack incentive to strictly monitor their brokers'
behavior.' 2 ' Therefore, the misconduct would continue if the threat of
monetary punishment were limited to the amount actually lost.'22 Hopefully, the Supreme Court's decision in Mastrobuonowill help in this regard.
In addition to the deterrent effect of punitive damages, the threat of
such damages motivates settlement of securities disputes.'2 3 For instance,
if a firm realizes that the arbitrator lacks the authority to award punitive
damages, thereby only exposing the firm to limited liability, the likelihood
of a fair settlement offer is poor.'24 Moreover, the firm recognizes that
if the settlement offer is refused, then the investor must incur continued
expenses, such as forum fees, expert witnesses, and attorney's fees.' 25
These factors unfairly influence the investor in accepting a low settlement.
To the contrary, the empowerment of arbitrators with the authority to
award punitive damages should motivate firms in settlement negotiations.' 26 The threat of punitive damages, accompanied by the fear of the
unknown amount which could be awarded, should help end the disputes in
a quicker and more equitable manner.'2 7 Because the arbitrators now have
the power to grant punitive damages, the entire arbitration process benefits,
even if the power is not actually exercised.
B. Safeguards
The most popular argument used in opposing an arbitrator's power to
award punitive damages is the lack of judicial review.' 28 This stance is
in response to the narrow and limited grounds for vacating an award.' 2 9

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
only:

Brief for Respondent at 14, Dreyfus (No. 11629/90).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 18.
Id.
Brief for Respondent at 18, Dreyfis (No. 11629/90).
Id.
Id. at 19.
See, e.g., Mendez, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 832.
9 U.S.C.A. § 10(a) (West Supp. 1994). The statute permits an award to be vacated
(1)

Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue
means.
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Although this argument is sensible, no court has held that the limited
judicial review given to arbitral awards denies the arbitration participants
due process. 30 Therefore, this argument consistently fails.' 3'
The fear of runaway arbitrators continuously awarding punitive
damages is another argument that is frequently employed by parties who
oppose the arbitrators power to award such damages.' 32 This theory
evolved from the court's reasoning in Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc.'33 In
Garrity,the court observed that unpredictable punitive damage awards may
occur as a result of the lack of guidelines for arbitral awards, as well as the
limited judicial review of the awards.' 34 Almost twenty years have passed
since Garrity,and the statistics now show that there is no need to fear that
arbitrators will abuse their power in granting punitive damages.'
In 1991, an extensive statistical analysis on this issue was written by
the Public Investors Arbitration Bar Association.' 36 The study, conducted
from June 1987 to December 1990, showed that out of approximately 1800
arbitration awards favoring investors, there were only forty-four punitive
damage awards.' 37 The low frequency of the punitive damage awards

(2)
(3)

(4)

(5)

Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators,
or either of them.
Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to
postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to
hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any
other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been
prejudiced.
Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly
executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the
subject matter submitted was not made.
Where an award is vacated and the time within which the agreement
required the award to be made has not expired the court may, in its
discretion, direct a rehearing by the arbitrators.

Id.
130. Reply Brief for Respondent at 6, Dreyfus (No. 11629/90).
131. See, e.g., Mendez, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 832-33.
132. See, e.g., Todd Shipyards, 943 F.2d at 1061; Raytheon, 882 F.2d at 8.
133. 353 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1976).
134. Id. at 796.
135. See generallyStuart C. Goldberg, 1991 Report Of The PublicInvestorsArbitration
Bar Association As To The Authority Of Arbitrators To Award Punitive Damages In
SecuritiesArbitration, 1991 PUB. INVESTORS ARB. B. ASS'N 1; see also SAC, supra note
100.
136. See generally Goldberg, supra note 135.
137. Id. at 109-10.
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demonstrates the arbitrators' reluctance to award such damages, unless
warranted by the situation.'3 8
Additionally, a similar study was performed by the Securities
Arbitration Commentator, which was published in May of 1993.'
This
study emphasized the proportionality ratios of punitive damage awards to
their compensatory damage counterpart. 40 The results showed that an
overwhelming majority of the awards fell into the 3:1 ratio; a fair and
equitable calculation.' 4 ' However, no exact line exists between an acceptable ratio and an unacceptable one; it is a matter of judgment.'4 2
No perfect formula exists in determining the size of a punitive damage
award.' 43 However, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals offered guidance
in Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co.'44 The court concluded that three times
the compensatory damage award is a proper guideline in determining the
45
amount of punitive damages that should be awarded in a churning case.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has upheld punitive damage awards
that have exceeded the 3:1 ratio. 46 For instance, in Pacific Mutual Life
InsuranceCo. v. Haslip,14 ' a punitive damage award which was four times
the amount of the compensatory damages was upheld. 48 Additionally, in
TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.,"'9 the Court upheld
a $10,000,000.00 punitive damage award when the compensatory damages
were only $19,000.00, a ratio of approximately 526:1.150 Although these
two cases did not involve arbitration, they5 directly involved due process
limitations on awards of punitive damages.' '
The Supreme Court's decision in Mastrobuono,based on principles of
contractual interpretation, may not have alleviated all of the fears regarding

138. Id. at 110.
139. See generally SAC, supra note 100.
140. Id. at 4.
141. Id. at 5. Additionally, only 12% of the awards exceeded the 3:1 ratio. Id.
142. Id.
143. Goldberg, supra note 135, at 84.
144. 637 F.2d 318 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 642 F.2d 1210 (1981).
145. Id. at 332.
146. See, e.g., TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993);
Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
147. 499 U.S. 1.
148. Id. at 24.
149. 113 S. Ct. 2711.
150. Id. at 2723.
151. See Haslip,499 U.S. at 9-15; see alsoTXO Production v. Alliance Resources: The
"Promise"Fades-LastWord on Punitives?, SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR, June 1993, at 2.

Published by NSUWorks, 1995

205

Nova Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 3 [1995], Art. 1
1078

Nova Law Review

Vol. 19

arbitrators abusing their power in awarding punitive damages. The court
made no mention of delineating an acceptable measure of punitive damages,
such as the general 3:1 ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages. 152 The studies mentioned above show that the arbitrators generally
follow this guideline without expressly being told to do so. 53 The Court
could have expressed its opinion of whether this practice is fair and
equitable, but it did not do so.
V.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Now that the Supreme Court has ruled in favor of arbitrators having the
authority to award punitive damages despite the presence of a New York
choice of law provision in securities client agreements, the arbitral forums
should implement guidelines and procedures for all to follow.' 54 This
would help to ensure that the punitive awards do not violate due process. 55 Moreover, these procedures will create a realistic
image that the
56
arbitrators award such damages fairly and reasonably.
First, the forums should require that the arbitration panel write out an
explanation on why it awarded punitive damages. 5 This will facilitate
any appeal of the ruling by notifying the appellate decision-maker of the
reasoning for the award. 5 Furthermore, the wrongdoer, as well as the
public, will know exactly why the award is being rendered, and this will
hopefully deter similar misconduct.' 59 Unfortunately, this requirement60has
not been created by any forum, although the NASD is considering it.'

152. See, e.g., Miley, 637 F.2d at 332.
153. See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 135, at 110.
154. See generally NATIONAL Ass'N OF SECURITIES DEALERS. INC., NOTIcES TO

MEMBERS, July 1994 at 319-43 [hereinafter NASD].
155. Id. at 334.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 330.
158. Id.
159. NASD, supra note 154, at 330.
160. See id. (citing the NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure, § 41 (1992), which only
requires that the awards be in writing and include the names of the parties and counsel, a
summary of the issues, the relief requested and awarded, a statement of issues resolved, and
other names and dates). Similarly, the American Arbitration Association only requires that
the awards be in writing, signed by a majority of the arbitrators, and that they include a
statement regarding the disposition of statutory claims. AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASS'N,
SECURITIES ARBITRATION RULES § 42 (1987).
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Next, the party against whom the punitive damages are rendered should
reserve the right to appeal the punitive portion of the award. 6 ' As
described earlier in this article, the current arbitration system offers a limited
right to appeal, which courts interpret narrowly.'62 Therefore, the appeal
should include not only the amount of the award, but the actual decision to
award punitive damages itself.'6 3
This appeals process must not take place in the court system because
that would circumvent the original purpose of submitting to arbitration.' 64
Rather, the appellate body should consist of three individuals who are
selected from a pool of arbitrators who are experienced in securities cases
involving punitive damages. 6 The appellate panel should only vacate
awards in which the arbitrators' decision below was clearly erroneous.' 66
This system will serve as a check on the arbitrators' power to award
punitive damages, and at the same time, uphold the integrity of the entire
arbitration process.
The purpose of punitive damages is not to provide a windfall to the
plaintiff or plaintiffs' counsel.' 67 Therefore, the arbitral forums should
require that a portion of each punitive damage award be given to an
appropriate entity.'68 For instance, if fifty percent of all punitive awards
were dispersed to groups in need of the money, then every year millions of
dollars could be generated to help those groups tremendously.'6 9 The
money received could go, for example, to the arbitral forum where the
hearings took place, the state or federal courts, or even to the plaintiffs'
favorite charity. 7 In fact, some states already have this procedure in
place for punitive damages awarded in court.' 7 '

161. Id.
162. See supra note 129.
163. NASD, supra note 154, at 331.
164. See Sabino, supra note 2, at 33.
165. NASD, supra note 154, at 331.
166. Id.
167. See id. at 334 (stating that the purpose of awarding punitive damages is to punish
those who purposefully harm the investing public for their own personal gain); see also
BARRON's LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 10, at 117.
168. NASD, supra note 154, at 334.
169. See Goldberg, supra note 135, at 7 (stating that over $9,000,000 was awarded in
punitive damages in securities arbitrations between June 1987 and Dec. 1990). Id.
170. NASD, supra note 154, at 334.
171. Id. (citing COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-21-102(4) (1992); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73
(West Supp. 1993); Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.675 (1991)).
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Even though the Supreme Court ruled in favor of empowering
securities arbitrators to award punitive damages, the arbitral forums must
further recognize the need to improve and expand the system. Implementing
the recommendations mentioned above would ensure equity and fairness
within the arbitration process.172
VI. CONCLUSION
The number of securities disputes submitted to arbitration every year
is continuously rising.'7 3 This is mainly attributed to the arbitration agreements which are usually contained in customer account forms, which public
investors sign upon the opening of their securities account.'7 4 In 1987, the
Supreme Court, in Shearson/AmericanExpress, Inc. v. Mc-Mahon, 75 held
that these agreements are legally enforceable and are supported by public
policy which strongly favors arbitration.'7 6 The Supreme Court, in
deciding Mastrobuono, apparently took into consideration the brokerage
firms' success in closing the road to the courthouse and thereby detouring
disgruntled customers to arbitration. Although the decision resolved the
issue of whether the arbitrators in that case had the power to award punitive
damages, the decision was more limited than what would have been desired.
The Court should have universally empowered the arbitrators with the
authority to award punitive damages. The Court could have relied on the
rationale that the punishment and deterrent purposes of such damages would
be achieved, thus creating a more professional atmosphere among the
numerous securities firms and their employees. Additionally, the Court
could have recognized that although lacking strict guidelines, arbitrators
have yet to exemplify bad faith or corruption in awarding punitive
damages.' 77
The brokerage firms will still have the ability to avoid a punitive
damage award being rendered against them. The Court has held that under
the FAA, "parties are generally free to structure their arbitration agreements

172.
173.
file with
174.

Id.
See NASD Chart, Self Regulatory OrganizationArbitration Filings, 1980-93 (on
author).
Stuart C. Goldberg, PIABA's 1991 PUBLIC INVESTOR RECOVERY GUIDE AND

ARBITRATOR SOURCE BOOK TO STOCKBROKER FRAUD AND SECURITIES ARBITRATION at ix

(1991).
175. 482 U.S. 220, reh'g denied, 483 U.S. 1056 (1987).
176. Id. at 242.
177. See Goldberg, supra note 135, at 110.
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as they see fit."'78 Therefore, if the brokerage firms use plain and clear
language which expressly prohibits punitive damages as a remedy under the
arbitration contract, then the arbitrators would not have the ability to award
such damages.' 79
The majority view empowered arbitrators with the authority to award
punitive damages, even when a New York choice of law provision was
present. 8
The minority view, which held that arbitrators lack such
powers, has apparently now been overruled by the Supreme Court's decision
in Mastrobuono.'' The Second and Seventh Circuits were the only
federal circuit courts which subscribed to the minority view. 2 Their
jurisdiction encompasses New York and Chicago, home to many large
securities firms and the markets in which they trade. Thus, the Supreme
Court's decision should have great impact on the securities industry.
However, the attack on the securities arbitrators' power to award punitive
damages will continue.
DarrenC. Blum

178. Volt, 489 U.S. at 479 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
179. E. Allan Farnsworth, Punitive Damagesin Arbitration,20 STETSON L. REv. 395,

409 (1991); see also Willoughby Roofing & Supply Co. v. Kajima Int'l, Inc., 776 F.2d 269
(11th Cir. 1985). However, if the parties agree to arbitrate according to the NASD rules,
they will not be able to limit the arbitrators' ability to award punitive damages. See supra
note 110.
180. See, e.g., Todd Shipyards, 943 F.2d at 1062; Bonar,835 F.2d at 1387; Mendez, 21

Cal. Rptr. 2d at 829.
181. See Mastrobuono, 1995 WL 86555.
182. See supranote 16.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Abortion. It is one of the most divisive issues of our time.... To some
it is nothing less than the slaughter of millions upon millions of the
most innocent and vulnerableof all victims, andthus stands as the most
monstrous moral outrage in human history. To others it tests our
society's commitment to fundamental principles of individual liberty,
personal autonomy, and women's welfare.'
Many women view the 1973 United States Supreme Court decision in

Roe v. Wade2 as the culmination of a battle for women's rights that began
before the Civil War.3 However, the holding in Roe, that a woman's right

1. DONALD P. JUDGES, HARD CHOICES, LOST VOICES 4 (1993). For a strong feminist
point of view, see Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV.
955, 981 (1984) ("Only women have abortions. Laws restricting access to abortion have a
devastating sex-specific impact").
2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3. See John W. Whitehead, CivilDisobedienceand OperationRescue: A Historicaland
TheoreticalAnalysis,48 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 77, 79 (1991) (quoting ELLEN C. DuBois,
FEMINISM AND SUFFRAGE, THE EMERGENCE OF AN INDEPENDENT WOMEN'S MOVEMENT IN
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to privacy includes a qualified right to abortion, did not settle the controversy concerning termination of a pregnancy in its early stages Instead, less
than twenty years later, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,5 the Court
dismantled the trimester scheme outlined in Roe, although it affirmed the
constitutional right to abortion.'
Since Casey, access to abortion is
governed by a test that condones numerous restrictions on a woman's
freedom of choice.7
The decisions in Casey and Roe constitute the goal posts at the opposite
ends of the playing field. In between, many judicial decisions delineate
yards gained or lost in the ongoing struggle for unchecked access to
abortion
This legal battle is kept alive by feminist groups such as the
National Organization of Women ("NOW") and Planned Parenthood on
behalf of women seeking abortions.9 Their opponents are the groups and

AMERICA 1848-1869, at 22 (1978)).

DuBois enumerates two sources as providing the
impetus for women to unite: women's "growing awareness of their common conditions and
grievances" in the decade preceding the Civil War and the abolitionists' emphasis on
universal equality. Id. at 79 n.16.
4. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153-54. The trimester test is governed by the point of fetal viability,
the point at which the State's interest in the health of the mother becomes compelling. Id.
at 163. When the Court heard the case 20 years ago, medical knowledge pinpointed viability
at the end of the first trimester of the pregnancy. Id. Thus, the Court divided pregnancy into
trimesters, leaving the decision as to abortion in the hands of the woman's physician in the
first trimester; allowing the state to regulate abortion in the second trimester; and permitting
abortions in the third trimester only "for the preservation of the life or health of the mother."
Id.at 163-64.
5. 112 S.Ct. 2791 (1992).
6. Id. at 2818. In place of the trimester scheme, the Court instituted an "undue burden"
test, specifying that "[r]egulations designed to foster the health of a woman seeking an
abortion are valid if they do not constitute an undue burden." Id. at 2821. But the opinion
gave little guidance as to the meaning of "undue."
7. The Court held that the following restrictions are constitutional: a 24 hour waiting
period to meet an informed consent requirement; parental consent for unemancipated women
under 18; and record keeping and reporting requirements for abortion facilities other than
those which would require spousal notice or consent. Id. at 2791.
8. See National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483, 1494. 1496
n. 13 (E.D. Va. 1989), aff'd, 914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990), rev 'd in part and vacatedin part
sub nom. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S.Ct. 753 (1993) (discussing
subsequent United States Supreme Court decisions that narrowed the Roe holding prior to
Casey). The decision in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services.492 U.S. 490 (1989), was
perhaps the most noteworthy prior to Casey. The decision was pivotal because it allowed
State regulation of abortion in the second trimester for protection of the fetus rather than the
mother. JUDGES, supra note 1, at 190.
9. See John H. Henn & Maria Del Monaco, CivilRights andRICO: Stopping Operation
Rescue, 13 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 251, 255 n.19 (1990). Henn and Del Monaco list cases in
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individuals whose avowed purposes are to discourage pregnant women from
seeking abortions and to close down abortion clinics."0 Their objective is
ultimately to make it impossible for women to terminate a pregnancy legally
in the United States."
To accomplish this purpose, abortion protestors, often under the aegis
of the militant group known as Operation Rescue, 2 began a systematic,
national campaign to obstruct access to abortion services in 1988.13 During
the blockades, abortion protestors disrupt the provision of medical and
counseling services and exhort patients, clinic personnel, and bystanders to
join the illegal activity. 4 In addition, the "rescuers" vandalize clinic
property, often defacing signs and disrupting traffic near the clinic by
spreading nails on the asphalt to deflate tires so that immobilized vehicles
barricade the clinic entrances. 5 Leaders of the anti-abortion movement
justify these illegal activities by invoking biblical passages and comparing
their mission to end abortion to the struggle for freedom and equality waged
by Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr.'6 Because the movement is
nationwide, Congress has decided the solution to ensuring women's access
to abortion facilities should be embodied in federal legislation. 7

which courts have issued injunctions against clinic blockaders; of the 10 cases cited, at least
six involved NOW or Planned Parenthood as plaintiffs. Id.
10. See OperationRescue, 726 F. Supp. at 1487-88. The trial court found the "principal
goals [of the defendant anti-abortionists] are to stop abortion and to end its legalization." Id.
at 1487; see also Bray, 113 S.Ct. at 758. Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia portrays
Operation Rescue, one of the petitioners, as "an unincorporated association whose members
oppose abortion ....[It] organizes antiabortion [sic] demonstrations in which participants
trespass on, and obstruct general access to, the premises of abortion clinics." Id.
11. Elizabeth L. Crane, Abortion Clinics and Their Antagonists: Protectionfrom
ProtestorsUnder 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 181, 182-83 (1993).
12. See generallyDavid Van Biema, In Your Town, in Your Face, TIME, July 19, 1993,
at 29 (recounting Operation Rescue's history and goals). Four years earlier, the magazine
described Operation Rescueprotestors favorably as"crusaders" and "uterine warriors." Garry
Wills, "Save the Babies:" OperationRescue: A CaseStudy in Galvanizingthe Antiabortion
Movement, TIME, May 1, 1989, at 26. The group's religious roots are evidenced by its name,
which comes from a passage in the Bible: "Rescue those who are being taken away." Id.
at 28 (citing Proverbs24:11).
13. Henn & Del Monaco, supra note 9, at 253.
14. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 781 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
15. OperationRescue, 726 F. Supp. at 1489-90.
16. See Whitehead, supranote 3, at 89, 90 n.100 ("The strategy of Operation Rescue
is massive civil disobedience in the tradition of Henry David Thoreau, Mahatma Gandhi, and
Martin Luther King, Jr.") (citations omitted).
17. See Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-259, 108
Stat. 694 (to be codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 248).
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This new legislation will have an impact on Operation Rescue and its
supporters as parties to much of the recent litigation in the abortion
controversy.18 Part II of this article begins with an overview of this highprofile anti-abortion group, and includes an analysis of Bray v. Alexandria
Women's Health Clinic, 9 the case which spurred Congress to pass the
Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994 ("FACE"). 2" Part III
examines the legislative history of FACE chronicled in congressional
committee reports and the Congressional Record as the Act wound through
the House and the Senate. The search through the legislative record is
instructive in understanding FACE and what it meant to accomplish. Part
IV surveys the First Amendment arguments adressed in Madsen v. Women's
Health Center, Inc.21 In Madsen, three members of Operation Rescue
petitioned the United States Supreme Court to overturn a Florida Supreme
Court decision favoring the owners of a Melbourne, Florida abortion
facility.22 Despite the gradual dismemberment of the holding in Roe v.
Wade, the latest judicial decisions have affirmed that a woman's right to an
abortion is constitutionally guaranteed.2"

18. See, e.g., National Org. for Women v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798, 800 (1994)
(describing the respondent, Joseph Scheidler, as opposing legal abortion); New York State
Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1343 (2d Cir. 1989) (citing as defendants
both Randall Terry and Operation Rescue); Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc.,
626 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 1993), aff'd in part and rev 'd in part sub nom. Madsen v. Women's
Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994).
19. 113 S.Ct. 753 (1993).
20. Pub. L. No. 103-259, 108 Stat. 694; see also Neal Devins, Through the Looking
Glass: What Abortion Teaches Us About American Politics, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 293, 301
(1994) (reviewing BARBARA H. CRAIG & DAVID M. O'BRIEN, ABORTION AND AMERICAN
POLMCS (1993)) (stating that Congress intends the Act to void the Court's holding in Bray).
The Senate sent the bill to President Clinton for signature on May 12, 1994, and the President
signed it into law on May 26, 1994. See Foes Sue Over Abortion-Protest Law, SUNSENTINEL, May 27, 1994, at 3A [hereinafter Foes];see also 140 CONG. REC. S5628 (1994)
(giving the roll call in the Senate as 69 vote for and 30 vote against passage of FACE);
Clinic Access: Senate Sends Prez StiffFACE; Challenge Looms, Abortion Report, May 13,
1994, available in LEXIS. Cmpgn Library, Abtrpt File [hereinafter Clinic Access].
21. 114 S. Ct. 2521 (1994).
22. Id.
23. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2516; Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. at 798; see also OperationRescue,
726 F. Supp. at 1494 n.13 (listing United States Supreme Court decisions that restricted the
scope of Roe); infra note 225.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Operation Rescue: The New Civil Disobedience
Although one commentator maintained that "civil disobedience is in
'
fact obedience, that it respects the law and is within the law,"24
another25
character."
in
[sic]
defined it as "an illegal public protest, non-violent
Operation Rescue has devised a specific type of civil disobedience to
influence governmental policy and to persuade the general public of the
righteousness of its cause: preventing access to abortion clinics by forming
human barricades at the doorways. 26 Viewed historically, the anti-abortion
movement is the latest in a series of national campaigns to use civil
disobedience to hasten social and political change. 2' Today, because of the
violence of its tactics and the resulting polarization of public opinion,
Operation Rescue clinic entrance blockades command considerable media
coverage; the pronouncements and arrests of its organizers provide headlines
for the local and national press.28

24. Symposium, Civil Disobedienceand the Law, 21 RUTGERs L. REV. 1, 17 (1966)
(section written by Harrop A. Freeman). Freeman concludes:
When [the protestor] has decided that the highest demands of law, the highest
morality, the highest values of humanity require a specific law to be challenged
(and particularly when there is no other effective way for him to do so) then the
conscientious citizen must humbly and contritely but courageously engage in
civil disobedience.
Id. at 26.
25. Id. at 3 (section written by Carl Cohen).
26. Henn & Del Monaco, supra note 9, at 251-53.
27. See Whitehead, supra note 3, at 89. Whitehead discusses American protest
movements beginning with the colonial protest against the British Stamp Act prior to the
American Revolution, and including abolition of slavery, women's rights, civil rights, antiVietnam protests, and anti-vivisection demonstrations. Id. at 77-89. Positioning Operation
Rescue as the culmination of this list of milestones that helped shape the American political
system perhaps clothes the anti-abortion movement in historical legitimacy it does not
deserve.
28. See generallyAbortion Report, supranote 20. The Report, updated daily, compiles
news clips from major newspapers on abortion issues of national interest. For example, a
summary of an editorial in the Milwaukee Sentinel on June 8, 1994, concerning the arrest of
seven abortion protestors who blockaded the entrance to a Milwaukee abortion clinic, states
that United States Attorney Thomas Schneider is "correct in his assessment that this is a clear
matter for a few individuals taking it upon themselves to deny the women involved their
constitutional right to an abortion." Id. (daily ed. June 13, 1994) (quoting the Milwaukee
Sentinel). The protestors were charged with violation of the newly-signed Freedom of Access
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Prior to Roe, opponents of abortion were organized into lobbying and
educational groups and were supported by the Roman Catholic Church.29
The abortion protests consisted of peaceful marches; "[c]ivil disobedience
was not their style."3 After Roe, Catholics began to sit in at clinics.3'
Randall Terry32 met two of the leaders of these passive protests in 1986,
and by 1987 he had organized Operation Rescue into a viable organization,
drawing members mainly from among evangelical Protestants.33
The first "rescue"34 was on November 28, 1987, in Cherry Hill, New
Jersey. 35 The success of the event, in which 300 rescuers participated in
preventing the performance of abortions by blocking access to the clinic for
36
the day, convinced two other clinics to shut their doors voluntarily.
Furthermore, other anti-abortion groups copied Operation Rescue's methods

to Clinic Entrances Act. Id. The same issue of the Report also quoted a New York Times
article under the heading, Hunters Seek FACE, the CincinnatiEnquireron abortion protests
in Cincinnati, as well as the Milwaukee Journalon the arrest of the seven clinic blockaders.
Id.
29. Wills, supra note 12, at 27.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Terry was a high school dropout raised in New York by his mother and two aunts
who were ardent feminists. Michael P. O'Brien, Note, OperationRescue Blockades and the
Misuse of 42 U.SC. § 1985(3), 41 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 145, 145 n.1 (1993) (quoting Sue
Hutchison & James N. Baker, The Right-to-Life Shock Troops, NEWSWEEK, May 1, 1989, at
32). After moving to Texas to become a rock star, he experienced a religious conversion and
became an evangelical minister. Id. Terry, who is now a superstar of the anti-abortion
movement, began his career as an abortion protestor by talking with patients outside an
abortion clinic during breaks from his job as a used car salesman. Henn & Del Monaco,
supra note 9, at 253; Whitehead, supra note 3, at 89 n.98 (citation omitted), see also Sandra
G. Boodman, Abortion Foes Strike at Doctors 'Home Lives: Illegal Intimidationor Protected
Protest?, WASH. POST, Apr. 8, 1993, at Al (depicting Terry as "the nation's best-known
antiabortion [sic] leader"). The conversations with patients then escalated to picketing outside
the clinic with others who objected to the performance of abortions inside the facility.
Whitehead, supra note 3, at 89 n.98 (citation omitted). Terry eventually aligned himself with
the anti-abortion movement and became a disciple of Joseph Scheidler, who heads the ProLife Action League and has been active in the anti-abortion movement since 1973.
Boodman, supra, at Al; see also cases cited supra note 18.
33. Wills. supra note 12, at 28.
34. "In general, a 'rescue' is a demonstration at the site of a clinic where abortions are
performed. At a 'rescue,' the demonstrators, called 'rescuers,' intentionally trespass on the
clinic's premises for the purpose of blockading the clinic's entrances and exits, thereby
effectively closing the clinic." Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. at 1487.
35. Whitehead, supra note 3, at 89.
36. Id.
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so that clinic blockades evolved into a national phenomenon."
Since
1987, their obstructionist tactics have put Operation Rescue and its supporters in the forefront of the abortion controversy.
Operation Rescue's tactics include packing rescuers around doors to
abortion clinics so no one can enter or leave the facility.38 The abortion
protestors at a 1989 clinic blockade in California were depicted as moving
"in a human sludge, on their knees, not standing," to avoid direct confrontation with the pro-choice demonstrators. 9 In the first year after its founding, Operation Rescue staged hundreds of such nonviolent actions, and
police arrested thousands of the protestors.4" By 1991, the group was so
well-organized that it nearly paralyzed Wichita, Kansas with a clinic
blockade that lasted forty-six days.4 ' Operation Rescue has subsequently
stayed in the headlines with widespread summer protests, such as the recent
"Cities of Refuge" campaign in 1993, which targeted seven urban areas.42
Terry's strategy evolved into activist protest: He and his followers put
aside speeches and placards in favor of trespass and other forms of civil
disobedience that lead to massive arrests.43 His goal is to force the
4
government to rescind its support of the pro-abortion stance of the courts.
Terry designs anti-abortion demonstrations to pit modem civil disobedience
against the constitutionally-sanctioned freedom of choice for women.
In the last twelve years, abortion protests have become violent,
culminating in the shooting deaths of two doctors, two clinic workers, and

37. Henn & Del Monaco, supra note 9, at 254.
38. Wills, supranote 12, at 27. Wills describes the jockeying for media attention during
the blockades, with the pro-choice protestors trying to dominate the TV cameras' footage of
the event with their own placards: "It is a noisy scene, hymns vs. chanted slogans, with both
sides resorting to bullhorns to get above the din (and the police finally adding their
loudspeakers)." Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.; see also Whitehead, supranote 3, at 89 (noting that by 1989 Operation Rescue

had branches in 200 cities and 35,000 members).
41. Van Biema, supra note 12, at 29.
42. Id.

43. See Henn & Del Monaco, supranote 9, at 254-55 & nn.19-20, 256 (listing cases
granting injunctions against clinic blockaders and cases in which contempt orders were issued
for violations of the injunctions).
44. "Terry has framed the issue in stark terms, asking, 'When the government has to
decide between jailing tens of thousands of people and making abortion illegal again, what
do you think it's going to do?' Id. at 256 (quoting Michael Matza, Throw this Man in Jail,
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER MAG.,

June 26, 1988, at 20, 22).
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an abortion-provider's bodyguard since March 1993."5 Three of the five
killings occurred in Pensacola, Florida.46 David Gunn, a physician, was
killed on March 10, 1993, as he arrived at the Women's Medical Services
clinic in Pensacola.47 On July 29, 1994, John Britton, a doctor who
worked at The Ladies Center in Pensacola, and his voluntary escort, James
Barrett, were fatally shot while sitting in the front seat of a pickup truck
outside the clinic.48 Barrett's wife, June, who was sitting in the rear of the
truck, was wounded in the left arm. 49 A third physician, Dr. George Tiller,
was wounded at an abortion clinic in Wichita, Kansas in August 1993.50
The most recent violence also claimed the most victims in a single
shooting spree. Two clinic staff members, Shannon Lowney and Lee Ann
Nichols, were murdered and five others were wounded on December 30,
1994, in an attack on two suburban Boston, Massachusetts clinics.5 ' The
rampage continued the next day in Norfolk, Virginia until the gunman was
arrested after firing shots at a third clinic. 2
The person responsible for the July 1994 shooting deaths in Pensacola,
Paul Hill, gained notoriety as the first offender charged with violation of
FACE. On October 5, 1994, after a three-day trial, a federal jury convicted
Hill of two counts for killing Britton and Barrett, a third count for the
wounding of June Barrett, and a fourth count for using a firearm. 3 In
Boston, federal prosecutors are considering whether to charge John Salvi
with violations of FACE.5 4 Massachusetts state attorneys are seeking life

45. "[T]he tally of violence over the past 12 years includes 123 cases of arson and 37
bombings in 33 states, and more than 1,500 cases of stalking, assault, sabotage and burglary"
nationwide, according to federal statistics. Laurie Goodstein, Clinic Killings Follow Years
of Antiabortion Violence, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 1995, at Al.
46. Ann O'Hanlon, Pensacola'sChain of Violence, WASH. POST, July 30, 1994, at A4;
see also Foes, supra note 20, at A3.
47. O'Hanlon, supra note 46, at A4.
48. William Claiborne, Two Killed at Clinic in Florida: RadicalAbortionFoe Charged
in Shootings, WASH. POST, July 30, 1994, at Al.
49. Id.
50. Don Phillips, Violence Hardly Ruffled ProtestRitual: Foes, Supporters ofAbortion
Rights Resume Routine at Kansas Clinic, WASH. POST, August 22, 1993, at A8.
51. Christopher B. Daly, Salvi Denies Murder Charges in Shooting Attacks on
MassachusettsClinics, WASH. POST, Jan. 10, 1995, at A3; Pamela Ferdinand, Salvi Acted
Alone, DA Says; DetailedPlan Alleged in Deadly Clinic Attack, BOSTON GLOBE. Feb. 16.
1995, at 29.
52. Daly, supra note 51, at A3.
53. FACE Trial: Hill Is the FirstConvicted Under New Act, Abortion Report, October
6, 1994, available in LEXIS, Cmpgn Library, Abtrpt File.
54. Daly, supra note 51, at A3.
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imprisonment for Salvi, who is charged with two counts of murder and five
counts of attempted murder.55
By passing FACE, which criminalizes the use of force, threats, or
blockades to intimidate or to interfere with women seeking abortions or with
abortion providers, Congress has increased the cost to protestors for
obstructing access to clinics and to abortion services. 6 The government
hopes to quell the rising violence of the protests without infringing the
rights of the protestors. Whether this escalation of liability will deter Terry
and his supporters depends on whether their judicial attacks on the law's
constitutionality will succeed. 7
B. The Bray Decision: A Misguided First
Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic,5" decided on January 13,
1993, was the first Supreme Court case to apply 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)' 9 to
abortion clinic blockaders. The statute provides a federal cause of action to
those deprived of their constitutional rights against persons conspiring to

55. Id.
56. 108 Stat. at 694.
57. See Foes, supranote 20, at 3A (reporting that two anti-abortion groups filed suits
challenging the Act's constitutionality immediately after the Act took effect).
58. 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993).
59. The section reads as follows:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on
the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either
directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of
the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the
purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or
Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such State or Territory
the equal protection of the laws; or if two or more persons conspire to prevent
by force, intimidation, or threat, any citizen who is lawfully entitled to vote,
from giving his support or advocacy in a legal manner, toward or in favor of the
election of any lawfully qualified person as an elector for President or Vice
President, or as a Member of Congress of the United States; or to injure any
citizen in person or property on account of such support or advocacy; in any
case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged
therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such
conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of
having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the
party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages
occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the
conspirators.
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1988).
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deprive "any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the
laws."6 Bray was also the first consideration by the Court of a claim
based on the "hindrance clause," the second clause of § 1985(3).61
Section 1985(3) was originally enacted as section 2 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1871, also known as the Ku Klux Klan Act.62 The 1871 Act "was
a response to the massive, organized lawlessness that infected our Southern
States" during Reconstruction, and it contained both a criminal and a civil
component.63 Its modem equivalent is twofold: § 1985(3) applies to the
infringement of civil rights, and 18 U.S.C. § 241 outlines the criminal
sanctions available against conspirators who deprive persons of the right to
equal protection.6 4
The respondents in Bray were nine clinics that performed abortions or
provided abortion counseling in the greater Washington, D.C. area, and five
organizations that supported free access to abortion. 65 The petitioners were
Operation Rescue 66 and six individuals who opposed the voluntary termination of pregnancy and dedicated themselves to actions that would prevent
the further sanctioning of abortion. 67 The respondents sought an injunction
to prevent the petitioners from trespassing on the premises of abortion
clinics in or around Washington, D.C. or from preventing access to those

60. Id.
61. Marjorie Richter, Comment, Blinking at Reality: An Examination of Bray v.
Alexandria, 20 HASTTNGS CONST. L.Q. 905, 910-11 (1993) (containing an excellent
discussion of the Bray case).
62. Id. at 911; see also United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 836
(1983) ("The central theme of the bill's proponents was that the Klan and others were
forcibly resisting efforts to emancipate Negroes and give them equal access to political
power. The predominant purpose of § 1985(3) was to combat the prevalent animus against
Negroes and their supporters."). See generallyJUDGES, supra note 1, at 264 (discussing the
Bray decision). Richter also points out that the Bray opinions call it "The Ku Klux Act of
1871," rather than the more common "Ku Klux Klan Act." See, e.g., Bray, 113 S.Ct. at 779
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Richter, supra note 61, at 911 n.44.
63. Bray, 113 S.Ct. at 779 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Richter, supra note 61, at
911 (detailing the statutory history of § 1985(3)). Justice Stevens explained that in deciding
whether to apply the statute, the Court should consider "whether the controversy has a purely
local character or the kind of federal dimension that gave rise to the legislation." Bray, 113
S. Ct. at 779.
64. 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1988) (sanctioning fines of up to $10,000 and imprisonment of up'
to 10 years for each violation).
65. OperationRescue, 726 F. Supp. at 1487.
66. See discussion of Operation Rescue supra part II.A.
67. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. at 1488.
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clinics by patients and staff.6" The lower court granted injunctive relief,
and the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed its decision, adding
that abortion protestors had "crossed the line from persuasion into coercion"
by denying the respondents their legal rights.6 9
For the Supreme Court, Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion, in
which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Kennedy, and Thomas
joined. According to the majority, the sole question presented to the
Supreme Court was "whether the first clause [the "deprivation" clause] of
• . . § 1985(3) . . . provides a federal cause of action against persons
obstructing access to abortion clinics."7 Thus, as one commentator was
careful to highlight, the Court limited the legal question in Bray to "the
jurisdiction of federal courts to hear blockade cases rather than the status of
abortion rights themselves."'"
Relying on two precedents72 for an interpretation of the statute, the
majority stated that for a private conspiracy to violate the deprivation clause,
a plaintiff must prove that "some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based,
invidiously discriminatory animus [lay] behind the conspirators' action."'73
The plaintiff must also show that the goal of the conspiracy is to interfere
with rights that are protected against private and governmental infringement.74

68. OperationRescue, 914 F.2d at 584; OperationRescue,726 F. Supp. at 1486, 149697.
69. OperationRescue, 914 F.2d at 585; OperationRescue, 726 F. Supp. at 1486, 149697. The trial court granted the injunction because of interference with the plaintiffs'
constitutional right to interstate travel and defendants' violation of the Virginia state law
prohibiting trespass and Virginia common law against creation of a public nuisance. Id.at
1493-95. However, the court rejected, on First Amendment grounds, the plaintiffs' request
for an injunction against the activities of abortion protestors "that tend to intimidate, harass
or disturb patients or potential patients of the clinics." Id. at 1497.
70. Bray, 113 S.Ct. at 757-58.
71. JUDGES, supra note 1, at 264.
72. The two cases the Bray Court based its opinion were Griffin v. Breckenridgeand
Carpenters.Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 758, 763 (citing Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971)
and Carpenters,463U.S. at 825). In Griffin, three African-American plaintiffs sued a group
of whites for attacking them on a public highway. The Court held that private conspiracies
could violate 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). Richter, supranote 61, at 913 (citing Griffin, 403 U.S.
at 89-92, 107). While Griffin broadened the scope of § 1985(3), the Court in Carpenters
voted five to four that the statute does not cover conspiracies against economic groups and
therefore cannot be applied to prejudice against non-union employees, thus narrowing the
reach of the statute. Id. at 915 (citing Carpenters,463 U.S. at 838).
73. Bray, 113 S.Ct. at 758 (quoting Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102).
74. Id. at 758 (quoting Carpenters,463 U.S. at 833).
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The Court held that the respondents met neither of these two requirements.75 The first element, requiring a "class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus," was not satisfied because, contrary to what the district court
had found, women wanting to terminate a pregnancy are not a class within
the meaning of § 1985(3).76 Furthermore, the Court asserted that the
protestors opposed abortion and not women, so that they were not motivated
by gender discrimination." The second element, requiring a violation of
protected rights, was also unsatisfied. Of the two constitutional rights cited,
the right to interstate travel and the right to abortion, the former, although
protected against private conspirators, was only incidentally affected.78
The Court held that a right not directly affected does not constitute a
sufficient basis for proving discriminatory animus. 79 In addition, the right
to abortion, while targeted by the petitioners, is not protected against private
interference.8"
Because neither element was satisfied, the majority
concluded that the respondents' § 1985(3) deprivation claim failed.8"
Even more damaging to the pro-choicers was the Court's unwillingness
to rule on the hindrance clause claim. 2 In contrast, the three dissenting

75. Id.
76. Id. at 759. Justice Scalia maintained that although it is unclear what the term "class"

encompasses beyond a class defined by the race of its members as the term was used in
Griffin, it must mean more than a group of persons engaged in conduct of which the
defendant being tried under § 1985(3) disapproves. Id. Because it reasoned that the protests
did not target women as a class, the Court also declined to rule whether women qualify as
a class for purposes of the conspiracies that § 1985(3) prohibits. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 759.
Thus, the Court did not interpret the hesitant "perhaps" left undefined in Griffin and did not
shed light on whether class-based discrimination under the statute can include gender
discrimination, as well as racial prejudice. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
77. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 759-60. Justice Scalia explained that "[w]hatever one thinks of
abortion, it cannot be denied that there are common and respectable reasons for opposing it,
other than hatred of or condescension toward ... women as a class .... " Id. at 760. He
did not, however, list those reasons.
78. Id. at 762; see also OperationRescue, 726 F. Supp. at 1494. In Operation Rescue,
the trial court deliberately sidestepped the abortion issue, reasoning that the holding in
Webster suggested that a woman's right to abortion may no longer be constitutionally
guaranteed. Id. (citations omitted). The court concluded that in order to resolve the instant
case, "it is unnecessary and imprudent to venture into this thicket." Id.
79. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 762.
80. Id. at 764.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 764-65. Justice Scalia noted that a claim based on the second clause of §
1985(3) had never been presented to the Court for resolution. Id. at 767. But quixotically
he proceeded to give a substantial analysis of the claim, as if it were before the Court. Bray,
113 S. Ct. at 765. He concluded that a close reading of the statute makes it clear that a
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opinions all agreed that the petitioners had violated the second clause of §
1985(3)." The hindrance clause bans any protest which seeks to hinder
the state authorities from protecting the rights of persons in the state.84
Thus, the Court cut off access to both sections of the statute as a legal
framework for putting an end to the abortion protests, "the kind of zealous,
politically motivated, lawless conduct that led to the enactment of the Ku
Klux Klan Act in 1871 and gave it its name. 85
According to the dissenting justices, the majority refused to apply either
clause of § 1985(3) because it erroneously assumed that the issue in dispute
was the defendants' opposition to abortion.86 The dissenters argued
vigorously that this case was only superficially about abortion. They
claimed that the substantive issue before the Court was whether the
government could use its authority to end a national conspiracy based on
disregard for the law.87 They further asserted that the Court could have
ensured protection of a woman's right to abortion from those who want the
government to rescind that right. Instead, by reversing the district court's
decision to grant injunctive relief, the Court condoned the anti-abortionists
conduct directed at preventing every woman from taking advantage of the
constitutional right to terminate her pregnancy. 8
As the dissenting
opinions aptly demonstrated, the majority sidestepped a historic opportunity
to invoke federal jurisdiction over abortion protestors, who have become
"organized and violent mobs across the country."89

hindrance clause claim required the same two elements as the deprivation clause claim and
therefore would fail for the same two reasons: a lack of class-based animus, and the absence
of a right protected against private conspiracies. Id. at 765-67.
83. Id. at 779 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), 795 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting), 805 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice Souter concluded that the finding of a
violation of the hindrance clause, which he called the prevention clause, required express
clarification from the district court and recommended that the case be remanded for that
purpose. Id. at 769. Justice Stevens stated his opinion more forcefully; he asserted that the
respondents unquestionably proved a hindrance clause claim. Id. at 795 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).

84. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1988).
85. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 782 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 798.

87. Id.
88. Id. at 788.
89. Id. at 780.
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By foregoing this opportunity, the Supreme Court in Bray yielded its
judicial lawmaking authority to the legislative branch, allowing Congress to
draw the line between legal clinic picketing and illegal clinic blockades.9"
III. FACE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
A. Abortion Politics
In the years preceding the Roe v. Wade9' decision, the legislative and
executive branches of the federal government kept a low profile in the
abortion controversy, allowing the states to regulate the issue. 92 Since Roe,

and until recently, although Congress initiated a remarkable number of
proposals affecting abortion, "abortion politics [was] a controversy where
rarely have so many public officials worked so hard to say so little about an
issue on the minds of so many citizens."93
Examination of legislative records show that in the past two decades
Congress has confronted the abortion issue itself only indirectly.94 Of note
are the passage of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act in 19789' and the
enactment of the Adolescent Family Life ("AFL") Demonstration Projects
in 1981,96 also known as the Chastity Act.97

The ban on employer

90. See 108 Stat. 694: see also infra note 193 and accompanying text (distinguishing
between peaceful picketing and violent obstruction).
91. 410 U.S. at 113.
92. Devins, supra note 20, at 294. Through the 1960s, following a 100 years of political
inaction, 23 states changed their abortion legislation, four by repealing their abortion laws and
19 by liberalizing them. Id. (citations omitted). Devins also indicates that even when
Congress acted on abortion prior to Roe, it did no more than "preserve the anti-abortion
status quo ante." Id. (citations omitted).
93. Id. at 295 & n. 15 (citing Amy Gutmann, No Common Ground,NEW REPUBLIC, Oct.
22, 1990, at 43).
94. Although Congress has not acted to codify the holding in Roe granting women a
right to abortion in the first trimester of pregnancy prior to fetus viability, a pro-choice
initiative, known as the Freedom of Choice Act of 1993, was introduced in the first session
of the 102d Congress. Devins, supra note 20, at 298 & n.23 (citing H.R. 25, 102d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1991)). Currently, the initiative is pending in both the House and the Senate. Bill
Tracking Report, H.R. 25 and S. 25, availablein LEXIS, Legis Library, Bltrck File. The Act
would prevent a state from restricting a woman's right to choose abortion either prior to fetal
viability or whenever the woman's life or health is threatened by the pregnancy. Id.
95. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988).
96. Id. § 300z-10. The legislation provides that "grants may be made only to projects
or programs which do not advocate, promote, or encourage abortion." Id. § 300z-10(a).
97. See generally Devins, supra note 20, at 301. Devins cites these two pieces of
legislation as examples of Congress refraining from restricting abortion funding and defeating
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discrimination against pregnant women broadened the scope of rights
afforded to working women, by equating pregnancy discrimination with
gender discrimination.98 But in addition to this praiseworthy achievement,
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act also allowed employers to exclude
abortions from health insurance benefits.99 The AFL Demonstration
Projects legislation attempted to discourage unwanted pregnancies, and
hence the need for abortions, by providing religious groups with federal
funding to promote sexual abstinence among teenagers.' 0 Under closer
scrutiny, it is clear that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act encourages a
woman to give birth rather than to abort the fetus, and the AFL legislation
advocated abstinence, thereby averting the need for abortion.' 0 Both acts
illustrate the conservative posture of Congress regarding abortion rights.
Otherwise, legislative activity has consisted mostly of placing
limitations on abortion funding, although Congress has avoided legislating
actual restrictions on access to abortion services. Beginning in 1976,
Congress started cutting off Medicaid funds for abortions. 02 Legislators
stopped funding abortion services in federal programs on family planning,
American assistance to foreign countries, legal aid, arhied forces hospitals,
and prisons, as well as limited the funds for abortions in the District of
Columbia.'0 3 Because of this lack of federal funding, unrestricted access
to abortion has receded further and further from the reach of economically
disadvantaged women who are often in the greatest need of federally
subsidized abortion services.
Although Congress has not shifted its position on abortion funding
restriction for several reasons, the recent enactment of the Freedom of
Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994 marks a turning point in congressional involvement in abortion politics. First, by criminalizing violence and
the threat of violence at abortion clinic entrances, FACE safeguards a
woman's right to receive abortion services. Second, the fact that the antiabortion and pro-choice factions of Congress could agree on the need for
FACE reveals a congressional consensus that a woman's right to choose
should be free from physical intimidation. Third, by providing federal
legislation, Congress has acknowledged that the problem of abortion clinic

attempts to overrule the Supreme Court holding in Roe. Id.
98. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988).

99. Id.
100. Devins, supra note 20, at 301.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 300 (citing material from CRAIG & O'BRIEN, supra note 20, at 110-37).
103. Id. (citing material from CRAIG & O'BRIEN, supra note 20, at 112-13, 131).
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blockades is now a national problem that can best be handled on the
national level. With the enactment of FACE, the federal legislative and
executive branches have finally confronted the abortion issue squarely and
discovered that a limited compromise is possible.
B. Evolution of FACE
A bill similar to the House of Representatives version of the enacted
law was first introduced in Congress in 1992."4 The House Subcommittee on Crime and Criminal Justice conducted a hearing on the proposal on
May 6, 1992.'05 The Subcommittee heard testimony on the abortion clinic
blockades and protests that had disrupted health care services both in
Wichita, Kansas during the summer of 1991 and in Buffalo, New York, in
the spring of 1992.106 Both the violence and the national scope of these
demonstrations brought obstruction of clinic access to the attention of
federal lawmakers. 7 The House did not have the opportunity to consider
enactment of House Bill 1703 in 1992, but the bill paved the way for further
action in the 103d Congress. House Bill 796 was introduced on February
3, 1993, as the next version of FACE.'0 8
Although the House took initiative by introducing a bill to address the
rising violence of the ongoing abortion protests, it was the Senate proposal,
Senate Bill 636, which was presented to the President on May 17, 1994.109
President Clinton signed the bill into law on May 26, 1994, which was
entered into the Congressional Record on June 7, 1994."10 Senator
Edward M. Kennedy introduced the bill on the Senate floor on March 23,
1993, and that same day it was referred to the Senate Labor and Human

104. H.R. REP. No. 306, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. 1 (1993), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 699, 699 (referring to H.R. 1703, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992)).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. H.R. 796, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); 139 CONG. REC. H483 (daily ed. Feb. 3,
1993); see also Bill Tracking Report, H.R. 796, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., availablein LEXIS,
Legis Library, BLT103 (containing a synopsis of the bill's progress through the House from
its introduction on Feb. 3, 1993, to the last action taken on Mar. 17, 1994, when House Bill
796 was incorporated into Senate Bill 636).
109. S. 636, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994); see generally Bill Tracking Report, S. 636,
103d Cong., 1st Sess., availablein LEXIS, Legis Library, BLT103 (containing a synopsis
of the bill's progress through the Senate from its introduction on March 23, 1993, to the final
action taken on June 7, 1994, when the newly signed law was entered into the Congressional
record).
110. Bill Tracking Report, S. 636, supra note 108.
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Resources Committee for consideration."' In his remarks, the senator
noted the grisly statistics in the war being waged against free access to
abortion facilities: "Over 100 clinics have been torched or bombed in the
past 15 years. Over 300 have been invaded and over 400 have been
vandalized. Already this year, clinics have sustained more than $1.3 million
in damage from arson alone.""'
He then stressed that only federally
toll
of
"nationwide extremist acts" and the
enacted laws can stop the rising
resulting damage to property and to the well-being of clinic patients and
staff."3 The senator's statement echoed that of William S. Sessions,
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who wrote prior to the
enactment of FACE that current federal legislation was inadequate to handle
the violent obstruction of abortion clinic entrances. "' Although it took
another fourteen months for the bill to become law, the majority of the
members of Congress eventually agreed with Senator Kennedy that the
situation demanded action on the federal level.
The text of the bill printed in the record at the request of Senator
Kennedy contained a section, since expunged," 5 outlining the congressional findings," 6 and represented the initial version of Senate Bill 636,

111. 139 CONG. REC. S3523-25 (daily ed. Mar. 23, 1993) (containing the full text of the
original version of Senate Bill 636); see also id. at S3479 (referring the bill to the Committee
on Labor and Human Resources). Senator Kennedy's introductory remarks included the
following statement: "Mr. President, today we are introducing legislation to protect women,
physicians, and other health personnel, and public and private health clinics, from opponents
of abortion who resort to violence, blockades, and other vigilante tactics." Id. at S3523. The
senator spoke less than two weeks after Dr. David Gunn was murdered outside a clinic in
Pensacola, Florida. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
112. 139 CONG. REC. S3523 (daily ed. Mar. 23, 1993).
113. Id. at S3524. Several months later, Senator Kennedy, in a speech to his colleagues,
reiterated his plea for speedy congressional action to put a stop to the mounting violence.
"It is not enough for Congress simply to condemn this reprehensible conduct. Legislation
must be enacted before another doctor dies, or another clinic is blockaded or burned to the
ground." Id. at SI1,311 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1993) (remarks entitled, The Tragedy of
Continuing Anti-Abortion Violence).
114. The Freedom ofAccess to ClinicEntrancesAct of 1993: Hearingon S. 636 Before
the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. 5 (1993)
[hereinafter Hearing](letter from William S. Sessions. Director, FBI, to Sen. Tom Harkin).
115. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 488, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2 (1994), reprintedin 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. 699, 724 (deleting the Findings section in the Senate Bill but including some
of the factual findings in the Purpose section).
116. 139 CONG. REc. S3524 (daily ed. Mar. 23, 1993). The following is a partial text
of the findings:
SEC. 2. CONGRESSIONAL STATEMENT OF FINDINGS AND PURPOSE.
(a) Findings. - Congress finds that -
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which was to undergo four subsequent rewritings." 7 Dated May 13,
1994,"18 the fifth and final version incorporated House Bill 796, which had
become part of Senate Bill 636 on March 17, 1994." ' Thus, in tracking
the evolution of the Act, the development of the Senate Bill is more
instructive.
For two months following the introduction of Senate Bill 636 on March2
23, 1993, co-sponsors were added at subsequent congressional sessions.' 1
The next significant event in the bill's evolution was the Senate Labor and
Human Resources Committee hearing on May 12, 1993.12' The testimony
given at the hearing 22 formed the basis for the committee report dated

(1) medical clinics and other facilities offering abortion services have been
targeted in recent years by an interstate campaign of violence and obstruction
aimed at closing the facilities or physically blocking ingress to them, and
intimidating those seeking to obtain or provide abortion services;
(2) as a result of such conduct, women are being denied access to, and health
care providers are being prevented from delivering, vital reproductive health
services;
(3) such conduct subjects women to increased medical risks and thereby
jeopardizes the public health and safety; ...
(6) such conduct operates to infringe upon women's ability to exercise full
enjoyment of rights secured to them by Federal and State law, both statutory and
constitutional, and burdens interstate commerce[;] ...
(10) the obstruction of access to abortion services can be prohibited, and the
right of injured parties to seek redress in the courts can be established, without
abridging the exercise of any rights guaranteed under the First Amendment
Id.
117. The fifth version was adopted by both the Senate and the House in May 1994 and
was sent to President Clinton to sign. 140 CONG. REC. H3135 (daily ed. May 5, 1994),
S5628 (daily ed. May 12, 1994), S5824 (daily ed. May 17, 1994); see also Full Text of Bills,
1994 S. 636, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., available in LEXIS, Legis Library, BTX103.
118. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 488.
119. 139 CONG. REC. H1519 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 1994).
120. Bill Tracking Report, S. 636, supra note 108.
121. Hearing,supra note 114, at 1.
122. Senate Report 117 quotes extensively from the statements of two of the witnesses
at the hearing, Attorney General Janet Reno and Harvard University Law Professor Laurence
H. Tribe. S. REP. No. 117, 103d Cong., Ist Sess., pts. IV & V (1993), availablein LEXIS,
Legis Library, Cmtrpt File. Attorney General Reno expressed her opinion concerning the
need for federal legislation to discourage the use of violence during abortion protests. She
testified as follows:
This is a problem that is national in scope. It is occurring throughout the
country; on the doorstep of the Nation's Capital; in Alexandria and Falls Church
in northern Virginia; in Pensacola and Melbourne in Florida; in West Hartford,
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day "with an amendment
July 29, 1993 and reported in the Senate the same
23
Bill.
Senate
the
of
substitute"
a
of
in the nature
This second version retained the congressional findings of fact outlining
the necessity for such legislation and defending its constitutionality. 24
But version two of the bill added four paragraphs to the original section
entitled, "Congressional Statement of Findings and Purpose.' 1 25 These

CT; in Wichita, KS; in Fargo, ND, and Dallas, TX, just to name a few of the
more visible incidents. Moreover, much of the activity has been orchestrated by
groups functioning on a nationwide scale. Because of this nationwide scope, the
problem transcends the ability of any single local jurisdiction to address it.
Hearing, supra note 114, at 9 (statement of Janet Reno, Attorney General of the United
States).
Professor Tribe testified concerning the ability of the Act as conceived to withstand the
expected constitutional challenges from its opponents:
[N]o court in the history of this country has ever suggested that the Bill of
Rights prevents Congress from limiting its prohibitions to those acts of force that
are deliberately intended by the actor to interfere with the finite, congressionally
specified set of activities or rights.
The first amendment just does not include any kind of 'all or nothing'
requirement.
Id. at 91. Professor Tribe also commented on a statement made by Professor Michael
McConnell regarding Senate Bill 636 that "Congress has selected a single point of
view-opposition to abortion-and subjected it to penalties applied to-no other point of
view." Id. at 92 (quoting Professor McConnell). He maintained that the "singling-out"
argument does not apply to the bill as written:
The ...objection ... completely misstates what this proposed bill does.

It does not select a point of view at all. What it selects is a specific lawful
activity-the provision of abortion services-and then it prohibits those acts and
only those acts that are intended to interfere forcibly with that specific lawful
activity.
Id.

123. S.REP. No. 117.
124. 139CONG. REc. S15,655-56 (daily ed.Nov. 16, 1993); seealsosupranotes114-15

and accompanying text.
125. 139 CONG. REc. S15,655-56 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1993); see also S. REP. No. 117,
pt. V.C. (discussing the sources of constitutional authority permitting Congress to regulate
clinic access). The Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources found that:
Congress has clear constitutional authority to enact [FACE] under the
Commerce Clause, which gives it authority to regulate interstate commerce.
...
Further, once Congress finds that a class of activities affects interstate
commerce, Congress may regulate all activities within that class, even if any of
those activities, taken individually, has no demonstrable effect on interstate
commerce.
Id. at pt. V.C.1. The Committee also found that §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, provides
independent authority to enact the Act because § I of the Amendment prohibits deprivation
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additional facts emphasized the national scope of the problem and clarified
the connection between the operation of the clinics and interstate commerce." 6 The statement of purpose in section 2(B) also added a reference
to "activities affecting interstate commerce" and empowered State Attorneys
General, together with the Attorney General
of the United States, to bring
27
statute.
proposed
the
under
action
an
In addition, the second version dropped two sections that mandated a
study of the effect of the proposed legislation on national reproductive28
health services and that called for an investigation of past violations.
As a result of the latter deletion, FACE would not criminalize past offenses,
but only violations occurring subsequent to its enactment. Furthermore, the
second version expanded the definitions section to explain the words
"interfere with," "intimidate," and "physical obstruction," thus specifying the
types of conduct that the bill prohibited.' 29
The most significant change was the expansion of the term "abortion
services" to read "abortion-related services" throughout subsequent Senate
versions."O This alteration of the language broadened the location of the
prohibited conduct to encompass clinics which counsel alternatives to
abortion, as well as those that provide abortion services. Finally, the July
1993 version added a fourth section "expressly provid[ing] ...that [the
Act] will apply only to conduct occurring on or after the date of its

of "liberty" without due process and § 5 gives Congress the power to enforce the
Amendment. Id. at pt. V.C.2. In Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2791, the Supreme Court reaffirmed
the holding in Roe that a woman's right to choose abortion is protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. Thus, the Committee found two sources of constitutional authority to support
the congressional enactment.
126. 139 CONG. REC. S15.655-56 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1993).
127. Id. at S15,656; S. REP. No. 117, pt. X.
128. 139 CONG. REC. S15,655 (daily ed.Nov. 16, 1993) (dropping proposed § 2715(c)(d) of version one); see also id. at S3524 (daily ed. Mar. 23, 1993) (setting forth text of
proposed § 2715(c)-(d)). The Senate version of the Act originally proposed inclusion of the
new provision ensuring clinic access in Title 42, the title governing public safety and welfare,
as § 2715. Id. at S3523. The sponsors reasoned that because the Senate bill was modeled
after the other civil rights legislation contained in this title, its rightful location would be in
Title 42, as an amendment of the Public Health Service Act, alongside such laws as §
1985(3). S.REP. No. 117, pt. V.A.1; see discussion supra part I.B. (discussing 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985(3) (1988) in the context of abortion clinic blockades); see also 139 CONG. REC.
S3523 (daily ed. Mar. 23, 1993) (introducing the bill in the Senate as a proposed amendment
to 42 U.S.C. § 300aaa).
129. 139 CONG. REc. S15,656 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1993).
130. Id. at S15,655-56; see also S. REP. NO. 117.

Published by NSUWorks, 1995

229

Nova Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 3 [1995], Art. 1

1995]

Franco

1103

enactment," 3 1thus specifically prohibiting retroactive application of its
provisions.
The third version, dated November 16, 1993, contained several
substantive changes to the previous proposal. First, a new section, unrelated
to abortion services, was inserted to protect the exercise of religion "at a
place of worship."' 32 Second, an addition to the proposed section govern3
ing penalties 3 distinguished between violent and nonviolent offenses,1 1
and reduced the maximum penalties for violations not involving force or the
threat of force, as proposed by Senator Kennedy. 35 The addition also
lowered the ceiling for criminal fines under Title 18 from $100,000 for first
offenses and $250,000 for subsequent offenses to $10,000 and $25,000,
respectively.' 36 Third, an insertion in the pivotal first section. outlining
the prohibited conduct, changed "obtaining or providing abortion-related

131. 139 CONG. REC. S15.656 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1993); S. REP. No. 117, pt. V.A.4.
132. 139 CONG. REC. S15,728 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1993). The full text of the proposed
section reads:
Whoever ...by force or threat of force or by physical obstruction, intentionally
injures, intimidates or interferes with or attempts to injure, intimidate or interfere
with any person lawfully exercising or seeking to exercise the First Amendment
right of religious freedom at a place worship ... shall be subject to the penalties
provided in subsection (b) and the civil remedies provided in subsection (c) ..
Id. The phrase "at a place of worship" was subsequently changed in the final version of
FACE to read "a place of religious worship." 108 Stat. at 694 (emphasis added).
The Hatch Amendment, adopted on November 16, 1993, would "guarantee that
religious liberty is protected against Government intrusion. Through this amendment,
religious liberty would also be protected against private intrusion - in exactly the same way
that S.636 would protect abortion." 139 CONG. REc. S15,660 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1993)
(remarks of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch). Senator Hatch was one of four senators of the seventeenmember Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee to vote against adoption of the
proposed Senate Bill 636 on June 23, 1993. S.REP. No. 117, pt. 1.
133. 139 CONG. REC. S15,728 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1993).
134. Proposed § 2715(b)(2) was expanded with the insertion of the following provision:
[E]xcept that for an offense involving exclusively a nonviolent physical obstruction, the fine shall be not more than $10,000 and the length of imprisonment shall be not more than six months, or both. for the first offense: and the
fine shall be not more than $25,000 and the length of imprisonment shall be not
more than 18 months, or both, for a subsequent offense ....
139 CONG. REC. S15,728 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1993).
135. Id.at S15,669.
136. Id. at S15,728; see also 140 CONG. REC. S5596 (daily ed. May 12, 1994)
("Nonviolent obstructions of clinics do not warrant the same maximum penalties as violence,
death threats, or destruction of property.").

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol19/iss3/1

230

et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
1104

Nova Law Review

Vol. 19

services" to "obtaining or providing pregnancy or abortion-related servic'
es."137
As in the change from the original version of Senate Bill 636 to
the second version, where the term "abortion services" was changed to
"abortion-related services," this last alteration again ensures that the bill will
prohibit the obstruction of clinics counseling alternatives to abortion, as well
as those performing abortions.
In addition, the November 1993 version of Senate Bill 636 added a
provision to the section specifying the Rules of Construction. The new
provision addressed possible abridgement of the First Amendment rights of
abortion protestors.'3 8 This addition specifically concerned freedom of
speech and expanded the fifth Rule of Construction included in the first two
versions of the bill, which states that "[n]othing in this section shall be construed or interpreted to . . . prohibit expression protected by the First
Amendment ....
'9 This same element was repeated in an additional
section, but was deleted in the enacted version of the bill. 40 Nonetheless,
its inclusion here indicates the adamant stance of the anti-abortion legislators
against the possible infringement of the protestors' rights to free speech and
the willingess of the pro-choice senators to compromise so that the bill
would be enacted.
On November 18, 1993, the House of Representatives debated its latest
version of House Bill 796 and added several amendments.' 4 ' Four months
later, the House voted to substitute its November 1993 version of the bill for

137. 139 CONG. REc. S 15,727 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1993) (setting forth text of proposed
§ 2715(a)(1)) (emphasis added).
138. Id. at S15,728. Section 2715(d)(6) reads: "Nothing in this section shall be
construed or interpreted to... create new remedies for interference with expressive activities
protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution, occurring outside a medical facility,
regardless of the point of view expressed." Id.
139. Id.
140. The additional section contained the following language:
Sec. 4. Rule of Construction.
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, nothing in this Act shall be
construed to interfere with the rights guaranteed to an individual under the First
Amendment to the Constitution, or limit any existing legal remedies against
forceful interference with any person's lawful participation in speech or peaceful
assembly.
Id.
141. 139 CONG. REc. H10,093-94, H10,098, H10,109 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 1993). The
full amended text can also be found in the Senate proceedings. 140 CONG. REc. S4183
(daily ed. Apr. 12, 1994).
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the then current version of Senate Bill 636142 by a recorded vote of 237
yeas and 169 nays, with twenty-seven Representatives not voting.'43 This
House amendment became the fourth version of Senate Bill 636.
During an impassioned late night" debate preceding the vote,
Representative McKinney, speaking in support of the Act, declared that
"[t]his bill is directed at terrorists and their malicious acts of violence.
These individuals are blocking real live Americans from exercising their
constitutional rights."' 45 Representative Hyde spoke against the Act with
equal vehemence, encouraging his colleagues to "resist it because it
destroys, it shreds, it does violence to the constitutional precept of equal
protection of the law," by singling out anti-abortion protestors because of
their views. 4 6 These remarks highlight the sharp differences of opinion
among the members of Congress.
Similarly, a comparison of the House 4 7 and Senate'4 8 bills (version
three) illustrates the differences in the outlook between the two Houses.
The most obvious of these are as follows: 1) The Senate bill begins with
a Congressional Statement of Findings and Purpose, which is absent from
the House version; 49 2) the Senate bill amends Title 42 of the United
States Code governing the public health and welfare, while the House bill
appends its proposal to Title 18 of the Code, governing crimes and criminal
procedure; 3) the Senate bill refers to "pregnancy or abortion-related
services" throughout, while the House bill refers to "reproductive health
services;" 4) the Senate proposal includes a prohibition against interference

142. See supranotes 130-38 and accompanying text (discussing the changes in the third
version of Senate Bill 636).
143. 140 CONG. REc. H1519 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 1994).
144. Representative Schroeder, who moved to make the substitution, apologized for the
lateness of the hour, and continued: "In my entire tenure I have never seen us have to go
through this extraordinary procedure to go to conference on a bill that passed 69 to 30 in the
other body, and on the motion to recommit it here it was defeated 246 to 182." Id. at
H1 510. Thus, although a definitive majority in the House supported passage of the bill and
the need for a conference with the Senate to work out differences concerning the specifics
of the legislation, the debate dragged on as members rose to vent personal feelings. For
example, Representative Bunning disclosed that four members of his immediate family were
active in Operation Rescue, but he insisted that "[n]ot one of them poses any kind of threat
of violence whatsoever." Id. at H1500.
145. Id. at H1520 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 1994).
146. Id. at H 1513.
147. 140 CONG. REc. S4183 (daily ed. Apr. 12, 1994) (text of version four of the bill).
148. 139 CONG. REc. S15,727 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1993) (text of version three of the
bill).
149. See supra notes 108, 114-15 and accompanying text.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol19/iss3/1

232

et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue

1106

Nova Law Review

Vol. 19

with the freedom of religion, which is absent from the House bill; 5 5)
the House bill does not include the distinction in penalties between violent
and nonviolent physical obstruction which the Senate version incorporated;
6) the Rules of Construction in both versions explicitly refer to First
Amendment protection of expression, but the Senate bill includes other
guarantees such as the right "to seek other available civil remedies;"''
and, 7) the Senate version defines "interfere with," as well as "intimidate."' 52 Thus, a conference was necessary to reach a viable compromise
between the House's blanket approach to stopping the violence and the
Senate's more narrowly defined solution to the problem.
In an accompanying motion, the House voted 228 in favor and 166
against, with thirty-nine members not voting, to "insist on its amendments
to [Senate Bill] 636 and request a conference with the Senate thereon."'5
A month later, the Senate agreed to the House's request for a conference.' 54 On April 26, 1994, the conferees appointed by each chamber
agreed to file a conference report.'55 The resulting document highlights
the differences between the Senate and the House and the resolution of these
differences. 5 6 This compromise led to congressional enactment of the
Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994 on May 26, 1994,11
and provided a new impetus for the deterrence of abortion-related violence.
C. Legislative Intent
In their separate committee reports recommending the enactment of
FACE, both the House Committee on the Judiciary and the Senate
Committee on Labor and Human Resources explained the purpose of the

150. 139 CONG. REC. S15,727 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1993) (setting forth the text of
proposed § 2715(a)(2)).
151. Id. (setting forth the text of proposed § 2715(d)(4)).
152. See generally H.R. CONF. REP. No. 488 (listing the differences between the two
versions of the legislation before explaining the compromise reached).
153. 140 CONG. REC. H1519-20 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 1994).
154. Id. at S4183 (daily ed. Apr. 12, 1994). Representative Mitchell requested that the
House version of Senate Bill 636 be presented to the Senate. Id. He then requested
"unanimous consent that the Senate disagree to the House amendments and agree to the
request for a conference with the House on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses ...
This request was also granted, and the presiding officer appointed nine conferees. Id.
155. Id. at D487 (daily ed. Apr. 26, 1994).
156. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 488.
157. 140 CONG. REC. D627 (daily ed. June 7, 1994) (listing Senate Bill 636 as a new
public law, Pub. L. No. 103-259).
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The House committee members intended that the Act
legislation. 5
prevent the mounting violence generated by the abortion protest movement. 59 In contrast, the Senate committee sought to protect a woman's
right to seek an abortion. 6 These two divergent points of view epitomize
the most significant difference between the House version of FACE and its
Senate counterpart: the House version 16 ' amended Title 18 of the United
States Code addressing criminal acts, while the Senate proposal amended
Title 42 of the Code safeguarding civil rights. 6 Thus, the House bill
emphasized the criminalization of the act of blocking abortion clinics, while
the Senate bill focused on preserving women's freedom of access to clinics.
Illustrative of this dichotomy are the descriptive headings each house
chose for the operative section of the bill. The House of Representatives
proposed an amendment to Title 18 by the addition of section 248 entitled,
"Blocking access to reproductive health services.' 63 The Senate proposed
an amendment to Title 42 by the addition of section 2715 entitled,
"Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances.' 6 4
The compromise in the enacted legislation was twofold: First, a
statement of purpose was included based on the one which appeared as a
preface to section 2715 in the Senate proposal, but omitting the extensive
list of congressional findings in Senate Bill 636.165 Instead, the House
proposed incorporation of part of the findings in the statement of purpose,
which also now refers to the imposition of "Federal criminal penalties" and
the provision of civil remedies for violations of the Act.' 66 The prefatory
statement also uses the word "violent" to describe the banned conduct, thus
highlighting the need for criminal penalties as well as distinguishing the
illegal violent conduct from legal nonviolent, peaceful activity. 67 Further158. H.R. REP. No. 306; S. REP. No. 117.
159. H.R. REP. No. 306, pt. I ("The purpose of the ... Act is to prevent the growing
violence accompanying the debate over the continued legality and availability ofabortion and
other reproductive health services.").
160. S. REP. No. 117, pt. V.C.2. ("The ... Act seeks to protect the right to terminate
a pregnancy, a right that falls squarely within the rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment.").
161. 140 CONG. REC. S4183 (daily ed. Apr. 12, 1994).
162. 139 CONG. REC. S15,728 (daily ed. Nov. 16. 1993); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 488, pt.
3 ("Codification"); see also supra notes 127-31 and accompanying text.
163. 140 CONG. REc. S4183 (daily ed. Apr. 12, 1994).
164. 139 CONG. REc. S15,727 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1993).
165. Id.; see also H.R. CONF. REP. No. 488, pt. 2.
166. 108 Stat. at 694 (quoting from "Sec. 2. Purpose."); see also H.R. CONF. REP. No.
488, pt. 2.
167. 108 Stat. at 694.
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more, the statement echoes the use of the word "intentionally" as found in
section 248(a), "Prohibited Activities," and adds the term "intended to" to
describe the banned conduct. 68 This addition also addresses the criminal
component of the legislation by indicating that conviction under the Act
requires intent.
Second, the title of the operative section is now a hybrid between the
two versions. While the legislation remains located within Title 18, Crimes
and Criminal Procedure, as the House favored, the inclusion of the concept
"Freedom of" in its name suggests a protected civil right, more appropriately
found under a Title 42 heading.' 69
As a result of a further compromise between the two houses, the word
"abortion" appears only once in the Act, as part of the fourth Rule of
Construction.' 70 The conferees agreed to replace the only reference to
abortion, which appeared throughout the Senate version in the phrase
"pregnancy and abortion-related services," with the House terminology,
"reproductive health services."' 7 ' Furthermore, in section 248(e)(5) the
phrase "including services relating to pregnancy or the termination of
pregnancy" is added to the definition of "reproductive health services." '
This substitution replaced the definition of "pregnancy and abortion-related
services" in the Senate's version of section 2715(e)(5). The phrase
"reproductive health services" better expresses the conferees' intent that
FACE apply to blockages of clinics that offer counseling on alternatives to
abortion, as well as clinics that provide abortion services. 173 Thus,
Congress intended that the Act be perceived as evenhanded, outlawing
blockades of abortion clinics by abortion protestors, as well as criminalizing
similar conduct by pro-choice demonstrators.
Several other alterations of section 248(e), containing definitions of key
terms, were intended to guard against challenges to the Act's constitutional-

168. Id.
169. Id.; 140 CONG. REc. S4183 (daily ed. Apr. 12, 1994); 139 CONG. REc. S15.727
(daily ed. Nov. 16, 1993).
170. 108 Stat. at 696 (setting forth the text of 18 U.S.C. § 248(d)(4)). According to the
Conference Report, the word "abortion" was a concession to the Senate conferees for their
agreement to omit a provision from § 248(a)(1) that nothing in this section shall be
"construed as 'expanding or limiting the authority of States to regulate the performance of
abortions or the availability of pregnancy or abortion-related services."' H.R. CONE. REP.
No. 488, pt. 9(d). Thus, the word "abortion" can be said to have crept back into the Act
through the back door.
171. 108 Stat. 694; H.R. CONE. REP. No. 488, pt. 4.
172. H.R. CONE. REP. No. 488, pt. 10(a).
173. Id.
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ity. For example, the conferees agreed to retain the Senate's inclusion of
a definition of the verb "interfere with," noting that the phrase "injure,
intimidate, or interfere with" is patterned after existing federal civil rights
laws, and that these terms are intended to have the same meaning. 7 4
Furthermore, the conferees noted that the language in section 248(a)
describing the person or class of persons against whom certain conduct is
proscribed also stemmed from existing federal civil rights laws.'7 5 By
carefully modeling this Act after existing legislation that has not fallen to
judicial challenge, Congress meant to avert an attack on the legislation's
constitutionality.
In addition, the final version of the Act retains the Senate definition of
'
"physical obstruction" as rendering access "hazardous."176
The conferees
noted that this definition was taken from a Texas penal statute that has
withstood a First Amendment challenge. 77 Moreover, in a final supplement to both versions of the bill, the House agreed to the inclusion of a
severability clause to guard against defeat of the whole Act should one part
be held unconstitutional. 7
These decisions concerning the content of
FACE indicate a cautious approach to the issue of the Act's constitutionality, which has sometimes been absent in Congress' prior enactments.' 79
In a coup for the Senate conferees, the oddly-placed prohibition against
interference with religious worship remained a part of the final enactment. 8 But the House inserted the word "religious" before the word
"worship" in the reference to "place of worship" in section 248(a)(2). 8 '
Apparently, the House members of the conference committee intended to
ensure that this section did not create a new cause of action and remedy for

174. Id. at pt. 10(c).
175. Id. at pt. 5.
176. 108 Stat. at 696.
177. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 488, pt. 10(d).
178. Id.at pt. 11.
179. Devins, supranote 20, at 318-19. Devins asked, "Does elected government take
seriously its responsibility as constitutional interpreter?" Id. at 318. He then cited legislation
in which legislators did not concern themselves with the constitutionality of their legislation,
e.g., the AFL Demonstration Projects, and proposals of which Congress carefully examined
all the constitutional implications, e.g., the Freedom of Choice Act of 1989. Id. at 318-19
(footnotes omitted); see also supranote 93 (discussing the Freedom of Choice Act). Devins
concluded that the answer is neither yes nor no, but somewhere in between. Devins, supra
note 20, at 318.
180. 108 Stat. at 694; H.R. CONF. REP. No. 488, pt. 6.
181. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 488, pt. 6.
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interference with worship outside a clinic.8 2 The final version of section
248(d)(2) repeats this caution and also states that the Act shall not 8be3
interpreted to create new remedies for interference with free speech.
Thus, the conferees concerned themselves with narrowing the scope of the
Act to avoid creating a new federal tort, as well as broadening it to include
free access to places of religious worship.
Overall, the final version of FACE is more concise than the Senate bill
and more cognizant of civil rights than the House bill. For example, the
lengthy Senate section on congressional findings and purpose was deleted
from the final version; the six Senate Rules of Construction plus the
additional section, "Rules of Construction," were pared down to four
rules.'84 But these four constitute two more than appeared in the House
version. 185
With respect to civil rights, the final version contains several safeguards
not present in the House bill. Two examples illustrate this focus on civil
rights in the Senate proposal. First, the finalized Rules of Construction
include a prohibition on limiting any existing causes of action for interference with the exercise of free speech or the free exercise of religion.'86
This prohibition was absent from the House version. 8 7 This Rule of
Construction would safeguard a person's right of access to the courts and
thus his or her civil rights. Second, and more important, the House bill
Thus, the
omitted any restriction on who may bring a private suit.'
House version may be interpreted as constraining the civil rights of the
protestors, since it created a potentially larger pool of plaintiffs who could
force them to defend their actions in court. In contrast, the Senate bill
provided more protection for abortion protestors by allowing fewer persons
the right to file a suit against them.

182. Id.
183. 108 Stat. at 696.
184. Id.
185. See 140 CONG. REc. S4183 (daily ed. Apr. 12, 1994).
186. 108 Stat. at 696; see also H.R. CONF. REP. No. 488, pt. 9(b).
187. See 140 CONG. REC. S4183 (daily ed. Apr. 12, 1994).
188. Id. 18 U.S.C. § 248(c)(1) reads: "RIGHT OF ACTION GENERALLY-Any
person who is aggrieved by a violation of subsection (a) of this section may in a civil action
obtain relief under this subsection." Id. (emphasis added). In contrast, the Senate bill limited
the person who may bring a private suit to someone either obtaining services from, or
providing services in, a clinic. 139 CONG. REc. S15,728 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1993) (setting
forth the text of proposed 42 U.S.C. § 2715(c)(1)(A)); see also H.R. CONF. REP. No. 488,
pt. 8(a).
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However, most protective of civil rights is the retention of the Senate's
version of the penalties for violations of the Act."8 9 This section distinguishes between nonviolent and violent prohibited conduct by lowering the
maximum criminal fines and prison terms for nonviolent physical obstruction.' 90 In its final version, the bill creates different categories of offenses.
It punishes physical obstruction without force by fines and imprisonment
and it imposes stiffer fines and longer prison terms on violent obstruction.'
However, it specifically excludes peaceful picketing from punishment.'92 On the one hand, the bill is not meant to reach peaceful demonstrators;' 93 but on the other hand, FACE contains stiff penalties for persons
who use violence to express their views.
Congress' intent in passing FACE was to stop "the massive wave of
violence, intimidation, and harassment directed at clinic patients and
personnel across the country."'9 4 To achieve this necessary end, Congress
created legislation to punish those who obstruct access to legal medical
services at clinics. The need for such a law is clear because the only cure
for a national campaign of violence is national legislation.'"
D. The Opposition
Throughout the congressional debate on FACE, the legislators opposing
FACE repeated several reasons for their opposition to the enactment of
legislation aimed at deterring abortion clinic blockades. 96 The foremost
189. 139 CONG. REC. S15,728 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1993).
190. 108 Stat. at 695; H.R. CONF. REP. No. 488, pt. 7(a); see also supra notes 124-27

and accompanying text.
191. 108 Stat. at 695.
192. 18 U.S.C. § 248(d)(1) (1988).
193. 140 CONG. REC. S5596 (daily ed. May 12, 1994). According to Senator Kennedy:
Those who are picketing peacefully outside clinics, praying or singing, or
engaging in sidewalk counseling and similar activities that do not block the

entrances have nothing to fear from the law. Those activities are protected by
the first amendment. and this legislation does not restrict them.
Nor does this legislation discriminate against any particular viewpoint..
The only conduct it prohibits is violent or obstructive conduct that is far
outside any constitutional protection.
Id.
194. Id. at S5596-97 (remarks of Sen. Kennedy).
195. Id. at S5597.
196. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 117, pt. IX; H.R. REP. No. 306; 139 CONG. REc. S15,719

(daily ed. Nov. 16, 1993). According to Senator Smith, who was a vocal opponent of FACE
during the debate preceding the adoption of the third Senate version of the bill: "To sum up,
... there are five reasons why [Senate Bill] 636 should be defeated. First, it is extreme.
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criticism voiced by the minority was that the Act is not facially neutral and
instead, discriminates against the anti-abortion movement.
First, opponents accused the supporters of the bill of targeting the
movement because the current political fashion mandates a pro-abortion or
pro-choice point of view. 197 According to Senator Hatch: "Unfortunately,
[Senate Bill] 636 ...is not really about stopping violence outside abortion
clinics. It is about punishing purely peaceful civil disobedience on behalf
of a cause that is not politically correct."' 9'
Second, opponents criticized the legislation as treating abortion
protestors unequally. According to the dissenting views appended to House
Report 306, the House bill did not protect abortion protestors, whose
activities take place outside a facility. 99 The language of the bill protected only those persons inside a facility who are "obtaining or providing
reproductive health services." 0 0 According to Senator Smith, the result
was that under the bill, a nun peacefully saying her rosary outside a clinic
subjects herself to imprisonment of up to eighteen months and fines of up
to $25,000 for blocking the entrance.2 ' 1 Opponents pointed out that although the bill set lower jail terms and fines for nonviolent physical
obstruction, its failure to eliminate the penalty for a peaceful blockade
means that those who protest abortion are treated less favorably than owners
of abortion clinics or their patients.0 2
Furthermore, the members of the Senate Committee on Labor and
Human Resources who opposed adoption of the bill wrote in their dissent
that the proposal for ending violence at clinic entrances is hostile to the antiabortion point of view.20 3 They cited two examples of this hostility.
First, the legislation singles out the anti-abortion movement for penalties that
cannot be applied to other causes employing similar tactics. 2 4 This
singling-out occurs because the legislation prohibits physical obstructions
only of facilities providing reproductive health services.20 5 Second, the

Second, it sets a terrible precedent. Third, it is vague. Fourth, it is hypocritical. And fifth,
it is unconstitutional." Id. at S15,722.
197. 140 CONG. REc. S5598 (daily ed. May 12, 1994).
198. Id.
199. H.R. REP. No. 306 (referring to § 248(a)(1) printed in the House report).
200. Id.
201. 139 CONG. REc. S15,723 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1993).
202. 108 Stat. at 695 (referring to § 248(b)(2)).
203. S. REP. No. 117, pt. IX.
204. Id.

205. 108 Stat. 694.
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bill uses vague and overbroad terminology that would chill free speech.2"6
The opponents contend that both these effects render the legislation
unconstitutional.2 07
Finally, opponents of the bill objected to the legislation as unnecessary.
They claim that existing state laws adequately protect abortion facilities and
that the Supreme Court decision in Scheidler2 "8 provided a suitable federal
remedy for clinic blockades. 2 9 House Report 306 pointed to the 70,000
arrests of abortion protestors in five years as evidence that local law
enforcement authorities can handle the protests without federal intervention. 2 0 Furthermore, the House report quoted from Justice Kennedy's
concurring opinion in Bray and argued that existing federal statutes already
provide for federal assistance to local authorities.2" ' In addition, opponents of the bill pointed to the Supreme Court's holding in Scheidler that
abortion protestors violate the federal racketeering laws when they conspire
to force clinics out of business.2"
With RICO 2 3 available for use
against violent clinic blockades, opponents asserted that Congress should not
have enacted another federal law to solve the problem.
Supporters of the legislation pointed out, however, that state law cannot
deal effectively with a phenomenon that is interstate or one in which local
206. S. REP. No. 117, pt. IX (citations omitted). See also 139 CONG. REC. S15,723
(daily ed. Nov. 16, 1993), in which Senator Smith cited the term "physical obstruction" as
unconstitutionally vague, even though the bill includes a definition of the term in 18 U.S.C.
§ 248(e)(4). 108 Stat. at 696.
207. "[S]peech on issues like abortion lies at the core of first amendment protections.
.'[D]ebate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."' H.R. REP. No.
306 (quoting NAACP v. Claibome Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982)). The dissent
concluded that any legislation that inhibits or chills free speech is unconstitutional. In
addition, House Report 306 cited another case that held that the government may not single
out speech because it disapproves of the topics presented. Id. (citing R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992)). Opponents of the bill assert that any hint of this type of
viewpoint discrimination would render it unconstitutional.
208. 114 S. Ct. at 798.
209. E.g., 140 CONG. REC. S5598 (daily ed. May 12, 1994). According to Senator
Hatch, state laws contain even more severe penalties for violent obstruction than the bill
would impose. Id.
210. H.R. REP. No. 306.
211. Id. Justice Kennedy suggested that 42 U.S.C. § § 10501, 10502(2)-(3) are available
to the states and local authorities. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 769 (Kennedy, J., concurring). These
statutes empower the United States Attorney General to use federal law enforcement
resources at the request of a state. Id.
212. Marcia Coyle, Clinics Win One: Justices Accept RICO Use Against Protesters;
Free Speech Challenge Lies Ahead, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 7, 1994, at 1.
213. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1988).
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authorities sometimes refuse to act."1 4 According to Attorney General
Janet Reno's testimony before the Senate Committee on Labor and Human
Resources, "[t]he reluctance of local authorities to protect the rights of
individuals provides a powerful justification for the enactment of federal
protections that has been invoked previously by Congress in passing laws
to protect civil rights." '
Supporters of the bill also maintained that
RICO is not a forceful deterrent to the violence of abortion clinic blockades.
Under the federal racketeering laws, the clinic owners and users would have
difficulty in establishing the liability of the protestors."1 6 Thus, RICO
would be too unwieldy a legal tool for stopping the violent obstructions and
is not an adequate replacement for FACE.217
The overwhelming support for FACE in Congress deflated the
arguments of the bill's opponents against its passage.2" 8 Nevertheless, of
all their objections to the Act, the minority argued most persuasively that the
Act constitutes a breach of the protestors' right to free speech. The
Supreme Court decision in Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.,219
handed down on June 30, 1994, declined to endorse the petitioners' free
speech arguments. 22' Although the context was a challenge to a state
court injunction and was not based on the newly enacted FACE, as a result
of the Court's decision, challengers of the new legislation may find it
difficult to convince the courts to overturn FACE on these First Amendment
grounds.
The Madsen decision, the third Supreme Court opinion on the abortion
issue in eighteen months, 221 is also noteworthy because it represents the
first judicial comment on abortion clinic blockades since the enactment of
FACE. The ruling constitutes an important milestone in the Act's progress

214. H.R. REP. No. 306.
215. Hearing,supra note 114, at 14 (statement of Janet Reno, Attorney General of the
United States); see also supra note 122 (quoting Attorney General Reno on the nationwide
scope of the abortion protests).
216. Coyle, supra note 212, at 37.
217. 140 CONG. REc. S5596 (daily ed. May 12, 1994).
218. Id. at S5628 (presenting results of vote in the Senate on adoption of House
Conference Report 488, 69 yeas and 30 nays, with one Senator not voting); see also id. at
H3122-23 (recording the vote in the House of Representatives on the Conference Report, 236
yeas and 181 nays, with 15 Representatives not voting).
219. 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994).
220. Id.
221. The three cases heard and decided by the Supreme Court since January 1993 are
Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 753; Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. at 798; and Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2516.
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toward judicial validation because it involved the same conduct that FACE
criminalizes: physical obstruction of abortion clinic entrances.
IV.

THE MADSEN DECISION:

THE FIRST STEP IN

PRESERVING FACE
The petitioners in Madsen22 2 challenged the constitutionality of a
Florida state court injunction that banned abortion protests.223 The
injunction restricted the time, manner, and place of demonstrations outside
a health clinic in Melbourne, Florida owned by the respondents.224 The
petitioners based their constitutional challenge to the court order mainly on
a violation of their First Amendment right to freedom of speech.225
However, the Court rejected the petitioners' First Amendment arguments in
part and upheld a provision of the injunction banning demonstrations and
picketing within a thirty-six foot "buffer zone" around the clinic ent22 6
rance.

222. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2516. The petitioners here were three of the named
individual petitioners in the case heard by the Florida Supreme Court: Judy Madsen, Ed
Martin, and Shirley Hobbs. See OperationRescue, 626 So. 2d at 679.
223. Madsen, 114 S.Ct. at 2521.
224. Id. The Court noted that it granted certiorari because of a conflict between
OperationRescue, upholding the injunction, and a decision by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit striking down the same injunction. Id. at 2523 (comparing
OperationRescue with Cheffer v. McGregor, 6 F.3d 705 (1993)). In Cheffer, the circuit
court struck down the injunction, reasoning that "[tihe clash . .. is between an actual
prohibition of speech and a potential hinderance to the free exercise of abortion rights."
Cheffer, 6 F.3d at 711.
225. Madsen, 114 S.Ct. at 2523. The petitioners brought several additional challenges
to the injunction. First, they claimed that it was vague and overbroad because the injunction
was applied to all persons or groups acting "in concert' with the petitioners. Id. at 2530.
Second, they objected to the "in concert" provision as an unconstitutional limit on their
freedom of association. Id.
The Court rejected the claims, reasoning that the petitioners lacked standing to sue on
behalf of parties not before the Court. Id. The Court held that in any case the provision is
neither vague nor overbroad, "but is simply directed at unnamed parties who might later be
found to be acting 'in concert' with the named parties." Id. With respect to the restriction
of the petitioners' freedom of assembly, the Court held that this First Amendment guarantee
"does not extend to joining with others for the purpose of depriving third parties of their
lawful rights," thus indirectly affirming that women have a legal right to seek medical
services. Madsen, 114 S.Ct. at 2530.
226. Id.
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To evaluate a possible infringement of the First Amendment rights of
the petitioners, the Court adopted the Florida Supreme Court's interpretation
of the injunction as addressing activities in a traditional public forum.227
Next, the Court followed Florida's lead in refusing to apply the strict
scrutiny level of analysis required for a content-based restriction of free
speech.22 Instead, it agreed with the Florida Supreme Court that the
restrictions against the abortion protestors were content-neutral.229 After
a detailed analysis of content-neutrality, the Court decided that the
injunction was unbiased because it did not discriminate against abortion
protestors based on their anti-abortion beliefs.23 Consequently, the Court
concluded that it should apply a lesser level of scrutiny in judging the
injunction's validity.23 '

227. Id. at 2522; OperationRescue, 626 So. 2d at 671. The Florida Supreme Court
concluded that petitioners' protests took place on "public streets, sidewalks, and rights-ofway," all of which fall within the definition of a traditional public forum. Id. at 671 (citing
Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 480 (1988)).
228. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2522. The Florida court stated that under strict scrutiny the
state must prove that the restriction is "necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that
it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end." OperationRescue, 626 So. 2d at 671 (citing Perry
Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)).
229. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2523.
230. Id. The Court reasoned that "[a]n injunction, by its very nature, applies only to a
particular group (or individuals) and regulates the activities, and perhaps the speech, of that
group." Id. The Court concluded that the fact that the injunction covered only people who
were against abortion did not prove it was content-based, and therefore held that it was
content-neutral. Id. at 2524. In addition, the Court found no evidence in the record that a
Florida court would not issue a similar restraint for any such conduct, whether or not related
to abortion. Id. at 2523.
231. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2524; OperationRescue, 626 So. 2d at 671. The level of
scrutiny identified by the Florida Supreme Court that covers content-neutral restrictions on
activities in a traditional public forum is intermediate. Id An intermediate level of scrutiny
asks whether the restrictions are "narrowly-tailored to serve a significant government interest,
and leave open ample alternative channels of communication." Id. (using the standard
formulated in Perry for a lesser level of scrutiny).
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Under the test the Court developed for a content-neutral injunction, 2
it first held that the thirty-six foot buffer zone around the clinic entrances
and its driveway did not infringe on the protestors' First Amendment right
to free speech. 3 Subsequently, the Court found the limitations in the
injunction on the high noise levels near the clinic to be constitutional.234
The other contested provisions of the injunction were struck down as
violating the First Amendment rights of the abortion protestors.2 " The
provisions that did not pass muster included a thirty-six foot protest-free
area on private property to the north and west of the clinic, and a 300-foot
zone in which protestors could not approach persons arriving at the
clinic. 6 In addition, the Court struck down a provision that would have
created a 300-foot zone around staff residences where protestors were
banned from demonstrating or using bullhorns. 7 The Court held that

232. The Court's new test for content-neutral injunctions is more stringent than the test
in Perry adopted by the Florida Supreme Court to decide the constitutionality of the
injunction. See Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2524. The Court reasoned that an injunction requires
closer scrutiny than a similarly content-neutral statute because court-made orders carry a
greater risk of discrimination than generally applicable statutes. Id. Thus, the test the Court
formulated requires determining "whether the challenged provisions.. . burden no more
speech than necessary to serve a significant government interest." Id. at 2525 (citations
omitted).
Both Justices Scalia and Stevens agreed with the majority's conclusion that the
injunction was content-neutral, in contrast to the holding of the Eleventh Circuit in Cheffer
that the injunction was content-based. See id. at 2531 (citing Cheffer, 6 F.3d at 711). But
both disagreed with the majority and with each other concerning the correct level of scrutiny
to be applied to an injunction that does not discriminate on the basis of the expressive
message of the protestors. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2525, 2531 (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part), 2534 (Scalia, J., concurring in thejudgment in part and dissenting in
part). Justice Stevens would apply a more lenient standard. Id. at 2531 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Scalia, on the other hand, ridicules the
majority's standard as "intermediate-intermediate" and says it is "frankly too subtle for me
to describe." Id. at 2538 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part). Instead, he would apply strict scrutiny to the injunction because, among other reasons,
discriminatory restrictions on speech are as much a risk in granting injunctive relief as in
passing a statute. Id. Thus, according to Justice Scalia, the majority's distinction between
a content-neutral injunction and a similarly content-neutral statute is irrelevant. Id.
233. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2528.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 2529-30.
236. Id.
237. Id.
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these provisions "sweep more broadly than necessary" to achieve the
aims238 of the injunction.239
While the six to three24 Supreme Court decision in Madsen barring
protestors from a thirty-six foot clinic buffer zone might constitute a
temporary setback to the anti-abortion movement, 4 ' it does not significantly affect the anti-abortionists long-term goal of shutting down abortion
clinics across the country.24 2 More important, the reasoning in Madsen,
though instructive as to the use of injunctive relief against abortion
protestors, is presumptively not applicable to a discussion of the possible
infringement of First Amendment rights in the context of a statute such as
FACE. The Court itself carefully made a distinction between an injunction
and a statute in deciding what level of scrutiny to apply in judging the
validity of an injunction. 243 As Senator Kennedy aptly pointed out a
month and a half prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in Madsen, its
outcome has no direct bearing on the constitutionality of FACE because the
two contexts differ.244 The Madsen injunction creates a speech-free buffer
zone, whereas FACE provides penalties for specific protest activities.245

238. The Court agreed with the Florida court's holding that the protestors' obstruction
of clinic entrances affected four significant governmental interests. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at
2526. These interests included protecting a woman's access to legal medical services,
guarding the public safety, ensuring unobstructed traffic, and protecting property rights of
private citizens. Id.; see also OperationRescue, 626 So. 2d at 672 (discussing government
interests).
239. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2530.
240. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion, in which Justices Blackmun,
O'Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg joined. Id. at 2520. Justice Souter concurred in the
opinion; Justice Stevens concurred in part and dissented in part; and Justice Scalia concurred
in the judgement in part and dissented in part in which Justices Kennedy and Thomas joined.
Id.
241. Craig Crawford, Justices 'DecisionDealsAbortionFoesa Setback, SUN-SENTINEL,
July 1, 1994, at IA. The article also quoted several pro-choicers who considered the decision
a victory for abortion advocates. Id. For example, the director of a clinic in Lauderhill,
Florida that performs abortions was quoted as saying she was "very gratified" by the decision
and hoped the local authorities will now enforce the laws against clinic entrance obstruction.
Id.
242. OperationRescue, 626 So. 2d at 667 n.3; see supranotes 10-11 and accompanying
text.
243. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2524; see supra note 230.
244. 140 CONG. REC. S5596 (daily ed. May 12, 1994).
245. According to Senator Kennedy, in Madsen the Court ruled on the constitutionality
of an injunction banning all protest activities within a specified buffer zone, even if the
activity does not block the clinic entrance. Id. The Senator contrasted this sweeping
prohibition with the narrowly tailored ban in FACE. which only forbids the physical
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Indirectly, however, any decision concerning the abortion issue is
instructive as to the current position of the Supreme Court. The Madsen
decision, reaffirming a woman's right to unobstructed access to abortion
services, may indeed signal the face of things to come. As such, the Court's
evolving position on the abortion issue may persuade anti-abortion groups
to refrain from mounting a free speech challenge to FACE's constitutionality.
V.

CONCLUSION:

OPERATION RESCUE-AN EPILOGUE

Less than a week after the United States Supreme Court ruled in
Madsen in favor of abortion advocates, leaders of Operation Rescue and two
other anti-abortion groups organized what was billed as a massive protest
against FACE in Little Rock, Arkansas.24 6 Instead, police officers and
pro-choice supporters outnumbered anti-abortionists at the small gathering
to mark the start of the three-day "Summer of Justice" demonstrations, as
the challenge to FACE fizzled in the rain.247
The protest was the first nationally-mounted anti-abortion demonstration since the enactment of FACE, whose purpose is to stem the rising
violence during abortion clinic blockades.24
The resulting peaceful
encounter in Little Rock might have been a harbinger of the success of
FACE in discouraging Operation Rescue and its followers from using force
to eliminate abortion as an option for American women. More likely,
however, is that the recent spate of fatal shootings at clinic entrances249
highlights the usefulness of FACE as a prosecutory tool and not as the
deterrent to violence envisioned by its congressional sponsors.
Helen R. Franco
obstruction of entrances. Id. He also pointed out that the petitioners conceded the validity
of the parts of the injunction that banned clinic entrance blockades. Id. The Senator
concluded that the issue of clinic entrance blockades was not before the Court in Madsen and
therefore its outcome would not affect the more specific prohibitions in FACE. Id.
246. 60 Join Protestat 2 ArkansasAbortion Clinics, N.Y. TIMEs, July 8, 1994, at A18
[hereinafter 60 Join Protest].
247. Id.; see also Arkansas: No Arrestsas Pro-Life DemonstrationsBegin, Abortion
Report, supranotes 20, 28 (daily ed. July 8, 1994). The spokesperson for the local police
department commented that the anti-abortion groups did not draw enough supporters for the
confrontation they planned. 60 Join Protest,supra note 246, at A18. "It looks like they
haven't gotten enough people here to do anything else than picket," the spokesperson said.
Id. (quoting Lieutenant Charles Holladay).
248. See supra notes 157-59 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 45-55 and accompanying text.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Until recently, the risk of a bank's insolvency was borne primarily by
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC").'
However, the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 19932 includes the National
Depositor Preference provision3 which, for the first time, places both

I.

A federal regulatory authority that began operating in 1934 and that supervises
insured state banks and provides insurance protection to both commercial banks
and thrifts for deposits of up to $100,000 in separate insured funds: the Savings
Association Insurance Fund (SAIF) for savings associations and the Bank
Insurance Fund (BIF) for banks.
ALAN GART, REGULATION, DEREGULATION, REREGULATION: THE FUTURE OF THE BANKING,
INSURANCE, AND SECURITIES INDUSTRIES 395-96 (1994). "The FDIC was created in 1933

in response to the Great Depression to 'preserve solvency of insured banks and thus to keep
open the channels of trade and commercial exchange."' Senior Unsecured Creditors' Comm.
of First Republicbank Corp. v. FDIC, 749 F. Supp. 758, 767 (N.D. Tex. 1990) (quoting Weir
v. United States, 92 F.2d 634, 636 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 761 (1937)).
2. Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312 (1993). The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1993 is "[a]n act to provide for reconciliation pursuant to section 7 of the concurrent
resolution on the budget for fiscal year 1994." Id.
3. Id. § 3001, 107 Stat. at 336 (amending 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(I1) (1988 & Supp. V
1993)).
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insured4 and uninsured5 depositors of FDIC insured depository institutions6
("banks")7 ahead of unsecured (general) creditors' in a bank liquidation. 9
Prior to the passing of this legislation, depositors and unsecured
creditors shared a bank's liquidated assets on a pro rata basis, except for
those banks located in one of the twenty-nine states that already had
depositor preference laws which applied only to thrifts and state-chartered
banks.'0 The National Depositor Preference provision applies to all banks,
and state laws governing the distribution of a failed bank's assets will be
preempted if they are inconsistent with the new federal law." The risk of
a bank's insolvency is now borne by the unsecured creditors, rather than
depositors of the bank.
"Though it was sold merely as an alternative to levying federal
examination fees on state-chartered institutions, depositor preference . . .
will have many far-reaching and numerous unintended consequences.""
This provision effectively relieves the burden carried by both the FDIC and
taxpayers when a bank fails.

4. "Subject to paragraph (2), the term 'insured deposit' means the net amount due to any
depositor for deposits in an insured depository institution .
12 U.S.C. § 1813(m)(1)
(1988 & Supp. V 1993).
5. "The term 'uninsured deposit' means the amount of any deposit of any depositor at
any insured depository institution in excess of the amount of the insured deposits of such
depositor (if any) at such depository institution." Id. § 1813(m)(3). Depositors with accounts
containing more than $100,000 risk losing part of their principal and interest earned if the
bank holding their account becomes insolvent and its assets are liquidated.
6. "The term 'insured depository institution' means any bank or savings association the
deposits of which are insured by the Corporation pursuant to this Act." Id. § 1813(c)(2).
7. "The term 'bank' . . . means any national bank, State bank, and District bank, and
any Federal branch and insured branch;
(B) includes any former savings association that(i) has converted from a savings association charter; and
(ii) is a Savings Association Insurance Fund member."
Id. § 1813(a)(1).
8. An general creditor is "[a] creditor at large ... or one who has no lien or security
for the payment of his debt or claim." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 368 (6th ed. 1990). A
creditor at large is "[o]ne who has not established his debt by the recovery of a judgment or
has not otherwise secured a lien on any of the debtor's property." Id.
9. Liquidation is the "process of reducing assets to cash, discharging liabilities and
dividing surplus or loss" among the banks' creditors. Id. at 931.
10. H.R. REP. No. 213, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
11. Id.
12. Bert Ely, Surprise! Congress Just Enacted the Core Banking System, AMERICAN
BANKER, Sept. 21, 1993, at 24.
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Before the National Depositor Preference provision was enacted, the
FDIC paid insured depositors up to $100,000 a per lost deposit, 4 and
attempted to recoup the depositor insurance payout through either liquidation
of the failed bank's assets or by allowing the failed institution to be acquired
by another bank. 5 Both secured and unsecured creditors of the bank were
reimbursed from the liquidated assets of the bank before the FDIC was fully
reimbursed, causing the FDIC to suffer great losses. As a result, the FDIC
deposit insurance fund 6 was depleted and taxpayers were forced to pick
up the tab.
With this in mind, part two of this article will discuss the recent history
of bank failures in the United States, providing the reader with a better
understanding of the impossible task that both the FDIC and Congress face
in attempting to protect taxpayers as well as the integrity of the banking
system. In part three, this article will provide an overview of the historical
development of depositor preference. Part four will define national
depositor preference and explain why it was included as part of the budget
bill. Part five will analyze the possible effect depositor preference will have
on unsecured creditors. In part six, the potential effect on the banking

13. "The net amount due to any depositor at an insured depository institution shall not
exceed $100,000.
... 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1)(B) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
14. The term "deposit" means:
the unpaid balance of money or its equivalent received or held by a bank or
savings association in the usual course of business and for which it has given or
is obligated to give credit, either conditionally or unconditionally, to a commercial, checking, savings, time, or thrift account, or which is evidenced by its
certificate of deposit, thrift certificate, investment certificate, certificate of
indebtness, or other similar name, or a check or draft drawn against a deposit
account and certified by the bank or savings association, or a letter of credit or
a traveler's check on which the bank or savings association is primarily liable

Id. § 1813(0(1).
15. When one bank acquires another, the two banks enter into a purchase and
assumption agreement. Through a purchase and assumption transaction, all deposits and other
liabilities of general creditors are assumed by a new or existing bank. Downriver Community
Fed. Credit Union v. Penn Square Bank, 879 F.2d 754, 764 n.8 (10th Cir. 1989). Therefore,
despite a bank failure, all depositors and other unsecured creditors are made whole instead
of simply receiving a pro rata share of the liquidated assets. Id. "[Since] 1960 about threefourths of all failed commercial banks and, until Penn Square Bank, all failures over $100
million in size [had] been handled through purchase and assumption transactions (P & As)."
Id. (citing FDIC, DEPOSIT INSURANCE IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT 6 (1983)).
16. The bank insurance fund is the "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC")

unit providing deposit insurance for banks other than thrifts."
INVESTMENT TERMS 31 (3d ed. 1991).
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industry will be discussed. Finally, this article will conclude that the
National Depositor Preference provision is not the solution to the bank
failure problem because it only treats a symptom, rather than the cause of
the problem. A national depositor preference scheme, while saving the
FDIC money in the short run, will do more harm than good, especially to
smaller banks and small businesses, because of the attempt by unsecured
creditors to protect themselves from the possibility of losing everything if
their bank fails.
II. THE TROUBLED BANKING SYSTEM AND THE FDIC
Traditional banking functions consist of accepting deposits, offering
checking privileges, and making loans. 7 Until recently, banks were able
to make a profit by concentrating strictly on traditional banking services
because federal regulation gave them a monopoly" in those services.
However, this monopoly situation no longer exists because other financial
institutions 9 have entered traditional banking markets. Savings are now
placed into a variety of investments other than bank accounts, such as
corporate,2" federal and municipal2' bonds, purchase money mortgages,22
and other investments that offer a greater return than deposit accounts at

17. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(1)(B)(i)-(ii) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
18. A monopoly is "control of the production and distribution of a product or service
by one firm .... " DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMs 259 (3d ed. 1991).
19. A financial institution is "[a]n institution that uses its funds chiefly to purchase
financial assets as opposed to tangible property. . . . Nondeposit intermediaries include,
among others, insurance companies, pension companies, and financial companies. Depository
intermediaries include commercial banks, savings banks, savings and loan associations, and
credit unions." GART, supra note 1, at 396.
20. A corporate bond is a:
debt instrument issued by a private corporation ... [that] typically [has] four
distinguishing features: 1) [it is] taxable; 2) [it has] a par value of $1000; 3) [it
has] a term maturity-which means they come due all at once-and are paid for
out of a sinking fund accumulated for that purpose: 4) [it is] traded on major
exchanges, with prices published in newspapers.
DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMs 87 (3d ed. 1991).
21. A municipal bond is a "debt obligation of a state or local government entity." Id.
at 264.
22. A purchase money mortgage is a "[mortgage] given by a buyer in lieu of cash for
the purchase of property." Id. at 345.
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banks.23 Additionally, money market funds24 offer checking privileges.2 5
Finally, loans are being made by a diversity of nonbank firms.26 The
bank's role as a financial intermediary, providing transaction services to
customers, and making a profit doing so, has been diminished because of
strong competition and advances in technology. 2 Heavy regulation of the
banking industry, while attempting to diminish the risk of bank failure, is
actually restricting the banking industry's ability to compete with nonbank
institutions. Subsequently, heavy regulation may actually have the adverse

effect of increasing the risk of bank failure.
Bank failures are attributable to many of the same causes which result
in the failure of other businesses.28 If a business becomes inefficient or
obsolete, it will no longer profit, and over time, it will fail. 29 "An obsolete
firm fails because consumer demand is too low to generate a price that is
.. high [enough] to cover the firm's ... costs... "30 Nonbank financial
institutions are offering not only the same services as banks, but also a wide
variety of other services that attract depositors and borrowers away from
banks. Therefore, to a great degree, banks are becoming obsolete.3'

23. JONATHON R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, BANKING LAW AND REGULATION
37 (1992).
24. A money market fund is a mutual fund "that invests in commercial paper, banker's
acceptances, repurchase agreements, government securities, certificates of deposit and other
highly liquid and safe securities, and pays money market rates of interest .... Such funds

usually offer the convenience of checkwriting privileges."
INVESTMENT TERMS 258 (3d ed. 1991).

DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND

25. MACEY & MILLER, supra note 23, at 37.
26. Id. For example, insurance companies, mortgage companies, pension funds, and
consumer finance firms. Id.
27. Id. Technology has eroded the banks' traditional informational edge that they once
had over other financial institutions. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Bank Failure:
The Politicizationof a Social Problem, 45 STAN. L. REV. 289, 294 (1992). One of the
reasons that banks profited was because they had a distinct informational advantage that
enabled them to make highly informed credit decisions. Id. Technology has given everyone
access to this same information. Id.
28. Id. at 290. The article is a summary and analysis of several recent books on the
failure of bank regulation. Included are: JAMES R. BARTH ET AL., THE FUTURE OF
AMERICAN BANKING (1992); LOWELL L. BRYAN, BANKRUPT: RESTORING THE HEALTH AND
PROFITABILITY OF OUR BANKING SYSTEM (1991); HELEN A. GARTEN, WHY BANK
REGULATION FAILED: DESIGNING A BANK REGULATORY STRATEGY FOR THE 1990S
JAMES L. PIERCE, THE FUTURE OF BANKING (1991).

(1991);

29. Id.
30. Macey & Miller, supranote 27, at 290.
31. Id.
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Banks and banking regulatory agencies facilitated their own destruction
by creating the monopoly banks enjoyed for so many years.32 When any
industry enjoys abnormally high profits, new entrants will be attracted to it
until it is no longer profitable to enter the market. When too many
companies enter a market, supply becomes greater than demand and only the
most cost-efficient firms that offer the most attractive products survive.
In the banking industry, the new entrants that compete directly with
banks are financial institutions like insurance companies, investment
banks,33 pension funds,34 and credit unions35 which, unlike their bank
counterparts, do not have to comply with costly regulations, such as those
that restrict the banks' activities.36 Although banks no longer enjoy a
monopoly in their market, they continue to be regulated as though they were
a monopoly.37 This has the effect of burdening the banking industry with
all of the costs associated with heavy regulation while simultaneously
prohibiting banks from competing in many profitable ventures.38 Thus,
rising costs and lower profits have led to increased bank failures over the
last several years.
In an effort to make up lost profits resulting from the changing
environment of the financial services industry, banks have increasingly
invested in riskier assets. "If there is any reason the insured might prefer
that an insured loss occur, or be inclined to be less careful to avoid the loss,
39 The protection of depositor funds
there is said to be a moral hazard."
by the FDIC has created a moral hazard that causes banks to take greater
chances. If the risks pay off, the shareholders gain a great deal, and if the
risks fail, the shareholders only lose up to their initial investment.4" In

32. Id. Politicians created the banking cartel because of their need and desire to have
banks at their disposal. Id. It was a very cozy arrangement.
33. An investment banker is a "firm, acting as underwriter or agent, that serves as
intermediary between an issuer of securities and the investing public." DICTIONARY OF
FINANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMS 210 (3d ed. 1991).

34. A pension fund is a "fund set up by a corporation, labor union, governmental entity,
or other organization to pay the pension benefits of retired workers." Id. at 315.
35. A credit union is a"not-for-profit financial institution typically formed by employees
of a company, a labor union, or a religious group and operated as a cooperative. Credit
unions may offer a full range of financial services and pay higher rates on deposits and
charge lower rates on loans than commercial banks." Id. at 93.
36. Id.
37. Macey & Miller, supra note 27, at 291.
38. Id.
39. SPENCER L. KIMBALL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INSURANCE LAW 134 (1992).
40. MACEY & MILLER, supra note 23, at 37.
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contrast, the FDIC has everything to lose and nothing to gain. Additionally,
deposit insurance keeps banks viable because it enables them to attract the
funds necessary for these risky investments at below market rates. Without
insurance, a bank would be forced to increase the interest rate earned by
depositors in order to compensate for the increased danger associated with
these riskier investments. Not only are banks investing in riskier assets, but
unlike nonbank financial institutions, whose assets are balanced by equity
debt, a bank's assets (largely illiquid) are balanced against demand debts
(highly liquid).4 Thus, if there is a run on a bank,42 due to a rumor of
bad investments or a bank panic,43 the bank will be unable to liquidate its
assets to pay off its liabilities. Consequently, another bank will fail.
When a bank fails, the FDIC becomes the receiver of the failed
institution and can either liquidate the bank's assets or allow another bank
to enter into a purchase and assumption agreement with the failed bank.44
If the first option is chosen, the failed bank is dissolved by the FDIC in an
attempt to pay off the creditors of the bank.4 5 If the assets are insufficient
to satisfy the claims of creditors, insured depositors will receive up to
$100,000 per deposit, and uninsured depositors will receive a pro rata
distribution of the remaining assets. After these payments are made, the
unsecured creditors will be paid, if money is left.46 Before the creation of
depositor preference, unsecured creditors and depositors would receive
payment, if any, from the bank's liquidated assets on a pro rata basis.
The overprotective treatment of banks by the FDIC has made the
$100,000 insurance coverage limit for insured deposits relatively unimportant.47 "In 861 of the 1086 bank failures during the 1980s, the FDIC either
found another bank to take over the operations of the failed bank through
a P&A or provided financial assistance to give the bank time to recover or

41. Macey & Miller, supra note 27, at 296.
42. A run on a bank is a "[s]ituation in which a large number of depositors of a bank
lose confidence in the safety of their deposits and attempt to withdraw their funds from the
bank." GART, supra note 1, at 400. "A bank failure resulting from a bank run occurs when
illiquid bank assets are sold at a loss to meet depositors' requests for funds." Rowena A.
Pecchenino, Risk-Based Deposit Insurance: An Incentive Compatible Plan, 24 J.MONEY,
CREDIT & BANKING 499, 501 (1992).

43. A bank panic is "[tlhe simultaneous failure of many banks."
at 391.
44.
45.
46.
47.

GART,

supra note 1,

Id. at 158.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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arrange a merger." ' The result, in these instances, is that neither uninsured depositors or unsecured creditors lost any money.4 9 "In the remaining 225 failures, insured deposits were transferred to another bank or were
paid off up to the $100,000 limit of coverage."5 Most of these banks
were smaller institutions. Thus, uninsured depositors, unsecured creditors,
and the FDIC suffered losses.'
Losses suffered by uninsured depositors and unsecured creditors, when
a small bank fails, create a shift of funds to larger banks. 2 Large banks
are protected by the "too big to fail" doctrine, thus effectively making
deposit insurance obsolete. 3 The underlying rationale behind the "too big
to fail" doctrine is that by allowing a large bank to fail, problems would be
created throughout the entire banking industry. 4 Therefore, all of the
deposits at the largest banks are fully protected because if a large bank were
headed toward insolvency, the FDIC would intervene.
Smaller banks,
however, are not protected in such a manner.
In November 1990, Freedom National Bank, a relatively small,
minority-owned, Harlem-based bank became insolvent as a result of
numerous speculative loans that went bad. The FDIC decided to close
and liquidate the bank... because the failure of the bank would not
have any serious repercussions on the rest of the banking system. Large
customers received about 50 cents on the dollar for deposits in excess
of $100,000. Charitable organizations, such as the National Urban
League and the Negro College Fund, and several churches suffered
losses. William Seidman, then FDIC chairman, testified before
Congress that "My first testimony when I came to this job was that it's
unfair to treat big banks in a way that covers all depositors but not
small banks. I promised to do my best to change that. Five years later,
I can report that my best wasn't good enough." It is interesting to note
that legislation was passed by Congress in late 1991 to eliminate "too
big to fail" operations by the FDIC beginning in 1994.56

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

GART, supra note 1, at 158.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 154-55.
GART, supra note I, at 159.
Id. at 155.
Id.
Id. at 156-57.
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In its attempt to make a profit, the bank may not be as concerned with
the risks it takes since the FDIC bears all of the risks of any bad investments. If deposit insurance is to remain in place, insured banks must be
forced back to their "traditional" role of accepting deposits and making
loans.
The goal of regulation is to force banks to protect the deposits of
individuals by requiring them to accumulate low-risk, marketable assets.
If this goal were accomplished, insured deposits and creations like the
National Depositor Preference provision would not be necessary to protect
deposits or to maintain people's confidence in the banking industry.
III. THE ROAD TO DEPOSITOR PREFERENCE

Throughout the modem era of banking in the United States, "[o]ne of
the objects of the national bank system [has been] to secure, in the event of58
insolvency, a just and equal distribution of the assets of national banks
among unsecured creditors, and to prevent such banks from creating
'
The National Bank
preferences in contemplation of their failure."59
6
Act's " policy in a bank liquidation is to achieve "equity of equality among
creditors."'" The rule against preferences was codified in the National
Bank Act at 12 U.S.C. §§ 91, 194.62

57. John A. Deangelis, Riches Do Not Last Forever: RealEstateInvestment by National
Banks, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 777, 785 (1991).
58. A national bank is a:
commercial bank whose charter is approved by the U.S. Comptroller of the
Currency rather than by a state banking department. National banks are required
to be members of the FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM and to purchase stock in the
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK in their district .... They must also belong to the
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION.
DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMS 269-70

(3d ed. 1991).

59. Mechanics Universal Joint Co. v. Culhane, 299 U.S. 51, 55 (1936).
60. "[The] National Banking Act of 1864 [c]reated Comptroller of Currency, which
provided for the granting of federal banking charters and examination and supervision of
national banks." GART, supra note 1, at 387.
61. Scott v. Armstrong, 146 U.S. 499, 511 (1892).
62. 12 U.S.C.S. §§ 91, 194 (Law. Co-op. 1984 & Supp. 1994); Mcorp & Mcorp Fin.,
Inc. v. Clarke, 755 F. Supp. 1402, 1407 n. I1 (N.D. Tex. 1991). If greater distributions are
made to some creditors over others, and there are insufficient assets in the receivership to
provide full payment to the intrabank creditors, the agreements are void as fraudulent
transfers under 12 U.S.C. § 191, and violate the ratable distribution requirements of 12
U.S.C. § 194. Senior UnsecuredCreditors' Comm., 749 F. Supp. at 774.
Section 91 prohibits the transfer of assets after the commission of an act of
insolvency made "with a view to the preference of one creditor to another."
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Historically, the courts have rejected the notion of depositor preference.63 The courts have interpreted the National Bank Act as not permitting depositor preference. It is only in the past several years that both state
and national banks have had depositor preferences in bank liquidations.
Accordingly, when the FDIC is involved in its capacity as receiver, the
National Bank Act must be read in conjunction with the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act.64
In Downriver Community Federal Credit Union v. Penn Square
Bank,65 the plaintiffs, certain uninsured depositors in the insolvent Penn
Square Bank, disputed the priority of the depositors' claims against the
insolvent bank's assets. The court reversed the district court's imposition
of a constructive trust upon Penn Square's assets in favor of the plaintiffdepositors, stating that "federal law limits these depositors' recovery to their
pro rata share of the assets held by the receiver. '66 Unsecured creditors of
a failed bank are entitled to only their pro rata share of liquidated bank
assets under the relevant provision of the National Bank Act.67
The district court imposed a constructive trust in favor of plaintiffs
because it applied state law, rather than federal law, in deciding the case.
Prior to the insolvency of a national bank, state law generally governs the
nature of the relationship between a national bank and its depositors.68
The creditor rights of a depositor of a national bank are determined by the
law of the state of the deposit, assuming there is no conflicting federal

Section 194 provides in part that "the comptroller shall make a ratable dividend
of the money so paid over to him by the receiver on all such claims as may have
been proved to his satisfaction or adjudicated in a court of competent jurisdiction." These statutory provisions were originally enacted in 1866 as part of the
NBA. Early decisions construing these laws arose in the context of bank
liquidations and characterized the purpose of the requirements as ensuring
equality of treatment among creditors in the distribution of assets of a failed
bank.
Id.; see, e.g., White v. Knox, 111 U.S. 784. 786 (1884); National Bank v. Colby, 88 U.S.
609, 613 (1874).
63. See, e.g., Downriver, 879 F.2d at 754 (holding that federal law limits a depositor's
recovery, in a bank liquidation, to a pro rata share of the assets held by the receiver).
64. FDIC v. McKnight, 769 F.2d 658, 662 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,475 U.S. 1010
(1986).
65. Downriver,879 F.2d. at 756 (including the FDIC, in its capacity as receiver of Penn
Square Bank, in this dispute).
66. Id.
67. Id. (citing 12 U.S.C. § 194 (1993)).
68. See Reno Nat'l Bank v. Seabom, 99 F.2d 482, 483 (9th Cir. 1938).
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statute. 9 However, the role that state law plays in determining the rights
of national banks is limited by the paramount authority of Congress to
regulate national banks."°
Since national banks are instrumentalities of the federal government,
it is federal law that ultimately determines the liquidation preferences of
unsecured creditors in a bank failure. In fact, any attempt by a state to
define or control the liquidation process of national banks and any other
FDIC insured banks is absolutely void.7" In addition, national banks are
under federal control in a bank liquidation and the liquidation of all other
FDIC insured banks is governed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, with
liquidation preferences specifically provided for by the depositor preference
provision."
Before the National Depositor Preference provision was enacted, the
distribution of an insolvent bank's assets was controlled, in the case of
national banks, by the National Bank Act.73 The most relevant provisions
of the Act were section 91, precluding payments by a bank that prefer some
creditors over others, and section 194, requiring a pro rata distribution of
assets among all general creditors entitled to share in the receivership
estate.74 All state laws inconsistent with the equal distribution scheme
among general creditors, established by the National Bank Act, were
preempted."
The National Bank Act was created to achieve, in case of a bank failure,
"a just and equal distribution of the assets of national banks among all
"This public aim in favor of all the citizens
,
unsecured creditors .
of every State of the Union is manifested by the entire context of the
'
There must be a ratable distribution of an insolvent
national bank act."77
bank's assets among all unsecured creditors, not a preference of some

69. Downriver, 879 F.2d at 758.
70. Id.

71. See id.
72. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
73. Downriver, 879 F.2d at 759.
74. Id.

75. Jennings v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 294 U.S. 216, 226 (1935).
76. Davis v. Elmira Say. Bank, 161 U.S. 275, 284 (1896); see also United States v.
Lemaire, 826 F.2d 387, 390 (5th Cir. 1987).
77. Davis, 161 U.S. at 284.
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creditors over others.78 The FDIC, therefore, in its capacity as receiver for
the insolvent bank, must treat all unsecured creditors equitably.7 9
Clearly, since the creation of the National Bank Act in 1864, the intent
of Congress has been to provide equal treatment to all unsecured creditors
in a bank liquidation."0 However, with the ever increasing number of bank
failures in the 1980s and early 1990s,"' the FDIC realized that treating all
unsecured creditors of a failed bank equally was becoming an increasingly
difficult endeavor. This is especially true now since most bank failures
today no longer result82in liquidation, as they did when the National Bank
Act was first enacted.
Most recent bank failures are resolved through purchase and assumption
agreements, rather than through the liquidation and distribution of the bank's
assets contemplated by the National Bank Act.83 A purchase and assump-

78. Hibernia Nat'l Bank v. FDIC, 733 F.2d 1403, 1407 (10th Cir. 1984).
79.
Unlike the FDIC, the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
("FSLIC") was never subject to the ratable distribution requirements of the NBA
[National Bank Act]. The FSLIC could, and indeed was obligated to,
discriminate among creditors in distributing receivership assets by following the
depositor preference statute set forth in federal regulations. FIRREA simply
codified this result [§ 1821(i)(2)] with respect to thrifts, and did no more than
preserve the status quo.
Senior Unsecured Creditors'Comm., 749 F. Supp. at 774 n.24.
80. See Mcorp, 755 F. Supp. at 1407.
81. Banking Failures:
DEPOSITS (Billions)
NUMBER
YEAR
44
1945-54
47
1955-64
60
1965-74
75
1975-81
9.9
42
1982
5.4
48
1983
2.9
79
1984
8.1
120
1985
6.5
138
1986
6.3
184
1987
24.9
200
1988
24.1
206
1989
14.8
169
1990
53.8
127
1991
N.A.
122
1992
GART, supra note 1, at 148.
82. Senior Unsecured Creditors'Comm., 749 F. Supp. at 775.
83. Id.
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tion agreement involves a solvent bank acquiring an insolvent bank. When
a solvent acquiring bank assumes the assets and liabilities of a failed bank,
with financial assistance from the FDIC, some, but not all of the failed
bank's liabilities are assumed."
Consequently, the assumed creditors
receive more on their claims than the unassumed creditors, thereby creating
an unequal distribution of a failed bank's assets to creditors.85 Thus, the
courts were left to determine "whether the assumption and full payment of
certain liabilities by an acquiring bank violates the rights vested by
[sections] 91 and 194 in creditors whose liabilities are not assumed. 86
Most courts held that the FDIC was required to provide creditors of a
failed bank with a ratable share of the banks assets, regardless of whether
the bank failure is resolved through a purchase and assumption transaction
or a liquidation.
However, some courts did recognize "considerable
force" in the FDIC's argument that purchase and assumption transactions
were not contemplated under the National Bank Act, and therefore, the
distribution requirements of sections 91 and 194 should be different for
these transactions.88 The FDIC argued that only the ratable distribution of
the liquidated value of the unassumed creditor's claim should be required
under sections 91 and 194.89 With the creation of the National Depositor
Preference provision, determining the applicability of sections 91 and 194
to purchase and assumption transactions became moot.
In 198690 and 1988, 9' the FDIC had bills introduced in the Senate
that would have created preference payments to depositors only for national
bank failures, but Congress did not pass either bill.92 The bills were
proposed because of the strain placed on the FDIC by the troubled banking
industry. In the absence of a depositor preference provision, general

84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 775.
87. See, e.g., FDIC v. United States Nat'l Bank, 685 F.2d 270, 273-77 (9th Cir. 1982)
(holding that a defrauded, subordinated note holder was entitled to receive a ratable
distribution from assets transferred in a purchase and assumption transaction); First Empire
Bank v. FDIC, 572 F.2d 1361, 1371 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that a purchase and assumption
agreement which provided 100% payment to assumed creditors but lesser payment to
unassumed creditors violated the provisions of sections 91 and 194).
88. Senior UnsecuredCreditors'Comm., 749 F. Supp. at 775-76.
89. Id. at 776.
90. S. 2592, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1 (1986).
91. S. 2715, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1 (1988).
92. Mcorp, 755 F. Supp. at 1419 n.36.
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creditors normally receive full payment of their claims since the majority of
bank failures are resolved by purchase and assumption agreements. 93
With the large number of bank failures that the FDIC handled, paying
everyone in full, rather than simply a pro rata share, became a burden that
the bank insurance fund was unable to bear. From 1986 through 1993, the
FDIC, through the deposit insurance fund, paid out approximately $31.93
billion for the resolution of failed banks. 94 It appears that during this same
period, if depositor preference had been in effect, the deposit insurance fund
would have actually grown because the assets of the failed banks, in most
instances, would have been adequate to cover the deposit liabilities of the
failed banks.95
The natural step for the FDIC to take, since Congress created the
agency for the protection of depositors and the integrity of the banking
system, was to prefer depositors in the distribution of a bank's assets, thus
granting much needed relief for the bank insurance fund. However, the
FDIC's inclination to give preference to depositors, in an attempt to protect
the deposit insurance fund against loss, is contrary to the congressional
intent of equitable and ratable payment of all general creditors.9 6 It
became apparent to both Congress and the FDIC that something needed to
change in order to relieve the burden placed on the deposit insurance fund
while at the same time insuring the integrity of the banking system.

93. Id. at 1419.
94. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT To CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES,
1992 BANK RESOLUTIONS-FDIC CHOSE METHODS DETERMINED LEAST COSTLY, BUTNEEDS

To IMPROVE PROCESS 2 (May 10, 1994).
95. Bank Failures:
TOTAL ASSETS (Billions)
NUMBER
YEAR
145
7.63
1986
9.23
203
1987
52.62
221
1988
29.40
1989
207
15.74
169
1990
63.40
1991
127
44.23
122
1992
4.06
42
1993
Id. at 10.
96. First Empire Bank, 572 F.2d at 1371.
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WHAT IS DEPOSITOR PREFERENCE?

The solution chosen by Congress on August 10, 1993 was a national
depositor preference scheme, which took effect on August 13, 1993. 9'
[A]mounts realized from the liquidation or other resolution of any
insured depository institution by any receiver.., shall be distributed to
pay claims (other than secured claims .. .) in the following order of

priority:
(i) Administrative expenses of the receiver.
(ii) Any deposit liability of the institution.
(iii) Any other general or senior liability of the institution ......
Depositor preference was included in the Omnibus Reconciliation Act
of 1993 "as a replacement for the administration's [unpopular] proposal to
raise additional [federal] revenues by charging state-chartered banks for

97. Banking, Depositor PreferenceProvisionsMay Have Impact on Foreign Creditors,

DAILY REP. FOR ExEcuTIvEs, Sept. 10, 1993, at 174.
98. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)( 1)(A) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
(11) Depositor preference
(A) In general
Subject to section 1815(e)(2)(C) of this title, amounts realized from the
liquidation or other resolution of any insured depository institution by any
receiver appointed for such institution shall be distributed to pay claims (other
than secured claims to the extent of any such security) in the following order of
priority:
(i) Administrative expenses of the receiver.
(ii) Any deposit liability of the institution.
(iii) Any other general or senior liability of the institution (which is not a
liability described in clause (iv) or (v)).
(iv) Any obligation subordinated to depositors or general creditors (which is
not an obligation described in clause (v)).
(v) Any obligation to shareholders or members arising as a result of their status
as shareholders or members (including any depository institution holding
company or any shareholder or creditor of such company).
(B) Effect on State law
(i)
In general
The provisions of subparagraph (A) shall not supersede the law of any State
except to the extent such law is inconsistent with the provisions of such
subparagraph, and then only to the extent of the inconsistency.
Id.§ 1821(d)(1 l)(A)-(B)(i).
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examinations conducted by the FDIC." 99 The Conference of State Banking
Supervisors ("Banking Supervisors") proposed depositor preference as an
alternative to increased examination fees which would have caused fees for
state-chartered banks to increase by one billion dollars over a four year period.' O The Banking Supervisors estimate that a national depositor preference scheme "could save $300 million in the first year, and $1.6 billion over
five years . . ,,"0' This surpasses the Clinton administration's goal of
raising $1.37 billion over five years, through increased fees, beginning in
1994. ' 02 By choosing a national depositor preference scheme instead of
increasing examination fees, Congress accomplished its intended goal of
decreasing the losses to the Bank Insurance Fund and increasing revenues.
Moreover, it accomplished these goals without placing the burden on already
troubled state-chartered banks. "[T]he exam fee proposal could have cost
over $2 billion in potential loans [in the first year] ... because every dollar
in capital can support $10 in new loans."'0 3
Depositor preference amends the Federal Deposit Insurance Act and
gives domestic depositors a liquidation preference over all other claims,
except secured claims and administrative expenses of receivers.0 4
Consequently, in most cases, the FDIC will be fully reimbursed for its
payout to depositors, and unsecured creditors of the bank will receive little
or no money. Prior to the enactment of this bill, the FDIC paid depositors
on a pro rata basis with all other unsecured creditors.0 5 Since depositor
preference gives both insured and uninsured depositors an advantage in a
bank liquidation, the FDIC will realize tremendous savings because it is
subrogated to the claims of the depositors it has indemnified.0 6 The
FDIC will be able to recoup most of the money it pays out to depositors
before the first unsecured creditor receives anything. It is estimated that
giving depositors preference will save the insurance fund approximately $.9

99. Banking, DepositorPreferenceProvision May Pose Some GreaterRisks, Banking
Experts Warn, DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES, Sept. 21, 1993, at 181 [hereinafter Banking,
Depositor Preference].
100. Bill Atkinson, States Push Alternatives to Hitting Their Banks with Higher Fees,
AMERICAN BANKER, Mar. 30, 1993, at 7.
101. Id.
102. Banks Hope Fed Heard Cue When House Rejected Exam Fees, 5 THOMSON'S
INTERNATIONAL BANKING REGULATOR, May 17, 1993, at 3.
103. Senate Committees Approve Banking Plan for Reconciliation, Delay Direct
Lending, BNA WASH. INSIDER, June 10, 1993, at 105.
104. H.R. REP. No. 111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1993).
105. Id.
106. Id.
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billion over the 1994-1998107 period.'0 8 However, the increased risk to
unsecured creditors will have a profoundly negative effect on both the
banking industry and unsecured creditors.
Depositor preference applies to both insured and uninsured depositors
and shifts the burden of paying off depositors from the FDIC to the failed
bank. By shifting the risks associated with a bank's investments to the
banks themselves rather than to the FDIC, the moral hazard associated with
depositor insurance is virtually eliminated. This will cause banks to more
carefully choose and monitor investments, thereby reducing the risks that
lead to failure.
Historically, all creditors of a failed bank were generally able to
recover seventy percent to eighty-five percent of the debts owed to them by
the bank. 9 All creditors, other than secured creditors, shared equally in
any loss when the bank's liquidated assets were insufficient to pay its liabilities." O Depositor preference has changed this equality, giving both
depositors and the FDIC an advantage over all other unsecured creditors of
a failed bank.
V. EFFECT OF DEPOSITOR PREFERENCE ON
UNSECURED CREDITORS
Prior to the enactment of the depositor preference statute, senior
obligations, such as letters of credit,"' were treated the same as uninsured
deposits in a bank liquidation. Now, unsecured creditors of a bank, in order
to protect themselves from risk, will be forced to either tum to other
financial institutions for investment and business transactions, or will assume
the risk of dealing with a bank only on a collateralized basis." 2 Since
there may only be enough assets to satisfy the claims of secured creditors
and depositors, unsecured creditors risk losing everything if a bank fails.

107. See id.
108. Senate Banking Committee Approves House Budget ReconciliationPackage, 60
BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS BANKING REP., June 14, 1993, § 24, at 872.
109. John L. Douglas, DepositorPreferenceMay Harm Banks, THE NAT'L L.J., Aug.
23, 1993, at 19.
110. Id.
111. A letter of credit is a "credit instrument issued by a bank guaranteeing payments
on behalf of its customer to a BENEFICIARY, normally to a third party... for a stated
period of time and when certain conditions are met." DICTIONARY OF BANKING TERMs 34
(2d ed. 1993).
112. Ely, supra note 12, at 24.
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Thus, depositor preference exposes unsecured creditors to risk that may be
too great to bear.
For example, if a bank has liabilities totaling ten dollars and assets of
nine dollars, the bank is insolvent and is considered a failed bank. If nine
dollars of the bank's liabilities are deposits, depositors will receive nine
dollars, while other unsecured creditors receive nothing. Before the creation
of national depositor preference, the failed bank's assets would have been
distributed on a pro rata basis. A pro rata distribution of the failed bank's
assets would have resulted in all unsecured creditors receiving ninety cents
on the dollar. The FDIC would have received eight dollars and ten cents,
after paying out nine dollars to insured depositors (assuming all the
depositors of the bank were insured), and the other unsecured creditors of
the failed bank would have received ninety cents.
Adding uninsured depositors and secured creditors to the equation,
under a pro rata distribution scheme, simply decreases the amount recovered
by the FDIC and unsecured creditors. However, under the current depositor
preference scheme, this virtually guarantees that there will be nothing left
for unsecured creditors when a bank failure is resolved. Unsecured creditors
have no choice but to react defensively to the new threat posed by depositor
preference.
"Unsecured bank borrowings, such as uninsured bank notes, may begin
to include 'acceleration clauses' that will [enable] the [creditor to] pull its
money out of the bank before [the institution enters receivership].""' 3
Additionally, foreign depositors and unsecured creditors can: 1) "require
collateral, to the extent legally allowed, to secure their extensions of credit;
[2] shorten the maturity of their deposits or obligations[;] or [3] insert put
options" 4 that can be exercised when a bank's credit rating is downgraded
by a rating agency....
The negative impact that the depositor preference provision will have
on unsecured creditors of banks will greatly affect the banking industry.
Unsecured creditors of a bank will be wiped out before the FDIC and

113. Id. at 25.
114. A put option is:
[a) contract giving the holder the right, but not the obligation, to sell a security
or financial instrument for a specified period of time at a specific price, called
the EXERCISE PRICE OR STRIKE PRICE. Puts are bought by investors who believe
the price of the underlying securities will go down, and they will be able to sell
the securities as a higher striking price. The opposite is a CALL OPTION.
DICTIONARY OF BANKING TERMS 487 (2d ed.o1993) (emphasis omitted).
115. Banking, Depositor Preference, supra note 99, at 181.
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uninsured domestic depositors suffer any loss. 116 The most likely unsecured creditors of a bank are holders of banker's acceptances," 7 federal
funds"' sellers, unsecured lenders, landlords, and counterparties in
swaps,1 9 options,12 and futures"' transactions. 22 In addition, banks
are commercial enterprises that "acquire products, contract for services and
deal with other financial institutions and their customers.' 23 Commercial
relationships cause a bank to "contract for various services and lease...
equipment ... assume a number of contractual liabilities to employees..
[and] enter into long-term contracts to perform certain services...., 2 4
All of these unsecured creditors face the increased risk placed upon them by
the depositor preference scheme.
Foreign depositors are at great risk under depositor preference because
the "FDIC [has] take[n] the position that foreign deposits payable only in
overseas branches are not deposits for purposes of the depositor preference
provisions., 125 Foreign depositors that fall into this category are lumped
together with unsecured creditors and stand to lose all of their money when
a bank fails, and its assets are liquidated. For this reason, foreign depositors
must take the same precautions as other unsecured creditors of a bank.

116. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(11) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
117. A banker's acceptance is a "time draft drawn on and accepted by a bank ....With
the credit strength of a bank behind it, the banker's acceptance usually qualifies as a MONEY
MARKET instrument. The liability assumed by the bank is called its acceptance liability."
DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMs 3 (3d ed. 1991).
118. Federal funds are "funds deposited by commercial banks at Federal Reserve Banks
....Banks may lend federal funds to each other on an overnight basis... [and] may also
transfer funds among themselves or on behalf of customers on a same-day basis by debiting
and crediting balances in the various reserve banks." Id. at 139-40.
119. A swap is the "exchange [of] one security for another." Id. at 451.
120. An option is a "right to buy or sell property that is granted in exchange for an
agreed-upon sum. If the right is not exercised after a specified period, the option expires and
the option buyer forfeits the money." Id. at 297.
121. Futures contracts are contracts involving an:
agreement to buy or sell a specific amount of a commodity or financial
instrument at a particular price on a stipulated future date. The price is
established between buyer and seller on the floor of a commodity exchange..
. [T]he contract [may be] sold to another before settlement date, which may
happen if a trader [wants] to take a profit or cut a loss.
Id. at 168.
122. Ely, supra note 12.
123. Douglas, supra note 109, at 23.
124. Id.
125. Banking, DepositorPreferenceProvisionsMay Have Impact on Foreign Creditors,
DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES, Sept. 10, 1993, at 174.
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The larger, "too big to fail" banks are now much more attractive to
both foreign depositors and general creditors. Consequently, there may be
a shift of funds away from smaller banks. This potential shift in assets may
cause an increased number of smaller banks to fail over the next several
years, causing an adverse effect on small business, since smaller banks tend
to cater to individual and small business financing. The potential repercussions of the depositor preference provision were ignored by Congress when
it enacted the new budget bill.
Depositor preference will force foreign depositors, federal funds sellers,
and other creditors to extend credit to a bank only if they can protect
themselves from the risk of loss associated with a bank failure. 2 6 They
can demand that any credit extended be fully secured, thus placing them
ahead of depositors in a liquidation, or they could include acceleration
clauses 127 in all of their loan documents. 121 If acceleration clauses are
widely used, as soon as there is even a rumor that a bank is in trouble,
unsecured creditors will demand and receive the balance of any outstanding
debt owed to them by the bank. Consequently, depositors may follow the
lead of the more informed unsecured creditors, possibly resulting in a run
on the bank and another bank failure.
VI. EFFECT ON THE BANKING INDUSTRY

The public's interest lies in secure deposits. 29 Having banks FDIC
insured and regulated is perceived as a key element of maintaining deposit
security. The introduction of the National Depositor Preference statute virtually guaranteed depositors that all of their deposits would be returned in
case of a bank failure. The tradeoff for depositor security, however, is the
30
increased risk of all other unsecured creditors of insured banks.
The long-term repercussions of depositor preference on the banking
industry are still unclear. "Because the [depositor preference] provision was

126. Banking, Depositor Preference,supra note 99, at 181.
127. An acceleration clause is a "provision, normally present in an INDENTURE
agreement, mortgage, or other contract, that the unpaid balance is to become due and payable
if specified events of default should occur. Such events include failure to meet interest,
principle, or sinking fund payments; insolvency ...... DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND
INVESTMENT TERMS 2-3 (3d ed. 1991).
128. Ely, supra note 12, at 24.
129. Deangelis, supra note 57, at 777.
130. "The term 'insured bank' means any bank (including a foreign bank having an
insured branch) the deposits of which are insured in accordance with the provisions of this
Act .... 12 U.S.C. § 1813(h) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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a small amendment in a very large and complex non-banking act, it received
. . . little . . . attention" from either Congress or the general public.'
Unsecured creditors will take protective actions, as discussed in part five, as
a result of their increased risk. These protective measures will affect the
risk position of the FDIC as insurer. The FDIC could possibly respond by:
redesign[ing] its calculation of deposit insurance premiums, to take
[into] account ... the amount of senior and junior claims as newly
defined [under the depositor preference provision]; redesign[ing] its
calculation of capital and capital requirements, for the same reasons;
interven[ing] or clos[ing] banks more quickly, because of the greater
likelihood of runs [on banks by federal funds] sellers or foreign depositor[s]; or ... [delaying the closing of banks] because of the greater
degree of insolvency necessary to inflict a loss on the insurance
32
fund.
Additionally, banks will seek to restructure their contractual arrangements and organizations in order to reduce deposit insurance premiums that
are greater than the risk to the insurance fund. 33 An individual bank, for
example, could decrease the amount of federal funds and foreign deposits,
thereby balancing the risk posed to the insurance fund and the insurance
premiums charged by the FDIC. However, uninsured depositors may react
to this restructuring by shifting their deposits to banks that have a greater
proportion of foreign deposits and federal funds, since these banks are
perceived as being safer for uninsured depositors in case of a failure.' 34
Specifically, when a bank fails, uninsured depositors will be made whole
before any unsecured creditors. Therefore, it is beneficial for uninsured
depositors to bank where there is a large proportion of unsecured creditors.
If uninsured creditors, banks, and the FDIC take reactive measures other, as
35
yet undetermined, consequences may occur.
VII. CONCLUSION
The National Depositor Preference provision of the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1993 was intended, by the Committee on the Budget,
to be one part of an intricate plan to reduce the federal deficit and to raise

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Banking, DepositorPreference,supra note 99, at 181.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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revenues."' Additionally, depositor preference was intended to save the
insurance fund and taxpayers a great deal of money. "Only when all
depositors have recovered 100 percent of losses [will] general creditors
recover anything. Thus, we expect that receipts to the federal deposit
insurance funds from asset sales [will] be higher, and insurance losses [will]
be lower""' than under previous laws that divided the assets of a failed
bank on a pro rata basis.
Since the enactment of the depositor preference statute, on August 10,38
1993, the banking industry is healthier than it has been in thirteen years.'
"[J]ust [thirteen] BIF-insured institutions, with $1.6 billion in assets, failed
[in 1994]."'"9 In comparison, twenty-three banks were closed in the first
half of 1993.140 Further, the bank insurance fund is up to $19.4 billion,
which is an all-time record. 14 ' Banks were earning record-high profits in
1994, with the number of problem banks "down to 383 with $53 billion in
assets, compared with 981 with $535 billion in assets two years ago.' 42
The banking industry is realizing an economic boom. One of the
consequences of this, however, is that the depositor preference provision has
had no impact on banks, the FDIC, or unsecured creditors. Because it has
received very little attention, the negative impact that this provision will
have on all parties concerned, once the rate of bank failures increases, will
be immediate and dangerous. Unsecured creditors will shift to the larger
"too big to fail" banks to insure the security of their money, and uninsured
depositors will seek banks that have a proportionally large number of
unsecured creditors to better guarantee a one hundred percent return on their
deposits in case of a bank failure. This shift may create instability in the
banking industry and cause even more banks to fail. Clearly, in an attempt
to raise revenues in the short term, Congress has ignored the potentially
devastating consequences of the depositor preference provisions.
David J. Ratway
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